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А. Б. Тугаров, Т. И. Лавренова

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Р е ц е н з е н т ы :
доктор философских наук, заведующий кафедрой педагогики и психологии
Пензенского государственного университета
М. А. Лыгина;
кандидат философских наук, доцент кафедры
Церковной истории и философии Пензенской духовной семинарии
М. А. Антипов

Тугаров, Александр Борисович.

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Содержатся лекции по основным темам учебной дисциплины «Философия», вопросы для самоконтроля, список основной и дополнительной литературы, перечень интернет-ресурсов для самостоятельной работы студентов.

Издание подготовлено на кафедре «Теория и практика социальной работы» ПГУ и предназначено для иностранных обучающихся по специальностям 31.05.01 «Лечебное дело», 31.05.03 «Стоматология», 33.05.01 «Фармация» по образовательным программам с использованием языка-посредника (английский язык).

It includes lectures on the main topics of the discipline “Philosophy”, questions for self-control, a list of basic and additional literature, a list of Internet resources for independent work of students.

The textbook was prepared at the Department of “Theory and Practice of social work” PSU and intended for foreign students of specialties 31.05.01 “Medical business”, 31.05.03 “Dentistry”, 33.05.01 “Pharmacy”, studying under educational programs using an intermediary language (English).

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Introduction

"*Philosophy*" is one of the basic disciplines for courses 31.05.01 General Medicine, 31.05.03 Dentistry, 33.05.01 Pharmasy. In accordance with the Federal State Educational Standards of Higher Education in these study fields the process of studying the discipline is aimed at forming the following competency: "*to be able to perform critical analysis of problems on the basis of systems approach, to develop an action strategy* ".

Thus one of the main goals of this textbook is to form students' ability of theoretical scientific and philosophical analysis. It may be achieved through several concrete skills:

1. to analyze the problem as a system, seeing its components and connections between them;
2. to identify gaps in the information necessary for solving the problem and to design processes to bridge them;
3. to evaluate critically information sources reliability, works with inconsistent information from various sources;
4. to work out and give reasons for the strategy of solving the problem on the basis of systems and interdisciplinary approach;
5. to build scenarios for implementing the strategy, identifying possible risks and proposing ways to address them.

Content of discipline helps to solve the task through philosophical knowledge, which seeks to create the holistic picture of the world and methodology of its cognition.

According to *Immanuel Kant* philosophy undertakes both to determine the limits of people knowledge, and at the same time to provide a foundation of scientific knowledge of nature, society, and human. Philosophy attempts to do this by examining our human faculties of knowledge.

Scientific and philosophical knowledge of world is not merely knowledge of what in fact happens in nature, society, culture, and history but knowledge of the causal laws of the Universe, natural and social worlds according to which what in fact happens must happen.

Philosophy represents the most serious attempt to understand the world in such a way that the conceptions of nature and society, and the conception of ourselves (as morally free, as having dignity, as perfectible, et cetera) fit together in a single system.

The authors tried to present in a simple and accessible form the basic philosophical categories, most important philosophical traditions, modern philosophical thought, and main spheres of philosophical knowledge.

Students are recommended to use the list of literature, as well as to select material on the Internet. The using of Internet sites is allowed with the indication of the address, the author of the publication, the title of the article or book. In a message or report, it is necessary to focus on the analysis of conceptual approaches, the strength and weakness of various positions, the causes of different points of view.

Independent work of students presupposes the ability to classify and critically analyze the information. Initially, the material is divided into theoretical, analytical, and factual.

The theoretical material can be attributed to the one in which the basic concepts and provisions are designated and analyzed, the history of theoretical research on the topic is presented. The analytical material reflects the variety of conceptual approaches and assessments presented in scientific, popular science and socio-political literature. Analytics concerns a certain problem situation, a social problem or a group of social problems, contains considerations about the causes and prospects for the development of the situation, the possibilities of its correction.

The theory is not described in detail in the analytical materials; a brief indication of the theoretical and methodological approaches may be contained. Factual material – statistical data and media information – should be used in the work with mandatory references to the source.

In the textbook students can find and use material for comparing different points of view and approaches expressed in philosophical ideas. It may help them to see philosophical meaning of life, social and personal questions and problems.

This makes it possible to hope that this publication will be convenient for students not only to learn the course but will make it easier to navigate in a complex social world full of problems, make responsible decisions, and plan their actions.

Theme 1
Philosophy as a kind of knowledge

The questions

1. Philosophy as a form of perception and explanation of world.
2. Philosophical questions and issue-area of philosophy. Philosophy's structure.
3. Subject and method, purpose and functions of philosophy.

There are three kinds of knowledge about the world: 1. scientific, 2. nonscientific or unscientific, 3. extra-scientific.

Nonscientific / unscientific knowledge has a religious and spiritual character.

Extra-scientific knowledge consists of an everyday (casual) knowledge, a philosophical knowledge, and knowledge of arts.

Why philosophy is not a science? Philosophy is a form of world view (world outlook, ideology). There are three historical forms of world view: mythology, religion, and philosophy. Science is based on facts and is divided on a theoretical and an empirical knowledge. Scientific fact is a unit of knowledge.

Philosophy is a universal knowledge about nature, society and thinking. Science, when it's discussed about nature and humanities when it's spoken about society, culture or history of people and society is a kind of concrete knowledge.

What Is a Philosophy? Literally it means "love of wisdom". But, really, philosophy begins in wonder. Thus taught most of the major figures of ancient philosophy. And it ends in wonder too, when philosophical taught has done its best. So, what characterizes philosophical wonder? How to achieve it? How to approach reading and writing philosophy, and why studying it?

Philosophy as an Answer. To some, philosophy's goal is a systematic worldview. You are a philosopher when you can find a place to any fact, in heaven or earth. Philosophers have indeed provided systematic theories of history, justice, the State, the natural world, knowledge, love, friendship. Engaging in philosophical thinking is, under this perspective, like putting in order a room to receive a guest: anything should find a place and, possibly, a reason for being where it is.

Philosophical Principles. Systematic philosophers have key principles around which to structure a worldview. Hegel, for instance, was well known

for his three-steps dialectic: thesis-antithesis-synthesis. Some principles are specific to a branch:

The *Principle of Sufficient Reason*: “Everything must have a reason” – which is specific to metaphysics.

A controversial principle in ethics is the *Principle of Utility*: “The right thing to do is the one that produces the greatest amount of good”.

Theory of knowledge centers around the *Epistemic Closure Principle*: “If a person knows that ***A***, and ***A*** entails ***B***, then that person knows that ***B*** as well”.

Philosophy as an Attitude. The meaning of philosophy lies not in the answers, but in the questions. Philosophical wonder is a methodology. It does not matter which topic comes under discussion and what we make of it; philosophy is about the stance we take towards it. Philosophy is that attitude which brings you to question even what’s most obvious:

Why are there spots on the surface of the moon? What creates a tide? What is the difference between a living and a non-living object?

Once upon a time, these were philosophical questions, and the wonder from which they emerged was a philosophical wonder.

What Does It Take to Be a Philosopher? Nowadays most philosophers are found in the academic world. But, certainly, one does not have to be a professor in order to be a philosopher. Several key figures in the history of philosophy did something else for a living. *Benedict Spinoza* was an optician; *Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz* worked – among other things – as a diplomatic; *David Hume’s* main employment was as an historian. Thus, whether you have a systematic worldview or the right attitude, you may aspire to be called “philosopher”.

The Queen of Sciences? Classic systematic philosophers – such as *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *Rene Descartes (Cartesius)*, *Georg Hegel* – boldly affirmed that philosophy grounds all other sciences. Also, among those who see philosophy as a method, you find many who regard it as the chief source of knowledge.

Is philosophy really the queen of sciences? There was a time in which philosophy vested the role of the queen of sciences. Nowadays, however, it may sound exaggerated to regard it as such. More modestly, philosophy may seem to provide valuable resources for thinking about fundamental questions. This is reflected, for instance, in the growing popularity of philosophical counseling.

The method of philosophy. The central rule to be observed for the profitable *study* of philosophy is: Use your own judgment and reason.

1. Eagerness to Know.

a) The main cause that prompts persons to philosophize is wonder or admiration. The mind wonders as long as a given fact has not been given an explanation and assigned adequate causes. The mind endeavors to discover causes and principles so as to account for experience.

b) An essential quality of the mind is to question and investigate, and never to feel at rest so long as a satisfactory explanation has not been found. The mind must compare facts, gather solutions, discuss, criticize, and harmonize them.

2. Personal Reflection.

a) Philosophy or a study of philosophy must be a personal work of understanding, not the mere memorizing of the words of books. It is a serious defect for the mind to remain inactive and to take for granted everything that is said without understanding the truth of it.

In philosophy it is always necessary first to understand and verify the truth of a statement. Never try to memorize anything which is not understood thoroughly. Philosophy must be the mind's own philosophy; not in the sense that the mind has discovered all the truths which it possesses, but in the sense that it has appropriated them and thought them for itself.

b) Habits of reflection must be acquired. Person must act for himself. This is not a book of ready made formulas, but rather a book of suggestions for the student's thought.

c) The study of philosophy should make man cautious in affirming and denying, in approving and condemning the opinions of others.

Division of philosophy. There is a classification of philosophical knowledge: classical philosophy, non-classical philosophy, post-non-classical philosophy, modernistic philosophy.

Classical philosophy has the following distinctive characteristics:

1. Classical philosophy is a system of knowledge, which consists of, at least, ontology (a theory of existence, being), gnoceology or epistemology (a theory of cognition), and ethics (social philosophy), etc.

2. Classical philosophy has a system of notions, conceptions. Basic conceptions or categories are matter, conscious, mind, motion, space, time, etc.

3. A history of philosophical excursion or excursion into the history of philosophy.

Which branches for philosophy? It's a question about the structure of philosophical knowledge. The deep relationship that philosophy bears to other sciences is clear by taking a look at its branches. Philosophy has some core areas: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic.

To these should be added an indefinite amount of branches. Some that are more standard: political philosophy, social philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science, philosophy of culture, philosophical anthropology.

Others that are specific: philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of medicine, philosophy of education, philosophy of art, philosophy of economics, legal philosophy, environmental philosophy, philosophy of technology.

The specialization of contemporary intellectual scientific research has affected the philosophy too.

The Various Branches of Philosophy:

a) Since the extension of the field of philosophy has varied so much in history, and since even today not all philosophers are agreed on this point, it is impossible to give a division of philosophy into its various branches that will be acceptable to all and that may claim to be finally and forever settled.

Not long ago logic, psychology and ethics had still an undisputed place in philosophy. Today many look upon them as independent sciences and only some of their higher problems are turned over to philosophy.

b) Philosophy comes after the study of physical sciences; hence the name "metaphysics" (literally after-physics), which is frequently given to philosophy or to a branch of it.

One more variant of the structure of philosophical knowledge:

1. The philosophical study of realities, i.e. of existing objects, includes: cosmology, or the general study of the world; biology, or the more special study of living organisms; psychology, or the still more special study of the human mind; theology, or the study of God as the first cause of the world.

2. Besides the real we have to consider: the ideal, i.e. the rules to which thought must conform in order to be consistent (logic); the expression of ideals to realize something beautiful (aesthetics); the guidance of our actions in conformity with the rules of morality (ethics).

3. Epistemology holds an intermediate place between the science (knowledge) of the real and that of the ideal. It examines whether and how far our ideas correspond to external reality.

The following summary

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="8">Philosophical study of the</td><td rowspan="4">real</td><td>world = cosmology</td></tr>
<tr><td>man = psychology and philosophy of the mind</td></tr>
<tr><td>God = theology</td></tr>
<tr><td>being in general = ontology</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">relations of knowledge with reality = epistemology</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">ideal</td><td>of thought = logic</td></tr>
<tr><td>of expression = aesthetics</td></tr>
<tr><td>of action = ethics</td></tr>
</table>

A part of philosophical knowledge is the knowledge of the history of philosophy. In the process of evolution of philosophical knowledge, the following periods and stages can be distinguished:

1. Ancient (antique) philosophy – a philosophy of Ancient Babylon, China, India, Egypt, Iran, and Greece.
2. Medieval philosophy.
3. Renaissance philosophy.
4. New Time (Modern) philosophy.
5. Enlightenment philosophy.
6. German classical philosophy; Marxist philosophy.
7. Russian idealist philosophy.
8. Contemporary (Modernist) philosophy.

The basis for this understanding of knowledge about the history of philosophy is the Cartesian idea of "*philosophical circles*".

Theme 2
The History of Philosophy

2.1. Philosophy in Antiquity: Greece

The questions

1. Pre-Socratic philosophy: general characteristics.
2. The classic philosophers in Ancient Greece: Socrates and Plato.
3. The classic philosophers in Ancient Greece: Aristotle.

The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century B.C.E. Greek thinkers who introduced a new way of inquiring into the world and the place of human beings in it. They were recognized in antiquity as the first philosophers and scientists of the Western tradition.

Who Were the Presocratic Philosophers? “Presocratic”, if taken strictly as a chronological term, is not quite accurate, for the last of them were contemporaneous with Socrates and even Plato.

That is almost certainly not how they could have described themselves. While it is true that *Heraclitus* says that “those who are lovers of wisdom must be inquirers into many things”, the word he uses, *philosophos*, does not have the special sense that it acquires in the works of Plato and Aristotle, when the philosopher is contrasted with both the ordinary person and other experts, including the sophist (particularly in Plato), or in the resulting modern sense in which we can distinguish philosophy from physics or psychology.

As the fragment from *Heraclitus* shows, the early Greek philosophers thought of themselves as inquirers into many things, and the range of their inquiry was vast. They had views about the nature of the world, and these views encompass what we today call physics, chemistry, geology, meteorology, astronomy, embryology, and psychology (and other areas of natural inquiry), as well as theology, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

In the earliest of the Presocratics, *the Milesians*, it can indeed be difficult to discern the strictly philosophical aspects of the views.

The questions that the early Greek philosophers asked, the sorts of answers that they gave, and the views that they had of their own inquiries were the foundation for the development of philosophy. Perhaps the fundamental characteristic is the commitment to explain the world in terms of its own inherent principles.

By contrast, consider the 7th century B.C.E. poem of *Hesiod*, his *Theogony* ("*Genealogy of the gods*"). Hesiod tells the traditional story of the Olympian gods, beginning with Chaos, a vague divine primordial entity or condition. From Chaos, a sequence of gods is generated, often by sexual congress, but sometimes no particular cause is given. Each divine figure that arises is connected with a part of the physical universe, so his theogony is also a cosmogony (an account of the generation of the world).

Hesiod's world is one that is god-saturated, where the gods may intervene in all aspects of the world, from the weather to mundane particulars of human life, reaching into the ordinary world order from outside, in a way that humans must accept but cannot ultimately understand.

The Presocratics reject this account, instead seeing the world as a *kosmos***,** an ordered natural arrangement that is inherently intelligible and not subject to supra-natural intervention. A striking example is *Xenophanes*: "And she whom they call Iris, this too is by nature cloud / purple, red, and greeny yellow to behold". Iris, the rainbow, traditional messenger of the gods, is after all, not supra-natural, not a sign from the gods on Olympus who are outside of and immune from the usual world order; rather it is, in its essence, colored cloud.

Calling *the Presocratics philosophers* also suggests that they share a certain outlook with one another; an outlook that can be contrasted with that of other early Greek writers. Although scholars disagree about the extent of the divergence between the early Greek philosophers and their non-philosophical predecessors and contemporaries, it seems evident that Presocratic thought exhibits a significant difference not only in its understanding of the nature of the world, but also in its view of the sort of explanation of it.

This is evident in *Heraclitus*. Although Heraclitus asserts that those who love wisdom must be inquirers into many things, inquiry alone is not sufficient. He rebukes four of his predecessors: "Much learning does not teach understanding; else it would have taught Hesiod and *Pythagoras*, and again *Xenophanes* and Hecataeus".

Heraclitus' implicit contrast is with himself; he suggests that he alone truly understands all things, because he grasps the account that enables him to "*distinguish each thing in accordance with its nature*" and say how it is. For Heraclitus there is an underlying principle that unites and explains everything. It is this that others have failed to see and understand.

The classic philosophers in Ancient Greece.

Plato is one of the world's best known and most widely read and studied philosophers. He was the student of *Socrates* and the teacher of *Aristotle*, and he wrote in the middle of the fourth century B.C.E. Though influenced

primarily by Socrates, to the extent that Socrates is usually the main character in many of Plato's writings, he was also influenced by *Heraclitus*, *Parmenides*, and *the Pythagoreans*.

His earliest works are generally regarded as the most reliable of the ancient sources on Socrates, and the character *Socrates* that we know through these writings is considered to be one of the greatest of the ancient philosophers.

In the dialogues generally accepted as early (or "*Socratic*"), the main character is always Socrates. Socrates is represented as extremely agile in question-and-answer, which has come to be known as "the Socratic method of teaching", or "the elenchus" (or *elenchos*, from the Greek term for *refutation*), with Socrates nearly always playing the role as questioner, for he claimed to have no wisdom of his own to share with others.

Plato's Socrates, in this period, was adept at reducing even the most difficult and recalcitrant interlocutors to confusion and self-contradiction. In the *Apology,* Socrates explains that *the embarrassment* he has thus caused to so many of his contemporaries is the result of a Delphic oracle given to Socrates' friend Chaerephon, according to which no one was wiser than Socrates. Plato's early dialogues provide intriguing arguments and refutations of proposed philosophical positions that interest and challenge philosophical readers.

The philosophical positions can be found directly endorsed or at least suggested in the early or "Socratic" dialogues include the following moral or ethical views:

1. A rejection of retaliation, or the return of harm for harm or evil for evil (*Crito*; *Republic*). 2. The claim that doing injustice harms one's soul, the thing that is most precious to one, and, hence, that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it (*Crito*; *Gorgias*; *Republic*). 3. Some form of what is called "*eudaimonism*", that is, that goodness is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to human happiness, well-being, or flourishing, which may also be understood as "living well", or "doing well" (*Crito*; *Euthydemus*; *Republic*). 4. The view that only virtue is good just by itself; anything else that is good is good only insofar as it serves or is used for or by virtue (*Apology*; *Euthydemus*). 5. The view that there is some kind of unity among the virtues: In some sense, all of the virtues are the same (*Protagoras*). 6. The view that the citizen who has agreed to live in a state must always obey the laws of that state, or else persuade the state to change its laws, or leave the state (*Crito*).

Methodological and epistemological positions in the Early Dialogues. In addition, Plato's Socrates in the early dialogues may plausibly be regarded as having certain methodological or epistemological convictions,

including definitional knowledge of ethical terms is at least a necessary condition of reliable judging of specific instances of the values they name (*Euthyphro*; *Laches*; *Lysis*; *Greater Hippias*; *Meno*; *Republic*).

Plato's middle to later works, including his most famous work, the *Republic*, are generally regarded as providing Plato's own philosophy, where the main character in effect speaks for Plato himself. These works blend ethics, political philosophy, moral psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics into an interconnected and systematic philosophy. It is most of all from Plato that we get the theory of Forms, according to which the world we know through the senses is only an imitation of the pure, eternal, and unchanging world of the Forms.

The theory of forms in the Middle Dialogues. In many of his dialogues, Plato mentions supra-sensible entities he calls "*Forms*" (or "*Ideas*"). So, for example, in the *Phaedo,* we are told that particular sensible equal things – for example, equal sticks or stones (see *Phaedo*) – are equal because of their "*participation*" or "*sharing*" in the character of *the Form of Equality*, which is absolutely, changelessly, perfectly, and essentially equal.

Plato sometimes characterizes this participation in the Form as a kind of imaging, or approximation of the Form. The same may be said of the many things that are greater or smaller and the Forms of Great and Small (*Phaedo*), or the many tall things and the Form of Tall (*Phaedo*), or the many beautiful things and the Form of Beauty (*Phaedo*; *Symposium*; *Republic*).

When Plato writes about instances of Forms "*approximating*" Forms, it is easy to infer that, for Plato, Forms are exemplars. If so, Plato believes that The Form of Beauty is perfect beauty, the Form of Justice is perfect justice, and so forth. Conceiving of Forms in this way was important to Plato because it enabled the philosopher who grasps the entities to be best able to judge to what extent sensible instances of the Forms are good examples of the Forms they approximate.

He has come to believe that for any set of things that shares some property, there is a Form that gives unity to the set of things (and univocity to the term by which we refer to members of that set of things). Knowledge involves the recognition of the Forms (*Republic*), and any reliable application of this knowledge will involve the ability compare the particular sensible instantiations of a property to the Form.

Immortality and reincarnation. In the early transitional dialogue, the *Meno,* Plato has Socrates introduce the Pythagorean idea that souls are immortal and existed before our births. All knowledge, he explains, is actually recollected from this prior existence.

Several arguments for the immortality of the soul, and the idea that souls are reincarnated into different life forms, are also featured in Plato's

Phaedo. Similar accounts of the transmigration of souls may be found, with somewhat different details, in *Book X* of the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus.*

Philosophical methodology in the Late Dialogues. One of the novelties of the dialogues after those of the middle period is the introduction of a new philosophical method. In the early period dialogues the mode of philosophizing was refutative question-and-answer (called *elenchus* or the "*Socratic method*").

Although the middle period dialogues continue to show Socrates asking questions, the questioning in these dialogues becomes much more overtly leading and didactic. The highest method of philosophizing discussed in the middle period dialogues, called "*dialectic*", is never very well explained. The correct method for doing philosophy, we are now told in the later works, is what Plato identifies as "collection and division", which is perhaps first referred to at *Phaedrus*.

In this method, the philosopher collects all of the instances of some generic category that seem to have common characteristics, and then divides them into specific kinds until they cannot be further subdivided. This method is explicitly and extensively on display in the *Sophist, Statesman,* and *Philebus.*

The creation of the Universe. The *Timaeus* is famous for its account of the creation of the universe by the Demiurge. Plato's Demiurge does not create *ex nihilo,* but rather orders the cosmos out of chaotic elemental matter, imitating the eternal Forms. Plato takes the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth (which Plato proclaims to be composed of various aggregates of triangles), making various compounds of these into what he calls the Body of the Universe.

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) numbers among the greatest philosophers of all time. Judged solely in terms of his philosophical influence, only Plato is his peer: Aristotle's works shaped centuries of philosophy from Late Antiquity through the Renaissance, and even today continue to be studied with keen interest.

Phainomena and the Endoxic method. Aristotle's basic approach to philosophy is best grasped by way of contrast. Aristotle begins with the conviction that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are basically dependable, that they for the most part put us into direct contact with the features and divisions of our world.

When he goes to work, Aristotle begins by considering how the world appears, reflecting on the puzzles those appearances throw up, and reviewing what has been said about those puzzles to date. These methods comprise his twin appeals to *phainomena* and the endoxic method. These two methods reflect in different ways Aristotle's deepest motivations for doing philosophy.

"Human beings began to do philosophy", he says, "*even as they do now, because of wonder, at first because they wondered about the strange things right in front of them, and then later, advancing little by little, because they came to find greater things puzzling"* (*Metaphysics*).

Human beings philosophize, according to Aristotle, because they find aspects of their experience puzzling. The sorts of puzzles we encounter in thinking about the universe and our place within it – *aporiai*, in Aristotle's terminology – tax our understanding and induce us to philosophize.

Aristotle's reliance on the credible opinion (*endoxa)* takes on a greater significance given the role such opinions play in *dialectic*, which he regards as an important form of non-scientific reasoning. *Dialectic*, like science (*epistêmê*), trades in logical inference; but science requires premises of a sort beyond the scope of ordinary dialectical reasoning.

Whereas science relies upon premises which are necessary and known to be so, a dialectical discussion can proceed by relying on *endoxa*, and so can claim only to be as secure as the *endoxa* upon which it relies. This is not a problem, suggests Aristotle, since we often reason fruitfully and well in circumstances where we cannot claim to have attained scientific understanding. Minimally, however, all reasoning – whether scientific or dialectical – must respect the canons of logic and inference.

Logic. Among the great achievements to which Aristotle can lay claim is the first systematic treatment of the principles of correct reasoning, the first logic. It remains true that he not only developed *a theory of deduction*, now called *syllogistic,* but added to it a modal syllogistic and went a long way towards proving some meta-theorems pertinent to these systems. No-one before Aristotle developed a systematic treatment of the principles governing correct inference.

In Aristotle's logic, the basic ingredients of reasoning are given in terms of *inclusion* and *exclusion* relations. He begins with the notion of a patently correct sort of argument, one whose evident and unassailable acceptability induces Aristotle to refer to it as a "*perfect deduction*". Generally, a *deduction* (*sullogismon*), according to Aristotle, is a valid or acceptable argument. More exactly, a deduction is *"an argument in which when certain things are laid down something else follows of necessity in virtue of their being so"* (*APr.*).

Dialectic. Not all rigorous reasoning qualifies as scientific. As Aristotle recognizes, we often find ourselves reasoning from premises which have the status of *endoxa*, opinions widely believed or endorsed by the wise, even though they are not known to be necessary. Still less often do we reason having first secured the first principles of our domain of inquiry.

So, we need some "*method by which we will be able to reason deductively about any matter proposed to us on the basis of endoxa*, *and to give an account of ourselves* (when we are under examination by an interlocutor) *without lapsing into contradiction*" (*Top*.). This method he characterizes as *dialectic*.

The suggestion that we often use dialectic when engaged in philosophical exchange reflects Aristotle's supposition that there are two sorts of dialectic: one negative, or destructive, and the other positive, or constructive. In fact, in his work dedicated to dialectic, *the Topics*, he identifies roles for dialectic in intellectual inquiry. Dialectic is useful for three purposes: for training, for conversational exchange, and for sciences of a philosophical sort.

That it is useful for training purposes is directly evident on the basis of these considerations: once we have a direction for our inquiry we will more readily be able to engage a subject proposed to us. It is useful for conversational exchange because once we have enumerated the beliefs of the many, we shall engage them not on the basis of the convictions of others but on the basis of their own; and we shall re-orient them whenever they appear to have said something incorrect to us.

It is useful for philosophical sorts of sciences because when we are able to run through the puzzles on both sides of an issue we more readily perceive what is true and what is false. Further, it is useful for uncovering what is primary among the commitments of a science.

For it is impossible to say anything regarding the first principles of a science on the basis of the first principles proper to the very science under discussion, since among all the commitments of a science, the first principles are the primary ones. This comes rather, necessarily, from discussion of the credible beliefs (*endoxa*) belonging to the science. This is peculiar to dialectic, or is at least most proper to it. For since it is what cross-examines, dialectic contains the way to the first principles of all inquiries (*Top*.).

The first two of the three forms of dialectic identified by Aristotle are rather limited in scope. By contrast, the third is philosophically significant. In its third guise, dialectic has a role to play in "*science conducted in a philosophical manner*" (*pros tas kata philosphian epistêmas* (*Top*.)), where this sort of science includes what we actually find him pursuing in his major philosophical treatises.

In these contexts, dialectic helps to sort the *endoxa*, relegating some to a disputed status while elevating others; it submits *endoxa* to cross-examination in order to test their staying power; and, most notably, according to Aristotle, dialectic puts us on the road to first principles (*Top.*). If that is so, then dialectic plays a significant role in the order of philosophical discovery: we come to establish first principles in part by determining which among our initial *endoxa* withstand sustained scrutiny.

The four causal account of explanatory adequacy. Central to Aristotle's thought is his *four-causal explanatory scheme*. Judged in terms of its influence, this doctrine is one of his most significant philosophical contributions. Aristotle expects the explanations he seeks in philosophy and science to meet certain criteria of adequacy. Unlike some other philosophers he takes care to state his criteria for adequacy explicitly; He states his scheme in a methodological passage in the second book of his *Physics*:

One way in which cause is spoken of is that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.

In another way cause is spoken of as the form or the pattern, i.e. what is mentioned in the account (*logos*) belonging to the essence and its genera, e.g. the cause of an octave is a ratio of 2:1, or number more generally, as well as the parts mentioned in the account (*logos*).

Further, the primary source of the change and rest is spoken of as a cause, e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is the cause of the child, and generally the maker is the cause of what is made and what brings about change is a cause of what is changed.

Further, the end (*telos*) is spoken of as a cause. This is that for the sake of which (*houheneka*) a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. 'Why is he walking about?' We say: "To be healthy" – and, having said that, we think we have indicated the cause (*Phys*.).

More fully, the four-causal account of explanatory adequacy requires an investigator to cite these four causes.

The Four Causes:

The *material cause*: that from which something is generated and out of which it is made, e.g. the bronze of a statue
The *formal cause*: the structure which the matter realizes and in terms of which it comes to be something determinate, e.g., the shape of the president, in virtue of which this quantity of bronze is said to be a statue of a president
The *efficient cause*: the agent responsible for a quantity of matter's coming to be informed, e.g. the sculptor who shaped the quantity of bronze into its current shape, the shape of the president
The *final cause:* the purpose or goal of the compound of form and matter, e.g. the statue was created for the purpose of honoring the president

2.2. Western Medieval and Renaissance philosophy

The questions

1. Medieval Philosophy.
2. Renaissance Philosophy.

"*Medieval philosophy*" refers to philosophy in Western Europe during the "*medieval*" period, the so called "*Middle Ages*". The notion of a "Middle Age" (or plural "Middle Ages") was introduced in the fifteenth century for the period between the decline of classical pagan culture in Western Europe and what was taken to be its rediscovery during the Renaissance.

The originators of the notion of the Middle Ages were thinking primarily of the so called "*Latin West*", the area, roughly speaking, of Roman Catholicism. While it is true that this region was to some extent a unit, culturally separate from its neighbors, it is also true that medieval philosophy was decisively influenced by ideas from the Greek East, from the Jewish philosophical tradition, and from Islam.

If one takes medieval philosophy to include the Patristic period, as the present author prefers to do, then the area must be expanded to include, at least during the early centuries, Greek-speaking eastern Europe, as well as North Africa and parts of Asia Minor.

In fact many features of Christianity do not fit well into classical philosophical views. The notion of the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity are obvious cases in point. But even before those doctrines were fully formulated, there were difficulties, so that an educated Christian in the early centuries would be hard pressed to know how to accommodate his religious views into the only philosophical tradition available.

To take just one example, consider pagan philosophical theories of the soul. At first glance, it would appear that the Platonic tradition would be most appealing to an early Christian. And in fact it was. In the first place, the Platonic tradition was very concerned with the moral development of the soul. Again, that tradition saw the highest goal of a human being as some kind of mystical gazing on or union with the Form of the Good or the One; it would be easy to interpret this as the "face to face" encounter with God in the next life. Most important of all, Platonism held that the soul could exist apart from the body after death. This would obviously be appealing to Christians, who believed in an afterlife.

On the other hand, there was another crucial aspect of Christianity that simply made no sense to a Platonist. This was the doctrine of the resurrection

of the dead at the end of the world. Platonism allowed for reincarnation, so there was no special theoretical problem for a Platonist about the soul's reentering the body. But for a Christian this resurrection was something to *look forward to,* it was a *good* thing.

This would be incomprehensible from a Platonic viewpoint, for which "the body is the prison of the soul", and for which the task of the philosopher is to "learn how to die" so that he might be free from the distracting and corrupting influences of the body. No, for a Platonist is it best for the soul *not* to be in the body.

A Christian would therefore have a hard time being a straightforward Platonist about the soul. But neither could he be an straightforward Aristotelian. Aristotle's own views on the immortality of the soul are notoriously obscure, and he was often interpreted as denying it outright. All the harder, therefore, to make sense of the view that the resurrection of the dead at the end of the world is something to be joyfully expected.

This problem illustrates the kind of difficulties that emerge from the above "*recipe*" for medieval philosophy.

An educated early Christian, striving to deal with his religion in terms of the only philosophical traditions he knew, would plainly have a lot of work to do. Such tensions may be regarded as the "motors" that drove much of philosophy throughout the period. In response to them, new concepts, new theories, and new distinctions were developed. Of course, once developed, these tools remained and indeed still remain available to be used in contexts that have nothing to do with Christian doctrine.

While the influence of classical pagan philosophy was crucial for the development of medieval philosophy, it is likewise crucial that until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries almost all the original Greek texts were lost to the Latin West, so that they exerted their influence only indirectly. They were "lost" not in the sense that the texts were simply unavailable but in the sense that very few people could read them, since they were written in the wrong language. As the Western Roman Empire gradually disintegrated, the knowledge of Greek all disappeared.

"*Patrology*" or "*patristics*" is the study of the so called "*Fathers* (*patres*) *of the Church*". In this sense, "fathers" does not mean priests, although of course many patristic authors *were* priests. Neither does it does mean "fathers" in the sense of "*founding fathers*", although many patristic authors were likewise foundational for everything that came afterward. Rather "fathers" in this sense means "teachers".

In early Christian usage, the term "father" was applied primarily to the bishop, who had preeminent teaching authority within the Church. But

gradually the word was extended until, much later; it came to include all early Christian writers who were taken to represent the authentic tradition of the Church.

By no means all patristic authors are of philosophical significance, but many of them definitely are. *Augustine* is certainly the most important and influential philosopher of the Middle Ages, and one of the most influential philosophers of any time. Yet despite his philosophical preeminence, Augustine was not, and did not think of himself as, a philosopher either by training or by profession. By training he was a rhetorician, by profession first a rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric.

What we find instead in Augustine is a man who is a "philosopher" in the original, etymological sense, a "lover a wisdom", one who is *searching* for it rather than one who writes as if he has found it and is now presenting it to us in systematic, argumentative form.

After Augustine, the first thinker of philosophical note was *Boethius*. Boethius is no doubt best known today for *The Consolation of Philosophy*, a dialogue in five books between Boethius and "Lady Philosophy", an allegorical figure who appears to him in a vision while he is languishing in jail under sentence of death for treason. Boethius had occupied a high station in society and government.

In the *Consolation*, Boethius and Lady Philosophy discuss the problem of evil and the fickleness of fortune – a particularly pressing issue for Boethius, given the circumstances under which the work was written. But although the *Consolation* is justly famous, both in our own day and in the Middle Ages, Boethius's long-term importance probably rests more on his translations and commentary activity. Boethius was well educated, and was one of the increasingly rare people in the West who knew Greek well, not just the language but the intellectual culture.

He came up with the lofty goal to translate Plato and Aristotle into Latin, write commentaries on the whole of that material, and then write another work to show that Plato and Aristotle essentially said the same thing. In addition to his translations, Boethius wrote a number of logical treatises of his own. He also proved to be influential in the twelfth century and afterwards for the metaphysical views contained in a series of short studies known collectively as the *Theological Tractates*.

After Boethius, as the classical Greco-Roman world grew ever more distant, philosophy – and to some extent culture generally – entered a period of relative stagnation, a period that lasted until after the year 1000. There was one short-lived bright spot, the so called "*Carolingian*" period.

The major philosophical figure in this period was *John Scottus Eriugena* (c. 800–877), an Irish monk who was at the court of Charles the

Bald around 850. Curiously, the knowledge of Greek was still not quite dead in Ireland even at this late date, and Eriugena brought a knowledge of the language with him. At the Carolingian court, Eriugena translated several Greek works into Latin.

After its brief "renaissance" during the Carolingian period, education and culture declined once again for roughly another 200 years. Then, shortly after the turn of the millennium, things began to revive. The Germanic "barbarian" tribes that had so disturbed the late Roman empire had long since settled down, and the later Viking raiders had by this time become respectable "Normans".

Trade began to revive, travel became relatively safe again, at least compared to what it had been, new cities began to emerge, and along with them new social arrangements began to develop. Education was part of this general revival, and with it philosophy.

The major medieval philosophers before the year 1000 are probably fewer than five in number (depending on how generously one wants to take the word "major"). But after 1000 their numbers grow exponentially. It is no longer possible to treat them individually in chronological order; indeed, it is difficult to keep track of them all. As time goes on, the complications and the numbers only increase.

Simultaneously, philosophy becomes increasingly technical and "academic". *Anselm of Canterbury* (1033–1109) represents a major transitional figure. Anselm is no doubt best known as the originator of the famous "ontological argument" for the existence of God. But he wrote much else besides, on many philosophical and theological topics. His writings abound in subtle and sophisticated reasoning; indeed, they illustrate the increasing role of "*dialectic*" in philosophy and theology.

In Anselm's hands, theology begins to develop into an argumentative discipline, less exclusively a matter of "*scripture studies*" and spirituality and increasingly a matter of systematic exploration and presentation of doctrine. This development grows even more pronounced after Anselm.

By the early twelfth century, the revival of education that had begun shortly after the millennium was in full swing. During the first half of the century, the most important philosopher by far was undoubtedly *Peter Abelard* (1079–1142). Abelard represents the full flower of "*early medieval philosophy*", just before the new translations of Aristotle and others transform everything. His views on logic and what we would call philosophy of language are sophisticated and novel; indeed, he is a serious contender for the title of the greatest logician of the entire medieval period, early or late.

Abelard's writings further amplify the tendency, already seen in Anselm, to increase the use of reasoning and argumentation in theology. But whereas Anselm had managed to deflect criticisms of this new approach in theology, Abelard's disputatious personality alarmed those who were more comfortable with the older style. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that his influence was widespread.

Throughout this early medieval period, we find many writers, usually of a broadly "Platonic" persuasion, who deal with philosophical topics in an unsystematic but far from shallow way that does not clearly distinguish philosophy from theology, or for that matter from "wisdom literature" generally.

As part of the cultural revival described above, and from the late-eleventh century on, there was a new and increasing interest in having translations of previously unavailable texts, not all of them philosophical by any means. No doubt this new interest was prompted in part by Western Europe's exposure to the Greek and Islamic world during the First Crusade (beginning in 1095).

As part of the revival that began after the turn of the millennium, new forms of education began to emerge in Western Europe. In general, we may distinguish four main types of educational practices in the Middle Ages: monastic schools, individual masters, cathedral schools and universities.

Universities were divided into "*faculties*". The four most common ones were the faculties of arts, law, medicine, and theology. Most universities had arts faculties, in addition to one or more of the others. The arts faculty was for the basic training of students, before they proceeded to one of the "higher" faculties. In effect, the arts faculty was the equivalent of the modern undergraduate program.

As for the "higher" faculties, Bologna was primarily a university for the study of law. Others were best known for medicine. Paris had all four faculties, but the faculty of theology was considered the highest of the four. In the medieval university, philosophy was cultivated first and foremost in the arts faculty.

By their very nature, universities brought together masters and students from all over Europe and put them in close proximity. Not surprisingly, the result was a "boom" in academic study, including philosophy. Histories of medieval philosophy often treat *Thomas Aquinas* (c. 1224–1274), *John Duns Scotus* (c. 1265–1308), and *William of Ockham* (c. 1287–1347) as the "*big three*" figures in the later medieval period; a few add *Bonaventure* (c. 1221–1274) as a fourth.

Beginning in the early-thirteenth century, several new orders were founded, notably the Franciscans (1209) and the Dominicans (1216), both of which became very prominent in late medieval universities. Aquinas was a Dominican, while Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham were Franciscans.

Medieval philosophy included all the main areas we think of as part of philosophy today. Nevertheless, certain topics stand out as worthy of special mention. To begin with, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that medieval philosophy invented the philosophy of religion. To be sure, ancient pagan philosophers sometimes talked about the nature of the gods. But a whole host of traditional problems in the philosophy of religion first took on in the Middle Ages the forms in which we still often discuss them today:

- The problem of the compatibility of the divine attributes.
- The problem of evil. Ancient philosophy had speculated on evil, but the particularly pressing form the problem takes on in Christianity, where an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent God freely created absolutely everything besides himself, first emerged in the Middle Ages.
- The problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge with human free will. Many medieval authors appealed to human free will in their response to the problem of evil, so that it was especially important to find some way to reconcile our free will with divine foreknowledge.

Renaissance philosophy. The Renaissance is the period that extends roughly from the middle of the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeenth century, was a time of intense, all-encompassing, and, in many ways, distinctive philosophical activity.

A fundamental assumption of the Renaissance movement was that the remains of classical antiquity constituted an invaluable source of excellence to which debased and decadent modern times could turn in order to repair the damage brought about since the fall of the Roman Empire. It was often assumed that God had given a single unified truth to humanity and that the works of ancient philosophers had preserved part of this original deposit of divine wisdom. This idea not only laid the foundation for a scholarly culture that was centered on ancient texts and their interpretation, but also fostered an approach to textual interpretation that strove to harmonize and reconcile divergent philosophical accounts. Stimulated by newly available texts, one of the most important hallmarks of Renaissance philosophy is the increased interest in primary sources of Greek and Roman thought, which were previously unknown or little read. The renewed study of Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism eroded faith in the universal truth of Aristotelian philosophy and widened the philosophical horizon, providing a rich

seedbed from which modern science and modern philosophy gradually emerged.

Improved access to a great deal of previously unknown literature from ancient Greece and Rome was an important aspect of Renaissance philosophy. The renewed study of Aristotle, however, was not so much because of the rediscovery of unknown texts, but because of a renewed interest in texts long translated into Latin but little studied, such as the *Poetics*, and especially because of novel approaches to well-known texts.

From the early fifteenth century onwards, humanists devoted considerable time and energy to making Aristotelian texts clearer and more precise. In order to rediscover the meaning of Aristotle's thought, they updated the Scholastic translations of his works, read them in the original Greek, and analyzed them with philological techniques.

The humanist movement did not eliminate older approaches to philosophy, but contributed to change them in important ways, providing new information and new methods to the field. Humanists called for a radical change of philosophy and uncovered older texts that multiplied and hardened current philosophical discord. Some of the most salient features of humanist reform are the accurate study of texts in the original languages, the preference for ancient authors and commentators over medieval ones, and the avoidance of technical language in the interest of moral suasion and accessibility.

Humanists stressed moral philosophy as the branch of philosophical studies that best met their needs. They addressed a general audience in an accessible manner and aimed to bring about an increase in public and private virtue. Regarding philosophy as a discipline allied to history, rhetoric, and philology, they expressed little interest in metaphysical or epistemological questions. Logic was subordinated to rhetoric and reshaped to serve the purposes of persuasion.

One of the seminal figures of the humanist movement was *Francesco Petrarca* (1304–1374), he elaborated what was to become the standard critique of Scholastic philosophy. One of the most original and important humanists of the *Quattrocento was Lorenzo Valla* (1406–1457). His most influential writing, a handbook of Latin language and style.

Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, humanists were unanimous in their condemnation of university education and their contempt for Scholastic logic.

Humanism also had an impact of overwhelming importance on the development of political thought. With *Institutio principis christiani* (*The Education of a Christian Prince*, 1516), *Erasmus* contributed to the popular genre of humanist advice books for princes.

These manuals dealt with the proper ends of government and how best to attain them. Among humanists of the fourteenth century, the most usual proposal was that a strong monarchy should be the best form of government. Petrarca, in his account of princely government that was written in 1373 and took the form of a letter to *Francesco da Carrara*, argued that cities ought to be governed by princes who accept their office reluctantly and who pursue glory through virtuous actions. Several authors exploited the tensions within the genre of "mirror for princes" in order to defend popular regimes. In *Laudatio Florentinae Urbis* (*Panegyric of the City of Florence*), *Bruni* maintained that justice can only be assured by a republican constitution. In his view, cities must be governed according to justice if they are to become glorious, and justice is impossible without liberty.

The most important text to challenge the assumptions of princely humanism, however, was *Il principe* (*The Prince*), written by the Florentine *Niccolò Machiavelli* (1469–1527). A fundamental belief among the humanists was that a ruler needs to cultivate a number of qualities, such as justice and other moral values, in order to acquire honour, glory, and fame. Machiavelli deviated from this view claiming that justice has no decisive place in politics.

It is the ruler's prerogative to decide when to dispense violence and practice deception, no matter how wicked or immoral, as long as the peace of the city is maintained and his share of glory maximized. Machiavelli did not hold that princely regimes were superior to all others. In his less famous, but equally influential, *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* (*Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy*, 1531), he offers a defense of popular liberty and republican government that takes the ancient republic of Rome as its model.

2.3. Western philosophy of XVII–XVIII centuries

The questions

1. Scientific and worldview revolution in XVII century: R. Descartes, F. Bacon.
2. Sensualist ontology: J. Locke, T. Hobbes.
3. European Enlightenment philosophy.

René Descartes is often credited with being the "Father of Modern Philosophy". This title is justified due both to his break with the traditional

Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy prevalent at his time and to his development and promotion of the new, mechanistic sciences. His fundamental break with Scholastic philosophy was twofold.

First, Descartes thought that the Scholastics' method was prone to doubt given their reliance on sensation as the source for all knowledge. Second, he wanted to replace their final causal model of scientific explanation with the more modern, mechanistic model.

Descartes attempted to address the former issue by his method of doubt. His basic strategy was to consider false any belief that falls prey to even the slightest doubt. This "hyperbolic doubt" then serves to clear the way for what Descartes considers to be an unprejudiced search for the truth. This clearing of his previously held beliefs then puts him at an epistemological ground-zero. From here Descartes sets out to find something that lies beyond all doubt.

He eventually discovers that "*I exist*" is impossible to doubt and is, therefore, absolutely certain. It is from this point that Descartes proceeds to demonstrate God's existence and that God cannot be a deceiver. This, in turn, serves to fix the certainty of everything that is clearly and distinctly understood and provides the epistemological foundation Descartes set out to find.

Once this conclusion is reached, Descartes can proceed to rebuild his system of previously dubious beliefs on this absolutely certain foundation. These beliefs, which are re-established with absolute certainty, include the existence of a world of bodies external to the mind, the dualistic distinction of the immaterial mind from the body, and his mechanistic model of physics based on the clear and distinct ideas of geometry. This points toward his second, major break with the Scholastic Aristotelian tradition in that Descartes intended to replace their system based on final causal explanations with his system based on mechanistic principles.

Descartes broke with Scholastic-Aristotelian tradition in at least two fundamental ways. The first was his rejection of substantial forms as explanatory principles in physics. A substantial form was thought to be an immaterial principle of material organization that resulted in a particular thing of a certain kind. The main principle of substantial forms was the final cause or purpose of being that kind of thing. Descartes rejected the use of substantial forms and their concomitant final causes in physics precisely for this reason.

Indeed, his essay *Meteorology*, that appeared alongside the *Discourse on Method*, was intended to show that clearer and more fruitful explanations can be obtained without reference to substantial forms but only by way of

deductions from the configuration and motion of parts. Hence, his point was to show that mechanistic principles are better suited for making progress in the physical sciences.

Another reason Descartes rejected substantial forms and final causes in physics was his belief that these notions were the result of the confusion of the idea of the body with that of the mind. His expulsion of the metaphysical principles of substantial forms and final causes helped clear the way for Descartes' new metaphysical principles on which his modern, mechanistic physics was based.

The second fundamental point of difference Descartes had with the Scholastics was his denial of the thesis that all knowledge must come from sensation. The Scholastics were devoted to the Aristotelian tenet that everyone is born with a clean slate, and that all material for intellectual understanding must be provided through sensation.

Descartes, however, argued that since the senses sometimes deceive, they cannot be a reliable source for knowledge. Furthermore, the truth of propositions based on sensation is naturally probabilistic and the propositions, therefore, are doubtful premises when used in arguments. Descartes was deeply dissatisfied with such uncertain knowledge. He then replaced the uncertain premises derived from sensation with the absolute certainty of the clear and distinct ideas perceived by the mind alone, as will be explained below.

In the preface to the French edition of the *Principles of Philosophy*, Descartes uses a tree as a metaphor for his holistic view of philosophy. "*The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals*". Although Descartes does not expand much more on this image, a few other insights into his overall project can be discerned.

First, notice that metaphysics constitutes the roots securing the rest of the tree. For it is in Descartes' metaphysics where an absolutely certain and secure epistemological foundation is discovered. This, in turn, grounds knowledge of the geometrical properties of bodies, which is the basis for his physics.

Second, physics constitutes the trunk of the tree, which grows up directly from the roots and provides the basis for the rest of the sciences.

Third, the sciences of medicine, mechanics and morals grow out of the trunk of physics, which implies that these other sciences are just applications of his mechanistic science to particular subject areas.

Finally, the fruits of the philosophy tree are mainly found on these three branches, which are the sciences most useful and beneficial to

humankind. However, an endeavor this grand cannot be conducted haphazardly but should be carried out in an orderly and systematic way. Hence, before even attempting to plant this tree, Descartes must first figure out a method for doing so.

Descartes called all of his previous beliefs into doubt through some of the best skeptical arguments of his day. But he was still not satisfied and decided to go a step further by considering false any belief that falls prey to even the slightest doubt. So, by the end of the *First Meditation*, Descartes finds himself in a whirlpool of false beliefs. However, it is important to realize that these doubts and the supposed falsehood of all his beliefs are for the sake of his method: he does not really believe that he is dreaming or is being deceived by an evil demon; he recognizes that his doubt is merely hyperbolic. But the point of this "*methodological*" or "*hyperbolic*" doubt is to clear the mind of preconceived opinions that might obscure the truth. The goal then is to find something that cannot be doubted even though an evil demon is deceiving him and even though he is dreaming. This first indubitable truth will then serve as an intuitively grasped metaphysical "axiom" from which absolutely certain knowledge can be deduced.

In the *Second Meditation*, Descartes tries to establish absolute certainty in his famous reasoning: *Cogito, ergo sum* or "*I think, therefore I am*". These *Meditations* are conducted from the first person perspective, from Descartes. However, he expects his reader to meditate along with him to see how his conclusions were reached.

This is especially important in the *Second Meditation* where the intuitively grasped truth of "I exist" occurs. So the discussion here of this truth will take place from the first person or "I" perspective. All sensory beliefs had been found doubtful in the previous meditation, and therefore all such beliefs are now considered false. This includes the belief that I have a body endowed with sense organs. But does the supposed falsehood of this belief mean that I do not exist? No, for if I convinced myself that my beliefs are false, then surely there must be an "I" that was convinced.

Moreover, even if I am being deceived by an evil demon, I must exist in order to be deceived at all. So "I must finally conclude that the proposition, "I am", "I exist", is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind". This just means that the mere fact that I am thinking, regardless of whether or not what I am thinking is true or false, implies that there must be something engaged in that activity, namely an "I". Hence, "I exist" is an indubitable and, therefore, absolutely certain belief that serves as an axiom from which other, absolutely certain truths can be deduced.

After discarding the traditional Scholastic-Aristotelian concept of a human being as a rational animal due to the inherent difficulties of defining

“rational” and “animal”, Descartes finally concludes that he is a thinking thing, a mind: “*A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sense perceptions*”. Descartes distinguishes intellectual perception and volition as what properly belongs to the nature of the mind alone while imagination and sensation are, in some sense, faculties of the mind insofar as it is united with a body. So imagination and sensation are faculties of the mind in a weaker sense than intellect and will, since they require a body in order to perform their functions.

Finally, Descartes claims that the mind or “I” is a non-extended thing. Now, since extension is the nature of body, is a necessary feature of body, it follows that the mind is by its nature not a body but an immaterial thing. Therefore, what I am is an immaterial thinking thing with the faculties of intellect and will.

Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was one of the leading figures in natural philosophy and in the field of scientific methodology in the period of transition from the Renaissance to the early modern era. To the present day Bacon is well known for his treatises on empiricist natural philosophy and for his doctrine of the idols.

According to Bacon, the human mind is not a *tabula rasa*. Instead of an ideal plane for receiving an image of the world *in toto*, it is a crooked mirror, on account of implicit distortions. He does not sketch a basic epistemology but underlines that the images in our mind right from the beginning do not render an objective picture of the true objects. Consequently, we have to improve our mind, free it from the idols, before we start any knowledge acquisition.

Bacon deals with the idols in the Second Book of *The Advancement of Learning*, where he discusses *Arts intellectual* (Invention, Judgment, Memory, Tradition). Idols are productions of the human imagination (caused by the crooked mirror of the human mind) and thus are nothing more than “*untested generalities*”.

In his Preface to the *Novum Organum* Bacon promises the introduction of a new method, which will restore the senses to their former rank, begin the whole labor of the mind again, and open two sources and two distributions of learning, consisting of a method of cultivating the sciences and another of discovering them. This new beginning presupposes the discovery of the natural obstacles to efficient scientific analysis, namely seeing through the idols, so that the mind’s function as the subject of knowledge acquisition comes into focus.

Bacon makes a distinction between the Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of the divine mind: whereas the former are for him nothing more

than “*certain empty dogmas*”, the latter show “*the true signatures and marks set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature*”.

Idols of the Tribe. The Idols of the Tribe have their origin in the production of false concepts due to human nature, because the structure of human understanding is like a crooked mirror, which causes distorted reflections (of things in the external world).

Idols of the Cave. The Idols of the Cave consist of conceptions or doctrines which are dear to the individual who cherishes them, without possessing any evidence of their truth. These idols are due to the preconditioned system of every individual, comprising education, custom, or accidental or contingent experiences.

Idols of the Market Place. These idols are based on false conceptions which are derived from public human communication. They enter our minds quietly by a combination of words and names, so that it comes to pass that not only does reason govern words, but words react on our understanding.

Idols of the Theatre. According to the insight that the world is a stage, the Idols of the Theatre are prejudices stemming from received or traditional philosophical systems. These systems resemble plays in so far as they render fictional worlds, which were never exposed to an experimental check or to a test by experience. The idols of the theatre thus have their origin in dogmatic philosophy or in wrong laws of demonstration.

Bacon ends his presentation of the idols with the remark that men should abjure and renounce the qualities of idols, “*and the understanding* [must be] *thoroughly freed and cleansed*”. He discusses the idols together with the problem of information gained through the senses, which must be corrected by the use of experiments.

In his first major book *The Advancement of Learning* Bacon presents a systematic survey of the extant realms of knowledge, combined with meticulous descriptions of deficiencies, leading to his new classification of knowledge. Natural science is divided by Bacon into physics and metaphysics. The former investigates variable and particular causes, the latter reflects on general and constant ones, for which the term *form* is used.

Forms are more general than the four Aristotelian causes and that is why Bacon’s discussion of the forms of substances as the most general properties of matter is the last step for the human mind when investigating nature. Metaphysics is distinct from *philosophia prima*. The latter marks the position in the system where general categories of a general theory of science are treated as: 1) universal categories of thought, 2) relevant for all disciplines.

Final causes are discredited, since they lead to difficulties in science and tempt us to amalgamate theological and teleological points of doctrine.

At the summit of Bacon's pyramid of knowledge are the laws of nature (the most general principles). At its base the pyramid starts with observations, moves on to invariant relations and then to more inclusive correlations until it reaches the stage of forms. The process of generalization ascends from natural history via physics towards metaphysics, whereas accidental correlations and relations are eliminated by the method of exclusion.

It must be emphasized that *metaphysics* has a special meaning for Bacon. This concept: 1) excludes the infinity of individual experience by generalization with a teleological focus; 2) opens our mind to generate more possibilities for the efficient application of general laws.

Already in his early text *Cogitata et Visa* (1607) Bacon dealt with his scientific method, which became famous under the name of *induction*. He repudiates the syllogistic method and defines his alternative procedure as one "*which by slow and faithful toil gathers information from things and brings it into understanding*".

In his *Novum Organum* he developed his method in detail, he still noted that "(of) *induction the logicians seem hardly to have taken any serious thought, but they pass it by with a slight notice, and hasten to the formulae of disputation. I on the contrary reject demonstration by syllogism*". Bacon's method appears as his conceptual plot, applied to all stages of knowledge, and at every phase the whole process has to be kept in mind.

Induction implies ascending to axioms, as well as a descending to works, so that from axioms new particulars are gained and from these new axioms. The inductive method starts from sensible experience and moves via natural history (providing sense-data as guarantees) to lower axioms or propositions, which are derived from the tables of presentation or from the abstraction of notions.

Bacon came to the fundamental insight that *facts* cannot be collected from nature, but must be constituted by methodical procedures, which have to be put into practice by scientists in order to ascertain the empirical basis for inductive generalizations. His induction, founded on collection, comparison, and exclusion of factual qualities in things and their interior structure, proved to be a revolutionary achievement within natural philosophy, for which no example in classical antiquity existed. Bacon's induction was construed and conceived as an instrument or method of discovery.

Sensualist ontology. John Locke (1632–1704) is a British philosopher, Oxford academic and medical researcher. Locke's monumental *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689) is one of the first great defenses of empiricism and concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding in respect to a wide spectrum of topics. Locke is often classified

as the first of the great English empiricists (ignoring the claims of Bacon and Hobbes). This reputation rests on Locke's greatest work, the monumental *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.*

Some philosophers before Locke had suggested that it would be good to find the limits of the Understanding, but what Locke does is to carry out this project in detail. In the four books of the *Essay* Locke considers the sources and nature of human knowledge. *Book I* argues that we have no innate knowledge. (In this he resembles *Berkeley* and *Hume*, and differs from *Descartes* and *Leibniz*) So, at birth, the human mind is a sort of blank slate on which experience writes. In *Book II* Locke claims that ideas are the materials of knowledge and all ideas come from experience.

The term "idea", Locke tells us "*…stands for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a man thinks*". Experience is of two kinds, sensation and reflection. One of these – sensation – tells us about things and processes in the external world. The other – reflection – tells us about the operations of our own minds. Reflection is a sort of internal sense that makes us conscious of the mental processes we are engaged in. Some ideas we get only from sensation, some only from reflection and some from both.

Locke has an atomic or perhaps more accurately a corpuscular theory of ideas. There is, that is to say, an analogy between the way atoms or corpuscles combine into complexes to form physical objects and the way ideas combine. Ideas are either simple or complex. We cannot create simple ideas; we can only get them from experience. In this respect the mind is passive. Once the mind has a store of simple ideas, it can combine them into complex ideas of a variety of kinds. In this respect the mind is active.

Thus, Locke subscribes to a version of the empiricist axiom that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses – where the senses are broadened to include reflection. *Book III* deals with the nature of language, its connections with ideas and its role in knowledge. *Book IV*, the culmination of the previous reflections, explains the nature and limits of knowledge, probability, and the relation of reason and faith.

Knowledge involves the seeing of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. What then is probability and how does it relate to knowledge? Locke writes:

"*The Understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the Certainty of true Knowledge… Therefore, as God has set some Things in broad day-light; as he has given us some certain Knowledge…So in the greater part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may say so, of*

Probability, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here, wherein to check our overconfidence and presumption, we might by every day's Experience be made sensible of our short sightedness and liableness to Error".

Probable reasoning, on this account, is an argument, similar in certain ways to the demonstrative reasoning that produces knowledge but different also in certain crucial respects. It is an argument that provides evidence that leads the mind to judge a proposition true or false but without a guarantee that the judgment is correct. This kind of probable judgment comes in degrees, ranging from near demonstrations and certainty to unlikeliness and improbability to near the vicinity of impossibility. It is correlated with degrees of assent ranging from full assurance down to conjecture, doubt and distrust.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), English philosopher, scientist, and historian, best known for his political philosophy, especially as articulated in his masterpiece *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes viewed government primarily as a device for ensuring collective security. Political authority is justified by a hypothetical social contract among the many that vests in a sovereign person or entity the responsibility for the safety and well-being of all. In metaphysics.

Hobbes defended materialism, the view that only material things are real. His scientific writings present all observed phenomena as the effects of "*matterinmotion*". Hobbes was not only a scientist in his own right but a great systematizer of the scientific findings of his contemporaries, including *Galileo* and *Johannes Kepler*.

Theories that trace all observed effects to matter and motion are called mechanical. Hobbes was thus a mechanical materialist: he held that nothing but material things are real, and he thought that the subject matter of all the natural sciences consists of the motions of material things at different levels of generality. Geometry considers the effects of the motions of points, lines, and solids; pure mechanics deals with the motions of three-dimensional bodies in a full space, or plenum; physics deals with the motions of the parts of inanimate bodies insofar as they contribute to observed phenomena; and psychology deals with the effects of the internal motions of animate bodies on behaviour.

The system of the natural sciences described in Hobbes's trilogy represents his understanding of the materialist principles on which all science is based. The fact that Hobbes included politics as well as psychology within his system, however, has tended to overshadow his insistence on the autonomy of political understanding from natural-scientific understanding.

According to Hobbes, politics does not need to be understood in terms of the motions of material things (although, ultimately, it can be); a certain kind of widely available self-knowledge is evidence enough of the human propensity to war. Although Hobbes is routinely read as having discerned the "laws of motion" for both human beings and human societies, the most that can plausibly be claimed is that he based his political philosophy on psychological principles that he thought could be illuminated by general laws of motion.

European Enlightenment philosophy. The Enlightenment is the period in the history of Western thought and culture, stretching roughly from the mid-decades of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, characterized by dramatic revolutions in science, philosophy, society and politics.

Enlightenment thought culminates historically in the political upheaval of the French Revolution, in which the traditional hierarchical political and social orders (the French monarchy, the privileges of the French nobility, the political power and authority of the Catholic Church) were violently destroyed and replaced by a political and social order informed by the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality for all, founded upon principles of human reason.

The Enlightenment begins with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The rise of the new science progressively undermines not only the ancient geocentric conception of the cosmos, but, with it, the entire set of presuppositions that had served to constrain and guide philosophical inquiry. The dramatic success of the new science in explaining the natural world, in accounting for a wide variety of phenomena by appeal to a relatively small number of elegant mathematical formulae, promotes philosophy (in the broad sense of the time, which includes natural science) from a handmaiden of theology, constrained by its purposes and methods, to an independent force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct the new, in the realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles.

D'Alembert, a leading figure of the French Enlightenment, characterizes his eighteenth century, in the midst of it, as "the century of philosophy *par excellence*", because of the tremendous intellectual progress of the age, the advance of the sciences, and the enthusiasm for that progress, but also because of the characteristic expectation of the age that philosophy (in this broad sense) would dramatically improve human life.

The task of characterizing philosophy in (or of) the Enlightenment confronts the obstacle of the wide diversity of Enlightenment thought. The

Enlightenment is associated with the French thinkers of the mid-decades of the eighteenth century, the so-called "*philosophes*", (*Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Montesquieu*, et cetera). The *philosophes* constitute an informal society of men of letters who collaborate on a loosely defined project of Enlightenment centered around the project of the Encyclopedia.

But the Enlightenment has broader boundaries, both geographical and temporal, than this suggests. In addition to the French, there was a very significant Scottish Enlightenment (key figures were *Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith*, and *Thomas Reid*) and a very significant German Enlightenment, key figures of which include *Christian Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn, G.E. Lessing* and *Immanuel Kant*.

Only late in the development of the German Enlightenment, when the Enlightenment was near its end, does the movement become self-reflective; the question of "What is Enlightenment?" is debated in pamphlets and journals. In his famous definition of "enlightenment" in his essay "*An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?*" (1784), which is his contribution to this debate, *Immanuel Kant* expresses many of the tendencies shared among Enlightenment philosophies of divergent doctrines. Kant defines "*enlightenment*" as humankind's release from its self-incurred immaturity; "*immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another*".

Enlightenment is the process of undertaking to think for oneself, to employ and rely on one's own intellectual capacities in determining what to believe and how to act. Enlightenment philosophers from across the geographical and temporal spectrum tend to have a great deal of confidence in humanity's intellectual powers, both to achieve systematic knowledge of nature and to serve as an authoritative guide in practical life. This confidence is generally paired with suspicion or hostility toward other forms or carriers of authority (such as tradition, superstition, prejudice, myth and miracles), insofar as these are seen to compete with the authority of reason.

Enlightenment philosophy tends to stand in tension with established religion, insofar as the release from self-incurred immaturity in this age, daring to think for oneself, awakening one's intellectual powers, generally requires opposing the role of established religion in directing thought and action. The faith of the Enlightenment – if one may call it that – is that the process of enlightenment, of becoming progressively self-directed in thought and action through the awakening of one's intellectual powers, leads ultimately to a better, more fulfilled human existence.

2.4. German philosophy of the XIX century

The questions

1. G. W. F. Hegel and his philosophical system. Dialectics as method. Hegel's logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of mind.
2. Anthropological materialism of L. Feuerbach.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels: dialectical and historical materialism.

G. Hegel' philosophy (1770–1831) was the culmination of the movement in German philosophy that started from Kant; although he often criticized Kant, his system could never have arisen if Kant's had not existed. His influence, though now diminishing, has been very great, not only or chiefly in Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, the leading academic philosophers, both in America and in Great Britain, were largely Hegelians.

Outside of pure philosophy, many Protestant theologians adopted his doctrines, and his philosophy of history profoundly affected political theory. Marx was a disciple of Hegel in his youth, and retained in his own finished system some important Hegelian features. His life contained few events of importance. In youth he was much attracted to mysticism, and his later views may be regarded, to some extent, as an intellectualizing of what had first appeared to him as mystic insight.

From his early interest in mysticism he retained a belief in the unreality of separateness; the world, in his view, was not a collection of hard units, whether atoms or souls, each completely self-subsistent. The apparent self-subsistence of finite things appeared to him to be an illusion; nothing, he held, is ultimately and completely real except the whole. But he differed from *Parmenides* and *Spinoza* in conceiving the whole, not as a simple substance, but as a complex system, of the sort that we should call an organism.

The apparently separate things of which the world seems to be composed are not simply an illusion; each has a greater or lesser degree of reality, and its reality consists in an aspect of the whole, which is what it is seen to be when viewed truly. With this view goes naturally a disbelief in the reality of time and space as such, for these, if taken as completely real, involve separateness and multiplicity. All this must have come to him first as mystic "*insight*"; its intellectual elaboration, which is given in his books, must have come later.

Hegel asserts that the real is rational, and the rational is real. But when he says this he does not mean by "*the real*" what an empiricist would mean. He admits, and even urges, that what to the empiricist appear to be facts are,

and must be, irrational; it is only after their apparent character has been transformed by viewing them as aspects of the whole that they are seen to be rational. Nevertheless, the identification of the real and the rational leads unavoidably to some of the complacency inseparable from the belief that "*whatever is, is right*".

The whole, in all its complexity, is called by Hegel "*the Absolute*". The Absolute is spiritual; Spinoza's view, that it has the attribute of extension as well as that of thought, is rejected. Two things distinguish Hegel from other men. One of these is emphasis on logic: it is thought by Hegel that the nature of Reality can be deduced from the sole consideration that it must be not self contradictory. The other distinguishing feature (which is closely connected with the first) is the triadic movement called the "*dialectic*".

Logic, as Hegel understands the word, is declared by him to be the same thing as metaphysics; it is something quite different from what is commonly called logic. His view is that any ordinary predicate, if taken as qualifying the whole of Reality, turns out to be self-contradictory. One might take as a crude example the theory of *Parmenide*, that the One, which alone is real, is spherical. Nothing can be spherical unless it has a boundary, and it cannot have a boundary unless there is something (at least empty space) outside of it. Therefore to suppose the Universe as a whole to be spherical is self-contradictory.

Let us take illustration, still more crude far too much so to be used by Hegel. You may say, without apparent contradiction, that Mr. A is an uncle; but if you were to say that the Universe is an uncle, you would land yourself in difficulties. An uncle is a man who has a nephew, and the nephew is a separate person from the uncle; therefore an uncle cannot be the whole of Reality.

This illustration might also be used to illustrate the dialectic, which consists of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.

First we say: "*Reality is an uncle*". This is the thesis. But the existence of an uncle implies that of a nephew. Since nothing really exists except the Absolute, and we are now committed to the existence of a nephew, we must conclude: "*The Absolute is a nephew*". This is the antithesis. But there is the same objection to this as to the view that the Absolute is an uncle; therefore we are driven to the view that the Absolute is the whole composed of uncle and nephew. This is the synthesis.

But this synthesis is still unsatisfactory, because a man can be an uncle only if he has a brother or sister who is a parent of the nephew. Hence we are driven to enlarge our universe to include the brother or sister, with his

wife or her husband. In this sort of way, so it is contended, we can be driven on, by the mere force of logic, from any suggested predicate of the Absolute to the final conclusion of the dialectic, which is called the "*Absolute Idea*". Throughout the whole process, there is an underlying assumption that nothing can be really true unless it is about Reality as a whole.

For this underlying assumption there is a basis in traditional logic, which assumes that every proposition has a subject and a predicate. According to this view, every fact consists in something having some property. It follows that relations cannot be real, since they involve two things, not one. "Uncle" is a relation, and a man may become an uncle without knowing it. In that case, from an empirical point of view, the man is unaffected by becoming an uncle; he has no quality which he did not have before, if by "*quality*" we understand something necessary to describing him as he is in himself, apart from his relations to other people and things.

The only way in which the subject-predicate logic can avoid this difficulty is to say that the truth is not a property of the uncle alone, or of the nephew alone, but of the whole composed of uncle-and-nephew. Since everything, except the Whole, has relations to outside things, it follows that nothing quite true can be said about separate things, and that in fact only the Whole is real. This follows more directly from the fact that "*A and B are two*" is not a subject-predicate proposition, and therefore, on the basis of the traditional logic, there can be no such proposition.

Therefore there are not as many as two things in the world; therefore the Whole, considered as a unity, is alone real. The above argument is not explicit in Hegel, but is implicit in his system, as in that of many other metaphysicians. A few examples of Hegel's dialectic method may serve to make it more intelligible.

He begins the argument of his logic by the assumption that "the Absolute is Pure Being"; we assume that it just *is*, without assigning any qualities to it. But pure being without any qualities is nothing; therefore we are led to the antithesis: "*The Absolute is Nothing*". From this thesis and antithesis we pass on to the synthesis: the union of Being and Not-Being is Becoming, and so we say: "*The Absolute is Becoming*". This also, of course, won't do, because there has to be something that becomes. In this way our views of Reality develop by the continue correction of previous errors, all of which arose from undue abstraction, by taking something finite or limited as if it could be the whole. "*The limitations of the finite do not come merely from without; its own nature is the cause of its abrogation, and by its own act it passes into its counterpart*".

The process, according to Hegel, is essential to the understanding of the result. Each later stage of the dialectic contains all the earlier stages, as

it were in solution; none of them is wholly superseded, but is given its proper place as a moment in the Whole. It is therefore impossible to reach the truth except by going through all the steps of the dialectic.

Knowledge as a whole has its triadic movement. It begins with sense-perception, in which there is only awareness of the object. Then, through skeptical criticism of the senses, it becomes purely subjective. At last, it reaches the stage of self-knowledge, in which subject and object are no longer distinct. Thus self-consciousness is the highest form of knowledge. This, of course, must be the case in Hegel's system, for the highest kind of knowledge must be that possessed by the Absolute, and as the Absolute is the Whole there is nothing outside itself for it to know.

Anthropological materialism of L. Feuerbach. For a number of years in the mid-nineteenth century *Ludwig Feuerbach* (1804–1872) played an important role in the history of *post-Hegelian* German philosophy and in the transition from idealism to various forms of naturalism, materialism and positivism that is one of the most notable developments of this period.

Feuerbach's importance for the history of modern philosophy is also due to the fact that the publication of *The Essence of Christianity* in 1841 can be taken, as it was by *Engels*, to symbolically mark the end of the period of classical German philosophy that had begun sixty years earlier with the appearance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* – though some might want to question the assumption involved in this way of putting things that classical German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian system that Engels thought of Feuerbach as having overthrown.

In the years following the appearance of *The Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach published two short philosophical manifestos, the "Preliminary Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy" (1842) and the *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1843), in which he called for a radical break with the tradition of modern speculative thought. In *Principles* he locates the origin of this tradition in the Cartesian philosophy, and specifically in "the abstraction from the sensuous from matter" through which the conception of the cogito first arose.

Much of the content of *Principles* consists of a truncated survey of the history of modern philosophy, which purports to trace through a number of dialectical inversions a necessary development from the rationalistic theism of Descartes and Leibniz through the pantheism of Spinoza to the idealism of Kant and Fichte, culminating in Hegel's philosophy of identity.

What this survey is primarily intended to show is that the fundamental tendency of this development has been toward the actualization and humanization of God or, alternatively, toward "the *divinization* of the *real*, of the

materially existent – of materialism, empiricism, realism, humanism – and the negation of theology". This survey is followed by a short "demonstration" of the historical necessity of the new philosophy, which takes the form of a critique of Hegel, and by the enumeration of several doctrines that distinguish the new philosophy from the old.

Whereas earlier rationalists had conceived of God as being entirely distinct from nature and possessing perfect knowledge untainted by materiality, and had furthermore "*placed the effort and labor of abstraction and of self-liberation from the sensuous only in themselves*", Feuerbach notes that Hegel was the first to transform "*this subjective activity into the self-activity of the divine being*", so that, like the heroes of pagan antiquity, God (or the Idea) must "*fight through virtue for his divinity*", and only comes to be for himself (or itself) at the end of a long and laborious process.

This process, as it is described by Hegel at the end of the *Science of Logic*, involves the logical Idea "*freely releasing* itself … [into] the *externality of space and time existing absolutely on its own without the moment of subjectivity*". What Feuerbach refers to as "*the liberation of the absolute from matter*" is achieved as spirit gradually distinguishes itself from nature before attaining to the awareness of itself as absolute.

Here, Feuerbach notes, "*matter is indeed posited in God, that is, it is posited as God*", and to posit matter as God is to affirm atheism and materialism, but insofar as the self-externalization of the Idea in nature is superseded in the course of the coming-to-be-for-itself of the Idea in the forms of subjective, objective and absolute spirit, this negation of "*theology*" (i.e. of God conceived as an immaterial being distinct from nature) is negated in turn.

Hegel's philosophy thus represents, for Feuerbach, "*the last magnificent attempt to restore Christianity, which was lost and wrecked, through philosophy by identifying it with the negation of Christianity*".

Whereas the claim for the identity of thought and being was the cornerstone of the Hegelian philosophy in which Feuerbach finds the "old" philosophy perfected, one of the most characteristic features of the new philosophy is its rejection of this claim. Because the concept of pure being with which Hegel begins the Logic is an abstraction, Feuerbach argues, in the end Hegel succeeds only in reconciling thought with the thought of being, and not with being itself.

The new philosophy affirms that being is distinct from, and prior to, thought, and that it is as various as is the panoply of individually existing beings, from which it cannot be intelligibly distinguished. "*Thought comes from being, but being does not come from thought*". To say that something

exists in actuality, Feuerbach maintains, is to say that it exists not only as a figment of someone's imagination, or as a mere determination of their consciousness, but that it exists for itself independently of consciousness.

"*Being is something in which not only I but also others, above all also the object itself, participate*". In affirming the distinction between being and thought, and that nature exists through itself, independently of thought, the new philosophy also affirms the reality of time and space, and that real existence is finite, determinate, corporeal existence.

Feuerbach had unfavorably contrasted the "*egoistic*", practical standpoint of religion, which he associated with the unrestricted subjectivity of feeling and imagination, with the theoretical standpoint of philosophy, which he associated with reason and objectivity. At the end of *Principles*, however, he informs his readers that the new philosophy, without ceasing to be theoretical, nevertheless has a fundamentally practical tendency, and that in this respect it "*assumes the place of religion*" and "*is in truth itself religion*".

This line of thought is developed somewhat further in an unpublished manuscript where Feuerbach observes that, in order to replace religion, philosophy must itself become religion in the sense that "*it must, in a way suited to its own nature, incorporate the essence of religion or the advantage that religion possesses over philosophy*".

Among the many issues that remain unclear in Feuerbach's later writings is what the expression "human essence" can mean for him once he has abandoned the species-ontology of his earlier writings and declared himself a nominalist. That pivotal question aside, it is at least clear that in *Principles*, and in his later writings on ethics, Feuerbach continues to emphasize the importance of inter-subjectivity and of the I-Thou relationship, but that these are no longer conceived in idealistic terms, as they had been in his earlier writings.

Human beings are essentially communal and dialogical beings, both with respect to our cognitive and linguistic capacities, and with respect to the range of moral sentiments we experience toward one another. But the communality in which the human essence is manifested is now said to be one that presupposes a real, "sensible" distinction between I and Thou.

K. Marx and F. Engels: dialectical and historical materialism.

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is best known not as a philosopher but as a revolutionary communist, whose works inspired the foundation of many communist regimes in the twentieth century. It is hard to think of many who have had as much influence in the creation of the modern world. Trained as a philosopher, Marx turned away from philosophy in his mid-twenties, towards economics and politics.

However, in addition to his overtly philosophical early work, his later writings have many points of contact with contemporary philosophical debates, especially in the philosophy of history and the social sciences, and in moral and political philosophy. Historical materialism – Marx's theory of history – is centered around the idea that forms of society rise and fall as they further and then impede the development of human productive power.

Marx sees the historical process as proceeding through a necessary series of modes of production, characterized by class struggle, culminating in communism. Marx's economic analysis of capitalism is based on his version of the labour theory of value, and includes the analysis of capitalist profit as the extraction of surplus value from the exploited proletariat. The analysis of history and economics come together in Marx's prediction of the inevitable economic breakdown of capitalism, to be replaced by communism. However Marx refused to speculate in detail about the nature of communism, arguing that it would arise through historical processes, and was not the realisation of a pre-determined moral ideal.

The Theses on Feuerbach contain one of Marx's most memorable remarks: "*the philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it*" (thesis 11). However the eleven theses as a whole provide, in the compass of a couple of pages, a remarkable digest of Marx's reaction to the philosophy of his day.

In the first thesis Marx states his objections to materialism and idealism. Materialism is complimented for understanding the physical reality of the world, but is criticized for ignoring the active role of the human subject in creating the world we perceive. Idealism, at least as developed by Hegel, understands the active nature of the human subject, but confines it to thought or contemplation: the world is created through the categories we impose upon it.

Marx combines the insights of both traditions to propose a view in which human beings do indeed create – or at least transform – the world they find themselves in, but this transformation happens not in thought but through actual material activity; not through the imposition of sublime concepts but through the sweat of their brow, with picks and shovels.

This historical version of materialism, which transcends and thus rejects all existing philosophical thought, is the foundation of Marx's later theory of history. This thought, derived from reflection on the history of philosophy, together with his experience of social and economic realities, as a journalist, sets the agenda for all Marx's future work.

Marx did not set out his theory of history in great detail. Accordingly, it has to be constructed from a variety of texts, both those where he attempts

to apply a theoretical analysis to past and future historical events, and those of a more purely theoretical nature. Of the latter, the 1859 Preface to *A Critique of Political Economy* has achieved canonical status. However, *The German Ideology*, co-written with Friedrich Engels in 1845, is a vital early source in which Marx first sets out the basics of the outlook of historical materialism.

In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels contrast their new materialist method with the idealism which had characterized previous German thought. Accordingly, they take pains to set out the "premises of the materialist method". They start, they say, from "real human beings", emphasizing that human beings are essentially productive, in that they must produce their means of subsistence in order to satisfy their material needs.

The satisfaction of needs engenders new needs of both a material and social kind, and forms of society arise corresponding to the state of development of human productive forces. Material life determines, or at least "*conditions*" social life, and so the primary direction of social explanation is from material production to social forms, and thence to forms of consciousness. As the material means of production develop, "*modes of co-operation*" or economic structures rise and fall, and eventually communism will become a real possibility once the plight of the workers and their awareness of an alternative motivates them sufficiently to become revolutionaries.

In the sketch of *The German Ideology*, all the key elements of historical materialism are present, even if the terminology is not yet that of Marx's more mature writings. Marx's statement in 1859 Preface renders much the same view in sharper form. This is the thesis that the productive forces tend to develop, in the sense of becoming more powerful, over time. This states not that they always do develop, but that there is a tendency for them to do so. The productive forces are the means of production, together with productively applicable knowledge: technology, in other words.

The next thesis is the primacy thesis, which has two aspects. The first states that the nature of the economic structure is explained by the level of development of the productive forces, and the second that the nature of the superstructure – the political and legal institutions of society – is explained by the nature of the economic structure.

The nature of a society's ideology, which is to say the religious, artistic, moral and philosophical beliefs contained within society, is also explained in terms of its economic structure. Indeed many activities may well combine aspects of both the superstructure and ideology: a religion is constituted by both institutions and a set of beliefs.

Revolution and epoch change is understood as the consequence of an economic structure no longer being able to continue to develop the forces

of production. At this point the development of the productive forces is said to be fettered, and, according to the theory once an economic structure fetters development it will be revolutionized – "burst asunder" – and eventually replaced with an economic structure better suited to preside over the continued development of the forces of production.

In outline, then, the theory has a pleasing simplicity and power. It seems plausible that human productive power develops over time, and plausible too that economic structures exist for as long as they develop the productive forces, but will be replaced when they are no longer capable of doing this. Yet severe problems emerge when we attempt to put more flesh on these bones.

The issue of Marx and morality poses a conundrum. On reading Marx's works at all periods of his life, there appears to be the strongest possible distaste towards bourgeois capitalist society, and an undoubted endorsement of future communist society. Yet the terms of this antipathy and endorsement are far from clear.

Theme 3
Ontology

The questions

1. Areas of philosophical enquiry.
2. Ontology as philosophical conception on the being.
3. Being of nature (of things, processes, states). Human's being and being of society.

There is an understanding of areas of philosophical enquiry. At least they can be considered ontology, philosophy of consciousness, epistemology, philosophy of nature, anthropology, axiology, and social philosophy.

Closely related to the understanding of the spheres of philosophical inquiry is the problem of a subject of philosophy. This is the problem of understanding in the philosophy of substance as an unchangeable essence of things.

The so-called basic question of philosophy has two sides – ontological and epistemological or cognitive. The ontological side of the main question of philosophy involves the search for an answer to substantive questions: What is the first? What is the beginning of everything? Matter or Mind?

There are two lines in ontology – materialism and idealism. Philosophers who believe that substance is matter belong to the line of materialism. In the history of the evolution of philosophical knowledge, it is possible to discover forms of philosophical materialism: atomistic materialism of antiquity, the eighteenth-century mechanistic materialism, anthropological materialism of *Ludwig Feuerbach*, and dialectical and historical materialism of *Karl Marx* and *Friedrich Engels*.

Philosophers who believe that substance is mind are in the line of idealism. Two historical forms of philosophical idealism require to be studied – subjective idealism (substance is a mind) and objective idealism (substance is an ideal abstract thing, such as the Absolute or the Absolute Idea, or a God).

The cognitive side of the main question of philosophy involves the search for an answer to epistemological question: What is the main source of knowledge of nature, society, man and his thinking? Depending on the answer to this question in the history of philosophy, researchers distinguish between two lines in gnoceology: sensualism and rationalism.

Areas of philosophical enquiry are supposed to be understood in terms of the methods of philosophy – dialectics and metaphysics.

The dialectical method is based on the principles of motion, development and interconnection. The main idea is the recognition that everything in the universe is changeable. The metaphysical method is based on the principle of constancy. The main idea is the recognition that everything in the universe is unchangeable.

Ontology is a major branch of philosophy and a central part of metaphysics that studies questions of being or existence. Aristotle called the studies of "being as being" the First Philosophy and his First Philosophy was closely tied to Theology as the study of a supreme being.

The ontological questions include a wide range of issues concerning being or existence:

1. The meaning of being or What it means "*to be*" for each of such beings as physical objects, non-physical objects (souls), God, values, numbers, time, space, imaginary objects, and others/
2. What is real existence?
3. Why does anything exist, rather than nothingness?
4. What constitutes the *identity* of an object? When does an object go *out* of existence, as opposed to *changing*?
5. Is existence an event, process? Or is it something static, stable, or unchanging?
6. How is existence related to time and space? What is a kind of being is time and space? Is it a being or something else?
7. What features are essential, as opposed to merely accidental, attributes of a given object? What are an object's properties or relations and how are they related to the object itself?
8. What could it mean to say that non-physical objects exist (such as times, numbers, souls, gods, values, imaginative objects)? What is an existence?
9. What is a physical object? Can one give an account of what it means to say that a physical object exists?
10. Is existence a property (characteristic)? What does it mean to say something exists or does not exist? Is existence properly a predicate (statement)? Are sentences expressing the existence or non-existence of something properly called statements?

Properties of Being. Being has three attributes that are not only inseparable from it but really identical with it: 1. unity, 2. truth, and 3. goodness. They have the same universal extension as being itself, and are therefore called *transcendental attributes*. They are analyzed from three points of view.

1. Every Being Is One, i.e. every being is undivided. If it is simple it is not only undivided but also indivisible. If it is composed of parts or elements it is divisible, but these parts or elements must be together undividedly in order that we may have the being.

This form of unity, called *transcendental unity*, is merely the fact that a being must have all its constitutive (formative) elements.

Essential unity refers to the possession of whatever is required to constitute the essence. If a being is simple this essential unity is obvious; if it is composite, like man or any material substance, it must possess all that is essential to it, e.g. body and soul, animality and rationality.

Accidental unity results either from the union of a substance with its accidents, e.g. of a man with his science, size, features; or from the union of several distinct substances, as a forest from many trees, a house from many materials, a watch from many parts.

2. Every Being Is True, i.e. every being possesses *ontological* truth. This statement means simply that:

2.1. Every being is truly what it is, even though the mind should mistake it for something else;

2.2. It is *knowable* by the mind even though the mind may fall into error. When things are imitations of a standard to which we compare them, we call them false. But this does not affect their ontological truth; they are true in themselves, but lead the mind to false judgments or to logical errors.

3. Every Being Is Good, i.e. primarily every being possesses some internal goodness *in itself* and *for itself*, some perfection, some action; and secondarily every being is or may be good for some other being with whose tendencies its own actuality may harmonize.

This question is closely connected with that of *teleology* since an aim is always a good. No reality is evil in itself, but it may be evil for another, that is, evil arises from a conflict of tendencies or evil arises from this relation of antagonism. For instance, fire in itself is good as the rapid combination of a substance with oxygen. It is also good for the man who is cold or wants to cook his food; evil for the man whom it burns or whose property it destroys.

Degrees and kinds of being:

1. Existent and Possible Being. Possibility of being means the abstract capacity of the subject itself to exist. A possible being is simply an idea, the elements of which include no contradiction.

Not so many years ago flying machines, X-rays, wireless telegraph and telephone, were merely internal possibilities which man had not yet been able to produce. Which things are possible, and under which conditions they are possible, the mind is often unable to decide.

2. Essence and Existence. Existence is opposed to mere possibility and means that a thing is not simply potential in its causes, but is actual. Essence is conceived as receiving, or being actualized by, existence. The only difference between essence and possibility is that, while possibility excludes existence, essence neither excludes nor includes it. To call one thing essential to another means that the latter can not exist without the former.

Body and soul are the elements of the physical essence of man; animality and rationality, the elements of his logical essence or definition. But it is not essential to man to be six feet tall, to know chemistry, to play baseball, etc.

3. Substance and Accident. Substance and accidents always go together, and together form the concrete being, but generally the substance is more permanent and its accidents are more easily changeable.

The denial of the reality of substances and the reduction of all realities to phenomena *(Phenomenalism)* or groups of qualities, is generally the result of a misunderstanding of the true meaning of substance, and leads to the impossibility of accounting for the existence of the phenomena themselves.

Theme 4
Philosophy of Consciousness

The questions

1. Consciousness' problem in philosophy. Natural scientific and philosophical interpretation of consciousness.
2. Genesis of human consciousness. Structure and forms of consciousness. Social nature of consciousness.
3. Consciousness as highest structuring and controlling activity. Self-consciousness.

Explaining *the nature of consciousness* is one of the most important areas of philosophy. The problem of consciousness is the most central issue in current philosophy of mind and is also importantly related to major traditional topics in metaphysics, such as the possibility of immortality and the belief in free will.

Terminological Matters: Various Concepts of Consciousness.

The concept of consciousness is indefinite. It is important first to make several distinctions and to define related terms. The abstract noun "consciousness" is not often used in the contemporary literature, though it should be noted that it is originally derived from the Latin *con* (with) and *scire* (to know).

Thus, "consciousness" has etymological ties to one's ability to know and understand, and should not be confused with conscience as soul or mind, which has the much more specific moral connotation of knowing when one has done or is doing something wrong.

Through consciousness, one can have knowledge of the external world or one's own mental states. The primary contemporary interest lies more in the use of the expressions "x is conscious" or "x is conscious of y". Under the first category, perhaps most important is the distinction between state and creature (organism) consciousness.

We sometimes speak of an individual mental state, such as a pain or perception, as conscious. On the other hand, we also often speak of organisms or creatures as conscious, such as when we say "human beings are conscious" or "dogs are conscious".

Creature consciousness is also simply meant to refer to the fact that an organism is awake, as opposed to sleeping or in a coma. However, some kind of state consciousness is often implied by creature (organism) consciousness, that is, the organism is having conscious mental states.

Due to the lack of a direct object in the expression *"x is conscious"*, this is usually referred to as intransitive consciousness, in contrast to transitive consciousness where the phrase "*x is conscious of y"* is used. Most contemporary theories of consciousness are aimed at explaining state consciousness; that is, explaining what makes a mental state a conscious mental state.

It might seem that "*conscious*" is synonymous with "*awareness*" (knowing) or "*experience*" or "*attention*". However, it is crucial to recognize that this is not generally accepted today. For example, though perhaps somewhat atypical, one might hold that there are even unconscious experiences, depending of course on how the term "*experience*" is defined. More common is the belief that we can be aware of external objects in some unconscious sense, for example, during cases of subliminal perception.

The expression "*conscious awareness*" does not therefore seem to be redundant. Finally, it is not clear that consciousness ought to be restricted to attention. It seems plausible to suppose that one is conscious (in some sense) of objects in one's peripheral visual field even though one is only attending to some narrow (focal) set of objects within that visual field.

Perhaps the most fundamental and commonly used notion of "*conscious*" is captured *"what it is like"* sense. When I am in a conscious mental state, there is *"something it is like"* for me to be in that state from the subjective or first-person point of view. When I am, for example, smelling a rose or having a conscious visual experience, there is something it "*seems*" or "*feels*" like from my perspective.

Philosophers sometimes refer to conscious states as phenomenal or qualitative states. More technically, philosophers often view such states as having qualitative properties.

Finally, it is helpful to distinguish between *consciousness* and *self-consciousness*, which plausibly involves some kind of awareness (knowing) or consciousness of one's own mental states (instead of something out in the world).

Self-consciousness comes in degrees of sophistication ranging from minimal bodily self-awareness to the ability to reason and reflect on one's own mental states, such as one's beliefs and desires. Some important historical figures have even held that consciousness entails some form of self-consciousness (*I. Kant; J. P. Sartre*), a view shared by some contemporary philosophers.

The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Materialism vs. Dualism.

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the ultimate (or final) nature (essence) of reality. There are two broad traditional and competing metaphysical views concerning the nature of the mind and conscious mental states: *dualism* and *materialism*.

1. While there are many versions of each, dualism generally holds that the conscious mind or a conscious mental state is non-physical in some sense.

2. On the other hand, materialists hold that the mind is the brain, or, more accurately, that conscious mental activity is identical with neural activity.

It is important to recognize that by non-physical, dualists do not merely mean "not visible to the naked eye". Many physical things fit this description, such as the atoms which make up the air in a typical room. For something to be non-physical, it must literally be outside the realm of physics; that is, not in space at all and undetectable in principle by the instruments of physics.

It is equally important to recognize that the category "*physical*" is broader than the category "*material*". Materialists are called such because there is the tendency to view the brain, a material thing, as the most likely physical candidate to identify with the mind.

However, something might be physical but not material in this sense, such as an electromagnetic or energy field. Thus, to say that the mind is non-physical is to say something much stronger than that it is non-material.

Dualists tend to believe that conscious mental states or minds are radically different from anything in the physical world at all.

There are a number of reasons why some version of dualism has been held throughout the centuries. For one thing, our conscious mental states just do not seem like physical things or processes. That is, when we reflect on our conscious perceptions, pains, and desires, they do not seem to be physical in any sense.

Consciousness seems to be a unique aspect of the world not to be understood in any physical way. Although materialists will urge that this completely ignores the more scientific perspective on the nature of consciousness and mind, this idea continues to have force for many today.

The metaphysical conclusion is that consciousness cannot be identical with anything physical, partly because there is no essential conceptual connection between the mental and the physical. Arguments such as these go back to *R. Descartes* and continue to be used today in various ways, but it is highly controversial as to whether they succeed in showing that materialism is false. *Materialists* have replied in various ways to such arguments.

Belief in dualism is often explicitly theologically motivated. If the conscious mind is not physical, it seems more plausible to believe in the possibility of life after bodily death. On the other hand, if conscious mental activity is identical with brain activity, then it would seem that when all brain activity ceases (ends), so do all conscious experiences and thus no immortality.

To put it another way: If we are entirely physical beings as the materialist holds, then mustn't all of the brain activity and behavior in question be determined by the laws of nature? Although materialism may not logically rule out immortality or free will, materialists will likely often reply that such traditional, perhaps even outdated or pre-scientific beliefs simply ought to be rejected to the extent that they conflict with materialism.

One might wonder "even if the mind is physical, what about the soul?" Maybe it's the soul, not the mind, which is non-physical as one might be told in many religious traditions. While it is true that the term "*soul*" (or "*spirit*") is often used instead of "*mind*" in such religious contexts, the problem is that it is unclear just how the soul is supposed to differ from the mind.

The terms "soul" and "mind" are often even used interchangeably (in a way that can be exchanged) in many historical texts and by many philosophers because it is unclear what else the soul could be other than "*the mental substance*".

It is difficult to describe the soul in any way that doesn't make it sound like what we mean by the mind. After all, that's what many believe goes on after bodily death; namely, conscious mental activity.

May be the term "soul" carries a more theological connotation, but it doesn't follow that the words "soul" and "mind" refer to entirely different things.

Theme 5
Epistemology

The questions

1. Genesis and development of cognition. Cognition as object of philosophical analysis. Category and structure of knowledge.
2. Sensual and rational cognition, its unity in a Modern cognitive model. General rational methods of cognition.
3. Science and scientific knowledge: peculiar evidences. Nature sciences and humanities: features and models.

Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Philosophers-epistemologists concern themselves with a number of tasks, which we might sort into two categories. First, we must determine the *nature* of knowledge: What does it mean to say that someone knows something, or fails to know something?

This is a matter of understanding what knowledge is, and how to distinguish between cases in which someone knows something and cases in which someone does not know something. While there is some general agreement about some aspects of this issue, this question is much more difficult than one might imagine.

Second, we must determine the extent (size) of human knowledge; that is, how much do we know? Or how much can we know? How can we use our reason, our senses, the testimony of others, and other resources to acquire knowledge?

Are there limits to what we can know? For instance, are some things unknowable? Is it possible that we do not know nearly as much as we think we do?

The study of knowledge is one of the most fundamental aspects of philosophical inquiry. Any claim to knowledge must be evaluated to determine whether or not it indeed constitutes knowledge. Such an evaluation essentially requires an understanding of what knowledge is and how much knowledge is possible?

Epistemology will continue to be an area of philosophical discussion as long as these questions remain.

Kinds of Knowledge. The term "epistemology" comes from the Greek *"episteme"*, meaning "knowledge", and "*logos"*, meaning, roughly, "study, or science, of". "Logos" is the root of all terms ending in "-ology" – such as psychology, anthropology – and of "logic", and has many other related meanings.

The word "*knowledge*" is used in a variety of ways.

1. One common use of the word "*know*" is as an expression of psychological conviction. For instance, we might hear someone say, "I just knew it wouldn't rain, but then it did". While this may an appropriate usage, philosophers tend to use the word "*know*" in a *factive* sense, so that one cannot know something that is not the case. Even if we restrict ourselves to factive usages, there are still multiple senses of "knowledge", and so we need to distinguish between them.

2. One kind of knowledge is procedural knowledge, sometimes called competence or "know-how"; for example, one can know how to ride a bicycle.

3. Another kind of knowledge is acquaintance knowledge or familiarity; for instance, one can know the department chairperson, or one can know Moscow.

4. Epistemologists typically do not focus on procedural or acquaintance knowledge, however, instead preferring to focus on *propositional* knowledge. A proposition is something which can be expressed by a declarative sentence, and which denotes to describe a fact or a state of affairs, such as "*Dogs are mammals*". (Note that a proposition may be true or false; that is, it need not *actually* express a fact).

Propositional knowledge, then, can be called knowledge – "that", statements of propositional knowledge (or the lack thereof) are properly expressed using "that"-clauses. In what follows, we will be concerned only with propositional knowledge. Propositional knowledge, obviously, encompasses knowledge about a wide range of matters: scientific knowledge, geographical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, self-knowledge, and knowledge about any field of study whatever. Any truth might, in principle, be knowable, although there might be unknowable truths.

One goal of epistemology is to determine the criteria for knowledge so that we can know what can or cannot be known. In other words, the study of epistemology fundamentally includes the study of meta-epistemology (what we can know about knowledge itself).

We can also distinguish between different types of propositional knowledge, based on the source of that knowledge:

Non-empirical or "*a priori knowledge*" is possible independently of any experience, and requires only the use of reason; examples include knowledge of logical truths, as well as knowledge of abstract claims (such as ethical claims or claims about various conceptual matters).

Empirical or "a posteriori knowledge" is possible only subsequent (after) to certain sense experiences (in addition to the use of reason); examples include knowledge of the color or shape of a physical object or knowledge

of geographical locations. An epistemology should, of course, address all kinds of knowledge, although there might be different standards for *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge.

We can also distinguish between individual knowledge and collective knowledge. (*Social epistemology* is the subfield of epistemology that addresses the way that groups, institutions, or other collective bodies might come to acquire knowledge).

The Nature of Propositional Knowledge. We have narrowed our focus to propositional knowledge. We must ask ourselves: What, exactly, constitutes knowledge? What does it mean for someone to know something? What is the difference between someone who knows something and someone else who does not know it, or between something one knows and something one does not know?

Since the scope of knowledge is so broad, we need a general characterization of knowledge, one which is applicable to any kind of proposition.

Epistemologists have usually undertaken this task by seeking a correct and complete analysis of the concept of knowledge.

In other words, a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions which determine whether someone knows something:

Belief. Begin with the observation that knowledge is a mental state; knowledge is a specific kind of mental state. Knowledge is a kind of *belief.* If one has no beliefs about a particular matter, one cannot have knowledge about it. Knowledge requires belief. Of course, not all beliefs constitute knowledge. Belief is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge.

Truth. We are all sometimes mistaken in what we believe; in other words, while some of our beliefs are true, others are false. As we try to acquire knowledge, we are trying to increase our stock of *true* beliefs (while simultaneously minimizing our false beliefs). We can say that truth is a *condition* of knowledge; that is, if a belief is not true, it cannot constitute knowledge. Accordingly, if there is no such thing as truth, then there can be no knowledge.

Justification. Knowledge requires factual belief. Not all true beliefs constitute knowledge; only true beliefs arrived at in the right way constitute knowledge. The requirement that knowledge involve justification does not necessarily mean that knowledge requires absolute certainty. The fact that a belief is true does not tell us whether or not it is justified; that depends on how the belief was arrived at.

Sources of Knowledge and Justification. For true beliefs to count as knowledge, it is necessary that they originate in sources we have good reason to consider reliable. These sources are: 1) perception, 2) introspection, 3) memory, 4) reason, 5) testimony:

Perception. Our perceptual faculties are our five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smelling, and tasting. We must distinguish between an experience: that can be classified as *perceiving* that *p* (for example, seeing that there is coffee in the cup and tasting that it is sweet), which entails that *p* is true, and a perceptual experience in which it seems to us as though *p*, but where *p* might be false. Let us refer to this latter kind of experience as *perceptual seemings.*

Philosophers (direct and indirect realists) hold different views about the structure of perceptual knowledge: indirect realists would say that we acquire perceptual knowledge of external objects by virtue of perceiving sense data that represent external objects. Sense data, a species of mental states, enjoy a special status: we know directly what they are like.

So indirect realists think that, when perceptual knowledge is foundational, it is knowledge of sense data and other mental states. Knowledge of external objects is indirect: derived from our knowledge of sense data. The basic idea is that we have indirect knowledge of the external world because we can have foundational knowledge of our own mind.

Direct realists can be more liberal about the foundation of our knowledge of external objects. Since they hold that perceptual experiences get you in direct contact with external objects, they can say that such experiences can give you foundational knowledge of external objects.

Introspection. Introspection is the capacity to inspect the, metaphorically speaking, "inside" of one's mind. Through introspection, one knows what mental states one is in: whether one is thirsty, tired, excited, or depressed. How can we account for the special status of introspection? Introspection reveals how the world appears to us in our perceptual experiences.

Memory. Memory is the capacity to retain knowledge acquired in the past. What one remembers, though, need not be a past event. One issue about memory concerns the question of what distinguishes memorial seemings from perceptual seemings or mere imagination. Memorial seemings of the past do not guarantee that the past is what we take it to be. Why, then, should we think that memory is a source of knowledge about the past?

Reason. Some beliefs would appear to be justified solely by the use of reason. Justification of that kind is said to be *a priori*: prior to any kind of experience.

Testimony. Testimony differs from the sources we considered above because it isn't distinguished by having its own cognitive faculty. The epistemological puzzle testimony raises is this: Why is testimony a source of knowledge? A philosopher might say that testimony is a source of knowledge if and only if it comes from a reliable source. Philosophers

suggested that, by our very nature, we accept testimonial sources as reliable and tend to attribute credibility to them unless we encounter special contrary reasons.

Models of epistemology:

1. *Virtue Epistemology*. Epistemology, as commonly practiced, focuses on the subject's beliefs. According to pure virtue epistemology, epistemic virtues and vices are *sui generis* = specific, particular. According to an externalist strand of virtue epistemology, it is the very notion of reliability that we should employ to capture the difference between epistemic virtues and vices. Stable ways of forming beliefs are epistemic virtues if and only if they tend to result in true beliefs, epistemic vices if and only if they tend to result in false beliefs.

2. *Naturalistic Epistemology*. According to a moderate version of naturalistic epistemology, one primary task of epistemology is to identify how knowledge and justification are manifested in the natural world. The pursuit of this task does not require of its proponents to replace traditional epistemology. Rather, this moderate approach accepts the need for *cooperation* between traditional conceptual analysis and empirical methods.

3. *Religious Epistemology*. In the history of philosophy, there are several famous arguments for the existence of God: the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, and the argument from design. From an epistemological point of view, the question is whether such arguments can constitute a rational foundation of faith, or even give us knowledge of God.

4. *Moral Epistemology.* The basic moral categories are those of right and wrong action. When we do theoretical ethics, we wish to find out what it is that makes a right action right and a wrong action wrong. When we do practical or applied ethics, we attempt to find out which actions are right and which are wrong. The epistemological question these areas of philosophy raise is this: How can we know any of that? Traditionally, philosophers have attempted to answer the questions of ethics via intuition, *a priori* reasoning, and the consideration of hypothetical cases. A further important question is whether moral knowledge is at all possible.

5. *Social Epistemology.* When we conceive of epistemology as including knowledge and justified belief as they are positioned within a particular social and historical context, epistemology becomes social epistemology. Social epistemology ought to amount to a radical departure from traditional epistemology, which has an individualistic orientation.

Theme 6
Anthropology

The questions

1. Anthropology as a philosophical science. Human as an object of philosophical analysis. Fundamentals of the human being.
2. Anthropogenesis: natural sciences and philosophical aspects. Biological and social in human being. Typologies of human being. Individual, individuality, personality.
3. The Human and his relations with the World. Human's being phenomena.

Philosophical anthropology is a discipline within philosophy that seeks to unify the several empirical investigations of human nature in an effort to understand individuals as both creatures of their environment and creators of their own values.

Origins and terminology. In the 18-th century, "anthropology" was the branch of philosophy that gave an account of human nature. At that time, almost everything in the domain of systematic knowledge was understood to be a branch of philosophy. For example, physics was still known as "natural philosophy", and the study of economics had developed as a part of "moral philosophy".

At the same time, anthropology was not where the main work of philosophy was done. As a branch of philosophy it served, instead, as a kind of review of the implications for human nature of philosophically more central doctrines, and it may have incorporated a good deal of empirical material that would now be thought of as belonging to psychology.

By the end of the 19th century, anthropology and many other disciplines had established their independence from philosophy. Anthropology emerged as a branch of the social sciences that studied the biological and evolutionary history of human beings (*physical anthropology*), as well as the culture and society that distinguished *Homo sapiens* from other animal species (*cultural anthropology*). In their study of social and cultural institutions and practices, anthropologists typically focused on the less highly developed societies, further distinguishing anthropology from sociology.

As a result of these developments, the term *philosophical anthropology* is not in familiar use among anthropologists and would probably not meet with any ready comprehension from philosophers either, at least in the

English-speaking world. When anthropology is conceived in contemporary terms, philosophical thought might come within its purview only as an element in the culture of some society that is under study.

Modern philosophical anthropology emphasizes the relevance of philosophical theories of human nature.

Man and Animal:

1. *Man's Unique Interest in Himself.* It seems safe to say that the human being gives more thought than any other animal to himself. He alone speculates on the origin of his species on the earth, on what happens to the individual soul after death, and on what is to be the destiny of the race in the long future of the planet.

This interest of man in himself is a justified interest:

Purely as a biological study, the human body is the most complex and interesting of all organic forms.

There are animals that live longer; but there are none that live so much during their lifetime, and none which are capable of so great variety in behavior.

No other creature has found ways of living in all climates, from equator to arctic zones.

No other fits himself out with clothing, varying from season to season, place to place, and fashion to fashion.

No other uses his sense organs to improve on his sense organs until he can hear his own whispers around the world and bring both the incredibly minute and the incredibly remote into his field of sight.

No other land animal projects himself for long journeys under water and through the air.

All this variety is a result of one asset - the human mind, with its inner resources of imagination. It is enough at present to see:

a) that mind and body are not the same;

b) that they are inseparably joined in the living person;

c) that, to think truly of our own mind, we must manage to think of thinking;

d) that, since we cannot directly perceive the thinking of other people, we have to get at their minds by way of their bodies, their gestures, expressions of emotion, language.

2. *Resemblances between man and animal.* Men have always been interested in the resemblances between themselves and animals. In ancient times, they were inclined to read the likeness backward: animals are surprisingly like men.

In modern times, they have been more inclined to read it forward: men are surprisingly like animals. So far as animals are like ourselves in mentality we can understand them, tame them, use them, and occasionally feel flattered when we win the confidence of a wild or timorous beast. As the bodily shape of the animal diverges from our own, the sense of understanding weakens.

During the last century, science has been interested in reading the continuities between animals and men, emphasizing everything in man that could be regarded as inherited from an animal ancestry. If we take all facts together, the biological view of human nature based on resemblances between man and animal does throw much light on why we are as we are. For the nineteenth century, it was the great source of illumination.

But it leaves many questions unanswered. For example, human interests do not limit themselves to what aids survival. No doubt hunger aids survival; but this does not explain why eating and cookery develop into fine arts. The human eye is an aid to survival, but who limits his interest in what he sees to what aids survival? Or in what he hears? How does music aid survival? It is through knowledge, as *F. Bacon* said, that we master nature; but when has curiosity stopped at that point?

Again, no man feels bound to stick to the biological pattern. Many deliberately break away from it. In some, scientific curiosity or ambition or some special lifework displaces all family attachments. Others turn down the whole biological invitation, taking the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, as devotees of a religious life.

There are some failures in these ambitious efforts to spurn ambition; but there are some remarkable successes which show that the thing is possible. Biology does not tell us how it is possible; there are no voluntary ascetics among the animals. Any real understanding of the human being and his interests must go on to consider the differences between man and the animals. Man can understand the animals; the animal can but dimly understand man, for whatever is most characteristic of the human being passes him completely by.

3. *Differences between man and animal.* Most definitions of man begin with the words "*Man is an Animal*". They then proceed to mention what they regard as the most important difference which separates him from the other animals. Thus, *Aristotle* defined man as the animal that reasons. He also proposed that man is the "political animal", i.e., the animal that builds societies going beyond the family to the more impersonal groupings of the village and the state. He added the remark that man is political because he has language.

Many other definitions have been proposed, more or less seriously. Man is the animal that laughs. Man is the animal that draws pictures. Man is the self-conscious animal. Man is the animal capable of shame, since no other animal shows signs of apology for its natural processes. Another definition comes nearer the center of the target: man is the animal with a moral sense; he is therefore capable of remorse and indeed of so much moral suffering that we occasionally fancy that a return to the animal condition would be a relief.

Meantime, having before us numerous mental differences between man and animal, let us inquire more systematically, and beginning with the main physiological differences.

4. *Physiological differences between man and animal.*

a) *Man is mediocre, nondescript, and unfinished.* In physique, man is a mediocre animal. He has no great strength, no great speed of motion, no great keenness of eye, ear, or smell. He has no impressive organs of offense (as tusks, horns, claws) nor of defense (as tough hide or carapace). Nor has he special organic tools, such as the elephant's trunk or the beaver's tail.

He is nondescript in the sense that he is not marked out by nature for any distinctive way of life or habitat. And he is unfinished at birth; his instincts do not carry him at once into successful techniques. A newborn calf will find its legs within a few minutes; the human infant struggles for months with the problem of locomotion.

This very unfinishedness is an advantage: it is man's opportunity for free adaptation to various and changing circumstances.

b) *Man is balanced*. The muscles of his front and back work opposite each other to hold him upright. This allows him not only a free pair of arms and a quick change of direction, but also an easy all-around survey. This is a physical symbol of his mental trait of "looking before and after" – using his memory of the past to anticipate the future.

c) *Man is unified*. The human being is neither so passive a creature nor so multiple. It has a singleness and steadiness to which we give the name "purpose". Purpose is something of which the animal is incapable; man's capacity for it is recorded in unity of the organization of his nervous system. This does not mean that purpose rides over instinct and pushes it out of the way. It means rather that purpose uses instinct. All the native impulses are a sort of raw material which can contribute to purpose.

5. *Whether man can be defined as the animal with a soul.* Man's mind sees things on their negative as well as on their positive side. And this is a result of seeing them as parts of wholes; for in the light of a totality, every partial fact has two reckonings – what it is and what it is not, what it lacks

of being complete. Oftentimes the negative reckoning is the more important side of the truth. No animal is worried by its ignorance; for man, the knowledge of how much he does not know is his perpetual incentive to learn. He grows because on all sides he is aware of the unachieved. When we have a creature whose thought takes account of wholes, we have a radical step, perhaps the most radical step, in mental history.

If so, man can be defined as the animal who thinks in terms of totalities. Some word for "*all*" and some word for "*the world*" are found in all languages. There are also words for the negatives "*not all*", "*absence*", "*emptiness*", "*silence*", "*nothing*", "*not enough*". These terms separate human from all animal language. Now the term "*soul*" has been used to indicate that there is an important gap between the animal and the human mind. And this gap has commonly been placed in man's moral nature, his capacity for self-judgment.

These qualities depend on the power we have now observed – the capacity to think of things and of himself in the frame of the whole in which they are placed, the infinite universe. With this understanding we may literally define man as the animal with a soul.

Sometimes the soul has been regarded as separate from the "*mind*", a sort of duplicate personality, with powers of a higher order than those of the ordinary self of the day's work. Such a separate and separable soul psychology has not been able to find; and some psychologists have hastened to conclude that there is no such thing as a soul, that the idea is at once useless and superstitious.

We understand why man is the animal that writes biographies and histories; for when a group of creatures begins to accumulate what it learns in the form of a tradition, that is a sign of a need to build up a total of knowledge adequate to a total world.

The cultural achievements of man and their perils

6. *Man as the maker of culture.* Seeking to extend his control through the future, man has a vested interest in whatever is permanent. He takes a peculiar pleasure in any product of his own which he thinks will last. Some of his earliest works are durable simply because they are hard, like his flint implements. But for some of them the materials were chosen because he considered them durable – his stone monuments, tombs, and architecture, his metallic tablets, ornaments, and sacred vessels. What we call culture is that working of ideas into the patterns of social life so that the freer human interests are not only maintained but developed continuously – the sciences, the technical arts, the fine arts, the customs and laws, the history and the religion.

We can therefore not approach the study of the meaning of human culture in a spirit of self-congratulation nor in the belief that something called "*evolution*" or "*progress*" is bound to take place. Neither shall we assume, with Spengler, that our civilization is necessarily in for disaster. Our problem is to examine its factors for the good they promise and to praise where praise is due. But we must also recognize the general rule of experience, that every advance brings new problems and new dangers.

Evolution. The theory of evolution claimed that the various species of living things have a natural rather than a divine origin. These species evolve through random changes that occur in their members, though these changes themselves are not per se inheritable, as the French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck had supposed. In one way or another, such changes can influence an animal's chances of survival and of reproducing itself. In this way, a process of natural selection takes place from which the human species itself emerged.

As a theory of human nature, evolution had a humbling effect on the pride associated with claims that humans held a privileged status among living things. Yet it did not have any direct bearing on the traditionally held distinction between the body and the mind. It was, in fact, hard to imagine what further influence evolution could have in the human case without appealing to changes that in one way or another would be of a mental character.

All of this made evolutionary thought more of a threat to religious beliefs than to philosophical accounts of human nature, because the latter did not require any special assumptions regarding how the human species was formed.

Theme 7
Philosophy of Nature

The questions

1. Nature as a philosophical thinking's object. Forms of perceiving of nature in the history of culture.
2. Abiotic and biotic nature. Nature and Human intercourse.
3. Philosophy of Biology. Methodology in Philosophy of Biology.

Philosophy in the Modern world is a self-conscious discipline. It has managed to define itself narrowly, distinguishing itself on the one hand from religion and on the other from exact science. But this narrowing of focus came about very late in its history – certainly not before the 18-th century.

The earliest philosophers of ancient Greece were theorists of the physical world; *Pythagoras* and *Plato* were at once philosophers and mathematicians, and in Aristotle there is no clear distinction between philosophy and natural science.

The term *natural philosophy*, or the *philosophy of nature* (Latin, *philosophia naturalis*), has several applications, according to its historical context. Before the development of modern science, "natural philosophy" referred to the objective study of nature and the physical universe, and is considered the counterpart, or the precursor, of what is now called natural science, especially physics.

"*Natural philosophy*". The usage of the term "natural philosophy" preceded the current term "science". The word "science" was a synonym for knowledge or study, and the term "natural philosophy" referred to knowledge or study of "the workings of nature". Natural philosophy became "science" (Latin, scientia, "knowledge") when the acquisition of knowledge through experiments (special experiences) performed according to the scientific method became a specialized branch of study, beyond the type of observation, speculation, and logical analysis which takes place in philosophy.

Forms of modern science historically developed out of natural philosophy. At older universities, long-established Chairs of Natural Philosophy are today occupied mainly by physics professors. In Europe, natural philosophy reached its height during the high and late Middle Ages (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), after the rise of the university system.

Before the emergence of modern "science" and "scientists" in the nineteenth century, the word "science" simply meant "knowledge" and the

label, “scientist” did not exist. *Isaac Newton*’s 1687 scientific treatise is known as *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy)*.

Natural philosophy of Plato. In what is thought to be one of Plato’s earliest dialogues, *Charmides,* the distinction was drawn between sciences or bodies of knowledge which produced a physical result, and those which did not. Natural philosophy was categorized as a theoretical, rather than a practical, branch of philosophy, such as ethics.

Sciences that guided arts and which drew upon the philosophical knowledge of nature did, of course, produce many practical results, such as architecture or medicine, but these subsidiary “sciences” were considered beyond the scope of natural philosophy.

Natural philosophy of Aristotle. In his lifelong study of nature, Aristotle identified the physical universe as being dependent on a first cause, an unmoved mover of the universe, which was without matter and therefore imperceptible. In his treatise, Metaphysics, he referred to the study of this first cause as the “first philosophy”, and to physics, or the study of the material world, as the “second philosophy”.

Since the first entities were not perceptible, and were causal entities, they could only be studied through a metaphysical investigation of physical entities. In *Physics*, Aristotle conducted an investigation of different kinds of natural phenomena, providing a general framework for an understanding of nature. Ancient Greek philosophers conducted their study of the natural world through observation, and drew their conclusions from reflection and logical deduction.

Medieval Natural Philosophy. Medieval natural philosophy in Europe can be divided into two periods, distinguished by the rise of the university system. Before the rise of the universities during the twelfth century, there existed mostly catalogues or encyclopedias of natural history, but very few works that dealt with natural philosophy.

Most scholarly research took place under the auspices of church schools, monasteries or private patrons, and the strongest Greek influence was from medical works and Plato’s *Timaeus,* part of which had been translated into Latin, with commentary, by *Calcidius*. During this period, several original texts emerged that dealt with natural philosophy, including *William of Conches*’ *Philosophia mundi (*Philosophy of the World*)*, *Bernard Sylvester*’s *Cosmographie,* and *Hildegard of Bingen*’*s Scivia (*Know the Ways*)*.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, natural history was an official subject in the arts faculties of the medieval universities, distinct from the seven liberal arts, ethics, metaphysics, theology, medicine, and law. The

works of Aristotle had become available in Latin, and the study of natural philosophy often took the form of disputations or commentaries arising from Aristotle's *Physics, De generatione et corruptione (*On Generation and Perishing*)*, the *De caelo (*On the Heavens*)*, *Meteorology, On the Soul,* and *Parva Naturalia,* a group of treatises on psychology.

Very little scientific experimentation took place, and investigations were mostly based on the use of new methods of medieval logic. Investigations of the natural world that were based on mathematics, such as astronomy and optics, were generally considered to be outside the realm of natural philosophy. Natural philosophy was considered useful to medicine and theology, most original work in natural philosophy was carried out in pursuit of answers to theological problems, such as the nature of the soul and of angels, or in an effort to resolve contradictions between Christian doctrines and Aristotelian concepts of the cosmos.

Scientific inquiry. The Enlightenment brought about a great increase in scientific experimentation and discovery, much of which was carried out under private patronage, independently of the great universities. As scientific methods of research became established, natural philosophy was superseded by the development of various fields of scientific study.

Galileo (1564–1642), *Francis Bacon* (1561–1626), and *Robert Boyle* (1627–1691) shared a conviction that practical experimental observation provided a more satisfactory understanding of nature than reliance on revealed truth or on a purely speculative approach. Galileo wrote about his experiments in a philosophical way, but his methodology resembled modern scientific research. Francis Bacon originated proposals for a much more inquisitive and practical approach to the study of nature.

In 1686, Robert Boyle wrote what is considered to be a seminal work on the distinction between nature and metaphysics, *A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. This book represented a radical departure from the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, and introduced innovations such as an insistence upon the publication of detailed experimental results, including the results of unsuccessful experiments; and also a requirement for the replication of experiments as a means of validating observational claims.

René Descartes (1596–1650) distinguished between two kinds of substance, matter and mind. According to this system, everything which is "matter" is deterministic and natural – and so belongs to natural philosophy – and everything which is "mind" is volitional and non-natural, and falls outside the domain of philosophy of nature.

Naturphilosophie, a movement prevalent in German philosophy, literature, and science from 1790 until about 1830, is chiefly associated with

Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) and *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel* (1770–1831), and championed the concept of an organic and dynamic physical world, instead of the mechanism and atomism of the materialists and championed the concept of an organic and dynamic physical world, instead of the mechanism and atomism of the materialists.

It originated from the philosophy of German idealism, and opposed the *Cartesian* dualism of mind and matter with a *Spinozan* concept of mind and matter as different modes of a single substance. Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* portrayed nature as individual instances of a spiritual notion, and gave nature a "life" and a "personality" which resembled the life and personality of human beings.

Developments in physics and biology have initiated philosophical discussions on a whole new range of topics, mostly concerning the relationship of humans with nature and humanity's perception of natural reality. Modern natural philosophy explores the fundamental nature of natural reality and its implications for mankind, and includes fields such as environmental ethics, the philosophy of biology, and the philosophy of physics.

Revival of natural philosophy. Recent discoveries and developments in science have given rise to new discussions of the philosophy of nature, and have opened new areas of inquiry. Philosophy of nature now explores the fundamental features of natural reality and their implications for humankind. Human understanding of nature shapes beliefs and attitudes in many areas, including ethics, moral theory, metaphysics, and anthropology.

Powerful new technology allows the observation and measurement of physical phenomena far beyond the capacity of human senses, and has inspired new thought about the nature of "matter" and the "imperceptible" world. In astronomy and physics, certain mathematical and geometric relationships which were assumed to be absolutely true have been found to alter when they are applied at infinitely greater magnitudes, raising questions about the definition of truth, and about how the human mind can grasp everyday practical reality and at the same time comprehend truth on a larger scale.

Humanity has developed ways of interfering with the natural biological order, such as genetic engineering, artificial insemination, organ transplants, cloning, gene therapy, and the use of chemical agents such as fertilizers and pesticides. This raises new questions about ethics; when and to what extent it is appropriate for humankind to intervene in natural processes of growth and multiplication, and whether such intervention will disrupt the natural balance of the universe.

A new field, philosophy of biology, is rapidly developing in response to these issues and to ancient philosophical questions about the nature of

happiness and the quality of life. In just a short time, modern technology has allowed human beings to have a disproportionate impact on nature. Humanity is rapidly reshaping the natural environment, and scientists and scholars are questioning whether "nature" can survive this onslaught.

Another field of natural philosophy concerns the ethical use and distribution of resources among an increasing world population, the effect of technology on the balance of political power, and the best way in which to administer global standards and resolve conflicting interests. Examples are the debate over global warming, efforts to stem the development of nuclear weapons, and the creation of laws to protect international resources such as fisheries.

In metaphysics, natural philosophy is concerned with concepts of "creation science" and intelligent design, with the idea of the universe as an organic whole, and with the definition of the "supernatural world" and its relationship with the physical world. Some philosophers and scientists question whether a strict scientific methodology of experimentation, observation, and documentation can, by itself, provide an adequate understanding of physical reality, or whether a larger framework is needed.

Philosophy of Biology. The growth of philosophical interest in biology over the past fifty years reflects the increasing prominence of the biological sciences in the same period. There is now an extensive literature on many different biological topics, and it would be impossible to summarize this body of work in this single entry. Instead, this entry sets out to explain what philosophy of biology *is*. Why does biology matter to philosophy and vice versa? A list of the entries in the encyclopedia which address specific topics in the philosophy of biology is provided at the end of the entry.

Three different kinds of philosophical enquiry fall under the general heading of philosophy of biology. First, general theses in the philosophy of science are addressed in the context of biology. Second, conceptual puzzles within biology itself are subjected to philosophical analysis. Third, appeals to biology are made in discussions of traditional philosophical questions. The first two kinds of philosophical work are typically conducted in the context of a detailed knowledge of actual biology, the third less so.

Philosophy of biology can also be subdivided by the particular areas of biological theory with which it is concerned. Biology is a diverse set of disciplines, ranging from historical sciences such as paleontology to engineering sciences such as biotechnology. Different philosophical issues occur in each field. The latter part of the entry discusses how philosophers have approached some of the main disciplines within biology.

Methodology in Philosophy of Biology. Most work in the philosophy of biology is self-consciously naturalistic, recognizing no profound discontinuity in either method or content between philosophy and science. Ideally, philosophy of biology differs from biology itself not in its knowledge base, but only in the questions it asks.

The philosopher aims to engage with the content of biology at a professional level, although typically with greater knowledge of its history than biologists themselves, and less hands-on skills. It is common for philosophers of biology to have academic credentials in the fields that are the focus of their research, and to be closely involved with scientific collaborators.

Philosophy of biology's naturalism and the continuity of its concerns with science itself is shared with much other recent work in the philosophy of science, perhaps most notably in the philosophy of neuroscience. Even the distinction between the *questions* of biology and those of philosophy of biology is not absolutely clear. As noted above, philosophers of biology address three types of questions: general questions about the nature of science, conceptual puzzles within biology, and traditional philosophical questions that seem open to illumination from the biosciences.

When addressing the second sort of question, there is no clear distinction between philosophy of biology and theoretical biology. But while this can lead to the accusation that philosophers of biology have abandoned their calling for 'amateur hour biology' it can equally well be said that a book like *The Selfish Gene* (*Dawkins, 1976*) is primarily a contribution to philosophical discussion of biology.

Certainly, the professional skills of the philosopher are as relevant to these internal conceptual puzzles as they are to the other two types of question. All three types of questions can be related to the specific findings of the biological sciences only by complex chains of argument.

Theme 8
Axiology

The questions

1. Genesis of axiology as peculiar sub-discipline in philosophy.
2. Axiology is a theory of values. The category of value. Values in a system of culture.
3. Regulating character of values. Individual and social values, its combination. Types of values: moral, religious, political and legal, aesthetic.
4. Moral philosophy. Metaethics.

Axiology (from Greek *axios*, "worthy"; *logos*, "science"), also called theory of value, is the philosophical study of goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms. Its significance lies in: 1) the considerable expansion that it has given to the meaning of the term value, 2) the unification that it has provided for the study of a variety of questions – economic, moral, aesthetic, and even logical – that had often been considered in relative isolation.

The term "value" originally meant the worth of something, chiefly in the economic sense of exchange value, as in the work of the 18th-century political economist *Adam Smith.*

A broad extension of the meaning of value to wider areas of philosophical interest occurred during the 19-th century under the influence of a variety of thinkers and schools: *the Neo-Kantians*; *Friedrich Nietzsche*, author of a theory of the transvaluation of all values; *Eduard von Hartmann*, philosopher of the unconscious, whose *Grundriss der Axiologie* (Outline of Axiology, 1909) first used the term in a title.

Ralph Barton Perry's book *General Theory of Value* (1926) has been called the magnum opus of the new approach. A value, he theorized, is "*any object of any interest*". Later, he explored eight "*realms*" of value: morality, religion, art, science, economics, politics, law, and custom.

A distinction is commonly made between instrumental and intrinsic value between what is good as a means and what is good as an end. *John Dewey*, in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922) and *Theory of Valuation* (1939), presented a pragmatic interpretation and tried to break down this distinction between means and ends, though the latter effort was more likely a way of emphasizing the point that many actual things in human life – such as health, knowledge, and virtue – are good in both senses.

Other philosophers have multiplied the distinctions – differentiating, for example, between instrumental value (being good for some purpose) and technical value (being good at doing something) or between contributory value (being good as part of a whole) and final value (being good as a whole).

Many different answers are given to the question “What is intrinsically good?” *Hedonists* say it is pleasure; *Pragmatists*, satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; *Kantians*, a good will; *Humanists*, harmonious self-realization; *Christians*, the love of God.

Pluralists, such as *G.E. Moore*, argue that there are many number of intrinsically good things. Moore, a founding father of Analytic philosophy, developed a theory of organic wholes, holding that the value of an aggregate of things depends upon how they are combined. Because “fact” symbolizes objectivity and “value” suggests subjectivity, the relationship of value to fact is of fundamental importance in developing any theory of the objectivity of value and of value judgments.

Where as such descriptive sciences as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and comparative religion all attempt to give a factual description of what is actually valued, as well as causal explanations of similarities and differences between the valuations, it remains the philosopher’s task to ask about their objective validity.

The philosopher asks whether something is of value because it is desired, as subjectivists such as *Perry* hold, or whether it is desired because it has value, as objectivists such as *Moore* and *Nicolai Hartmann* claim. In both approaches, value judgments are assumed to have a cognitive status, and the approaches differ only on whether a value exists as a property of something independently of human interest in it or desire for it.

Noncognitivists, on the other hand, deny the cognitive status of value judgments, holding that their main function is either emotive, as the positivist *A.J. Ayer* maintains, or prescriptive, as the analyst *R.M. Hare* holds. *Existentialists*, such as *Jean-Paul Sartre*, emphasizing freedom, decision, and choice of one’s values, also appear to reject any logical or ontological connection between value and fact.

The term “*value theory*” is used in at least three different ways in philosophy. In its broadest sense, “value theory” is a catch-all label used to encompass all branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion – whatever areas of philosophy are deemed to encompass some “evaluative” aspect. In its narrowest sense, “value theory” is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory particularly, but not exclusively, of concern to consequentialists. In this narrow sense, “*value theory*” is roughly synonymous with “*axiology*”.

Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states, or objective states of the world.

But in a more useful sense, "*value theory*" designates the area of moral philosophy that is concerned with theoretical questions about value and goodness of all varieties – the theory of value. The theory of value, so construed, encompasses axiology, but also includes many other questions about the nature of value and its relation to other moral categories.

The division of moral theory into the theory of value, as contrasting with other areas of investigation, cross-cuts the traditional classification of moral theory into normative and metaethical inquiry, but is a worthy distinction in its own right; theoretical questions about value constitute a core domain of interest in moral theory, often cross the boundaries between the normative and the metaethical, and have a distinguished history of investigation.

Let's look at a range of the questions which come up in the theory of value, and try to impose some structure on the terrain by including some observations about how they are related to one another.

1. *Basic questions*. The theory of value begins with a subject matter. It is hard to specify in some general way exactly what counts, but it certainly includes what we are talking about when we say any of the following sorts of things:

"*pleasure is good / bad*"; "*it would be good / bad if you did that*"; "*she is good / bad for him*"; "*too much cholesterol is good / bad for your health*"; "*that is a good / bad knife*"; "*he's a good / bad man*"; "*it's good / bad that you came*"; "*it would be better / worse if you didn't*"; "*my new can opener is better / worse than my old one*"; "*it's better / worse for it to end now, than for us to get caught later*"; "*best / worst of all, would be if they won the World Championship and kept all of their players for next year*"; "*celery is the best / worst thing for your health*".

The word "*value"* doesn't appear anywhere on this list; it is full, however, of "*good*", "*better*", and "*best*", and correspondingly of "*bad*", "*worse*", and "*worst*". And these words are used in a number of different kinds of constructions, of which we may take these four to be the main exemplars:

1. Pleasure is good.
2. It is good that you came.
3. She is good for him.
4. That is a good knife.

Sentences like 1, in which "*good*" is predicated of a mass term, constitute a central part of traditional axiology, in which philosophers have wanted to know what things (of which there can be more or less) are good. We'll stipulatively call them value claims, and use the word "*stuff*" for the kind of thing of which they predicate value (like pleasure, knowledge, and money).

Sentences like 2 make claims about what we'll (again stipulatively) call goodness *simpliciter*; this is the kind of goodness appealed to by traditional utilitarianism.

Sentences like 3 are good for sentences, and when the subject following "*for*" is a person, we usually take them to be claims about welfare or well-being.

And sentences like 4 are what we'll call *attributive* uses of "*good*", because "*good*" functions as a predicate modifier, rather than as a predicate in its own right.

Many of the basic issues in the theory of value begin with questions or assumptions about how these various kinds of claim are related to one another. Some of these are introduced here, focusing on the relationship between four kinds of sentences, and focusing on the relationship between "*good*" and "*better*", and between "*good*" and "*bad*".

2. *Traditional questions*. Traditional axiology seeks to investigate what things are good, how good they are, and how their goodness is related to one another. Whatever we take the "primary bearers" of value to be, one of the central questions of traditional axiology is that of what stuffs are good: what is of value.

Intrinsic Value: *What is intrinsic value?* Of course, the central question philosophers have been interested in, is that of what is of *intrinsic* value, which is taken to contrast with *instrumental* value. Paradigmatically, money is supposed to be good, but not intrinsically good: it is supposed to be good because it leads to other good things: HD TV's and houses in desirable school districts, for example.

These things, in turn, may only be good for what they lead to: exciting National Football League (NFL) Sundays and adequate educations, for example. And those things, in turn, may be good only for what they lead to, but eventually, it is argued, something must be good, and not just for what it leads to. Such things are said to be intrinsically good.

Philosophers' adoption of the term "*intrinsic*" for this distinction reflects a common theory, according to which whatever is non-instrumentally good must be good in virtue of its intrinsic properties. This idea is supported by a natural argument: if something is good only because it is related to

something else, the argument goes, then it must be its relation to the other thing that is non-instrumentally good, and the thing itself is good only because it is needed in order to obtain this relation.

The premise in this argument is highly controversial, and in fact many philosophers believe that something can be non-instrumentally good in virtue of its relation to something else. Consequently, sometimes the term "*intrinsic*" is reserved for what is good in virtue of its intrinsic properties, or for the view that *goodness* itself is an intrinsic property, and non-instrumental value is instead called "*telic*" or "*final*". We'll stick to "*intrinsic*", but we keep in mind that intrinsic goodness may not be an intrinsic property, and that what is intrinsically good may turn out not to be so in virtue of its intrinsic properties.

Instrumental value is also sometimes contrasted with "*constitutive*" value. The idea behind this distinction is that instrumental values lead *causally* to intrinsic values, while constitutive values *amount* to intrinsic values. For example, giving a boy money may causally result in his experiencing pleasure, whereas his experiencing pleasure may *constitute*, without causing, his being happy.

For many purposes this distinction is not very important, and constitutive values can be thought, along with instrumental values, as things that are ways of getting something of intrinsic value. We'll use "*instrumental*" in a broad sense, to include such values.

Intrinsic Value: *What is the intrinsic / instrumental distinction among?* The intrinsic / instrumental distinction is among what we have been calling "value claims", such as "pleasure is good", rather than among one of the other kinds of uses of "good". It does not make sense, for example, to say that something is a good can opener, but only instrumentally, or that Sue is a good dancer, but only instrumentally.

Perhaps it does make sense to say that vitamins are good for Jack, but only instrumentally; if that is right, then the instrumental / intrinsic distinction will be more general, and it may tell us something about the structure of and relationship between the different senses of "good", to look at which uses of "good" allow an intrinsic / instrumental distinction. It is sometimes said that consequentialists, since they appeal to claims about what is good simpliciter in their explanatory theories, are committed to holding that states of affairs are the "primary" bearers of value, and hence are the only things of intrinsic value. This is not right.

First, consequentialists can appeal in their explanatory moral theory to facts about what state of affairs would be best, without holding that states of affairs are the "*primary*" bearers of value; instead of having a "good-first"

theory, they may have a "*value-first*" theory, according to which states of affairs are good or bad *in virtue* of there being more things of value in them.

Moreover, even those who take a "good-first" theory are not really committed to holding that it is states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable; states of affairs are not, after all, something that you can collect more or less of. So they are not really in parallel to pleasure or knowledge.

Monism / Pluralism. One of the oldest questions in the theory of value is that of whether there is more than one fundamental (intrinsic) value. Monists say "*no*", and pluralists say "*yes*". This question only makes sense as a question about intrinsic values; clearly there is more than one instrumental value, and monists and pluralists will disagree, in many cases, not over whether something is of value, but over whether its value is *intrinsic*.

For example, as important as he held the value of knowledge to be, *John Stuart Mill* was committed to holding that its value is instrumental, not intrinsic. *G.E. Moore* disagreed, holding that knowledge is indeed a value, but an intrinsic one, and this expanded Moore's list of basic values.

Mill's theory famously has a pluralistic element as well, in contrast with Bentham's, but whether Mill properly counts as a pluralist about value depends on whether his view was that there is only one value – happiness – but two different kinds of pleasure which contribute to it, one more effectively than the other, or whether his view was that each kind of pleasure is a distinctive value.

The field of *ethics (or moral philosophy)* involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics and applied ethics.

Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves.

Normative ethics takes on a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our behavior on others.

Finally, *applied ethics* involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war.

By using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these controversial issues. The lines

of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics are often blurry.

For example, the issue of abortion is an applied ethical topic since it involves a specific type of controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to life, which are litmus tests for determining the morality of that procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues such as, "*where do rights come from?*" and "*what kind of beings have rights?*".

Metaethics. The term "*meta*" means *after* or *beyond*, and, consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a removed, or bird's eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined area of moral philosophy.

It covers issues from moral semantics to moral epistemology. Two issues, though, are prominent: 1) *metaphysical i*ssues concerning whether morality exists independently of humans and 2) *psychological* issues concerning the underlying mental basis of our moral judgments and conduct.

Theme 9
Social philosophy

The questions

1. Approaches to society interpretation in a history of philosophy: main periods in the development of social-philosophical thought.
2. Social reality and its forms of being. Models of a social reality: the realistic, the naturalistic, the active, the phenomenological.
3. Political philosophy as a part of social philosophy. Contemporary political philosophy.

Apart from epistemology, the most significant philosophical contributions of the Enlightenment were made in the fields of social and political philosophy. The *Two Treatises of Civil Government* (1690) by *John Locke* and *The Social Contract* (1762) by *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* proposed justifications of political association grounded in the newer political requirements of the age.

The Renaissance political philosophies of *Niccolò Machiavelli*, *Jean Bodin*, and *Thomas Hobbes* had presupposed or defended the absolute power of kings and rulers. But the Enlightenment theories of Locke and Rousseau championed the freedom and equality of citizens.

The philosophical problem of human life in society

1. *Need and Difficulty of a Philosophical Study of Society.* When discussion gets down to bedrock, it is philosophy. In order to make right decisions, we must know our true situation, and we must also know ourselves. It generally takes so much to live a decent and worthwhile life that any man does well to be suspicious of easy solutions of something as large as the problem of human civilization.

We may think that all we need today is to get the government out of our private and individual affairs so that we can be free once again. But that commits us to individualism. Have we thought what individualism really means, following it out into every detail so that we see the whole social order drawn up in such terms? Or suppose we simply condemn the selfishness of individuals as the source of all evil in our present world, as it was in all those times we know about through history. Well, if selfishness is such an absolute fact, how does it happen that we have any family life, fellowship with others, clubs, labor unions, societies, states, nations? There is more to it than these single-term solutions indicate.

2. *The spurious conflict between the individual and the state.* In an easy kind of philosophy, the real problems are left out of sight while in a social philosophy we imagine an exaggerated battle between two great opponents, the Individual and the State. They are represented as lasting enemies of each other; the gain of one is inevitably the loss of the other. Those of the party who idealize the social whole, the "socialists" look forward to a perfect regulation of the lives of men by the state for the sake of social justice. But the "individualists" seek to be free from the government of the state altogether.

Now there is, indeed, a genuine problem about the limits of the authority of government, but it is false and misleading to make "*man*" and "*the state*" into two great opposing parties. For the men and the women are the state; and conversely, the state is all the people. The problems that are really worth bothering about are those that fall inside the whole organization of men in the state and society.

They are the problems of the relation of some parts to other parts, and individual men are standing on both sides of the fence. The whole state, too, is involved in every issue. That old sham battle of individual versus society is not worth discussing, and it is an unworthy distraction from the urgent practical issues, where a decision really makes a difference in the lives and happiness of people.

What are these issues today? Here is where we must really begin social philosophy.

3. *Some philosophical problems of life in our social order.*

Inequality. The questions that really bother people are those like inequality. We are living in a society which professes to assure all men in it of their equal rights; but we see them discriminated against, some having privileges and others suffering under disabilities.

We are not living up to our principles. The question then is whether we understand these principles. Or it may be more serious still – are they true? And if they are true, what makes people act as if they were not? Do they secretly believe something else? Is it, perhaps, the notion that men are not really equal, that some are bound to be superior, and that those who are ought to have the benefits of their superiority of mind, character, and ability to succeed?

Here is something one must get to the bottom of, because it has to do with the whole foundation of human life in society. There seems to be a struggle between two principles, one which works toward inequality, the other toward equality, and this struggle is what makes social life the troublesome thing it is.

Discrimination against nation and race. The most superficial view of this situation shows that some other problems are involved. We notice at once that it is not the individuals alone who are unequal. It is not the sheer merit of this or that person which entitles him to his wealth, position, or power in the community; nor is it something that the individual himself could do or not do that puts him at the disadvantage with others which we consider unfair or unequal.

Men are treated, not as the men they individually are, but as members of some social group, for instance a nation or a race. All of one group is lumped together for the benefits or the disabilities of the discrimination. This struggle of whole groups for their rights is another one of the present realities of our situation.

Capital and labor. An urgent problem exists within our great and complex economic order. Men are engaged in wide spread business dealings with each other, in industry and commerce, and some groups of men are managing other men. This gives them a power over the others. The power is not confined, however, to the actual business of the factory or the commercial enterprise.

The economic system itself touches almost the whole of life, and it determines the chances a man has, not only for work, but also for most of his opportunities in life, and even for his bare survival. The power of control that resides in this system is vast, and some individuals have to be at the controls, directing and using this power. They naturally have their own interests and look out for them. It has long been said, and accepted as a supposed truth of economics, that men are ruled by such self-interest. At any rate, the facts of the situation are clear enough.

In the face of this economic power, men, determined to be free, have organized themselves in labor or trade unions to protect themselves. As citizens of a free democracy they have demanded their elementary rights. They have presented their grievances and sought to have them rectified. They have used their bargaining power through unions to gain advantages for themselves. They have appealed to the public for social justice. And they have actively fought for all these things, too, by such means as they have had at their disposal, chiefly the power to strike. The story of "*capital and labor*" is one of continuing conflict and antagonism between powerful groups within a particular society.

Nationalism and international relations. All these urgent questions lead beyond the state and beyond the nation. Economic questions have an international character, and organizations of industry and commerce, as well as of labor, reach across the lines between the states of the world. Churches do likewise in their spiritual ministry to man.

The protests of minorities against unfair and inhuman treatment are made in every quarter. And the rights of man are believed to be universal rights – the same in America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Whatever troubles any state has in respect to any of these matters has reverberations everywhere else: the failure to deal adequately with these economic, political, and social problems in any one nation involves the others. So the various states of the world are inevitably implicated in a whole set of international problems.

But we have been suffering from a blind or willful nationalism in this regard. What is to be done about it? How are the nations to deal with the realities of today which are international? What must be the relations of states and nations to each other so that they will form a peaceful community?

Political philosophy can be defined as philosophical reflection on how best to arrange our collective life – our political institutions and our social practices, such as our economic system and our pattern of family life. (Sometimes a distinction is made between *political* and *social* philosophy, but we'll use "political philosophy" in a sense as a part of social philosophy).

Social philosophers seek to establish basic principles that will, for instance, justify a particular form of state, show that individuals have certain inalienable rights, or tell us how a society's material resources should be shared among its members. This usually involves analyzing and interpreting ideas like freedom, justice, authority and democracy and then applying them in a critical way to the social and political institutions that currently exist.

Some social philosophers have tried primarily to justify the prevailing arrangements of their society; others have painted pictures of an ideal state or an ideal social world that is very different from anything we have so far experienced (*utopianism*).

Political philosophy as a part of social philosophy has been practiced for as long as human beings have regarded their collective arrangements not as immutable and part of the natural order but as potentially open to change, and therefore as standing in need of philosophical justification. It can be found in many different cultures, and has taken a wide variety of forms.

There are two reasons for this diversity. The first, the methods and approaches used by social philosophers reflect the general philosophical tendencies of their epoch. Developments in epistemology and ethics, for instance, alter the assumptions on which political philosophy can proceed. But the second, the social philosopher's agenda is largely set by the pressing political issues of the day. In medieval Europe, for instance, the proper relationship between Church and State became a central issue in political philosophy; in the early modern period the main argument was between

defenders of absolutism and those who sought to justify a limited, constitutional state. In the nineteenth century, the social question – the question of how an industrial society should organize its economy and its welfare system – came to the fore.

When we study the history of political philosophy, therefore, we find that alongside some perennial questions – how can one person ever justifiably claim the authority to govern another person, for instance? There are some big changes: in the issues addressed, in the language used to address them, and in the underlying premises on which the social philosopher rests his or her argument.

One question that immediately arises is whether the principles that social philosophers establish are to be regarded as having universal validity, or whether they should be seen as expressing the assumptions and the values of a particular political community. This question about the scope and status of political philosophy has been fiercely debated.

It is closely connected to a question about human nature. In order to justify a set of collective arrangements, a social philosophy must say something about the nature of human beings, about their needs, their capacities, about whether they are mainly selfish or mainly altruistic, and so forth. But can we discover common traits in human beings everywhere, or are people's characters predominantly shaped by the particular culture they belong to?

If we examine the main works of social philosophy in past centuries, they can be divided roughly into two categories. On the one hand there are those produced by philosophers elaborating general philosophical systems, whose political philosophy flows out of and forms an integral part of those systems. Leading philosophers who have made substantial contributions to political thought include *Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Th. Hobbes, J. Locke, D. Hume, G. Hegel and J.S. Mill*.

On the other hand there are social and political thinkers whose contribution to philosophy as a whole has had little lasting significance, but who have made influential contributions to political philosophy specifically. In this category we may include *Cicero, N. Machiavelli, J.-J. Rousseau, J. Bentham, J.G. Fichte and K. Marx. Among the most important twentieth-century political thinkers are H. Arendt, P.-M. D. Foucault, M. Gandhi, A. Gramsci, J. Habermas, J.B. Rawls, and J.-P. Sartre.*

Contemporary political philosophy. The last quarter of the 20-th century has seen a powerful revival of political philosophy, which in Western societies at least has mostly been conducted within a broadly liberal framework. Other ideologies have been outflanked: Marxism has gone into a rapid decline, and conservatism has survived only by taking on board large portions of liberalism.

Some have claimed that the main rival to liberalism is now communitarianism; however on closer inspection the debate can be seen to be less a debate about liberalism itself than about the precise status and form that a liberal political and social philosophy should take – whether, for example, it should claim universal validity, or should present itself simply as an interpretation of the political culture of the Western liberal democracies.

The vitality of political philosophy as a part of social philosophy is not to be explained by the emergence of a new ideological revival to liberalism, but by the fact that a new set of political issues has arisen whose resolution will stretch the intellectual resources of liberalism to the limit. What are these issues? The first is the issue of social justice, which in one form or another has dominated social philosophy for much of the 20-th century. Most of the many liberal theories of justice on offer have had a broadly egalitarian flavour, demanding at least the partial offsetting of the economic and social inequalities thrown up by an unfettered market economy.

These theories rested on the assumption that social and economic policy could be pursued largely within the borders of a self-contained political community, sheltered from the world market. This assumption has become increasingly questionable, and it presents liberals with the following dilemma: if the pursuit of social justice is integral to liberalism, how can this be now be reconciled with individual freedoms to move, communicate, work, and trade across state boundaries?

The second issue is posed by feminism, and especially the feminist challenge to the conventional liberal distinction between public and private spheres. In many respects feminism and liberalism are natural allies, but when feminists argue for fundamental changes in the way men and women conduct their personal relationships, or advocate affirmative action policies for employment that seems to contravene firmly-entrenched liberal principles of desert and merit, they pose major challenges to liberal social philosophy.

The third, there is a set of issues arising from what might be called the new politics of cultural identity. Many groups in contemporary societies now demand that political institutions should be altered to reflect and express their distinctive cultures; these include, on the one hand, nationalist groups asserting that political boundaries should be redrawn to give them a greater measure of self-determination, and on the other cultural minorities whose complaint is that public institutions fail to show equal respect for those attributes that distinguish them from the majority (for instance their language or religion).

These demands once again collide with long-established liberal beliefs that the state should be culturally neutral, that citizens should receive equal treatment under the law, and that rights belong to individuals, not groups. It remains to be seen whether liberalism is sufficiently flexible to incorporate such demands.

Finally, liberalism is challenged by the environmental movement, whose adherents claim that liberal political principles cannot successfully address urgent environmental concerns, and more fundamentally that the liberal image of the self-sufficient, self-directing individual is at odds with the ecological picture of humanity's subordinate place in the system of nature as a whole. Liberalism is too firmly wedded to the market economy and to consumption as the means of achieving personal well-being, to be able to embrace the radical policies needed to avoid environmental disaster.

None of these problems is capable of easy solution, and it can be said with some confidence that political philosophy as a part of social philosophy will continue to flourish even in a world in which the sharp ideological divisions of the beginning-twenty first century exist. It may also be expected a renewal of non-Western traditions of political philosophy as free intellectual enquiry revives in those countries where for half a century or more it has been suppressed by the state.

Political questions that have concerned social philosophers for two millennia or more will be tackled using new languages and new techniques, while the ever-accelerating pace of technological and social change will generate new problems whose solution people can barely begin to anticipate.

Questions for self-control

The subject of philosophy and the history of philosophy

1. Genesis of philosophy as form of perception and explanation of world.
2. Definition of philosophy. Philosophy as a kind of knowledge, its peculiarities.
3. Subject and method, purpose and functions of philosophy.
4. Ancient Greek philosophy's peculiarities. Periods of Ancient Greece philosophy.
5. Main directions and representatives of Pre-Socratic philosophy.
6. Classic period: sophistry and Socrates.
7. Classic period: Plato. Aristotle.
8. Peculiarities of Middle Ages philosophical thinking and circle of philosophical problems.
9. Peculiarities of European Renaissance's philosophy. Humanism in Renaissance as cultural and philosophical current.
10. Main characteristics of Modern Western philosophy.
11. Rationalism and method of knowledge acquiring. R. Descartes. F. Bacon.
12. Sensualist ontology: J. Locke. T. Hobbes.
13. European Enlightenment philosophy: materialism and atheism.
14. G. Hegel and his philosophical system: logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of mind. Dialectics as method.
15. Anthropological materialism of L. Feuerbach.
16. K. Marx and F. Engels: dialectical and historical materialism.
17. Positivism: method and content.
18. XXth century philosophy: non-classical rationality. Neo-Kantianism: W. Windelband. H. Rickert. Neo-Hegelianism: B. Croce.
19. XXth century philosophy: Phenomenology: E. Husserl. Existentialism: M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers, J-P. Sartre.

The main spheres of philosophical knowledge:

1. Ontology as philosophical conception on the Being.
2. Being of Nature (of things, processes, states).
3. Human's being and being of society.
4. Anthropology as a philosophical science.
5. Human as an object of philosophical analysis. Fundamentals of the human being.
6. Anthropogenesis: natural sciences and philosophical aspects.
7. The biological and the social in human being. Fundamentals of the human being.

8. Typologies of human being. Body and spirit foundations of person. Individual, individuality, personality.
9. The Human and his relations with the World. The Problem of Other (I and You). The Problem of society (I and We).
10. The Human's relations to the Nature and the Culture.
11. Human's being phenomena. The meaning of life.
12. Axiology as a theory of values. The category of value.
13. Values in a system of culture.
14. Regulating character of values. Individual and social values, its combination.
15. Types of values: moral, religious, political and legal, aesthetic.
16. Consciousness' problem in philosophy.
17. Natural scientific and philosophical interpretation of consciousness.
18. Genesis of human consciousness. Social nature of consciousness.
19. Consciousness as highest structuring and controlling activity. Structure and forms of consciousness.
20. Genesis and development of cognition. Cognition as a philosophical analysis' object.
21. Cognition as comprehension of Truth. Truth and its criteria.
22. Category and structure of knowledge. Sensual and rational cognition, its unity in a Modern cognitive model.
23. General rational methods of cognition: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction, generalization, comparison, idealization, observation, measurement and experiment.
24. Science and scientific knowledge. Nature sciences and humanities: features and models.
25. Nature as a philosophical thinking's object.
26. Forms of nature perceiving in the history of culture.
27. Abiotic and biotic nature. Problem of life: its value and origin.
28. Nature and Human intercourse. Harmony and conflict between nature and culture.
29. Destruction of a natural environment and the global ecological problem in the Modern world.
30. Approaches to society interpretation in a history of philosophy: main periods in the development of social-philosophical thought.
31. Social reality and its forms of being. Society reproducing process.
32. Society as sociocultural system. Sub-systems, components and elements of society.
33. Models of a social reality: the realistic and the naturalistic.
34. Models of a social reality: the active and the phenomenological.
35. Philosophy of history: society's functioning and development in the time.
36. Social progress' hypothesis. Modernization problem and a choice of aims in development of modern societies.
37. Global problems in Modern time in philosophy of history context.

References

a) Basic reading.

1. Cave P. Philosophy : a Beginner's Guide. Oxford : Oneworld, 2012.
2. Copleston F. C. Russian Philosophy. London : Continuum, 2003.
3. Perry J., Fischer J. M., Bratman M. Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York : Oxford University Press, 2013.
4. Russel B. History of Western Philosophy. London : Routledge, 2008.
5. Stewart D., Blocker H. G., Petrick J. Fundamentals of Philosophy. 7th Ed. Boston : Prentice Hall, 2010.

b) Supplementary reading.

1. Burns K. Eastern Philosophy. New York : Enchanted Lion Books, 2006.
2. Hocking W. E., Blanshard B., Hendel Ch. W., Randall J. H. Preface to Philosophy. Textbook. New York : Macmillan, 1947.
3. Nuttall J. An Introduction to Philosophy. Cambridge, UK : Polity; Malden, Massachusetts : Blackwell Publishers, 2002.
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5. Velasquez M. Philosophy : A Text with Readings. 7th ed. Belmont, CA : Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1999.
6. Philosophy. Part 1. The History of Philosophy. Teaching Materials for the Practical Course / comp. and ed. by T. G. Skorokhodova. Penza : State University Pub., 2014.
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c) Software and internet resources.

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Тугаров Александр Борисович,
Лавренова Татьяна Ивановна

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Корректор *М. Н. Кузнецова*
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440026, Пенза, Красная, 40.
Тел.: (8412) 66-60-49, 66-67-77; e-mail: iic@pnzgu.ru