Т. Г. Скороходова

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Teaching Materials
for the Practical Course

Учебно-методическое пособие

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Р е ц е н з е н т

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С44   The History of Philosophy. Teaching Materials for the
Practical Course : учеб.-метод. пособие / Т. Г. Скороходова. – Пенза : Изд-во ПГУ, 2020. – 228 с.

     Представлены темы и задачи семинарских занятий по истории философии, тексты для чтения, вопросы к зачету, а также список литературы и интернет-ресурсов для самостоятельной работы.
     Издание подготовлено на кафедре «Теория и практика социальной работы» и предназначено для изучающих курс философии на английском языке, направление подготовки 31.05.01 «Лечебное дело».

     Topics and tasks of seminars on the history of philosophy, texts for reading, guestions for the test, as well as a list of literature and Internet resources for individual work are presented.
     The publication was prepared at the sub-department "Theory and practice of social work" and is intended for students of the course of philosophe in English, training direction 31.05.01 "General Medicine".

CONTENTS

SUBJECT'S SYLLABUS

Theme 1. Philosophy as a Kind of Knowledge.

Definition of philosophy. Historical forms of perception and explanation of world: myth, religion, philosophy. Worldview and philosophy connection. Origins of philosophy. Genesis of philosophy in Antiquity (VII–VI centuries B. C. E.). Three cultural centers of philosophy's genesis: India, China, Greece. "Axial age" as period of appearance of philosophical thought. Cultural circumstances of philosophy's development.

Philosophy as a kind of knowledge, its peculiarities. Philosophy and religion. Philosophy and science. Subject and method of philosophy. Philosophical questions. Philosophy in the culture. Purpose and functions of philosophy. Philosophy's structure: ontology, anthropology, axiology, philosophy of consciousness, epistemology, natural philosophy, social philosophy, philosophy of culture, philosophy of religion, history of philosophy etc.

Theme 2. Indian Philosophical Traditions in Antiquity and Middle Ages.

General characteristics of Indian philosophical thought. Periods of Indian philosophy by S. Radhakrishnan: The Vedic period, the Epic period, Sutras period, Scholastic period. Origins of philosophical thinking in the Vedas and Upanishads. "Bhagavadgita". Nine philosophical systems (*darshanas*). Orthodox philosophical systems (*astika*): Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Vedanta. Heterodox philosophical systems (*nastica*): Charvaka-lokayata, Jain, Buddhist.

Main philosophical problems in India: eternity of the World and Absolute, extremity of thye world in space, soul and body relations, soul and Absolute relations, life and death, joy and suffering, etc. Aspiration to systematization in Indian Philosophy. Middle Ages' thought.

Theme 3. Philosophy in Antiquity: Greece.

Philosophy in Ancient Greece. Circumstances of its genesis. Ancient Greek philosophy's peculiarities: discovery of theoretical thinking, cosmology, dialectics, heuristic, identity of science and

philosophy. Greek philosophy as the source of European and World philosophy and culture. Periods of Ancient Greece philosophy. Ionian school. Milesian philosophy. Thales. Anaximander. Anaximenes. Heraclitus. Italic philosophy. Pythagoras and Pythagoreans. Eleatic philosophy. Parmenides of Elea. Zeno of Elea. Leucippus. Democritus. Classic period: sophistry and Socrates. Plato. Aristotle. Hellenistic philosophy. Neo-Platonism. Plotinus. Skepticism. Stoicism. Epicureanism. Eclecticism.

Theme 4. Western Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy.

Role of Christianity in a genesis of Middle Ages' philosophy. Peculiarities of Middle Ages thinking: theocentrism, traditionalism, symbolism. Exegesis as method of obtaining of knowledge. Platonism and Aristotelianism role in development of Middle Ages' philosophy. Patristic thought. Scholasticism. Main philosophical problems in Middle Ages: correlation of reason and faith, good and evil, freedom and predestination. Philosophical approach to universal notions: realism, nominalism, conceptualism. Augustine of Hippo. Thomas Aquinas.

European Renaissance and its main characteristics. Peculiarities of Renaissance's philosophy: anthropocentrism, critics of scholasticism, natural philosophical pantheism etc. Humanism in Renaissance as cultural and philosophical current: Dante, Petrarch, L. Valla, M. Ficino, Erasmus. Natural philosophy. Nicolas Cusanus. N. Copernicus. D. Bruno. Leonardo da Vinci. N. Machiavelli. Thomas More. Reformation and its philosophical ideas. European Renaissance philosophy's role in the History of Western culture.

Theme 5. Modern Western Philosophy.

Modernity: notion and content. Periods in Modern Western philosophy. Scientific and worldview revolution in XVII century and genesis of Modern philosophy. Peculiarities of Modern Western philosophy. Rationalism and method of knowledge acquiring. R. Descartes. F. Bacon. B. Spinoza. G. Leibniz. J. Locke. T. Hobbes. European Enlightenment philosophy. Materialism. Atheism. D. Diderot, R. A. Helvetius, F. Voltaire, P. A. d'Holbach. I. Kant and his philosophy: ontology, epistemology, practical philosophy. G. W. F. Hegel and his philosophical system. Dialectics as method. Hegel's logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of mind. Anthropological materialism of L. Feuerbach. K. Marx and F. Engels: dialectical and historical

materialism. Positivism, method and content. XXth century philosophy. Neo-Kantianism. W. Windelband. H. Rickert. Neo-Hegelianism. B. Croce. Phenomenology. E. Husserl. Existentialism. M. Heidegger, K. Jaspers, J-P. Sartre. Western philosophy's impact on world philosophical process.

Theme 6. Modern Indian Philosophy.

Modernity in India: British colonial governments and foundations of modernization process in traditional society. Acquaintance of Indian with Western culture and philosophical thought. Periods in Modern Indian philosophy. The Indian Renaissance as an epoch of national-cultural renaissance. Main characteristics of the epoch. Idea of Synthesis of Western and Indian cultural paradigms is base of India's development in Modern world. Bengal as center of new intellectual movement Rammohun Roy as inaugurator of Indian Renaissance. Philosophical ideas by Rammohun Roy: reinterpretation of Vedanta, Upanishads translations, religious philosophy, social and political views. Rammohun Roy's role in development of social thought in Modern India. The Brahmo Samaj and philosophical views of its leaders: D. Tagore and Kesubchandra Sen. Development of social thought. H. L. V. Derozio and "Young Bengal". Positivist and utilitarian influence on Indian thought. Bankimchandra Chattopaddhyaya. Genesis of Neo-Vedantism. Swami Vivekananda. Aurobindo Ghosh. Rabindranath Tagore's philosophical views. Inclusion other Indian regions in Renaissance processes. D. Naoroji. Swami Dayananda. "Arya Samaj". B. G. Tilak. Political philosophy: from anglophlilsm to idea of Indian independence. Surendranath Banerjea. M. K. Gandhi and his conception of non-violent resistance. Philosophical views by J. Nehru. Indian philosophy in XX century. Ramana Maharshi. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.. P. T. Raju. P. J. Chaudhury. A. Rahman.

Theme 7. Russian Philosophy.

Periods in Russian philosophy. General characteristics: ontologism, patriotism, historiosophical character, spirituality, preferring of art forms in reasoning to theoretical one. Catholicity idea. First philosophical ideas in Kiev and Moscow Russia. Russian enlightenment philosophy. I. N. Novikov. A. N. Radischev. Peculiarities in development of Russian philosophy. Pyotr Tchaadaev. Westernism and slavophilism as search for meaning of Russian history and social life.

F. Dostoyevsky. L. Tolstoy. Russian religious philosophy. West and East synthesis in philosophy by V. Solovyov. General characteristics of Russian philosophy in XX century. Christian socialism. Eurasianism. Marxism in Russia.

Main Goals of Mastering Subject

1. Formation of entire representation about philosophy as kind of knowledge, which seeks to create the holistic picture of the world and methodology of its cognition.
2. Consideration of the most important philosophical traditions and Modern philosophical thought.
3. Introducing into the main spheres of philosophical knowledge and its basic categories.
4. Understanding of philosophers' role in the formulation and solution of contemporary problems.

Instructional Guidance for Individual Students' Work

Themes for individual student's work repeat and deepen lecture themes and help to develop appropriate knowledge, skills and application.

The individual work on all discipline themes includes the preparation for class study, writing essay, preparation for achievement tests assessment and the exam.

Preparation for class study includes reading of lecture abstract, working with the textbooks and add literature (with abstracting of the topic content), formulating own position on debated issue (if debating provided). Reading of philosophical text-sources or the articles on the topic can be provided for explication of the main ideas.

Writing essay are provides the individual study of philosophical systems or questions and its describing on the paper (write or print forms are possible). Volume of essays is from 7 to 10 pages in print variant and from 10 to 15 lists in wrote variant. Concludes in the essay is required. Students must be able to generalize and to conclude on the described.

Preparation for achievement tests assessment includes working with the lecture abstracts, the textbooks and practical class abstract on the considered themes.

PRACTICAL CLASSES SCHEDULE

Theme 1. Philosophy as a Kind of Knowledge

Purposes: 1) create the general representation of philosophy as a field of knowledge, its domain, the method, functions in the culture and the role in cognition; 2) reveal the world-view significance of the study of philosophy and using of its categorical apparatus.

The questions

1. Philosophy as form of perception and explanation of world.
2. Philosophical questions and issue-area of philosophy.
3. Philosophy's structure.
4. Subject and method, purpose and functions of philosophy.
5. Philosophy and religion.
6. Philosophy in the culture.

Task

1. Read the text of the articles.
2. Write out main ideas of the authors.
3. Compare your results in discussion.
4. Formulate your own answer to the questions:
   What is utility of Philosophy for a human?
   What is Philosophy?
   What are the divisions of philosophy?
   What is the content of philosophy's method?

Literature

1. Cave, P. Philosophy: a Beginner's Guide / P. Cave. – Oxford : Oneworld, 2012.

2. Nuttall, J. An Introduction to Philosophy / J. Nuttall. – Cambridge, UK : Polity ; Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 2002.

3. Perry, J. Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings / J. Perry, J. M. Fischer, M. Bratman. – New York : Oxford University Press, 2013.

4. Russel, B. History of Western Philosophy / B. Russel. – London : Routledge, 2008.

Theme 2. Indian Philosophical Traditions in Antiquity and Middle Ages

Purposes: 1) create the general representation of the origins, general characteristics and periods of Indian philosophical tradition; 2) introduce the content of ancient and medieval Indian philosophical schools; 3) represent the main philosophical problems in Indian thought.

The questions

1. Origins of philosophical thinking in the Vedas and Upanishads.
2. Heterodox philosophical systems in India: Charvaka-lokayata, Jain, Buddhist.
3. Orthodox philosophical systems in India: Nyaya, Vaisesika.
4. Orthodox philosophical systems in India: Samkhya, Yoga.
5. Orthodox philosophical systems in India: Mimamsa, Vedanta.

Essay themes

1. Origins of philosophical thinking in the Vedas and Upanishads.
2. Philosophical ideas in "Bhagavadgita".
3. Charvaka-lokayata system.
4. Jain philosophy.
5. Buddhist philosophy: schools (madhyamaka, yogachara, vaibhashika, sautrantika).
6. Sankhya system.
7. Yoga system: Patanjali's "Yoga-sutra".
8. Nyaya system.
9. Vaisesika System.
10. Mimamsa system. Jaimini's "Mimamsa-sutra".
11. Vedanta-System: Triple canon and Gaudapada.
12. Vedanta-System: Sankara's advaita.
13. Vedanta-System: Ramanuja's vishista-advaita.
14. Vedanta-System: Madhva's dvaita.

Task 1

1. Read the texts on the heterodox philosophical schools in Ancient India.
2. Write out main ideas of each school according the areas of knowledge.
3. What ideas you consider as the main in each of schools? Why? (Argumentate your point of view).

Task 2

1. Read the texts on the orthodox philosophical schools in Ancient India.

2. Write out main ideas of each schools according the areas of knowledge.

3. What ideas you consider as the main in each of schools? Why? (Argumentate your point of view).

Literature

1. Bartley, C. J. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy / C. J. Bartley. – London : New York : Continuum, 2011.

2. Burns, K. Eastern Philosophy / K. Burns. – New York : Enchanted Lion Books, 2006.

3. Chatterjee, S. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy / Satischandra Chatterjee, Dheerendramohan Datta. – Calcutta : University of Calcutta, 1968.

4. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy / S. Radhakrishnan, J. Mohanty. – New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2008.

5. Solomon, R. C. World Philosophy: a Text with Readings / R. C. Solomon, K. M. Higgins. – New York : McGraw-Hill, 1995.

6. Indian Philosophy. An Encyclopedia / ed. by M. T. Stepanyantz. – Moscow : Eastern Philosophy RAS, 2009.

Theme 3. Philosophy in Antiquity: Greece

Purposes: 1) create the general representation of the origins, general characteristics and periods of ancient Greek philosophy; 2) introduce the content of Greek philosophical schools of different periods; 3) represent the main philosophical problems in Classical Greek thought.

The questions

1. Pre-Socratic philosophy. Ionian school. Milesian philosophy. Thales. Anaximander. Anaximenes. Heraclitus.

2. Pre-Socratic philosophy. Italic philosophy. Pythagoras and Pythagoreans.

3. Pre-Socratic philosophy. Eleatic philosophy. Parmenides of Elea. Zeno of Elea. Leucippus. Democritus.

4. Classic period: sophistry and Socrates. Plato. Aristotle.

5. Hellenistic philosophy. Neo-Platonism. Plotinus. Skepticism.

6. Hellenistic philosophy. Stoicism. Epicureanism. Eclecticism.

Essay themes

1. Pre-Socratic philosophy: Milesian school.
2. Pre-Socratic philosophy: Pythagoreans.
3. Pre-Socratic philosophy: Eleatic.
4. Atomistic theory: Leucippus and Democritus.
5. Classic period: sophistry and Socrates.
6. Plato's philosophy.
7. Aristotle's philosophy.
8. Hellenistic philosophy: Stoicism.
9. Hellenistic philosophy: Neo-Platonism.
10. Hellenistic philosophy: Epicureanism.

Task 1

1. Read the texts on the pre-socratic philosophers in Ancient Greece.
2. Write out main ideas of each thinker.
3. What was the main issue of these philosophers?

Task 2

1. Read the texts on the classic philosophers in Ancient Greece.
2. Write out main ideas of each thinker.
3. What was the main issue of these philosophers?
4. Can you mark in the Plato's philosophy the ideas, which are alike to the ideas of Indian philosophy?
5. What are the main characteristic of dialectc method by Aristotle?

Task for final discussion

Find arguments for assertion: "There are many comparable ideas in Indian and Ancient Greek philosophy". Compare the Indian and Grecian pjilosophical ideas. Follow your extracts from the former texts.

Literature

1. Russel, B. History of Western Philosophy / B. Russel. – London : Routledge, 2008.
2. Solomon, R. C. World Philosophy: a Etext with Readings / R. C. Solomon, K. M. Higgins. – New York : McGraw-Hill, 1995.
3. Velasquez, M. Philosophy: A Text with Readings / M. Velasquez. – 7th ed. – Belmont, CA : Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1999.

Theme 4. Western Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy

Purposes: 1) formation of a general representation of the medieval and Renaissance philosophy of Europe; 2) description of the philosophical concepts of the most important figures in the history of this historical period.

The questions

1. Peculiarities of Middle Ages thinking and circle of philosophical problems.
2. Patristic thought. Augustine of Hippo.
3. Scholasticism. Thomas Aquinas.
4. Peculiarities of European Renaissance's philosophy.
5. Humanism in Renaissance as cultural and philosophical current: Dante, Petrarch, L. Valla, M. Ficino, Erasmus.
6. Natural philosophy. Nicolas Cusanus. N. Copernicus. D. Bruno. Leonardo da Vinci.
7. Political philosophy: N. Machiavelli. Thomas More.
8. Reformation and its philosophical ideas.

Task

1. Read the texts on Western Medieval and Renaissance philosophical movements.
2. Write out the peculiarities and main ideas of each.
3. Are there similar ideas in Western Renaissance and Indian philosophical scools?
4. Can you describe the main characteristics of on Western Medieval and Renaissance philosophy?

Literature

1. Nuttall, J. An Introduction to Philosophy / J. Nuttall. – Cambridge, UK : Polity ; Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 2002.
2. Russel, B. History of Western Philosophy / B. Russel. – London : Routledge, 2008.
3. Solomon, R. C. World Philosophy: a Etext with Readings / R. C. Solomon., K. M. Higgins. – New York : McGraw-Hill, 1995.
4. Velasquez, M. Philosophy: A Text with Readings / M. Velasquez. – 7th ed. – Belmont, CA : Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1999.

Theme 5. Modern Western philosophy

Purposes: 1) description of the main periods of Modern Western philosophy's development; 2) consideration of the key philosophical ideas and concepts in the XVII–XIX centuries; 3) identification of the most significant trends in the development of twentieth century philosophy.

The questions

1. Scientific and worldview revolution in XVII century and genesis of Modern philosophy. Rationalism and method of knowledge acquiring. R. Descartes. F. Bacon. B. Spinoza. G. Leibniz.
2. Sensualist ontology: J. Locke. T. Hobbes.
3. European Enlightenment philosophy: materialism and atheism. D. Diderot, R. A. Helvetius, F. Voltaire, P. A. d'Holbach.
4. Agnosticism and skepticism: D. Hume, G. Berkeley.
5. Philosophy by I. Kant: ontology, epistemology, practical philosophy.
6. G. W. F. Hegel and his philosophical system. Dialectics as method. Hegel's logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of mind.
7. Anthropological materialism of L. Feuerbach.
8. K. Marx and F. Engels: dialectical and historical materialism.
9. Positivism: method and content. A. Comte. E. Durkheim.
10. Philosophical currents in XXth century: Phenomenology, Existentialism, Neo-Kantianism, Neo-Hegelianism etc.

Task for discussion

What characteristics of European Renaissance were inherited by Western philosophy?

Essay themes

1. F. Bacon's method and philosophy.
2. R. Descartes' method and philosophy.
3. B. Spinoza and his philosophy.
4. G. Leibniz and his philosophical theory.
5. Sensualist ontology: J. Locke. T. Hobbes.
6. Philosophical ideas of French Enlightenment.
7. Philosophical ideas of English Enlightenment.
8. Philosophical ideas of German Enlightenment.

9. Immanuel Kant and his philosophy.

10. G. W. F. Hegel and his philosophical system.

11. Anthropological materialism of L. Feuerbach.

12. Dialectical and historical materialism by K. Marx and F. Engels.

13. Positivism, method and content.

14. XXth century philosophy currents: Neo-Cantianism.

15. XXth century philosophy currents: Neo-Hegelianism,

16. XXth century philosophy currents: Phenomenology.

17. XXth century philosophy currents: Existentialism.

Task 1

1. Read the text on Modern Western thinkers of XVII century.

2. Write out the main ideas of each.

3. Compare the ideas and try to find its similarities and differences.

4. What is main characteristics of Western Rationality?

Task 2

1. Read the text on Enlightenment in Europe of XVIII century

2. Write out the main characteristics of the epoch.

3. Write out the names of epoch's philosophers and his ideas.

4. What are main characteristics and ideas of the epochs?

Task 3

1. Read the text on G. W. F. Hegel's philosophy.

2. Write out the main characteristics of dialectical method by Hegel.

3. Write out the main ideas of his Philosophy of history.

Task 4

1. Read the text on L. Feuerbach's philosophy.

2. Write out the main characteristics of his philosophy

3. What are the main differences of Feuerbach's ideas from ones by Hegel?

Task 5

1. Read the text on K. Marx's philosophy.

2. Write out the main ideas of his method and philosophy of history.

Task 6

1. Read the text on philosophers-founders of positivism.
2. Write out the main ideas and methods of Positivism.

Task 7

1. Read the texts on some philosophical currents of XX century.
2. Write out the main characteristics of the currents and ideas by its philosopers.
3. What are main differences of these currents of thought from positivist or Marx's philosophical approach and ideas?

Literature

1. Nuttall, J. An Introduction to Philosophy / J. Nuttall. – Cambridge, UK : Polity ; Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 2002.
2. Russel, B. History of Western Philosophy / B. Russel. – London : Routledge, 2008.
3. Solomon, R. C. World Philosophy: a Etext with Readings / R. C. Solomon., K. M. Higgins. – New York : McGraw-Hill, 1995.
4. Velasquez, M. Philosophy: A Text with Readings / M. Velasquez. – 7th ed. – Belmont, CA : Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1999.

Theme 6. Modern Indian Philosophy

Purposes: 1) create a whole picture of the Modern Indian philosophy; 2) description of the basic characteristics of Modern Indian social thought; 3) consideration of the philosophical views of the key figures in the Indian Renaissance philosophy; 4) demonstration of synthesis nature of Indian thought in XIX–XX centuries.

The questions

1. Modernity in India. Main characteristics of the Indian Renaissance.
2. Philosophical ideas by Rammohun Roy: reinterpretation of Vedanta, Upanishads translations, religious philosophy.
3. Social and political views of Rammohun Roy and his role in development of social thought in Modern India.
4. The Brahmo Samaj and philosophical views of its leaders: D. Tagore and Kesubchandra Sen. Development of social thought.
5. Swami Dayananda. "Arya Samaj" in Gujarat and Punjab.

6. Positivist and utilitarian influence on Indian thought. Bankimchandra Chattopaddhyaya (Chatterjee).

7. Genesis of Neo-Vedantism. Swami Vivekananda.

8. Philosophy of Aurobindo Ghosh.

9. Rabindranath Tagore's philosophical views.

10. Political philosophy: from anglophlilism to idea of Indian independence. Dadabhai Naoroji. Surendranath Banerjea. Bal Gangadhar Tilak.

11. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and his philosophical ideas. Conception of *satyagraha* and *ahimsa*: non-violent resistance to evil.

12. Philosophical views by J. Nehru.

13. Indian philosophy in XX century. Neo-Vedantism. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.

14. Freedom as Development: social thought of Amartya Sen.

Task for final discussion

1. What Western philosophical ideas were imbibed by Indian intellectuals XIX–XX centuries?

2. What ideas and schools of Indian philosophical tradition were perceived by Modern Indian philosophers.

Essay themes

1. Philosophical ideas by Rammohun Roy.

2. Social and political views of Rammohun Roy.

3. Philosophical views of leaders of the Brahmo Samaj: Devendranath Tagore and Kesubchandra Sen.

4. Bankimchandra Chattopaddhyay (Chatterjee): philosophical and sociological ideas.

5. Neo-Vedantism of Swami Vivekananda.

6. Philosophy of Aurobindo Ghosh.

7. Rabindranath Tagore's philosophical views.

8. Swami Dayananda and "Arya Samaj": main ideas and conceptions.

9. B. G. Tilak and his thought.

10. M. K. Gandhi's philosophical views.

11. Philosophical views by J. Nehru

12. Neo-Vedantism in XXth century India: Ramana Maharshi.

13. Neo-Vedantism in XXth century: Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan.

14. Neo-Vedantism in XXth century: Pulla Tiruparti Raju.

15. Philosophy of science in India.

16. Social thought of Amartya Sen.

Task 1

1. Read the texts on the Bengal Renaissance and Neo-Vedantism.
2. Write out the main characteristics of the epoch.
3. Write out the names of epoch's main figures and his ideas.
4. What Western philosophers have influenced to the thinkers of the Bengal Renaissance?

Task 2

1. Read the texts on Sapvepalli Radhakrishnan.
2. Write out his main philosophical ideas.
3. Why does he be one of eminent representatives of Neo-Vedantism?

Literature

1. Bartley, C. J. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy / C. J. Bartley. – London : New York : Continuum, 2011.
2. Indian Philosophy. An Encyclopedia / ed. by M. T. Stepanyantz. – Moscow : Eastern Philosophy RAS, 2009.
3. Skorokhodova, T. G. The Bengal Renaissance. Essays on History of Socio-cultural Synthesis in Modern Indian Philosophical Thought / T. G. Skorokhodova. – St. Petersburdg, 2008. (In Russian).
4. Skorokhodova, T. G. Young Bengal. Essays on History of Social Thought of the Bengal Renaissance (First Phase, 1815–1857) / T. G. Skorokhodova. – St. Petersburg : St. Petersburg Centre for Oriental Studies Publishers, 2012.
5. Skorokhodova T. G. Philosophy of Rammohun Roy. An Experience of Reconstruction / T. G. Skorokhodova. – St. Petersburdg : St. Petersburg Centre for Oriental Studies Publishers, 2018. (In Russian).
6. Radhakrishnan, S. Indian Philosophy / S. Radhakrishnan, J. N. Mohanty. – New Delhi : Oxford University Press, 2008.

Theme 7. Russian Philosophy

Purposes: 1) create a general picture of the development of philosophical thought in Russia from the origin to the philosophical ideas of the twentieth century; 2) identify the most important themes and ideas in the Russian philosophy in the XIX century; 3) carrying out the parallels between the development of Indian and Russian philosophical thought in Modern times.

The questions

1. General characteristics of Russian philosophy.
2. First philosophical ideas in Kiev and Moscow Russia.
3. Russian enlightenment philosophy. I. N. Novikov. A. N. Radischev.
4. Peculiarities in development of Russian philosophy in XIX century.
5. Pyotr Tchaadaev. Westernism and slavophilism as search for meaning of Russian history and social life.
6. F. Dostoyevsky. L. Tolstoy and Russian religious philosophy.
7. West and East synthesis in philosophy by V. Solovyov.
8. General characteristics of Russian philosophy in XX century. Christian socialism. Eurasianism.
9. Marxism in Russia.

Task for final discussion

There is a number of alike topics in Modern Indian and Russian philosophical thought. How to explain the alikeness?

Task

1) Read the texts on Russian philosophy.
2) Write out the main characteristics of Russian philosophy.

Literature

1. Copleston, F. C. Russian Philosophy / F. C. Copleston. – London : Continuum, 2003.
2. Edie, J. M. Russian Philosophy / J. M. Edie, J. P. Scanlan, M. B. Zeldin. – Chicago : Quadrangle Books, 1965.

QUESTIONS FOR THE EXAM

1. Genesis of philosophy as form of perception and explanation of world.

2. Definition of philosophy. Philosophy as a kind of knowledge, its peculiarities.

3. Subject and method, purpose and functions of philosophy.

4. Philosophy's structure. Philosophy in the culture.

5. General characteristics of Indian philosophical thought. Periods of Indian philosophy.

6. Origins of philosophical thinking in the Vedas, Upanishads and "Bhagavadgita".

7. Six orthodox philosophical systems in India: Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Mimamsa, Vedanta.

8. Heterodox philosophical systems in India: Charvaka-lokayata, Jainism, Buddhism.

9. Ancient Greek philosophy's peculiarities. Periods of Ancient Greece philosophy.

10. Ionian school. Milesian philosophy. Thales. Anaximander. Anaximenes. Heraclitus.

11. Italic philosophy. Pythagoras and Pythagoreans.

12. Eleatic philosophy. Parmenides of Elea. Zeno of Elea.

13. Amomism of Leucippus. Democritus.

14. Classic period: sophistry and Socrates.

15. Classic period: Plato. Aristotle.

16. Hellenistic philosophy. Neo-Platonism. Plotinus. Skepticism.

17. Hellenistic philosophy. Stoicism. Epicureanism. Eclecticism.

18. Peculiarities of Middle Ages philosophical thinking and circle of philosophical problems.

19. Patristic thought. Scholasticism. Augustine of Hippo. Thomas Aquinas.

20. Peculiarities of European Renaissance's philosophy. Humanism in Renaissance as cultural and philosophical current: Dante, Petrarch, L. Valla, M. Ficino, Erasmus.

21. Natural philosophy. Nicolas Cusanus. N. Copernicus. D. Bruno. Leonardo da Vinci.

22. Political philosophy: N. Machiavelli. Thomas More. Reformation and its philosophical ideas.

23. Main characteristics of Modern Western philosophy. Periods in Modern Western philosophy.

24. Rationalism and method of knowledge acquiring. R. Descartes. F. Bacon. B Spinoza. G. Leibniz.

25. Sensualist ontology: J. Locke. T. Hobbes.

26. Agnosticism and skepticism: D. Hume, G. Berkeley.

27. European Enlightenment philosophy: materialism and atheism. D. Diderot, R. A. Helvetius, F. Voltaire, P. A. d'Holbach.

28. Philosophy by I. Kant: ontology, epistemology, practical philosophy.

29. G. W. F. Hegel and his philosophical system: logic, philosophy of nature, philosophy of mind. Dialectics as method.

30. Anthropological materialism of L. Feuerbach.

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TEXTS FOR READINGS ON THE THEMES

Theme 1. Philosophy as a kind of Knowledge

Andrea Borghini
What Is Philosophy?
Odds and Ends of the Old Queen of Sciences
(http://philosophy.about.com/od/Philosophy101/a/What-Is-Philosophy.htm)

Literally it means "love of wisdom". But, really, philosophy begins in wonder. Thus taught most of the major figures of ancient philosophy, including Plato, Aristotle, and the *Tao Te Ching*. And it ends in wonder too, when philosophical taught has done its best – as A. N. Whitehead once suggested. So, what characterizes philosophical wonder? How to achieve it? How to approach reading and writing philosophy, and why studying it?

Philosophy as an Answer
To some, philosophy's goal is a systematic worldview. You are a philosopher when you can find a place to any fact, in heaven or earth. Philosophers have indeed provided systematic theories of history, justice, the State, the natural world, knowledge, love, friendship: you name it. Engaging in philosophical thinking is, under this perspective, like putting in order your own room to receive a guest: anything should find a place and, possibly, a reason for being where it is.

Philosophical Principles
Rooms are organized according to basic criteria: *Keys stay in the basket*, *Clothing should never be scattered unless in use*, *All books should sit on the shelves unless in use*. Analogously, systematic philosophers have key principles around which to structure a worldview. Hegel, for instance, was well known for his three-steps dialectic: thesis-antithesis-synthesis (although he never used these expressions). Some principles are specific to a branch. Like the *Principle of Sufficient Reason*: "Everything must have a reason" – which is specific to metaphysics. A controversial principle in ethics is the *Principle of Utility*, invoked by so-called consequentialists: "The right thing to do is the one that produces the greatest amount of good." Theory of knowledge centers around the *Epistemic Closure Principle*: "If a person knows that A, and A entails B, then that person knows that B as well".

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The Wrong Answers?

Is systematic philosophy doomed to failure? Some believe so. For one, philosophical systems have done lots of damage. For example, Hegel's theory of history was used to justify racist politics and nationalistic States; when Plato tried to apply the doctrines exposed in *The Republic* to the city of Syracuse, he faced sheer failure. Where philosophy has not done damages, it nonetheless at times spread false ideas and spurred useless debates. Thus, an exaggerated systematic approach to the theory of souls and angels led to ask questions such as: "How many angels can dance on the head of a pin?"

Philosophy as an Attitude

Some take a different route. To those the gist of philosophy lies not in the answers, but in the questions. Philosophical wonder is a methodology. It does not matter which topic comes under discussion and what we make of it; philosophy is about the stance we take towards it. Philosophy is that attitude which brings you to question even what's most obvious. Why are there spots on the surface of the moon? What creates a tide? What is the difference between a living and a non-living entity? Once upon a time, these were philosophical questions, and the wonder from which they emerged was a philosophical wonder.

What Does It Take to Be a Philosopher?

Nowadays most philosophers are found in the academic world. But, certainly, one does not have to be a professor in order to be a philosopher. Several key figures in the history of philosophy did something else for a living. Baruch Spinoza was an optician; Gottfried Leibniz worked – among other things – as a diplomatic; David Hume's main employments were as a tutor and as an historian. Thus, whether you have a systematic worldview or the right attitude, you may aspire to be called 'philosopher'. Beware though: the appellation may not always carry a good reputation!

The Queen of Sciences?

Classic systematic philosophers – such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hegel – boldly affirmed that philosophy grounds all other sciences. Also, among those who see philosophy as a method, you find many who regard it as the chief source of knowledge. Is philosophy really the queen of sciences? Granted, there was a time in which philosophy vested the role of protagonist. Nowadays, however, it may sound exaggerated to regard it as such. More modestly, philosophy may seem

to provide valuable resources for thinking about fundamental questions. This is reflected, for instance, in the growing popularity of philosophical counseling, philosophical cafés, and in the success that philosophy majors seem to enjoy on the job market.

Which Branches for Philosophy?

The deep and multifarious relationship that philosophy bears to other sciences is clear by taking a look at its branches. Philosophy has some core areas: metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, logic. To these should be added an indefinite amount of branches. Some that are more standard: political philosophy, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of science. Others that are domain specific: philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of culture, philosophy of education, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of art, philosophy of economics, legal philosophy, environmental philosophy, philosophy of technology. The specialization of contemporary intellectual research has affected the queen of wonder too.

Ch. A. Dubray

Division of Philosophy

(Ch. A. Dubray. Introductory Philosophy. A Textbook for Colleges. New York : London : Longmans, Green and Co, 1923)

DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY (P. 10–11)

I. The Various Branches of Philosophy. (a) Since the extension of the field of philosophy has varied so much in history, and since even to-day not all philosophers are agreed on this point, it is impossible to give a division of philosophy into its various branches that will be acceptable to all and that may claim to be finally and forever settled. Not long ago logic, psychology, and ethics had still an undisputed place in philosophy. To-day many look upon them as independent sciences, and only some of their higher problems are turned over to philosophy.

For our purpose in the present course it matters little how much ground philosophy strictly so-called should cover. Our point of view is a practical one, and hence we shall treat of those questions which have been neglected heretofore and yet are necessary to complete the knowledge acquired so far and prepare the student for further studies.

(b) Philosophy comes after the study of physical sciences; hence the name "metaphysics" (literally after-physics), which is frequently given to philosophy or to a branch of it.

(i) The philosophical study of realities, i.e. of existing objects, includes cosmology, or the general study of the world; biology, or the more special study of living organisms; psychology, or the still more special study of the human mind; theodicy, or the study of God as the first cause of the world. (2) Besides the real we have to consider the ideal, i.e. the rules to which thought must conform in order to be consistent (logic}; the expression of ideals to realize something beautiful (aesthetics); the guidance of our actions in conformity with the rules of morality (ethics). (3) Epistemology holds an intermediate place between the science of the real and that of the ideal. It examines whether and how far our ideas correspond to external reality. Hence the following synopsis:

Philosophical study of the	real	world = cosmology.
		man = psychology and philosophy of the mind.
		God = theodicy
		being in general = ontology,
	relations of knowledge with reality = epistemology.	
	ideal	of thought = logic.
		of expression = aesthetics.
		of action = ethics.

<...>

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY (P. 12–14)

The central rule to be observed for the profitable study of philosophy is: Use your own judgment and reason under the guidance of your professor and text-book.

1. Eagerness to Know. (a) The main cause that prompts men to philosophize, as Plato and Aristotle already pointed out, is wonder or admiration. The mind wonders as long as a given fact has not been given an explanation and assigned adequate causes. It endeavors to discover causes and principles so as to account for experience. Out of this desire philosophy was born ; in this desire it finds its incentive.

(b) Hence an essential quality of the mind is to be in quisitive, to question and investigate, and never to feel at rest so long as a satisfactory explanation has not been found. It must compare facts, gather solutions, discuss, criticize, and harmonize them.

2. Personal Reflection. (a) This work must be a personal work of understanding, not the mere memorizing of the words of the professor or of books. It is true that without books or professor the student could do very little; he would grope in the dark, uncertain of the direction to be taken and of the value of the progress already made. But nevertheless

these are only aids for the student s thinking, and their teaching would be of little value if the mind did not verify it and appropriate it. If exaggerated self-confidence is a serious defect, if man must listen to the opinions of others, be somewhat diffident of his own intellect, and proceed cautiously, it is also a serious defect for the mind to remain inactive and to take for granted everything that is said without understanding the truth of it.

A lesson in philosophy is not like a lesson in geography or history. When I am told that Peking is in China and London in England, I believe it at once; my activity consists only in memorizing a fact which I do not verify and on which all agree. But in philosophy it is always necessary first to understand and verify the truth of a statement; the work of memorizing comes last. Never try to memorise anything which is not understood thoroughly. A nurse is a help to the child who begins to walk; she guides his first steps, but cannot take the place of the child s own activity; the walking process must be that of the child. So also the beginner in philosophy needs guidance, but this can never dispense with his own activity. To be genuine and to deserve its name, philosophy must be the mind s own philosophy; not in the sense that the mind has discovered all the truths which it possesses, but in the sense that it has appropriated and digested them and thought them for itself.

(b) Habits of reflection must be acquired. Man is not, or should not be, a machine to be moved at will by an engineer; he must act for himself. This is not a book of ready made formulas, but rather a book of suggestions for the student's thought.

(c) The study of philosophy should make man cautious in affirming and denying, in approving and condemning the opinions of others. If those men are not to be admired and imitated who are never able to take a resolution, to side for or against a proposition, and to give a straight answer, still less are those to be commended who have ready-made ideas on all questions, unchangeable and categorical solutions for all problems, and whom no amount of proofs, however cogent, can ever induce to modify their views.

(d) When names of philosophers or schools of philosophy are mentioned, it will be useful to seek further information in the Outlines of the History of Philosophy at the end of the volume, especially in order to locate these names chronologically. The index also must be consulted frequently in order to acquire clearer and more complete ideas by the reference to various passages dealing with the same subject in different parts of the book and from different points of view.

In one word, at the time when the body is acquiring its full development, let the mind also grow, and, by its own efforts under the guidance of those who are more skillful and experienced, proceed in the acquisition, or rather in the building up for itself, of a sound philosophy.

Theme 2. Indian Philosophical Traditions in Antiquity and Middle Ages

Abigail Turner-Lauck Wernicki
Lokayata/Carvaka – Indian Materialism
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/indmat/)

In its most generic sense, "Indian Materialism" refers to the school of thought within Indian philosophy that rejects supernaturalism. It is regarded as the most radical of the Indian philosophical systems. It rejects the existence of other worldly entities such an immaterial soul or god and the after-life. <…>

The terms Lokāyata and Cārvāka have historically been used to denote the philosophical school of Indian Materialism. Literally, "Lokāyata" means philosophy of the people. The term was first used by the ancient Buddhists until around 500 B.C.E. to refer to both a common tribal philosophical view and a sort of this-worldly philosophy or nature lore. The term has evolved to signify a school of thought that has been scorned by religious leaders in India and remains on the periphery of Indian philosophical thought. <…> It was not until between the 6th and 8th century C.E. that the term "Lokāyata" began to signify Materialist thought. Indian Materialism has also been named Cārvāka after one of the two founders of the school. Cārvāka and Ajita Kesakambalin are said to have established Indian Materialism as a formal philosophical system, but some still hold that Bṛhaspati was its original founder. Bṛhaspati allegedly authored the classic work on Indian Materialism, the Bṛhaspati Sūtra. <…>

a. Epistemology

Epistemological thought varies in Indian philosophy according to how each system addresses the question of "Pramānas" or the "sources and proofs of knowledge." (Mittal 41) The Lokāyata (Cārvāka) school recognized perception (*pratyaksa*) alone as a reliable source of knowledge. They therefore rejected two commonly held pramānas: 1) inference (*anumana*) and 2) testimony (*sabda*). Because of its outright rejection of such commonly held sources of knowledge, the Lokāyata was not taken seriously as a school of philosophy. The common view was that Cārvākas merely rejected truth claims and forwarded none of their own. To be a mere skeptic during the time amounted to very low philosophical stature. <…>

The Cārvākas denied philosophical claims that could not be verified through direct experience. Thus, the Lokāyata denied the validity of inferences that were made based upon truth claims that were not empirically verifiable. However, logical inferences that were made based on premises that were derived from direct experience were held as valid. It is believed that this characterization of the epistemology of the Lokāyata most accurately describes the epistemological position of contemporary Indian Materialism.

Cārvākas were, in a sense, the first philosophical pragmatists. They realized that not *all* sorts of inference were problematic; in order to proceed through daily life inference is a necessary step. For practical purposes, the Lokāyata made a distinction between inferences made based on probability as opposed to certainty. The common example used to demonstrate the difference is the inference that if smoke is rising from a building it is *probably* an indication that there is a fire within the building. However, Cārvākas were unwilling to accept anything beyond this sort of mundane use of inference, such as the mechanical inference forwarded by the Buddhists. The Lokāyata refused to accept inferences about what has never been perceived, namely god or the after-life.

b. Ontology

The ontology of the Lokāyata rests on the denial of the existence of non-perceivable entities such as God or spiritual realm. <…> The Lokāyata posited that the world itself and all material objects of the world are real. They held that all of existence can be reduced to the four elements of air, water, fire and earth. All things come into existence through a mixture of these elements and will perish with their separation. Perhaps the most philosophically sophisticated position of Indian Materialism is the assertion that even human consciousness is a material construct. According to K. K. Mittal, the ontology of the Lokāyata is strictly set forth as follows:

1. Our observation does not bring forth any instance of a disincarnate consciousness. For the manifestation of life and consciousness, body is an inalienable factor.

2. That body is the substratum of consciousness can be seen in the undoubted fact of the arising of sensation and perception only in so far as they are conditioned by the bodily mechanism.

3. The medicinal science by prescribing that certain foods and drinks (such as Brāhmighrta) have the properties conducive to the intellectual powers affords another proof and evidence of the relation of consciousness with body and the material ingredients (of food). (Mittal 47)

Mittal reports (*ibid.*), apparently two schools of thought within the Lokāyata arose out of these tenets. One forwarded the position that there can be no self or soul apart from the body; another posited that a soul can exist alongside a body as long as the body lives, but that the soul perishes with the body. <...> Therefore, the Lokāyata collectively rejects the existence of an other-worldly soul, while sometimes accepts the notion of a material soul.

c. Cosmology

To speculate as to why the universe exists would be an exercise in futility for an Indian Materialist. The purpose and origin of existence is not discoverable through scientific means. Furthermore, the speculation about such matters leads to anxiety and frustration, which reduce pleasure and overall contentment. There is no teleology implicit in Indian Materalism, which is evidenced in the school's position that the universe itself probably came into existence by chance. Although there can be no certainty about the origin of the universe, the most *probable* explanation is that it evolved as a result of a series of random events.

There is also no doctrine of Creation in the Lokāyata. The principles of *karma* (action) and *niyati* (fate) are rejected because they are derived from the notion that existence in itself is purposeful. The fundamental principle of Indian Materialism was and remains "Svabhava" or nature. This is not to suggest that nature itself has no internal laws or continuity. <...> While it posits no "creator" or teleology, Indian Materialism regards nature itself as a force that thrives according to its own law.

4. Ethics

The most common view among scholars regarding the ethic of Indian Materialism is that it generally forwards Egoism. In other words, it adopts the perspective that an individual's ends take priority over the ends of others. <...> Indian Materialism regards pleasure in itself and for itself as the only good and thus promotes hedonistic practices. Furthermore, it rejects a utilitarian approach to pleasure. Utilitarianism regards pleasure (both higher and lower) as the ultimate good and therefore promotes the maximization of the good (pleasure) on a collective level. Indian Materialism rejects this move away from pure egoism. The doctrine suggests that individuals have no obligation to promote the welfare of society and would only tend to do so if it were to ultimately benefit them as well. <...>

The term "nāstika" is used by almost all schools of Indian Philosophy as a critical term to refer to another school of thought that has severely breeched what is thought to be acceptable in terms of both religious beliefs and ethical values. The greatest recipient of this term is the Cārvāka school. Commonly degraded to the same degree, the term "Cārvāka" and the more general term "nāstika" are sometimes used interchangeably simply to denote a brand of thinking that does not fall in line with the classical schools of Indian thought. <…>

Mark Owen Webb

Jain Philosophy

(http://www.iep.utm.edu/jain/)

Jainism is properly the name of one of the religious traditions that have their origin in the Indian subcontinent. According to its own traditions, the teachings of Jainism are eternal, and hence have no founder; however, the Jainism of this age can be traced back to Mahavira, a teacher of the sixth century BCE, a contemporary of the Buddha. Like those of the Buddha, Mahavira's doctrines were formulated as a reaction to and rejection of the Brahmanism (religion based on the Hindu scriptures, the Vedas and Upanisads) then taking shape. The brahmans taught the division of society into rigidly delineated castes, and a doctrine of reincarnation guided by karma, or merit brought about by the moral qualities of actions. Their schools of thought, since they respected the authority of the Vedas and Upanisads, were known as *orthodox darsanas* ('*darsanas*' means literally, 'views'). Jainism and Buddhism, along with a school of materialists called *Carvaka*, were regarded as the *unorthodox darsanas*, because they taught that the Vedas and Upanisads, and hence the brahman caste, had no authority.

1. Metaphysics

According to Jain thought, the basic constituents of reality are souls (*jiva*), matter (*pudgala*), motion (*dharma*), rest (*adharma*), space (*akasa*), and time (*kala*). Space is understood to be infinite in all directions, but not all of space is inhabitable. A finite region of space, usually described as taking the shape of a standing man with arms akimbo, is the only region of space that can contain anything. This is so because it is the only region of space that is pervaded with *dharma*, the principle of motion (*adharma* is not simply the absence of *dharma*, but rather a principle that causes objects to stop moving). The physical world resides in the

narrow part of the middle of inhabitable space. The rest of the inhabitable universe may contain gods or other spirits.

While Jainism is dualistic – that is, matter and souls are thought to be entirely different types of substance – it is frequently said to be atheistic. What is denied is a creator god above all. The universe is eternal, matter and souls being equally uncreated. The universe contains gods who may be worshipped for various reasons, but there is no being outside it exercising control over it. The gods and other superhuman beings are all just as subject to *karma* and rebirth as human beings are. By their actions, souls accumulate karma, which is understood to be a kind of matter, and that accumulation draws them back into a body after death. Hence, all souls have undergone an infinite number of previous lives, and – with the exception of those who win release from the bondage of karma – will continue to reincarnate, each new life determined by the kind and amount of karma accumulated. Release is achieved by purging the soul of all karma, good and bad.

Every living thing has a soul, so every living thing can be harmed or helped. For purposes of assessing the worth of actions (see Ethics, below), living things are classified in a hierarchy according to the kinds of senses they have; the more senses a being has, the more ways it can be harmed or helped. Plants, various one-celled animals, and 'elemental' beings (beings made of one of the four elements–earth, air, fire, or water) have only one sense, the sense of touch. Worms and many insects have the senses of touch and taste. Other insects, like ants and lice, have those two senses plus the sense of smell. Flies and bees, along with other higher insects, also have sight. Human beings, along with birds, fish, and most terrestrial animals, have all five senses. This complete set of senses (plus, according to some Jain thinkers, a separate faculty of consciousness) makes all kinds of knowledge available to human beings, including knowledge of the human condition and the need for liberation from rebirth.

2. Epistemology and Logic

Underlying Jain epistemology is the idea that reality is multifaceted (*anekanta*, or 'non-one-sided'), such that no one view can capture it in its entirety; that is, no single statement or set of statements captures the complete truth about the objects they describe. This insight, illustrated by the famous story of the blind men trying to describe an elephant, grounds both a kind of fallibilism in epistemology and a sevenfold classification of statements in logic.

Every school of Indian thought includes some judgment about the valid sources of knowledge (*pramanas*). While their lists of *pramanas* differ, they share a concern to capture the common-sense view; no Indian school is skeptical. The Jain list of *pramanas* includes sense perception, valid testimony (including scriptures), extra-sensory perception, telepathy, and *kevala*, the state of omniscience of a perfected soul. Notably absent from the list is inference, which most other Indian schools include, but Jain discussion of the *pramanas* seem to indicate that inference is included by implication in the *pramana* that provides the premises for inference. That is, inference from things learned by the senses is itself knowledge gained from the senses; inference from knowledge gained by testimony is itself knowledge gained by testimony, etc. Later Jain thinkers would add inference as a separate category, along with memory and *tarka*, the faculty by which we recognize logical relations.

Since reality is multi-faceted, none of the *pramanas* gives absolute or perfect knowledge (except *kevala*, which is enjoyed only by the perfected soul, and cannot be expressed in language). As a result, any item of knowledge gained is only tentative and provisional. This is expressed in Jain philosophy in the doctrine of *naya*, or partial predication (sometimes called the doctrine of perspectives or viewpoints). According to this doctrine, any judgment is true only from the viewpoint or perspective of the judge, and ought to be so expressed. Given the multifaceted nature of reality, no one should take his or her own judgments as the final truth about the matter, excluding all other judgments. This insight generates a sevenfold classification of predications. <...>

3. Ethics

Given that the proper goal for a Jain is release from death and rebirth, and rebirth is caused by the accumulation of karma, all Jain ethics aims at purging karma that has been accumulated, and ceasing to accumulate new karma. Like Buddhists and Hindus, Jains believe that good karma leads to better circumstances in the next life, and bad karma to worse. However, since they conceive karma to be a material substance that draws the soul back into the body, all karma, both good and bad, leads to rebirth in the body. No karma can help a person achieve liberation from rebirth. Karma comes in different kinds, according to the kind of actions and intentions that attract it. In particular, it comes from four basic sources: (1) attachment to worldly things, (2) the passions, such as anger, greed, fear, pride, etc., (3) sensual enjoyment, and (4) ignorance, or false belief. Only the first three have a directly ethical or moral upshot, since ignorance is cured by knowledge, not by moral action.

The moral life, then, is in part the life devoted to breaking attachments to the world, including attachments to sensual enjoyment. Hence, the moral ideal in Jainism is an ascetic ideal. Monks (who, as in Buddhism, live by stricter rules than laymen) are constrained by five cardinal rules, the "five vows": *ahimsa,* frequently translated "non-violence," or "non-harming," *satya*, or truthfulness, *asteya*, not taking anything that is not given, *brahmacharya*, chastity, and *aparigraha*, detachment. This list differs from the rules binding on Buddhists only in that Buddhism requires abstention from intoxicants, and has no separate rule against attachment to the things of the world. The cardinal rule of interaction with other *jivas* is the rule of *ahimsa.* This is because harming other *jivas* is caused by either passions like anger, or ignorance of their nature as living beings. Consequently, Jains are required to be vegetarians. According to the earliest Jain documents, plants both are and contain living beings, although one-sensed beings, so even a vegetarian life does harm. This is why the ideal way to end one's life, for a Jain, is to sit motionless and starve to death. Mahavira himself, and other great Jain saints, are said to have died this way. That is the only way to be sure you are doing no harm to any living being.

While it may seem that this code of behavior is not really moral, since it is aimed at a specific reward for the agent–and is therefore entirely self-interested–it should be noted that the same can be said of any religion-based moral code. Furthermore, like the Hindus and Buddhists, Jains believe that the only reason that personal advantage accrues to moral behavior is that the very structure of the universe, in the form of the law of karma, makes it so.

Richard P. Hayes
**Buddhist Philosophy // Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ed. by E.Craig. London: Routledge**
(http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/F001 (SECT 1, 4, 5))

Buddhism was an important ingredient in the philosophical melange of the Indian subcontinent for over a millennium. From an inconspicuous beginning a few centuries before Christ, Buddhist scholasticism gained in strength until it reached a peak of influence and originality in the latter half of the first millennium. Beginning in the eleventh century, Buddhism gradually declined and eventually disappeared from northern India. <…> Most of the issues addressed by Buddhist philosophers in India stem directly from the teachings attributed to Siddhārtha Gautama, known better through his honorific title, the Buddha. <…>

1. Human nature

A key tenet of Buddhist doctrine is that discontent is an outcome of desires grounded in false beliefs. The most important of these false beliefs are that (1) one's own individual existence is more important than those of other individuals, and that (2) fulfilment can be achieved by acquiring and owning property. If these misunderstandings can be replaced by an accurate view of human nature, suggested the Buddha, then unrealistic craving and ambition will cease, and so will frustration. Happiness, in other words, can be achieved by learning to recognize that (1) no one is more important than anyone else, since all beings ultimately have the same nature, and that (2) the very idea of ownership is at the root of all conflicts among living beings. The methods by which one achieves contentment, according to the Buddha, are both intellectual and practical. One can gradually become free of the kinds of beliefs that cause unnecessary pain to oneself and others by carefully observing one's own feelings and thoughts, and how one's own words and actions affect others. To counter the view that one's own individual existence is more important than the existence of other beings, Buddhist philosophers adopted the radical strategy of trying to show that in fact human beings do not have selves or individual identities. That is, an attempt was made to show that there is nothing about a person that remains fixed throughout a lifetime, and also that there is nothing over which one ultimately has real control. Failure to accept the instability, fragmentation and uncontrollability of one's body and mind is seen as a key cause of frustration of the sort that one could avoid by accepting things as they really are. On the other hand, realizing that all beings of all kinds are liable to change and ultimately to die enables one to see that all beings have the same fundamental destiny. This, combined with the recognition that all living beings strive for happiness and wellbeing, is an important stage on the way to realizing that no individual's needs, including one's own, are more worthy of consideration than any other's.

The notion that one does not have an enduring self has two aspects, one personal and the other social. At the personal level, the person is portrayed in Buddhist philosophy as a complex of many dozens of physical and mental events, rather than as a single feature of some kind that remains constant while all peripheral features undergo change. Since these constituent events are incessantly undergoing change, it follows that the whole that is made up of these constituents is always taking on at least some difference in nature. Whereas people might tend to see themselves as having fixed personalities and characters, the Buddha argued it is always possible for people either to improve their character

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through mindful striving, or to let it worsen through negligence and obliviousness. Looking at the social aspects of personal identity, the Buddha maintained, in contrast to other views prevalent in his day, that a person's station in human society need not be determined by birth. According to the view prevalent in ancient and classical Indian society, a person's duties, responsibilities and social rank were determined by levels of ritual purity; these were in turn influenced by pedigree and gender and various other factors that remained constant throughout a person's lifetime. In criticizing this view, Buddhist philosophers redefined the notions of purity and nobility, replacing the concept of purity by birth with that of purity by action (karma) (…). Thus the truly noble person, according to Buddhist standards, was not one who had a pure and revered ancestry, but rather one who habitually performed pure and benevolent actions. <…>

4. Epistemology

Siddhārtha Gautama the Buddha is portrayed in Buddhist literature as ridiculing the sacrificial rituals of the Brahmans and accusing the priests of fabricating them for no better reason than to make money from the wealthy and to manipulate the powerful. Attacking the sacrificial practices of the Brahman priests in this way eventually led to challenging the authority of the Vedic literature that the priests considered sacred. An early Buddhist philosopher who challenged the authority of sacred texts was Nāgārjuna, whose arguments called into question the very possibility of justified belief. In a text called *Vigrahavyāvartanī (Averting Disputes)*, Nāgārjuna argued that all opinions are warranted by an appeal to experience, or to various forms of reasoning, or to the authority of tradition. Now among the opinions that one may hold, said Nāgārjuna, is the opinion that all opinions are warranted in one of those ways. Nothing, however, seems to warrant that opinion. If one should claim that that opinion is self-warranting, then why not grant that all other opinions are also self-warranting? On the other hand, if that opinion requires substantiation, the result will be an infinite regress. Therefore, concluded Nāgārjuna, no opinion can be grounded. Realizing that one can never arrive at certainty thus becomes for Nāgārjuna the most reliable way of freeing oneself from the various delusions that cause unhappiness in the world. Dispelling delusions is therefore not a matter of discovering truth, but a matter of realizing that all opinions that pass as knowledge are not really knowledge at all.

Although Nāgārjuna's scepticism managed to capture the spirit of some passages of Buddhist literature that depict the Buddha as questioning the authoritarianism of other teachers, it did not leave adequate room for distinguishing truth from error. Most Buddhist philosophers who came after Nāgārjuna, therefore, placed an emphasis on both eliminating error and securing positive knowledge. Dignāga, modifying theories of knowledge that Brahmanical thinkers had developed, argued that there are just two types of knowledge, each having a distinct subject matter unavailable to the other: through the senses one gains knowledge of particulars that are physically present, while the intellect enables one to form concepts that take past and future experiences into consideration. <…>

5. Metaphysics

Given the emphasis in Buddhist teachings on the role of erroneous belief as a cause of unhappiness, it was natural that Buddhist philosophers should focus on questions of ontology and the theory of causation. Ontology was important, since a kind of intellectual error that was supposed to lead to unhappiness was being mistaken about what exists. The theory of causation was important, since the eradication of the cause of unhappiness was supposed to result in the removal of unhappiness itself.

The earliest attempts to systematize the teachings of Buddhism were in the genre of literature known as 'Abhidharma', in which all the factors of human experience were classified according to a variety of schemata (…). The study of the relationships among these classes of factors eventually evolved into a detailed theory of causality, in which several types of causal relationship were enumerated. There were many schools of Abhidharma, and each had its own set of schemata for the classification and enumeration of the factors of experience. Indeed, each had its own interpretation of what the very word 'Abhidharma' means; among the possible interpretations of the word, a common one is that it means a higher or more advanced doctrine, or a doctrine that leads to a higher form of wisdom. The variety of approaches taken in Abhidharma literature makes it difficult to discuss this literature in any but the most general way. Among most schools of Abhidharma, there was a commitment to the idea that the best strategy for coming to an understanding of any complex being is to analyse that being into its ultimate parts. An ultimate part is that which cannot be analysed into anything more simple. Most Buddhist systematists held to the principle that the ultimately simple building blocks out of which things are made are ultimately real, while complex things that are made up of more simple parts

are not ultimately real; they are held to be real only through the consensus of a community. As was seen above in the section on human nature (§1), for example, there was a strong tendency for Buddhists to accept that a person's character is the product of many components; these components were held to be real, but the person was held to be ultimately unreal. The idea of a person may be a fiction, but it is one that makes the running of society more manageable, and therefore it can be regarded as a consensual reality, in contrast to an ultimate reality. <…>

During the last five hundred years that Buddhism was an important factor in Indian philosophy (600–1100), criticism of Buddhist doctrines by Brahmanical and Jaina religious philosophers, as well as from anti-religious materialists, forced Buddhist thinkers to refine some of their arguments and even to abandon some of their doctrinal positions. <…>

Shyam Ranganathan
Systematic Hindu Philosophy: the Darśanas
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/hindu-ph/)

<…> The term "*darśana*" in Sanskrit translates as "vision" and is conventionally regarded as designating what we are inclined to look upon as systematic philosophical views. The history of Indian philosophy is replete with *darśanas*. The number of *darśanas* to be found in the history of Indian philosophy depends largely on the organizational question of how one is to enumerate *darśanas*: how much difference between expressions of philosophical views can be tolerated before we are inclined to count texts as expressing distinct *darśanas*? The question seems particularly pertinent in cases like Buddhist and Jain philosophy, which have all had rich philosophical histories. The issue is relatively easier to settle in the context of Hindu philosophy, for a convention has developed over the centuries to count systematic Hindu philosophy as being comprised of *six* (*āstika*, or Veda recognizing) *darśanas*. The six *darśanas* are: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and Vedānta. <…>

a. Nyāya
The term "*nyāya*" traditionally had the meaning "formal reasoning," though in later times it also came to be used for reasoning in general, and by extension, the legal reasoning of traditional Indian law courts. Opponents of the Nyāya school of philosophy frequently reduce it to the status of an arm of Hindu philosophy devoted to questions

of logic and rhetoric. While reasoning is very important to Nyāya, this school also had important things to say on the topic of epistemology, theology and metaphysics, rendering it a comprehensive and autonomous school of Indian philosophy.

The Nyāya school of Hindu philosophy has had a long and illustrious history. The founder of this school is the sage Gautama (2nd cent. C.E.) – not to be confused with the Buddha, who on many accounts had the name "Gautama" as well. Nyāya went through at least two stages in the history of Indian philosophy. At an earlier, purer stage, proponents of Nyāya sought to elaborate a philosophy that was distinct from contrary *darśanas*. At a later stage, some Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors (such as Śaṅkara-Misra, 15th cent. C.E.) became increasingly syncretistic and viewed their two schools as sister *darśanas*. As well, at the latter stages of the Nyāya tradition, the philosopher Gaṅgeśa (14th cent. C.E.) narrowed the focus to the epistemological issues discussed by the earlier authors, while leaving off metaphysical matters and so initiated a new school, which came to be known as Navya Nyāya, or "New" Nyāya. Our focus will be mainly on classical, non-syncretic, Nyāya.

According to the first verse of the *Nyāya-Sūtra*, the Nyāya school is concerned with shedding light on sixteen topics: *pramāna* (epistemology), *prameya* (ontology), *saṃśaya* (doubt), *prayojana* (axiology, or "purpose"), *dṛṣṭānta* (paradigm cases that establish a rule), *Siddhānta* (established doctrine), *avayava* (premise of a syllogism), *tarka* (driving to the absurd), *nirnaya* (certain beliefs gained through epistemically respectable means), *vāda* (appropriately conducted discussion), *jalpa* (sophistic debates aimed at beating the opponent, and not at establishing the truth), *vitaṇḍa* (a debate characterized by one party's disinterest in establishing a positive view, and solely with refutation of the opponent's view), *hetvābhāsa* (persuasive but fallacious arguments), *chala* (unfair attempt to contradict a statement by equivocating its meaning), *jāti* (an unfair reply to an argument based on a false analogy), and *nigrahasthāna* (ground for defeat in a debate) (*Nyāya-Sūtra* and *Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya* I.1.1–20).

With respect to the question of epistemology, the *Nyāya-Sūtra* recognizes four avenues of knowledge: these are perception, inference, analogy, and verbal testimony of reliable persons. Perception arises when the senses make contact with the object of perception. Inference comes in three varieties: *pūrvavat* (*a priori*), *śeṣavat* (*a posteriori*) and *sāmanya-todṛṣṭa* (common sense) (*Nyāya-Sūtra* I.1.3–7).

The Nyāya's acceptance of both arguments from analogy and testimony as means of knowledge, allows it to accomplish two theological goals. First, it allows Nyāya to claim that the Veda's are valid owing to the reliability of their transmitters (*Nyāya-Sūtra* II.1.68). Secondly, the acceptance of arguments from analogy allows the Nyāya philosophers to forward a natural theology based on analogical reasoning. Specifically, the Nyāya tradition is famous for the argument that God's existence can be known for (a) all created things resemble artifacts, and (b) just as every artifact has a creator, so too must all of creation have a creator (Udayanācārya and Haridāsa Nyāyālaṃkāra I.3–4).

The metaphysics that pervades the Nyāya texts is both realistic and pluralistic. On the Nyāya view the plurality of reasonably believed things exist and have an identity independently of their contingent relationship with other objects. This applies as much to mundane objects, as it does to the self, and God. The ontological model that appears to pervade Nyāya metaphysical thinking is that of atomism, the view that reality is composed of indecomposable simples (cf. *Nyāya-Sūtra* IV.2.4.16).

Nyāya's treatment of logical and rhetorical issues, particularly in the *Nyāya Sūtra*, consists in an extended inventory acceptable and unacceptable argumentation. Nyāya is often depicted as primarily concerned with logic, but it is more accurately thought of as being concerned with argumentation.

b. Vaiśeṣika

The Vaiśeṣika system was founded by the ascetic, Kaṇāda (1st cent. C.E.). His name translates literally as "atom-eater." On some accounts Kaṇāda gained this name because of the pronounced ontological atomism of his philosophy (*Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* VII.1.8), or because he restricted his diet to grains picked from the field. If the Nyāya system can be characterized as being predominantly concerned with matters of argumentation, the Vaiśeṣika system can be characterized as overwhelmingly concerned with metaphysical questions. Like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika in its later stages turned into a syncretic movement, wedded to the Nyāya system. Here the focus will be primarily on the early Vaiśeṣika system, with the help of some latter day commentaries.

Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*'s opening verses are both dense and very revealing about the scope of the system. The opening verse states that the topic of the text is the elaboration of dharma (ethics or morality). According to the second verse, dharma is that which results not only in *abhyudaya* but also the Supreme Good (*niḥreyasa*), commonly known

as *mokṣa* (liberation) in Indian philosophy (*Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* I.1.1–2). The term "*abhyudaya*" designates the values extolled in the early, action portion of the Vedas, such as *artha* (economic prosperity) and *kāma* (sensual pleasure). From the second verse it thus appears that the Vaiśeṣika system regards morality as providing the way for the remaining *puruṣārtha*. A reading of the obscure third verse provided by the latter day philosopher Śaṅkara-Misra (15th cent. C.E.) states that the validity of the Vedas rests on the fact that it is an explication of dharma. (Misra's alternative explanation is that the phrase can be read as asserting that the validity of the Vedas derives from the authority of its author, God – this is a syncretistic reading of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, influenced by Nyāya philosophy.) (Śaṅkara-Misra's *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya* I.1.2, p.7).

From the densely worded fourth verse, it appears that the Vaiśeṣika system regards itself as an explication of dharma. The Vaiśeṣika system holds that the elaboration or knowledge of the particular expression of dharma (which is the Vaiśeṣika system) consists of knowledge of six categories: substance (*dravya*), attribute (*guṇa*), action (karma), genus (*sāmānya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), and the relationship of inherence between attributes and their substances (*samavāya*) (*Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* I.1.4).

The dense fourth verse of the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* gives expression to a thorough going metaphysical realism. On the Vaiśeṣika account, universals (*sāmānya*) as well as particularity (*viśeṣa*) are realities, and these have a distinct reality from substances, attributes, actions, and the relation of inherence, which all have their own irreducible reality.

The metaphysical import of the fourth verse potentially obscures the fact that the Vaiśeṣika system sets itself the task of elaborating dharma. Given the weight that the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* gives to ontological matters, it is inviting to treat its insistence that it seeks to elaborate dharma as quite irrelevant to its overall concern. However, subsequent authors in the Vaiśeṣika tradition have drawn attention to the significance of dharma to the overall system.

Śaṅkara-Misra suggests that dharma understood in its particular presentation in the Vaiśeṣika system is a kind of sagely forbearance or withdrawal from the world (Śaṅkara-Misra's *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya* I.1.4. p.12). In a similar vein, another commentator, Chandrakānta (19th cent. C.E.), states:

Dharma presents two aspects, that is under the characteristic of *Pravṛitti* or worldly activity, and the characteristic of *Nivṛitti* or withdrawal from worldly activity. Of these, Dharma characterized by *Nivṛitti*, brings forth *tattva–jñana* or knowledge of truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes. (Chandrakānta p.15.) . <...>

c. Sāṅkhya

The term "Sāṅkhya" means 'enumeration' and it suggests a methodology of philosophical analysis. On many accounts, Sāṅkhya is the oldest of the systematic schools of Indian philosophy. It is attributed to the legendary sage Kapila of antiquity, though we have no extant work left to us by him. His views are recounted in many *smṛti* texts, such as the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and the *Bhagavad Gītā*, but the Sāṅkhya system appears to stretch back to the end of the Vedic period itself. Key concepts of the Sāṅkhya system appear in the *Upaniṣads* (*Kaṭha Upaniṣad* I.3. 10–11), suggesting that it is an indigenous Indian philosophical school that developed congenially in parallel with the Vedic tradition. Its relative antiquity appears to be confirmed by the references to the school in classical Jain writings (for instance, *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* I.i.1.13), which are known for their antiquity. Unlike many of the other systematic schools of Hindu philosophy, the Sāṅkhya system does not explicitly attempt to align itself with the authority of the Vedas (cf. *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 2).

The oldest systematic writing on Sāṅkhya that we have is Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* (4th cent. C.E.). In it we have the classic Sāṅkhya ontology and metaphysic set out, along with its theory of agency.

According to the Sāṅkhya system, the cosmos is the result of the mutual contact of two distinct metaphysical categories: *Prakṛti* (Nature), and *Puruṣa* (person). *Prakṛti*, or Nature, is the material principle of the cosmos and is comprised of three *guṇas*, or "qualities." These are *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. *Sattva* is illuminating, buoyant and a source of pleasure; *rajas* is actuating, propelling and a source of pain; *tamas* is still, enveloping and a source of indifference (*Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 12–13).

Puruṣa, in contrast, has the quality of consciousness. It is the entity that the personal pronoun "I" actually refers to. It is eternally distinct from Nature, but it enters into complex configurations of Nature (biological bodies) in order to experience and to have knowledge. According to the Sāṅkhya tradition, mind, mentality, intellect or *Mahat* (the Great one) is not a part of the *Puruṣa*, but the result of the complex organization of matter, or the *guṇas*. Mentality is the closest thing in Nature to *Puruṣa*, but it is still a natural entity, rooted in materiality. *Puruṣa*, in contrast, is a pure witness. It lacks the ability to be an agent. Thus, on the Sāṅkhya account, when it seems as though we as persons are making decisions, we are mistaken: it is actually our natural constitution comprised by the *guṇas* that make the decision. The *Puruṣa* does nothing but lend consciousness to the situation (*Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 12–13, 19, 21).

The contact of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*, on the Sāṅkhya account, is not a chance occurrence. Rather, the two principles make contact so that *Puruṣa* can come to have knowledge of its own nature. A *Puruṣa* comes to have such knowledge when *sattva*, the illuminating *guṇa*, assumes a governing position in a bodily constitution. The moment that this knowledge comes about, a *Puruṣa* becomes liberated. The *Puruṣa* is no longer bound by the actions and choices of its body's constitution. However, liberation consists in the end of karma tying the *Puruṣa* to *Prakṛti*: it does not coincide with the complete annihilation of past karma, which would consist in the disentangling of a *Puruṣa* from *Prakṛti*. Hence, the *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* likens the self-realization of the *Puruṣa* to a potter's wheel, which continues to spin down, after the potter has ceased putting energy to keep the wheel in motion (*Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 67). <…>

d. Yoga

The Yoga tradition shares much with the Sāṅkhya *darśana*. Like the Sāṅkhya philosophy, traces of the Yoga tradition can be found in the *Upaniṣads*. While the systematic expression of the Yoga philosophy comes to us from Patañjali's *Yoga Sūtra*, it comes relatively late in the history of philosophy (at the end of the epic period, roughly 3rd century C.E.), the Yoga philosophy is also expressed in the *Bhagavad Gītā*. The Yoga philosophy shares with Sāṅkhya its dualistic cosmology. Like Sāṅkhya, the Yoga philosophy does not attempt to explicitly derive its authority from the Vedas. However, Yoga departs from Sāṅkhya on an important metaphysical and moral point – the nature of agency – and from Sāṅkhya in its emphasis on practical means to achieve liberation.

Like the Sāṅkhya tradition, the Yoga *darśana* holds that the cosmos is the result of the interaction of two categories: *Prakṛti* (Nature) and *Puruṣa* (Person). Like the Sāṅkhya tradition, the Yoga tradition is of the opinion that *Prakṛti*, or Nature, is comprised of three *guṇas*, or qualities. These are the same three qualities extolled in the Sāṅkhya system – *tamas*, *rajas*, and *sattva* – though the *Yoga Sūtra* refers to many of these by different terms (cf. *Yoga Sūtra* II.18). As with the Sāṅkhya system, liberation in the Yoga system is facilitated by the ascendance of *sattva* in a person's mind, which permits enlightenment on the nature of the self.

A relatively important point of cosmological difference is that the Yoga system does not consider the Mind or the Intellect (*Mahat*) to be the greatest creation of Nature. A major difference between the two schools concerns Yoga's picture of how liberation is achieved. On the Sāṅkhya account, liberation comes about by Nature enlightening the

Puruṣa, for *Puruṣas* are mere spectators (cf. *Sāṅkhya Kārikā* 62). In the contexts of the Yoga *darśana*, the *Puruṣa* is not a mere spectator, but an agent: *Puruṣa* is regarded as the "lord of the mind" (*Yoga Sūtra* IV.18): for Yoga it is the effort of the *Puruṣa* that brings about liberation. The empowered account of *Puruṣa* in the Yoga system is supplemented by a detail account of the practical means by which *Puruṣa* can bring about its own liberation.

The *Yoga Sūtra* tells us that the point of yoga is to still perturbations of the mind – the main obstacle to liberation (*Yoga Sūtra* I.2). The practice of the Yoga philosophy comes to those with energy (*Yoga Sūtra* I.21). In order to facilitate the calming of the mind, the Yoga system prescribes several moral and practical means. The core of the practical import of the Yoga philosophy is what it calls the *Astāṅga yoga* (not to be confused with a tradition of physical yoga also called *Astāṅga Yoga*, popular in many yoga centers in recent times). The *Astāṅga yoga* sets out the eight (*aṣṭa*) limbs (*aṅga*) of the practice of yoga (*Yoga Sūtra* II.29). The eight limbs include:

- *yama* – abstention from evil-doing, which specifically consists of abstention from harming others (*Ahiṃsā*), abstention from telling falsehoods (*asatya*), abstention from acquisitiveness (*asteya*), abstention from greed/envy (*aparigraha*); and sexual restraint (*brahmacarya*)
- *niyamas* – various observances, which include the cultivation of purity (*sauca*), contentment (*santos*)) and austerities (*tapas*)
- *āsana* – posture
- *prāṇāyāma* – control of breath
- *pratyāhāra* – withdrawal of the mind from sense objects
- *dhāranā* – concentration
- *dhyāna* – meditation
- *samādhi* – absorption [in the self] (*Yoga Sūtra* II. 29–32).

According to the *Yoga Sūtra*, the *yama* rules "are basic rules… They must be practiced without any reservations as to time, place, purpose, or caste rules" (*Yoga Sūtra* II.31). The failure to live a morally pure life constitutes a major obstacle to the practice of Yoga (*Yoga Sūtra* II.34). On the plus side, by living the morally pure life, all of one's needs and desires are fulfilled. <…>

The steadfast practice of the *Astāṅga yoga* results in counteracting past karmas. This culminates in a milestone-liberating event: *dharmameghasamādhi* (or the absorption in the cloud of virtue). In this penultimate state, the aspirant has all their past sins washed away by a

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cloud of dharma (virtue, or morality). This leads to the ultimate state of liberation for the yogi, *kaivalya* (*Yoga Sūtra* IV.33). "*Kaivalya*" translates as "aloneness". <…>

e. Pūrvamīmāṃsā

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school of Hindu philosophy gains its name from the portion of the Vedas that it is primarily concerned with: the earlier (*pūrva*) inquiry (*Mīmāṃsā*), or the *karma khaṇḍa*. In the context of Hinduism, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school is one of the most orthodox of the Hindu philosophical schools because of its concern to elaborate and defend the contents of the early, ritually oriented part of the Vedas. Like many other schools of Indian philosophy, Pūrvamīmāṃsā takes dharma ("duty" or "ethics") as its primary focus (*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* I.i.1). Unlike all other schools of Hindu philosophy, Pūrvamīmāṃsā did not take *mokṣa*, or liberation, as something to extol or elaborate upon. The very topic of liberation is nowhere discussed in the foundational text of this tradition, and is recognized for the first time by the medieval Pūrvamīmāṃsā author Kumārila (7th cent. C.E.) as a real objective worth pursuing in conjunction with dharma (Kumārila V.xvi.108–110).

The school of philosophy known as Pūrvamīmāṃsā has its roots in the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, written by Jaimini (1st cent. C.E.). The *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, like the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, begins with the assertion that its main concern is the elaboration of dharma. The second verse tells us that dharma (or the ethical) is an injunction (*codana*) that has the distinction (*lakṣaṇa*) of bringing about welfare (*artha*) (*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* I.i.1–2).

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā system is distinguished from other Hindu philosophical schools – but for the Vedānta systems – in its view that the Vedas are epistemically foundational. Foundationalism is the view that certain knowledge claims are independently valid (which means that no further justificatory reasons are either possible or necessary to justify these claims), and moreover, that these independently valid knowledge claims are able to serve as justifications for beliefs that are based upon them. Such independently valid knowledge claims are thought to be justificatory foundations of a system of beliefs. While all Hindu philosophical schools recognize the validity of the Vedas, only the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems explicitly regard the Vedas as foundational, and being in no need of further justification: "… instruction [in the Vedas] is the means of knowing it (dharma) – infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent…" (*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* I.i.5). The justificatory capacity of the Vedas serves to

ground the *smṛti* literature, for it is the sacred tradition based on the Vedas (*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* I.iii.2). If a *smṛti* text conflicts with the Vedas, the Vedas are to be preferred. When there is no conflict, we are entitled to presume that the Vedas stand as support for the *smṛti* text (*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* I.iii.3). <…>

f. Vedānta

Like the Pūrvamīmāṃsā tradition, the Vedānta school is concerned with explicating the contents of a particular portion of the Vedas. While the Pūrvamīmāṃsā concerns itself with the former portion of the Vedas, the Vedānta school concerns the end (*anta*) of the Vedas. Whereas the principal concern of the earlier portion of the Vedas is action and dharma, the principal concern of the latter portion of the Vedas is knowledge and *mokṣa*.

Philosophies that count technically as expressions of the Vedānta philosophy find their classical expression in a commentary on a synopsis of the *Upaniṣads*. The synopsis of the contents of the *Upaniṣads* is called the *Vedānta Sūtras*, or the *Brahma Sūtras*, and its author is Bādarāyana (1st cent. C.E.). The latter portion of the Vedas is a vast corpus that does not elaborate a single doctrine in the manner of a monograph. Rather, it is a collection of speculative texts of the Vedas with overlapping themes and images. A common thread that runs through most of the *Upaniṣads* is a concern to elaborate the nature of the Ultimate, or *Brahman*, *Ātma* or the Self (often equated in these texts with *Brahman*) and what in the subsequent tradition is known as the *jīva*, or the individual psychological unity. The *Upaniṣads* are relatively clear that *Brahman* stands to creation as its source and support, but its unsystematic nature leaves much to be specified in the way of doctrine. While Bādarāyana's *Brahma Sūtra* is the systematization of the teachings of the *Upaniṣads*, many of the verses of the *Brahma Sūtra* are obscure and unintelligible without a commentary.

Owing to the cryptic nature of the *Brahma Sūtra* itself, many commentarial subtraditions have evolved in Vedānta. As a result, it is possible to misleadingly use the term "Vedānta" as though it stood for one comprehensive doctrine. Rather, the term "Vedānta" is best understood as a term embracing within it divergent philosophical views that have a common textual connection: their classical expression as a commentary on Bādarāyana's text.

There are three famous commentaries (*Bhāṣyas*) on the *Brahma Sūtra* that shine in the history of Hindu philosophy. These are the 8th

century C.E. commentary of Śaṅkara (Advaita) the 12th century C.E. commentary of Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita) and the 13th century C.E. commentary by Madhva (Dvaita). These three are not the only commentaries. There appears to have been no less than twenty-one commentators on the *Brahma Sūtra* prior to Madhva (Sharma, vol.1 p.15), and Madhva is by no means the last commentator on the *Brahma Sūtra* either. Important names in the history of Indian theology are amongst the latter day commentators: Nimbārka (13th cent. C.E.), Śrkaṇṭha(15th cent. C.E.), Vallabha (16th cent. C.E.), and Baladeva (18th cent. C.E.). However, the majority of the commentaries prior to Śaṅkara have been lost to history. The philosophical positions expressed in the various commentaries fall into four major camps of Vedānta: Bhedābheda, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. They principally differ on the metaphysics of individual selves and *Brahman*, though there are also some striking ethical differences between these schools as well.

i. Bhedābheda

According to the Bhedābheda view, *Brahman* converts itself into the created, but yet maintains a distinct identity. Thus, the school holds that *Brahman* is both different (*bheda*) and not different (*abheda*) from creation and the individual *jīva*.

The philosophical persuasion that has produced the most commentaries on the *Brahma Sūtra* is the Bhedābheda philosophy. Textual evidence suggests that all of the commentaries authored prior to Śaṅkara's famous Advaita commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* subscribed to a form of Bhedābheda, which one historian calls "Pantheistic Realism" (Sharma, pp. 15–7). And on natural readings, it appears that most of the remaining commentators (but for the three famous commentators) also promulgate an interpretation of the *Brahma Sūtra* that falls within the Bhedābheda camp. <…>

iii. Advaita

Combining the negative particle "*a*" with the term "*dvaita*" creates the term "*advaita*". The term "*dvaita*" is often translated as "dualism" as the term "*advaita*" is often translated as "non-dualism." In the case of Dvaita Vedānta, this convention of translation is misleading, for Dvaita Vedānta does not, like the Sāṅkhya system, propound a metaphysical dualism. Indeed, Dvaita Vedānta holds an explicitly pluralistic metaphysics. Rather, "*dvaita*" in the context of Vedānta nomenclature is an ordinal, meaning "secondness." Dvaita Vedānta, thus, holds that there

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is such a thing as secondness–something extra, that comes after the first: *Brahman*. Advaita Vedānta, in contrast, holds that *Brahman* is one without a second. "Advaita" can thus be translated as "monism," "non-duality" or most perspicuously as "non-secondness" (Hacker p.131n21).

The principal author in the Advaita tradition is Śaṅkara. In addition to writing several philosophical works, Śaṅkara the commentator on the *Brahma Sūtra*, set up four monasteries in the four corners of India. Successive heads of the monasteries, according to tradition, take Śaṅkara's name. This has contributed to great confusion about the views that Śaṅkara, the commentator on the *Brahma Sūtras* held, for many of his successors also authored philosophical works with the same name. On the basis of comparing writing style, vocabulary, and the colophons of the various works attributed to "Śaṅkara," the German philologist and scholar of Indian philosophy, Paul Hacker, has concluded that only a portion of the works attributed to Śaṅkara are by the author of the commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* (Hacker pp. 41–56). These genuine works include commentaries on the *Upaniṣads*, and a commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā*. The following explication will be restricted to such works.

It is commonly held that Śaṅkara argued that the common sense, empirical world as we know it is an illusion, or *māyā*. The term "*māyā*" does not figure prominently in the genuine writings of Śaṅkara. However, it is an accurate assessment that Śaṅkara holds that the majority of our beliefs about the reality of a plurality of objects and persons are ultimately false.

Śaṅkara's philosophy and criticism of common sense rests on an argument unique to him in the history of Indian philosophy–an argument that Śaṅkara sets at the outset of his commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*. From this argument from superimposition, the ordinary human psyche (which self identifies with a body, a unique personal history, and distinguishes itself from a plurality of other persons and objects) comes about by an erroneous superimposition of the characteristics of subjectivity (consciousness, or the sense of being a witness), with the category of objects (which includes the characteristics of having a body, existing at a certain time and place and being numerically distinct from other objects). According to Śaṅkara, these categories are opposed to each other as night and day. And hence, the conflation of the two categories is fallacious. However, it is also a creative mistake. As a result of this superimposition, the *jīva* (individual person) is constructed complete with psychological integrity, and a natural relationship with a body (*Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, Preamble to I.i.1). All of this is brought about by

beginningless nescience (*avidyā*) – a creative factor at play in the creation of the cosmos.

In reality, all there really is on Śaṅkara's account is *Brahman*: objects of its awareness, such as the entire universe, exist within the realm of its consciousness. The liberation of the individual *jīva* occurs when it undoes the error of superimposition, and no longer identifies itself with a body, or a particular person with a natural history, but with *Brahman*. . <…>

Śaṅkara's Advaita tradition is known for giving a nuanced, and two-part account of the 'self' and '*Brahman*.' On Śaṅkara's account, there is a lower and higher self. The lower self is the *jīva*, while the higher self (the real referent of the personal pronoun "I," used by anyone) is the one real Self: *Ātma*, which on Śaṅkara' s account is *Brahman*. Likewise, on Śaṅkara's account, there is a lower and a higher *Brahman* (Śaṅkara *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* IV.3.16. pp. 403–4). The lower *Brahman* is the personal God that pious devotees pray to and meditate on, while the Higher *Brahman* is devoid of most all such qualities, is impersonal, and is characterized as being essentially bliss (*ānanda*) (Śaṅkara *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* III.3.14) truth (*satyam*) knowledge (*jñānam*) and infinite (*anantam*) (cf. Śaṅkara, *Taittitrīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya* II.i.1.). The lower *Brahman*, or the personal God that people pray to, can be afforded the title of "*Brahman*" owing to its proximity to the Highest *Brahman*: in the world of plurality, it is the closest thing to the Ultimate (Śaṅkara *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* IV.3.9). However, it too, like the concept of the individual person, is a result of the error of superimposing the qualities of objectivity and subjectivity on each other (Śaṅkara, *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* IV.3.10). In the Advaita tradition, the lower *Brahman* is known as the *saguṇa Brahman* (or *Brahman*with qualities) while the highest *Brahman* is known as the *nirguṇa Brahman* (or *Brahman* without qualities) (Śaṅkara *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* III.2.21). <…>

iv. Viśistādvaita

The term "Viśiṣṭādvaita" is often translated as "Qualified Non-Dualism." An alternative, and more informative, translation is "Non-duality of the qualified whole," or perhaps 'Non-duality with qualifications." The principal exponent of this school of Vedānta is Rāmānuja, who attempted to eschew the illusionist implications of Advaita Vedānta, and the perceived logical problems of the Bhedābheda view while attempting to reconcile the portions of the *Upaniṣads* that affirmed a substantial monism and those that affirmed substantial pluralism. Rāmānuja's solution to his problematic is to argue for a theistic and organismic conception of *Brahman*.

The theism of Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita shows up in his insistence that *Brahman* is a specific deity (Viṣṇu, also known as "Nārāyana") who is an abode of an infinite number of auspicious qualities. The organismic aspect of Rāmānuja's model consists in his view that all things that we normally consider as distinct from *Brahman* (such as individual persons or *jīvas*, mundane objects, and other unexalted qualities) constitute the Body of *Brahman*, while the *Ātman* spoken of in the *Upaniṣads* is the non-body, or mental component of *Brahman*. The result is a metaphysic that regards *Brahman* as the only substance, but yet affirms the existence of a plurality of abstract and concrete objects as the qualities of *Brahman*'s Body and Soul (*Vedārthasaṅgraha* §2).

Rāmānuja holds that in the absence of stains of passed karma the *jīva* (individual person) resembles *Brahman* in being of the nature of consciousness and knowledge (Rāmānuja, *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, I.i.1. "*Great Siddhānta*" pp. 99–102). Past actions cloud our true nature and force us to act out their consequences. On Rāmānuja's account, the prime way of extricating ourselves from the beginningless effects of karma involves *bhakti*, or devotion to God. But *bhakti* on its own is not sufficient, or at least, *bhakti* if it is to bring about liberation must either be combined with the *karma yoga* mentioned in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, or it must turn into *bhakti yoga*. For attending to one's dharma (duty) is the chief means by which one can propitiate God, on Rāmānuja's account (Rāmānuja, *Gītā Bhāṣya*, XVIII.47 p. 583). Moreover, in attending to one's dharma in the deontological spirit characteristic of *karma-yoga* and consonant with *bhakti yoga* one prevents the development of new karmic dispositions, and can allow the past stores of karma to be naturally extinguished. This will have the effect of unclouding the individual *jīva*'s omniscience, and bringing the *jīva* closer to a vision of God, which alone is an unending source of joy (*Vedārthasaṅgraha* §241). Unlike Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja insists that dharma is never to be abandoned (Rāmānuja, *Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya* XVIII.66, p. 599).

v. Dvaita

Madhva is one of the principal theistic exponents of Vedānta. On his account, *Brahman* is a personal God, and specifically He is the Hindu deity Viṣṇu.

According to Madhva, reality is characterized by a five-fold difference: (i) *jīvas* (individual persons) are different from God; (ii) *jīvas* are also different from each other; (iii) inanimate objects are different from God; (iv) inanimate objects are different from other inanimate objects;

(v) inanimate objects are different from *jīvas* (*Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ,* I. 70–71). The number of types of entities on Madhva's account appears thus to be three: God, *jīvas,* and inanimate objects. However, the actual number of objects on Madhva's account appears to be very high. This substantial pluralism sets Madhva apart from the other principle exponents of Vedānta.

A distinctive doctrine of Madhva's Vedānta is his view that *jīvas* fall into a hierarchy, with the most exalted *jīvas* occupying a place below Viṣṇu (such as Viṣṇu's companions in his eternal abode) to the lowest *jīvas,* who occupy dark hell regions. Moreover, on Madhva's account, the ranking of *jīvas* is eternal, and hence those who occupy the lowest hells are eternally damned. Amongst the middle level *jīvas*, the Gods and the most virtuous of humans are eligible for liberation. The average amongst the middle rung *jīvas* transmigrate forever, while the lowest amongst the middle level *jīvas* find themselves in the upper hells (*Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ* I.85-88).

Madhva holds that liberation comes to those who appreciate the five-fold differences and the hierarchy of the *jīvas* (*Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ,* 81–2). However, ultimately, whether one is liberated or not is completely at the discretion of *Brahman*, and *Brahman* is pleased by nothing more than *bhakti*, or devotion (*Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ* I.117).

Theme 3. Philosophy in Antiquity: Greece

Patricia Curd

Presocratic Philosophy
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/presocratics/)

The Presocratics were 6th and 5th century BCE Greek thinkers who introduced a new way of inquiring into the world and the place of human beings in it. They were recognized in antiquity as the first philosophers and scientists of the Western tradition.

1. Who Were the Presocratic Philosophers?

<…> "Presocratic," if taken strictly as a chronological term, is not quite accurate, for the last of them were contemporaneous with Socrates and even Plato. <…>

That is almost certainly not how they could have described themselves. While it is true that Heraclitus says that "those who are lovers of wisdom must be inquirers into many things", the word he uses, *philosophos*, does not have the special sense that it acquires in the works of Plato and Aristotle, when the philosopher is contrasted with both the ordinary person and other experts, including the sophist (particularly in Plato), or in the resulting modern sense in which we can distinguish philosophy from physics or psychology; yet the Presocratics certainly saw themselves as set apart from the ordinary person and also from other thinkers (poets and historical writers, for example) who were their predecessors and contemporaries. As the fragment from Heraclitus shows, the early Greek philosophers thought of themselves as inquirers into many things, and the range of their inquiry was vast. They had views about the nature of the world, and these views encompass what we today call physics, chemistry, geology, meteorology, astronomy, embryology, and psychology (and other areas of natural inquiry), as well as theology, metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In the earliest of the Presocratics, the Milesians, it can indeed be difficult to discern the strictly philosophical aspects of the views in the evidence available to us. <…>

The questions that the early Greek philosophers asked, the sorts of answers that they gave, and the views that they had of their own inquiries were the foundation for the development of philosophy as it came to be defined in the work of Plato and Aristotle and their successors. Perhaps the fundamental characteristic is the commitment to explain the world in terms of its own inherent principles. <…>

Calling the Presocratics *philosophers* also suggests that they share a certain outlook with one another; an outlook that can be contrasted with that of other early Greek writers. Although scholars disagree about the extent of the divergence between the early Greek philosophers and their non-philosophical predecessors and contemporaries, it seems evident that Presocratic thought exhibits a significant difference not only in its understanding of the nature of the world, but also in its view of the sort of explanation of it that is possible. This is evident in Heraclitus. Although Heraclitus asserts that those who love wisdom must be inquirers into many things, inquiry alone is not sufficient. … He rebukes four of his predecessors: "Much learning does not teach understanding; else it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus." Heraclitus' implicit contrast is with himself; he suggests that he alone truly understands all things, because he grasps the account that enables him to "distinguish each thing in accordance with its nature" and say how it is. For Heraclitus there is an underlying principle that unites and explains everything. It is this that others have failed to see and understand. <…>

2. The Milesians

In his account of his predecessors' searches for "causes and principles" of the natural world and natural phenomena, Aristotle says that Thales of Miletus (a city in Ionia, on the west coast of what is now Turkey) was the first to engage in such inquiry. He seems to have lived around the beginning of the 6th c. B.C.E. Aristotle mentions that some more ancient persons placed great importance on water, like Thales himself, and then later raises the question of whether perhaps Hesiod was the first to look for a cause of motion and change. These suggestions are rhetorical: Aristotle does not seriously imply that those he mentions are engaged in the same sort of inquiry as he thinks Thales was. Two other Greek thinkers from this very early period, Anaximander and Anaximenes, were also from Miletus, and although the ancient tradition that the three were related as master and pupil may not be correct, there are enough fundamental similarities in their views to justify treating them together.

The tradition claims that Thales predicted a solar eclipse in 585 B.C., introduced geometry into Greece from Egypt, and produced some engineering marvels; Anaximander is reported to have invented the gnomon, that raised piece of a sundial whose shadow marks time, and to have been the first to draw a map of the inhabited world. Regardless of whether these reports are correct (and in the case of Thales' prediction

they almost certainly are not), they indicate something important about the Milesians: their interests in measuring and explaining celestial and terrestrial phenomena were as strong as their concern with the more abstract inquiries into the causes and principles of substance and change that Aristotle attributes to them (Algra 1999, White 2008). They did not see the scientific and philosophical questions as belonging to separate disciplines, requiring distinct methods of inquiry. The assumptions and principles that we (along with Aristotle) see as constituting the philosophical foundations of their theories are, for the most part, implicit in the claims that they make. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to treat the Milesians as having philosophical views, even though no clear statements of these views or specific arguments for them can be found in the surviving fragments and testimonia.

Aristotle's comments do not sound as if they were based on firsthand knowledge of Thales' views, and the doxographical reports say that Thales did not write a book. Yet Aristotle is confident that Thales belongs, even if honorifically, to that group of thinkers that he calls "inquirers into nature" and distinguishes him from earlier poetical "myth-makers." In Book I of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle claims that the earliest of these, among whom he places the Milesians, explained things only in terms of their matter. This claim is anachronistic in that it presupposes Aristotle's own novel view that a complete explanation must encompass four factors: what he called the material, efficient, formal, and final causes. Yet there is something in what Aristotle says. In his discussion, Aristotle links Thales' claim that the world rests on water with the view that water was the *archē*, or fundamental principle, and he adds that "that from which they come to be is a principle of all things". He suggests that Thales chose water because of its fundamental role in coming-to-be, nutrition, and growth, and claims that water is the origin of the nature of moist things.

Aristotle's general assertion about the first thinkers who gave accounts of nature (and his specific discussion of Thales' reliance on water as a first principle) brings out a difficulty in interpreting the early Presocratics. According to Aristotle's general account, the Presocratics claimed that there was a single enduring material stuff that is both the origin of all things and their continuing nature. Thus, on this view, when Thales says that the first principle is water, he should be understood as claiming both that the original state of things was water and that even now (despite appearances), everything is really water in some state or another. The change from the original state to the present one involves changes in the material stuff such that although it may not now appear to

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be water everywhere (but seems to be airier or earthier than water in its usual state, or its original one), there is no transformation of water into a different kind of stuff (air or earth, for instance). Yet, when Aristotle comes to give what details he can of Thales' view, he suggests only that for Thales, water was the first principle because everything comes from water. Water, then, was perhaps the original state of things for Thales, and water is a necessary condition for everything that is generated naturally, but Aristotle's summary of Thales' view does not imply that Thales claimed that water endures through whatever changes have occurred since the original state, and now just has some new or additional properties. Thales may well have thought that certain characteristics of the original water persisted: in particular its capacity for motion (which must have been innate in order to generate the changes from the original state). This is suggested by Thales' reported claims that the lodestone (with its magnetic properties) and amber (which when rubbed exhibits powers of attraction through static electricity) have souls and that all things are full of gods. Aristotle surmises that Thales identified soul (that which makes a thing alive and thus capable of motion) with something in the whole universe, and so supposed that everything was full of gods' – water, or soul, being a divine natural principle. Certainly the claim that the lodestone has soul suggests this account. Given that the analysis of change (both qualitative and substantial) in terms of a substratum that gains and loses properties is Aristotelian (although perhaps foreshadowed in Plato), it is not surprising that the earlier views were unclear on this issue, and it is probable that the Milesian view did not distinguish the notions of an original matter and an enduring underlying stuff.

The reports about Thales show him employing a certain kind of explanation: ultimately the explanation of why things are as they are is grounded in water as the basic stuff of the universe and the changes that it undergoes through its own inherent nature. In this, Thales marks a radical change from all other previous sorts of accounts of the world (both Greek and non-Greek). Like the other Presocratics, Thales sees nature as a complete and self-ordering system, and sees no reason to call on divine intervention from outside the natural world to supplement his account— water itself may be divine, but it is not something that intervenes in the natural world from outside. While the evidence for Thales' naturalistic account is circumstantial, this attitude can be directly verified for Anaximander.

In the one fragment that can be securely attributed to Anaximander (although the extent of the implied quotation is uncertain), he emphasizes the orderly nature of the universe, and indicates that the order is internal

rather than imposed from outside. Simplicius, a 6th century C.E. commentator on Aristotle's *Physics*, writes:

Of those who say that [the first principle] is one and moving and indefinite, Anaximander, son of Praxiades, a Milesian who became successor and pupil to Thales, said that the indefinite (*to apeiron*) is both principle (*archē*) and element (*stoicheion*) of the things that are, and he was the first to introduce this name of the principle. He says that it is neither water nor any other of the so-called elements, but some other indefinite (*apeiron*) nature, from which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them; and those things, from which there is coming-to-be for the things that are, are also those into which is their passing-away, in accordance with what must be. For they give penalty (*dikê*) and recompense to one another for their injustice (*adikia*) in accordance with the ordering of time–speaking of them in rather poetical terms. It is clear that having seen the change of the four elements into each other, he did not think it fit to make some one of these underlying subject, but something else, apart from these. (Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* 24).

Thus, there is an original (and originating) indefinite stuff, from which all the heavens and the worlds in them come to be. This claim probably means that the original state of the universe was an indefinitely large mass of stuff that was also indefinite in its character. This stuff then gave rise through its own inherent power to the ingredients that themselves constitute the world as we perceive it.

A testimony about Anaximander from Pseudo-Plutarch says that "Something productive of hot and cold was separated off from the eternal at the genesis of this world and from this a sphere of flame grew around the air around the earth like the bark around a tree." Neither the cause nor the precise process of separation is explained, but it is probable that Anaximander would have thought of the original source of change as part of the character of the indefinite itself. The passage from Simplicius shows that Anaximander does not think that the eternal indefinite stuff gives rise directly to the cosmos as we know it. Rather, the *apeiron* somehow generates the opposites hot and cold. Hot and cold are themselves stuffs with powers; and it is the actions of these stuffs/powers that produce the things that come to be in our world. The opposites act on, dominate, and contain each other, producing a regulated structure; thus things pass away into those things from which they came to be. It is this structured arrangement that Anaximander refers to when he speaks of justice and reparation. Over the course of time, the cycles of the seasons, the

rotations of the heavens, and other sorts of cyclical change (including coming-to-be and passing-away) are regulated and thus form a system. This system, ruled by the justice of the ordering of time is in sharp contrast with the chaotic and capricious world of the personified Greek gods who interfere in the workings of the heavens and in the affairs of human beings (Kahn 1985a, Vlastos 1947, Guthrie 1962).

The pattern that can be seen in Thales and Anaximander of an original basic stuff giving rise to the phenomena of the cosmos continues in the views of the third of the Milesians, Anaximenes. He replaces Anaximander's *apeiron* with air, thus eliminating the first stage of the coming-to-be of the cosmos (the something productive of hot and cold). Rather, he returns to an originating stuff more like Thales' water. Aristotle's associate Theophrastus… speculates that Anaximenes chose air because he agreed that a basic principle must be neutral (as Anaximander's *apeiron* is) but not so lacking in properties that it seems to be nothing at all. Air can apparently take on various properties of color, temperature, humidity, motion, taste, and smell. Moreover, according to Theophrastus, Anaximenes explicitly states the natural mechanism for change; it is the condensation and rarefaction of air that naturally determine the particular characters of the things produced from the originating stuff. Rarified, air becomes fire; more and more condensed, it becomes progressively wind, cloud, water, earth, and finally stones. "The rest," says Theophrastus, "come to be from these." Plutarch says that condensation and rarefaction are connected with cooling and heating, and he gives the example of breath. Releasing air from the mouth with compressed lips produces cool air (as in cooling soup by blowing on it), but relaxed lips produce warm air (as when one blows on cold hands to warm them up).

Does the originating stuff persist through the changes that it undergoes in the generating processes? Aristotle's account suggests that it does, that Anaximenes, for instance, would have thought that stone was really air, although in an altered state, just as we might say that ice is really water, cooled to a point where it goes from a liquid to a solid state. Because the water does not cease to be water when it is cooled and becomes ice, it can return to a liquid when heated and then become a gas when more heat is applied. On this view, the Milesians were material monists, committed to the reality of a single material stuff that undergoes many alterations but persists through the changes (Barnes 1979, Guthrie 1962, Sedley, 2007 and 2009). <…>

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3. Xenophanes of Colophon and Heraclitus of Ephesus

Living in the last years of the 6th c. and the beginning of the 5th, Xenophanes and Heraclitus continue the Milesian interest in the nature of the physical world, and both offer cosmological accounts; yet they go further than the Milesians not only through their focus on the human subject and the expanded range of their physical explanations, but by investigating the nature of inquiry itself. Both explore the possibility of human understanding and question its limits. <…>

Heraclitus writes in an aphoristic style, his apparently paradoxical claims presenting difficulties to any interpreter. Nevertheless, he raises important questions about knowledge and the nature of the world. The opening of Heraclitus' book refers to a "*logos* which holds forever." There is disagreement about exactly what Heraclitus meant by using the term *logos*, but it is clear from … other fragments that he refers to an objective law-like principle that governs the cosmos, and which it is possible (but difficult) for humans to come to understand. There is a single order that directs all things ("all things are one"); this order is divine, and is sometimes connected by humans with the traditional gods (it is "both unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus"). Just as Zeus, in the traditional view, controls from Olympus with a thunderbolt, so this single ordered system steers and controls the whole cosmos from within. The sign of the unchanging order of the eternal system is fire – just as fire is always changing and always the same, so with the *logos* that embodies the order and rules all things.

The plan or order that steers the cosmos is, itself, a rational order. This means not only that it is non-capricious and so intelligible (in the sense that humans can, at least in principle, come to understand it), it is also an intelligent system: there is an intelligent plan at work, if only in the sense of the cosmos working itself out in accordance with rational principles:

"Those who would speak with understanding must ground themselves firmly in that which is common to all, just as a city does in its law, and even more firmly! For all human laws are nourished by one law, the divine; for it rules as far at it wishes and suffices for all, and is still more than enough."

Heraclitus is not only claiming that human prescriptive law must harmonize with divine law, but he is also asserting that divine law encompasses both the universal laws of the cosmos itself and the particular laws of men. The cosmos itself is an intelligent, eternal (and hence divine) system that orders and regulates itself in an intelligent way: the

logos is the account of this self-regulation. We can come to grasp and understand at least part of this divine system. This is not merely because we ourselves are part of (contained in) the system, but because we have, through our capacity for intelligent thinking, the power to grasp the system as a whole, through knowing the *logos*. How this grasping is supposed to work is tantalizingly obscure.

Heraclitus regards the order of cosmos as like a language that can be read or heard and understood by those who are attuned to it. That language is not just the physical evidence around us ("Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to those with barbarian souls"); the sheer accumulation of information is not the same as wisdom (…). Although the evidence of the senses is important (…), careful and thoughtful inquiry is also necessary. Those who are lovers of wisdom must be good inquirers into many things (… "I enquired into myself"), and must be able to grasp how the phenomena are signs or evidence of the larger order; as Heraclitus notes…, "nature is accustomed to hide itself," and the evidence must be carefully interpreted. That evidence is the interplay of opposing states and forces, which Heraclitus points to by claims about the unity of opposites and the roles of strife in human life as well as in the cosmos. There are fragments that proclaim the unity or identity of opposites: the road up and down are one and the same (…), the path of writing is both straight and crooked (B59), sea water is very pure and very foul (…). The famous river fragments (…) question the identity of things over time, while a number of fragments point to the relativity of value judgments (…). Anaximander's system of just reciprocity ordered by time is replaced by a system governed by war: "It is right to know that war is common and justice strife, and that all things come to be through strife and are so ordained" (…). The changes and alterations that constitute the processes of the cosmos are regular and capable of being understood by one who can speak the language of the *logos* and thus interpret properly. Although the evidence is confusing, it points to the deeper regularities that constitute the cosmos, just as Heraclitus' own remarks can seem obscure yet point to the truth. Heraclitus surely has his own message (and his delivery of it) in mind…, "The lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals, but gives a sign."

One of the earliest of the Greek philosophers to discuss the human soul, Heraclitus' claims about it, like his other views, are expressed enigmatically. Yet it seems fairly clear that he treats soul as the seat of emotion, movement, and intellect. …He indicates that understanding is a function of soul, and …, the drunken man who must be led by a boy because he has lost control of his legs, and also does not know where he

goes or what he does. Drunkenness is the cause of all this: because his soul has become wet its powers are dampened down and become ineffective. He asserts "gleam of light: dry soul, wisest and best." This suggests that for Heraclitus, soul is a stuff that is affected by changes along the hot/cold and wet/dry continua. Although Heraclitus says that it is only divine nature that has complete understanding (…), his linking of fire with the *logos* and the divine, along with his view that the best and wisest soul is hot and dry, suggests that humans who care for their souls and search for the truth contained in the *logos* can overcome human ignorance and approach understanding. <…>

4. Parmenides of Elea

Parmenides, born ca. 510 B.C.E in the Greek colony of Elea in southern Italy (south of Naples, and now known as Velia), explores the nature of philosophical inquiry, concentrating less on knowledge or understanding (although he has views about these) than on what can be understood. Xenophanes identified genuine knowledge with the grasping of the sure and certain truth and claimed that "no man has seen" it; Heraclitus had asserted that divine nature, not human, has right understanding. Parmenides argues that human thought can reach genuine knowledge or understanding, and that there can be certain marks or signs that act as guarantees that the goal of knowledge has been reached. A fundamental part of Parmenides' claim is that what *must* be (cannot not-be, as Parmenides puts it) is more knowable than what is merely contingent (what may or may not be), which can be the object only of belief.

Parmenides gives us a poem in Homeric hexameters, narrating the journey of a young man (a *kouros*, in Greek) who is taken to meet a goddess who promises to teach him "all things" (…). The content of the story the goddess tells is not the knowledge that will allow humans, by having it, to know. Rather, the goddess gives the *kouros* the tools to acquire that knowledge himself. <…>

The goddess does not provide a list of true propositions, as a body of knowledge for him to acquire, and false ones to be avoided. Rather, in teaching the *kouros* how to evaluate claims about what-is, the goddess gives him the power to know all, by testing and evaluation, accepting or rejecting claims about the ultimate nature of things – that being what, and all that, is capable of being known. For Parmenides, the mark of what is known is that it is something that genuinely is, with no taint of what-is-not. That is why, for him, it not only is, but must be and cannot not-be. <…>

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The routes are methods of inquiry: keeping on the correct route will bring one to what-is, the real object of thought and understanding. Although what the goddess tells the *kouros* has divine sanction (hers), that is not why he should accept it. Rather, the truth she tells reveals a mark of its own truth: it is testable by reason or thought itself. In B7 the goddess warns that we must control our thought in the face of the ever-present seductions of sense-experience. <…>

The *kouros* himself can reach a decision or determination of the truth solely through use of his *logos*. *Logos* here means thinking or reasoning. It is probably not reason as a faculty that Parmenides intends here, but the reasoning aspect of *noos*, the capacity for thought in general. In any case, the test (…), is "is or is not?" – this is not just the question of non-contradiction (which would give us coherence), but whether or not the claim that something is entails, on further examination, the actual reality of what-is-not.

The arguments … demonstrate *how* what-is must be, and in applying these arguments as tests against any suggested basic entity in the Presocratic search for ultimate causes or principles, the *kouros* can determine whether or not a proposed theory is acceptable. For Parmenides *noos* is not itself an infallible capacity. One can think well or badly; correct thinking is that which takes the correct route and so reaches what-is. The mortals on the incorrect route are thinking, but their thoughts have no real object (none that is real in the appropriate way), and so cannot be completed or perfected by reaching the truth. <…>

After laying out the arguments about what-is, the goddess turns to the route of mortals, in an account which she calls "deceptive." Although Parmenides has been read as thus rejecting any possibility of cosmological inquiry (Barnes 1979, Owen 1960), there are persuasive interpretations that allow for justified belief about the contingent world, a world that may or may not be, and is not such that it must be (Nehamas 2002, Curd 2004, Palmer 2009). The problem of mortals is that they mistake what they perceive for what there is (and must be). As long as one realizes that the world of perception is not genuinely real, and cannot therefore be the object of knowledge, it may be possible for there to be justified belief about the cosmos. Some details of Parmenides' own cosmology are given, arguably as justified belief, in the *Doxa* section of the poem, and more in the testimonia from later authors. Parmenides marks a sharp distinction between being (what-is and must be) and becoming, and between knowledge and perception-based belief or opinion.

5. The Pythagorean Tradition

In the last quarter of the sixth century, before Parmenides' birth, Pythagoras of Samos (an Aegean island) arrived in Croton, in southern Italy. He established a community of followers who adopted his political views, which favored rule by the "better people," and also the way of life he recommended on what seem to have been more or less philosophical bases. The traditional view has been that the aristocracy, the "better people," generally meant the rich. But Burkert notes that as early as the 4th c. B.C.E there were two traditions about Pythagoras, one that meshes with the traditional view and associates Pythagoras with political tyrants, and another that credits him with rejecting tyrannies for aristocracies that might not have been grounded in wealth (Burkert 1972, 119). The Pythagorean Archytas (born late 5th century) lived in a democracy (Tarentum in southern Italy), and seems to have argued for fair and proportionate dealings between rich and poor (Huffman 2005). The Pythagorean way of life included adherence to certain prescriptions including religious rites and dietary restrictions (see the general discussion in Kahn 2001).

Like Socrates, Pythagoras wrote nothing himself, but had a great influence on those who followed him. He had a reputation for great learning and wisdom (…), although he was treated satirically by both Xenophanes (…) and Heraclitus (…). We do not know to what extent this included knowledge of mathematics, as would be suggested by the attribution to him of the famous Pythagorean theorem of geometry. The details of Pythagoras' views are unclear, but he seems to have advocated the immortality of the soul (a novel idea among the Greeks, also developed in Orphic religion) and the possibility of the transmigration of the human soul after death into other animal forms. Pythagorean writers after his own time stressed the mathematical structure and order of the universe. This is often attributed directly to Pythagoras (primarily because of the geometrical theorem that bears his name), but recent scholarship has shown that the evidence for attributing this mathematically-based cosmology to Pythagoras himself is convoluted and doubtful (Burkert 1972, Huffman 1993 and 2005; but see Zhmud 1997).

What seems clear is that the early Pythagoreans conceived of nature as a structured system ordered by number (…), and that such post-Parmenidean Pythagoreans as Philolaus (last half of the 5th century, more than a generation after Pythagoras' death) and Archytas (late 5th to early 4th century) held more complicated views about the relation between mathematics and cosmology than it is reasonable to suppose Pythagoras himself could have advanced. The Pythagorean tradition thus

includes two strains. There are reports of a split in the period after Pythagoras' death between what we would term the more philosophically inclined Pythagoreans and others who primarily adopted the Pythagorean ethical, religious and political attitudes. The latter, called the *acusmatici*, followed the Pythagorean precepts, or *acusmata* (which means "things heard"). The former, the philosophical Pythagoreans (including Philolaus and Archytas), were the called *mathematici*, and while they recognized that the *acusmatici* were indeed Pythagoreans by virtue of accepting Pythagorean precepts, they claimed that they themselves were the true followers of Pythagoras.

Philolaus of Croton seems to have blended the Pythagorean life with an awareness of and appreciation for the arguments of Parmenides (Huffman 1993). According to Philolaus, "Nature in the cosmos was fitted together out of unlimiteds and limiters" (…). These limiters and unlimiteds play the role of Parmenidean basic realities – they are and unchangingly must be what they are, and so can be known; they are joined together in a harmonia (literally, a carpenter's joint; metaphorically, a harmony), and "it was not possible for any of the things that are and are known by us to come to be, without the existence of the being of things from which the cosmos was put together" (…). The unlimiteds are unstructured stuffs and continua; the limiters impose structure (shape, form, mathematical structure) on the unlimiteds. Things become knowable because they are structured in this way; the structure can apparently be expressed in a numerical ratio that allows for understanding: "All things that are known have number; for without this nothing whatever could possibly be thought of or known" (…).

6. Other Eleatics: Zeno (and Melissus)

Parmenides had argued that there were strict metaphysical requirements on any object of knowledge; the later Eleatics, Zeno of Elea (born ca. 490) and Melissus of Samos (fl. ca. 440), extended and explored the consequences of his arguments. Zeno paid particular attention to the contrast between the requirements of logical argument and the evidence of the senses (Vlastos 1967, McKirahan 1999 and 2005). The four famous paradoxes of motion, for which he is now and in antiquity best known, purported to show that, despite the evidence all around us, the ordinary motion of everyday life is impossible. The paradoxes claim that motions can never be begun (the Achilles) or be completed (the Dichotomy), entail contradictions (the Moving Blocks), or are altogether impossible (the Arrow). Recent philosophers of space and time (see Grünbaum

1967, articles in Salmon 2001, Huggett 1999) hold that the arguments are reductios of the theses that space and time are continuous (the Achilles and the Dichotomy) or discrete (the Moving Blocks and the Arrow). Consider the Dichotomy: a runner can never complete a run from point A to point B. First, the runner must move from A to a point halfway between A and B (call it C). But between A and C there is yet another halfway point (D), and the runner must first reach D. But between A and D there is yet another halfway point … and so on, ad infinitum. So the runner, starting at A, can never reach B. The argument assumes that it is impossible to pass an infinite number of points in a finite time. Similarly, Zeno produced paradoxes showing that plurality is impossible: if things are many, contradictions follow (…); there were also purported proofs that place is impossible (…) and that things cannot have parts (the Millet Seed). <…>

7. Presocratic Atomism

<…> Ancient atomism … (says) what is real is an infinite number of solid, uncuttable (*atomon*) units of matter. All atoms are made of the same stuff (solid matter, in itself otherwise indeterminate), differing from one another (according to Aristotle) only in shape, position, arrangement. (….) In addition, the Presocratic atomists, Leucippus and Democritus (Democritus was born in about 460 BCE in Abdera in Northern Greece, shortly after Socrates was born in Athens), enthusiastically endorsed the reality of the empty (or void). The void is what separates atoms and allows for the differences noted above (except weight, which could not be accounted for by void, since void in an atom would make it divisible and, hence, not an atom) (Sedley 1982; see also Sedley 2008).

…The atomists consider all phenomenal objects and characteristics as emerging from the background mixture; in the case of atomism, the mix of atoms and void (Wardy 1988). Everything is constructed of atoms and void: the shapes of the atoms and their arrangement with respect to each other (and the intervening void) give physical objects their apparent characteristics. As Democritus says: "By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention color: in reality atoms and void" (…). For example, Theophrastus says that the flavors differ according to the shapes of the atoms that compose various objects; thus "Democritus makes sweet that which is round and quite large, astringent that which large, rough, polygonal and not rounded" (...). Simplicius reports that things composed of sharp and very fine atoms in similar positions are hot and fiery; those composed of atoms

with the opposite character come to be cold and watery (…). Moreover, Theophrastus reports that the atomists explain why iron is harder than lead but lighter; it is harder because of the uneven arrangements of the atoms that make it up, lighter because it contains more void than lead. Lead, on the other hand, has less void than iron, but the even arrangement of the atoms makes lead easier to cut or to bend.

Adopting a strong distinction between appearance and reality, and denying the accuracy of appearances, as we see him do in the above quotation, Democritus was seen by some ancient sources (…) as a sort of skeptic, yet the evidence is unclear. It is true that Democritus is quoted as saying, "In truth we know nothing; for truth is in the depths" (…). So for him, the truth is not given in the appearances. . <…> …Sextus suggests that the evidence of the senses, when properly interpreted by reason, can be taken as a guide to reality (the claim that "appearances are a sight of the unseen" is attributed to Democritus as well as to Anaxagoras). We just need to know how to follow this guide, through proper reasoning, so as to reach the truth – i.e., the theory of atoms and void (Lee 2005).

In addition to fragments advancing these metaphysical and physical doctrines, there are a number of ethical fragments attributed to Democritus (but the question of authenticity looms large here); although a passage reported in John Stobaeus seems to link moderation and cheerfulness with small measured movements in the soul and says that excess and deficiencies give rise to large movements (68B191), it is unclear whether or how these claims are directly related to the metaphysical aspects of atomism (Vlastos 1945 and 1946, Kahn 1985b). Democritus was identified in antiquity with the idea of "good cheer" (*euthumiē*) as the proper guiding objective in living one's life. In this, as in other aspects of his philosophy, he may have had some influence on the formation of Epicurus' philosophy a century later.

8. Diogenes of Apollonia and the Sophists

In the last part of the 5th century, Diogenes of Apollonia (active after 440 B.C.E) revived and revised the Milesian system of cosmology, claiming that "all the things that are are alterations from the same thing and are the same thing" (64B2); he identified this single basic substance with air, like Anaximenes more than a century before (Graham 2006, Laks 2008, 2008a). Yet Diogenes takes care to give arguments for the existence and properties of his basic principle. … He says that only things that are alike can affect one another. If there were a plurality of basic

substances, each differing in what Diogenes calls their "own proper nature," there could be no interaction between them. Yet the evidence of the senses is clear: things mix and separate and interact with one another. Thus, all things must be forms of some one single thing. ... Diogenes claims that the cosmic system is ordered by intelligence, and he argues that that "which possesses intelligence (*noēsis*) is what human beings call air" (…). Humans and animals live by breathing air, and are governed by it – in them air is both soul and intelligence, or mind (…). Moreover, Diogenes argues, air governs and rules all things and is god (…). Thus, (…) Diogenes has a theory grounded in intelligence, although Diogenes is more fully committed to teleological explanations, insofar as he states explicitly that intelligence (*noēsis*) orders things in a good way (…). In presenting his arguments, Diogenes fulfills his own requirement for a philosophical claim. In B1 he says, "In my opinion, anyone beginning a *logos* (account) ought to present a starting principle (*archē*) that is indisputable and a style that is simple and stately." He notes that his theory that air is soul and intelligence "will have been made clearly evident in this book" (…).

Theophrastus says that Diogenes was the last of the physical philosophers, the *physiologoi*, or "inquirers into nature," as Aristotle called them. There was also another group of thinkers active about this time: the Sophists. Many of our views about this group have been shaped by Plato's aggressively negative assessment of them: in his dialogues Plato expressly contrasts the genuine philosopher, i.e., Socrates, with the Sophists, especially in their role as teachers of young men growing into their maturity (youths at the age when Socrates, too, engaged with them in his discussions). Modern scholarship (Woodruff and Gagarin 2008, Kerferd 1981, Guthrie 1969) has shown the diversity of their views. They were not completely uninterested in the theoretical problems that concerned others of the Presocratics. Gorgias of Leontini explored the possibility of the sort of theoretical knowledge that Parmenides explored: in his "*On Nature*, or *On what-is-not"*, Gorgias claims that nothing satisfies Parmenides' requirements for what-is (Mansfeld 1985, Mourelatos 1987b, Palmer 1999, Caston 2002, Curd 2006). Protagoras, too, questioned the possibility of the sort of objective knowledge that the Presocratics sought. The Sophists explored ethical and political questions: Does law or convention ground what is right, or is it a matter of nature? They were peripatetic, sometimes serving as diplomats, and they were both entertainers and teachers. They gave public displays of rhetoric (this contrasts with Diogenes of Apollonia's comments about his book, which seems to

imply a more private enterprise) and took on students, teaching both the art of rhetoric and the skills necessary for succeeding in Greek political life. With the Sophists, as with Socrates, interest in ethics and political thought becomes a more prominent aspect of Greek philosophy.

9. The Presocratic Legacy

The range of Presocratic thought shows that the first philosophers were not merely physicists (although they were certainly that). Their interests extended to religious and ethical thought, the nature of understanding, mathematics, meteorology, the nature of explanation, and the roles of mechanism, matter, form, and structure in the world. Almost all the Presocratics seemed to have something to say about embryology, and fragments of Diogenes and Empedocles show a keen interest in the structures of the body; the overlap between ancient philosophy and ancient medicine is of growing interest to scholars of early Greek thought (Longrigg 1963, van der Eijk 2008). Recent discoveries, such as the Derveni Papyrus (Betegh 2004, Kouremenos et al. 2006, Janko 2001, Laks and Most 1997), show that interest in and knowledge of the early philosophers was not necessarily limited to a small audience of rationalistic intellectuals. They passed on many of what later became the basic concerns of philosophy to Plato and Aristotle, and ultimately to the whole tradition of Western philosophical thought.

Thomas Brickhouse,
Nicholas D. Smith

Plato (427–347)
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/plato/)

Plato is one of the world's best known and most widely read and studied philosophers. He was the student of Socrates and the teacher of Aristotle, and he wrote in the middle of the fourth century B.C.E. in ancient Greece. Though influenced primarily by Socrates, to the extent that Socrates is usually the main character in many of Plato's writings, he was also influenced by Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the Pythagoreans.

There are varying degrees of controversy over which of Plato's works are authentic, and in what order they were written, due to their antiquity and the manner of their preservation through time. Nonetheless, his earliest works are generally regarded as the most reliable of the ancient sources on Socrates, and the character Socrates that we know

through these writings is considered to be one of the greatest of the ancient philosophers.

Plato's middle to later works, including his most famous work, the *Republic*, are generally regarded as providing Plato's own philosophy, where the main character in effect speaks for Plato himself. These works blend ethics, political philosophy, moral psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics into an interconnected and systematic philosophy. It is most of all from Plato that we get the theory of Forms, according to which the world we know through the senses is only an imitation of the pure, eternal, and unchanging world of the Forms. <…>

5. The Early Dialogues
<…>
b. Plato's Characterization of Socrates
In the dialogues generally accepted as early (or "Socratic"), the main character is always Socrates. Socrates is represented as extremely agile in question-and-answer, which has come to be known as "the Socratic method of teaching," or "the elenchus" (or *elenchos*, from the Greek term for refutation), with Socrates nearly always playing the role as questioner, for he claimed to have no wisdom of his own to share with others. Plato's Socrates, in this period, was adept at reducing even the most difficult and recalcitrant interlocutors to confusion and self-contradiction. In the *Apology,* Socrates explains that the embarrassment he has thus caused to so many of his contemporaries is the result of a Delphic oracle given to Socrates' friend Chaerephon (...), according to which no one was wiser than Socrates. As a result of his attempt to discern the true meaning of this oracle, Socrates gained a divinely ordained mission in Athens to expose the false conceit of wisdom. The embarrassment his "investigations" have caused to so many of his contemporaries—which Socrates claims was the root cause of his being brought up on charges (...) – is thus no one's fault but his "victims," for having chosen to live "the unexamined life" (…).

The way that Plato's represents Socrates going about his "mission" in Athens provides a plausible explanation both of why the Athenians would have brought him to trial and convicted him in the troubled years after the end of the Peloponnesian War, and also of why Socrates was not really guilty of the charges he faced. Even more importantly, however, Plato's early dialogues provide intriguing arguments and refutations of proposed philosophical positions that interest and challenge philosophical readers. <…> …Plato frames the discussions he represents in dramatic settings that make the content of these discussions especially

compelling. So, for example, in the *Crito,* we find Socrates discussing the citizen's duty to obey the laws of the state as he awaits his own legally mandated execution in jail, condemned by what he and Crito both agree was a terribly wrong verdict, the result of the most egregious misapplication of the very laws they are discussing. The dramatic features of Plato's works have earned attention even from literary scholars relatively uninterested in philosophy as such. Whatever their value for specifically historical research, therefore, Plato's dialogues will continue to be read and debated by students and scholars, and the Socrates we find in the early or "Socratic" dialogues will continue to be counted among the greatest Western philosophers.

c. Ethical Positions in the Early Dialogues

The philosophical positions most scholars agree can be found directly endorsed or at least suggested in the early or "Socratic" dialogues include the following moral or ethical views:

▪ A rejection of retaliation, or the return of harm for harm or evil for evil (*Crito* 48b–c, 49c–d; *Republic* I.335a–e);

▪ The claim that doing injustice harms one's soul, the thing that is most precious to one, and, hence, that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it (*Crito* 47d–48a; *Gorgias* 478c–e, 511c–512b; *Republic* I.353d–354a);

▪ Some form of what is called "eudaimonism," that is, that goodness is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to human happiness, well-being, or flourishing, which may also be understood as "living well," or "doing well" (*Crito* 48b; *Euthydemus* 278e, 282a; *Republic* I. 354a);

▪ The view that only virtue is good just by itself; anything else that is good is good only insofar as it serves or is used for or by virtue (*Apology* 30b; *Euthydemus* 281d–e);

▪ The view that there is some kind of unity among the virtues: In some sense, all of the virtues are the same (*Protagoras* 329b–333b, 361a–b);

▪ The view that the citizen who has agreed to live in a state must always obey the laws of that state, or else persuade the state to change its laws, or leave the state (*Crito* 51b–c, 52a–d).

d. Psychological Positions in the Early Dialogues

Socrates also appears to argue for, or directly makes a number of related psychological views:

▪ All wrongdoing is done in ignorance, for everyone desires only what is good (*Protagoras* 352a–c; *Gorgias* 468b; *Meno* 77e–78b);

▪ In some sense, everyone actually believes certain moral principles, even though some may think they do not have such beliefs, and may disavow them in argument (*Gorgias* 472b, 475e–476a).

e. Religious Positions in the Early Dialogues

In these dialogues, we also find Socrates represented as holding certain religious beliefs, such as:

▪ The gods are completely wise and good (*Apology* 28a; *Euthyphro* 6a, 15a; *Meno* 99b–100b);

▪ Ever since his childhood (see *Apology* 31d) Socrates has experienced a certain "divine something" (*Apology* 31c–d; 40a; *Euthyphro* 3b; see also *Phaedrus* 242b), which consists in a "voice" (*Apology* 31d; see also *Phaedrus* 242c), or "sign" (*Apology* 40c, 41d; *Euthydemus* 272e; see also *Republic* VI.496c; *Phaedrus* 242b) that opposes him when he is about to do something wrong (*Apology* 40a, 40c);

▪ Various forms of divination can allow human beings to come to recognize the will of the gods (*Apology* 21a–23b, 33c);

▪ Poets and rhapsodes are able to write and do the wonderful things they write and do, not from knowledge or expertise, but from some kind of divine inspiration. The same can be said of diviners and seers, although they do seem to have some kind of expertise – perhaps only some technique by which to put them in a state of appropriate receptivity to the divine (*Apology* 22b–c; *Laches* 198e–199a; *Ion* 533d–536a, 538d–e; *Meno* 99c);

▪ No one really knows what happens after death, but it is reasonable to think that death is not an evil; there may be an afterlife, in which the souls of the good are rewarded, and the souls of the wicked are punished (*Apology* 40c–41c; *Crito* 54b–c; *Gorgias* 523a–527a).

f. Methodological and Epistemological Positions in the Early Dialogues

In addition, Plato's Socrates in the early dialogues may plausibly be regarded as having certain methodological or epistemological convictions, including:

▪ Definitional knowledge of ethical terms is at least a necessary condition of reliable judging of specific instances of the values they name (*Euthyphro* 4e–5d, 6e; *Laches* 189e–190b; *Lysis* 223b; *Greater Hippias* 304d–e; *Meno* 71a–b, 100b; *Republic* I.354b–c);

▪ A mere list of examples of some ethical value – even if all are authentic cases of that value – would never provide an adequate analysis of what the value is, nor would it provide an adequate definition of the value term that refers to the value. Proper definitions must state what is common to all examples of the value (*Euthyphro* 6d–e; *Meno* 72c–d);

▪ Those with expert knowledge or wisdom on a given subject do not err in their judgments on that subject (*Euthyphro* 4e–5a; *Euthydemus* 279d–280b), go about their business in their area of expertise in a rational and regular way (*Gorgias* 503e–504b), and can teach and explain their subject (*Gorgias* 465a, 500e–501b, 514a–b; *Laches* 185b, 185e, 1889e–190b); *Protagoras* 319b–c).

6. The Middle Dialogues <...>
b. The Theory of Forms

In many of his dialogues, Plato mentions supra-sensible entities he calls "Forms" (or "Ideas"). So, for example, in the *Phaedo,* we are told that particular sensible equal things – for example, equal sticks or stones (see *Phaedo* 74a–75d) – are equal because of their "participation" or "sharing" in the character of the Form of Equality, which is absolutely, changelessly, perfectly, and essentially equal. Plato sometimes characterizes this participation in the Form as a kind of imaging, or approximation of the Form. The same may be said of the many things that are greater or smaller and the Forms of Great and Small (*Phaedo* 75c–d), or the many tall things and the Form of Tall (*Phaedo* 100e), or the many beautiful things and the Form of Beauty (*Phaedo* 75c–d, *Symposium* 211e, *Republic* V.476c). When Plato writes about instances of Forms "approximating" Forms, it is easy to infer that, for Plato, Forms are exemplars. If so, Plato believes that The Form of Beauty is perfect beauty, the Form of Justice is perfect justice, and so forth. Conceiving of Forms in this way was important to Plato because it enabled the philosopher who grasps the entities to be best able to judge to what extent sensible instances of the Forms are good examples of the Forms they approximate.

Scholars disagree about the scope of what is often called "the theory of Forms," and question whether Plato began holding that there are only Forms for a small range of properties, such as tallness, equality, justice, beauty, and so on, and then widened the scope to include Forms corresponding to every term that can be applied to a multiplicity of instances. In the *Republic,* he writes as if there may be a great multiplicity of Forms – for example, in Book X of that work, we find him writing

about the Form of Bed (see *Republic* X.596b). He may have come to believe that for any set of things that shares some property, there is a Form that gives unity to the set of things (and univocity to the term by which we refer to members of that set of things). Knowledge involves the recognition of the Forms (*Republic* V.475e–480a), and any reliable application of this knowledge will involve the ability compare the particular sensible instantiations of a property to the Form.

c. Immortality and Reincarnation

In the early transitional dialogue, the *Meno,* Plato has Socrates introduce the Orphic and Pythagorean idea that souls are immortal and existed before our births. All knowledge, he explains, is actually recollected from this prior existence. In perhaps the most famous passage in this dialogue, Socrates elicits recollection about geometry from one of Meno's slaves (*Meno* 81a–86b). Socrates' apparent interest in, and fairly sophisticated knowledge of, mathematics appears wholly new in this dialogue. It is an interest, however, that shows up plainly in the middle period dialogues, especially in the middle books of the *Republic.*

Several arguments for the immortality of the soul, and the idea that souls are reincarnated into different life forms, are also featured in Plato's *Phaedo* (which also includes the famous scene in which Socrates drinks the hemlock and utters his last words). <…> Similar accounts of the transmigration of souls may be found, with somewhat different details, in Book X of the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus,* as well as in several dialogues of the late period, including the *Timaeus* and the *Laws.* No traces of the doctrine of recollection, or the theory of reincarnation or transmigration of souls, are to be found in the dialogues we listed above as those of the early period.

d. Moral Psychology

The moral psychology of the middle period dialogues also seems to be quite different from what we find in the early period. In the early dialogues, Plato's Socrates is an *intellectualist* – that is, he claims that people always act in the way they believe is best for them (at the time of action, at any rate). Hence, all wrongdoing reflects some cognitive error. But in the middle period, Plato conceives of the soul as having (at least) three parts:

1. a *rational* part (the part that loves truth, which should rule over the other parts of the soul through the use of reason),

2. a *spirited* part (which loves honor and victory), and

3. an *appetitive* part (which desires food, drink, and sex), and justice will be that condition of the soul in which each of these three parts "does its own work," and does not interfere in the workings of the other parts (see esp. *Republic* IV.435b–445b). It seems clear from the way Plato describes what can go wrong in a soul, however, that in this new picture of moral psychology, the appetitive part of the soul can simply overrule reason's judgments. One may suffer, in this account of psychology, from what is called *akrasia* or "moral weakness"– in which one finds oneself doing something that one actually believes is not the right thing to do (see especially *Republic* IV.439e–440b). <…>

7. Late Transitional and Late Dialogues
a. Philosophical Methodology

One of the novelties of the dialogues after those of the middle period is the introduction of a new philosophical method. This method was introduced probably either late in the middle period or in the transition to the late period, but was increasingly important in the late period. In the early period dialogues, as we have said, the mode of philosophizing was refutative question-and-answer (called *elenchos* or the "Socratic method"). Although the middle period dialogues continue to show Socrates asking questions, the questioning in these dialogues becomes much more overtly leading and didactic. The highest method of philosophizing discussed in the middle period dialogues, called "dialectic," is never very well explained (…). The correct method for doing philosophy, we are now told in the later works, is what Plato identifies as "collection and division," which is perhaps first referred to at *Phaedrus* 265e. In this method, the philosopher collects all of the instances of some generic category that seem to have common characteristics, and then divides them into specific kinds until they cannot be further subdivided. This method is explicitly and extensively on display in the *Sophist, Statesman,* and *Philebus.* <…>

e. The Creation of the Universe

The *Timaeus* is … famous for its account of the creation of the universe by the Demiurge. Unlike the creation by the God of medieval theologians, Plato's Demiurge does not create *ex nihilo,* but rather orders the cosmos out of chaotic elemental matter, imitating the eternal Forms. Plato takes the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth (which Plato proclaims to be composed of various aggregates of triangles), making various compounds of these into what he calls the Body of the Universe.

Of all of Plato's works, the *Timaeus* provides the most detailed conjectures in the areas we now regard as the natural sciences: physics, astronomy, chemistry, and biology.

<…>

Christopher Shields

Aristotle

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/)

Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) numbers among the greatest philosophers of all time. Judged solely in terms of his philosophical influence, only Plato is his peer: Aristotle's works shaped centuries of philosophy from Late Antiquity through the Renaissance, and even today continue to be studied with keen, non-antiquarian interest. A prodigious researcher and writer, Aristotle left a great body of work, perhaps numbering as many as two-hundred treatises, from which approximately thirty-one survive. His extant writings span a wide range of disciplines, from logic, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, through ethics, political theory, aesthetics and rhetoric, and into such primarily non-philosophical fields as empirical biology, where he excelled at detailed plant and animal observation and taxonomy. In all these areas, Aristotle's theories have provided illumination, met with resistance, sparked debate, and generally stimulated the sustained interest of an abiding readership.

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3. Phainomena and the Endoxic Method

Aristotle's basic approach to philosophy is best grasped initially by way of contrast. Whereas Descartes seeks to place philosophy and science on firm foundations by subjecting all knowledge claims to a searing methodological doubt, Aristotle begins with the conviction that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are basically dependable, that they for the most part put us into direct contact with the features and divisions of our world, and that we need not dally with sceptical postures before engaging in substantive philosophy. Accordingly, he proceeds in all areas of inquiry in the manner of a modern-day natural scientist, who takes it for granted that progress follows the assiduous application of a well-trained mind and so, when presented with a problem, simply goes to work. When he goes to work, Aristotle begins by considering how the world appears, reflecting on the puzzles those appearances throw up, and reviewing what has been said about those puzzles to date. These methods comprise his twin appeals to *phainomena* and the endoxic method.

These two methods reflect in different ways Aristotle's deepest motivations for doing philosophy in the first place. "Human beings began to do philosophy," he says, "even as they do now, because of wonder, at first because they wondered about the strange things right in front of them, and then later, advancing little by little, because they came to find greater things puzzling" (*Met.* 982b12). Human beings philosophize, according to Aristotle, because they find aspects of their experience puzzling. The sorts of puzzles we encounter in thinking about the universe and our place within it – *aporiai*, in Aristotle's terminology – tax our understanding and induce us to philosophize.

According to Aristotle, it behooves us to begin philosophizing by laying out the *phainomena*, the *appearances*, or, more fully, *the things appearing to be the case*, and then also collecting the *endoxa*, the credible opinions handed down regarding matters we find puzzling. As a typical example, in a passage of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle confronts a puzzle of human conduct, the fact that we are apparently sometimes akratic or weak-willed. When introducing this puzzle, Aristotle pauses to reflect upon a precept governing his approach to philosophy:

As in other cases, we must set out the appearances (*phainomena*) and run through all the puzzles regarding them. In this way we must prove the credible opinions (*endoxa*) about these sorts of experiences – ideally, all the credible opinions, but if not all, then most of them, those which are the most important. For if the objections are answered and the credible opinions remain, we shall have an adequate proof. (*EN* vii 1, 1145b2–7)

<...>

4. Logic, Science, and Dialectic

Aristotle's reliance on *endoxa* takes on a still greater significance given the role such opinions play in *dialectic*, which he regards as an important form of non-scientific reasoning. Dialectic, like science (*epistêmê*), trades in logical inference; but science requires premises of a sort beyond the scope of ordinary dialectical reasoning. Whereas science relies upon premises which are necessary and known to be so, a dialectical discussion can proceed by relying on *endoxa*, and so can claim only to be as secure as the *endoxa* upon which it relies. This is not a problem, suggests Aristotle, since we often reason fruitfully and well in circumstances where we cannot claim to have attained scientific understanding. Minimally, however, all reasoning – whether scientific or dialectical – must respect the canons of logic and inference.

4.1. Logic

Among the great achievements to which Aristotle can lay claim is the first systematic treatment of the principles of correct reasoning, the first logic. Although today we recognize many forms of logic beyond Aristotle's, it remains true that he not only developed a theory of deduction, now called syllogistic, but added to it a modal syllogistic and went a long way towards proving some meta-theorems pertinent to these systems. Of course, philosophers before Aristotle reasoned well or reasoned poorly, and the competent among them had a secure working grasp of the principles of validity and soundness in argumentation. No-one before Aristotle, however, developed a systematic treatment of the principles governing correct inference; and no-one before him attempted to codify the formal and syntactic principles at play in such inference. Aristotle somewhat uncharacteristically draws attention to this fact at the end of a discussion of logic inference and fallacy:

"Once you have surveyed our work, if it seems to you that our system has developed adequately in comparison with other treatments arising from the tradition to date – bearing in mind how things were at the beginning of our inquiry – it falls to you, our students, to be indulgent with respect to any omissions in our system, and to feel a great debt of gratitude for the discoveries it contains". (*Soph. Ref.* 184b2–8)

<...>

In Aristotle's logic, the basic ingredients of reasoning are given in terms of *inclusion* and *exclusion* relations... He begins with the notion of a patently correct sort of argument, one whose evident and unassailable acceptability induces Aristotle to refer to is as a 'perfect deduction' (*APr.* 24b22–25). Generally, a *deduction* (*sullogismon*), according to Aristotle, is a valid or acceptable argument. More exactly, a deduction is 'an argument in which when certain things are laid down something else follows of necessity in virtue of their being so' (*APr.* 24b18–20). His view of deductions is, then, akin to a notion of validity, though there are some minor differences. For example, Aristotle insists that irrelevant premises will ruin a deduction, whereas validity is indifferent to irrelevance or indeed to the addition of premises of any kind to an already valid argument. Moreover, Aristotle insists that deductions make progress, whereas every inference from P to P is trivially valid. Still, Aristotle's general conception of deduction is sufficiently close to validity that we may pass into speaking in terms of valid structures when characterizing his syllogistic. In general, he contends that a deduction is the sort of argument whose

structure guarantees its validity, irrespective of the truth or falsity of its premises. This holds intuitively for the following structure:

1. All *A*s are *B*s.
2. All *B*s are *C*s.
3. Hence, all *A*s are *C*s.

Accordingly, anything taking this form will be a deduction in Aristotle's sense. Let the *A*s, *B*s, and *C*s be anything at all, and *if* indeed the *A*s are *B*s, and the *B*s *C*s, then *of necessity* the *A*s will be *C*s. This particular deduction is *perfect* because its validity needs no proof, and perhaps because it admits of no proof either: any proof would seem to rely ultimately upon the intuitive validity of this sort of argument.

Aristotle seeks to exploit the intuitive validity of perfect deductions in a surprisingly bold way, given the infancy of his subject: he thinks he can establish principles of transformation in terms of which *every* deduction (or, more precisely, every non-modal deduction) can be translated into a perfect deduction. He contends that by using such transformations we can place all deduction on a firm footing. <…>

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4.2. Science

Aristotle approaches the study of logic not as an end in itself, but with a view to its role in human inquiry and explanation. Logic is a tool, he thinks, one making an important but incomplete contribution to science and dialectic. Its contribution is incomplete because science (*epistêmê*) employs arguments which are more than mere deductions. A deduction is minimally a valid syllogism, and certainly science must employ arguments passing this threshold. Still, science needs more: a science proceeds by *organizing* the data in its domain into a series of arguments which, beyond being deductions, feature premises which are necessary and, as Aristotle says, "better known by nature", or "more intelligible by nature" (*gnôrimôteron phusei*) (*APo.* 71b33–72a25; *Top.* 141b3–14; *Phys.* 184a16–23). By this he means that they should reveal the genuine, mind-independent natures of things.

He further insists that science (*epistêmê*) – a comparatively broad term in his usage, since it extends to fields of inquiry like mathematics and metaphysics no less than the empirical sciences – not only reports the facts but also explains them by displaying their priority relations (*APo.* 78a22–28). That is, science explains what is less well known by what is better known and more fundamental, and what is explanatorily anemic by what is explanatorily fruitful.

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Science seeks to capture not only the causal asymmetries in nature, but also its deep, invariant patterns. Consequently, in addition to being explanatorily basic, the first premise in a scientific deduction will be necessary. So, says Aristotle:

We think we understand a thing without qualification, and not in the sophistic, accidental way, whenever we think we know the cause in virtue of which something is – that it is the cause of that very thing – *and also* know that this cannot be otherwise. Clearly, knowledge (*epistêmê*) is something of this sort. After all, both those with knowledge and those without it suppose that this is so – although only those with knowledge are actually in this condition. Hence, whatever is known without qualification cannot be otherwise. (*APo* 71b9–16; cf. *APo* 71b33–72a5; *Top.* 141b3–14, *Phys.* 184a10–23; *Met.* 1029b3–13)

For this reason, science requires more than mere deduction. Altogether, then, the currency of science is *demonstration (apodeixis)*, where a demonstration is a deduction with premises revealing the causal structures of the world, set forth so as to capture what is necessary and to reveal what is better known and more intelligible by nature (*APo* 71b33–72a5, *Phys.* 184a16–23, *EN* 1095b2–4).

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4.3. Dialectic

Not all rigorous reasoning qualifies as scientific. Indeed, little of Aristotle's extant writing conforms to the demands for scientific presentation laid down in the *Posterior Analytics*. As he recognizes, we often find ourselves reasoning from premises which have the status of *endoxa*, opinions widely believed or endorsed by the wise, even though they are not known to be necessary. Still less often do we reason having first secured the first principles of our domain of inquiry. So, we need some 'method by which we will be able to reason deductively about any matter proposed to us on the basis of *endoxa*, and to give an account of ourselves [when we are under examination by an interlocutor] without lapsing into contradiction' (*Top.* 100a18–20). This method he characterizes as *dialectic*.

The suggestion that we often use dialectic when engaged in philosophical exchange reflects Aristotle's supposition that there are two sorts of dialectic: one negative, or destructive, and the other positive, or constructive. In fact, in his work dedicated to dialectic, the *Topics*, he identifies three roles for dialectic in intellectual inquiry, the first of which is mainly preparatory:

Dialectic is useful for three purposes: for training, for conversational exchange, and for sciences of a philosophical sort. That it is useful for training purposes is directly evident on the basis of these considerations: once we have a direction for our inquiry we will more readily be able to engage a subject proposed to us. It is useful for conversational exchange because once we have enumerated the beliefs of the many, we shall engage them not on the basis of the convictions of others but on the basis of their own; and we shall re-orient them whenever they appear to have said something incorrect to us. It is useful for philosophical sorts of sciences because when we are able to run through the puzzles on both sides of an issue we more readily perceive what is true and what is false. Further, it is useful for uncovering what is primary among the commitments of a science. For it is impossible to say anything regarding the first principles of a science on the basis of the first principles proper to the very science under discussion, since among all the commitments of a science, the first principles are the primary ones. This comes rather, necessarily, from discussion of the credible beliefs (*endoxa*) belonging to the science. This is peculiar to dialectic, or is at least most proper to it. For since it is what cross-examines, dialectic contains the way to the first principles of all inquiries. (*Top.* 101a26–b4) The first two of the three forms of dialectic identified by Aristotle are rather limited in scope. By contrast, the third is philosophically significant.

In its third guise, dialectic has a role to play in 'science conducted in a philosophical manner' (*pros tas kata philosphian epistêmas*; *Top.* 101a27–28, 101a34), where this sort of science includes what we actually find him pursuing in his major philosophical treatises. In these contexts, dialectic helps to sort the *endoxa*, relegating some to a disputed status while elevating others; it submits *endoxa* to cross-examination in order to test their staying power; and, most notably, according to Aristotle, dialectic puts us on the road to first principles (*Top.* 100a18–b4). If that is so, then dialectic plays a significant role in the order of philosophical discovery: we come to establish first principles in part by determining which among our initial *endoxa* withstand sustained scrutiny. Here, as elsewhere in his philosophy, Aristotle evinces a noteworthy confidence in the powers of human reason and investigation.

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7. The Four Causal Account of Explanatory Adequacy

Equally central to Aristotle's thought is his *four-causal explanatory scheme*. Judged in terms of its influence, this doctrine is surely one

of his most significant philosophical contributions. Like other philosophers, Aristotle expects the explanations he seeks in philosophy and science to meet certain criteria of adequacy. Unlike some other philosophers, however, he takes care to state his criteria for adequacy explicitly; then, having done so, he finds frequent fault with his predecessors for failing to meet its terms. He states his scheme in a methodological passage in the second book of his *Physics*:

One way in which cause is spoken of is that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.

In another way cause is spoken of as the form or the pattern, i.e. what is mentioned in the account (*logos*) belonging to the essence and its genera, e.g. the cause of an octave is a ratio of 2:1, or number more generally, as well as the parts mentioned in the account (*logos*).

Further, the primary source of the change and rest is spoken of as a cause, e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is the cause of the child, and generally the maker is the cause of what is made and what brings about change is a cause of what is changed.

Further, the end (*telos*) is spoken of as a cause. This is that for the sake of which (*houheneka*) a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. 'Why is he walking about?' We say: 'To be healthy'– and, having said that, we think we have indicated the cause. (*Phys.* 194b23–35)

More fully, the four-causal account of explanatory adequacy requires an investigator to cite these four causes:

The Four Causes

The *material cause*: that from which something is generated and out of which it is made, e.g. the bronze of a statue.
The *formal cause*: the structure which the matter realizes and in terms of which it comes to be something determinate, e.g., the shape of the president, in virtue of which this quantity of bronze is said to be a statue of a president.
The *efficient cause*: the agent responsible for a quantity of matter's coming to be informed, e.g. the sculptor who shaped the quantity of bronze into its current shape, the shape of the president.
The *final cause*: the purpose or goal of the compound of form and matter, e.g. the statue was created for the purpose of honoring the president.

Epicurus (341–271 B.C.E.)

(http://www.iep.utm.edu/epicur/)

Epicurus is one of the major philosophers in the Hellenistic period, the three centuries following the death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C.E. (and of Aristotle in 322 B.C.E.). Epicurus developed an unsparingly materialistic metaphysics, empiricist epistemology, and hedonistic ethics. Epicurus taught that the basic constituents of the world are atoms, uncuttable bits of matter, flying through empty space, and he tried to explain all natural phenomena in atomic terms. Epicurus rejected the existence of Platonic forms and an immaterial soul, and he said that the gods have no influence on our lives. Epicurus also thought skepticism was untenable, and that we could gain knowledge of the world relying upon the senses. He taught that the point of all one's actions was to attain pleasure (conceived of as tranquility) for oneself, and that this could be done by limiting one's desires and by banishing the fear of the gods and of death. Epicurus' gospel of freedom from fear proved to be quite popular, and communities of Epicureans flourished for centuries after his death.
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3. Metaphysics

Epicurus believes that the basic constituents of the world are atoms (which are uncuttable, microscopic bits of matter) moving in the void (which is simply empty space). Ordinary objects are conglomerations of atoms. Furthermore, the properties of macroscopic bodies and all of the events we see occurring can be explained in terms of the collisions, reboundings, and entanglements of atoms.

a. Arguments for the Existence of Atoms and Void

Epicurus' metaphysics starts from two simple points: (1) we see that there are bodies in motion, and (2) nothing comes into existence from what does not exist. Epicurus takes the first point to be simply a datum of experience. The second point is a commonplace of ancient Greek philosophy, derived from the Principle of Sufficient Reason (the principle that for everything which occurs there is a reason or explanation for why it occurs, and why this way rather than that).

First, because bodies move, there must be empty space for them to move in, and Epicurus calls this empty space 'void.' Second, the ordinary bodies that we see are compound bodies–that is, bodies which are made up of further bodies, which is shown by the fact that they can be broken

down into smaller pieces. However, Epicurus thinks that this process of division cannot go on indefinitely, because otherwise bodies would dissolve away into nothing. Also, there must be basic and unchangeable building blocks of matter in order to explain the regularities in nature. These non-compound bodies are atoms – literally, 'uncuttables.' Only bodies and void exist *per se,* that is, exist without depending for their existence on something else. Other things – such as colors, time, and justice – are ultimately explicable as attributes of bodies.

b. Properties of Atoms, Limitlessness of the Universe

Because Epicurus believes that nothing comes into existence from nothing, he thinks that the universe has no beginning, but has always existed, and will always exist. Atoms, too, as the basic building blocks of all else, cannot come into existence, but have always existed. Our particular cosmos, however, is only a temporary agglomeration of atoms, and it is only one of an infinite number of such cosmoi, which come into existence and then dissolve away. Against Aristotle, Epicurus argues that the universe is unlimited in size. If the universe were limited in size, says Epicurus, you could go to the end of it, stick your fist out, and where your fist was located would be the new 'limit' of the universe. Of course, this process could be reiterated an endless number of times. Since the universe is unlimited in size, there must also be an unlimited number of atoms and an infinite amount of void. If the number of atoms were limited, then the 'density' of atoms in any region would effectively be zero, and there would be no macroscopic bodies, as there evidently are. And there must be an unlimited amount of void, since without a limitless amount of void, the infinite number of atoms would be unable to move.

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e. The Gods

Because of its denial of divine providence, Epicureanism was often charged in antiquity with being a godless philosophy, although Epicurus and his followers denied the charge. The main upshot of Epicurean theology is certainly negative, however. Epicurus' mechanistic explanations of natural phenomena are supposed to *displace* explanations that appeal to the will of the gods. In addition, Epicurus is one of the earliest philosophers we know of to have raised the Problem of Evil, arguing against the notion that the world is under the providential care of a loving deity by pointing out the manifold suffering in the world.

Despite this, Epicurus says that there are gods, but these gods are quite different from the popular conception of gods. We have a conception of the gods, says Epicurus, as supremely blessed and happy beings.

Troubling oneself about the miseries of the world, or trying to administer the world, would be inconsistent with a life of tranquility, says Epicurus, so the gods have no concern for us. In fact, they are unaware of our existence, and live eternally in the intermundia, the space between the cosmoi. For Epicurus, the gods function mainly as ethical ideals, whose lives we can strive to emulate, but whose wrath we need not fear. <…>

f. Philosophy of Mind

Epicurus is one of the first philosophers to put forward an Identity Theory of Mind. In modern versions of the identity theory, the mind is identified with the brain, and mental processes are identified with neural processes. Epicurus' physiology is quite different; the mind is identified as an organ that resides in the chest, since the common Greek view was that the chest, not the head, is the seat of the emotions. However, the underlying idea is quite similar. (Note: not all commentators accept that Epicurus' theory is actually an Identity Theory.)

The main point that Epicurus wants to establish is that the mind is something bodily. The mind must be a body, thinks Epicurus, because of its ability to interact with the body. The mind is affected by the body, as vision, drunkenness, and disease show. Likewise, the mind affects the body, as our ability to move our limbs when we want to and the physiological effects of emotional states show. Only bodies can interact with other bodies, so the mind must be a body. Epicurus says that the mind cannot be something incorporeal, as Plato thinks, since the only thing that is not a body is void, which is simply empty space and cannot act or be acted upon.

The mind, then, is an organ in the body, and mental processes are identified with atomic processes. The mind is composed of four different types of particles – fire, air, wind, and the "nameless element," which surpasses the other particles in its fineness. Although Epicurus is reticent about the details, some features of the mind are accounted for in terms of the features of these atoms – for instance, the mind is able to be moved a great deal by the impact of an image (which is something quite flimsy), because of the smallness of the particles that make up the mind. The mind proper, which is primarily responsible for sensation and thought, is located in the chest, but Epicurus thinks that there is also a 'spirit,' spread throughout the rest of the body, which allows the mind to communicate with it. The mind and spirit play roles very similar to those of the central and peripheral nervous systems in modern theory.

One important result of Epicurus' philosophy of mind is that death is annihilation. The mind is able to engage in the motions of sensation

and thought only when it is housed in the body and the atoms that make it up are properly arranged. Upon death, says Epicurus, the container of the body shatters, and the atoms disperse in the air. The atoms are eternal, but the mind made up of these atoms is not, just as other compound bodies cease to exist when the atoms that make them up disperse.

<…>

5. Ethics

Epicurus' ethics is a form of egoistic hedonism; i.e., he says that the only thing that is intrinsically valuable is one's own pleasure; anything else that has value is valuable merely as a means to securing pleasure for oneself. However, Epicurus has a sophisticated and idiosyncratic view of the nature of pleasure, which leads him to recommend a virtuous, moderately ascetic life as the best means to securing pleasure. <…>

a. Hedonism, Psychological and Ethical

Epicurus' ethics starts from the Aristotelian commonplace that the highest good is what is valued for its own sake, and not for the sake of anything else, and Epicurus agrees with Aristotle that happiness is the highest good. However, he disagrees with Aristotle by identifying happiness with pleasure. Epicurus gives two reasons for this. The main reason is that pleasure is the only thing that people do, as a matter of fact, value for its own sake; that is, Epicurus' ethical hedonism is based upon his psychological hedonism. Everything we do, claims Epicurus, we do for the sake ultimately of gaining pleasure for ourselves. This is supposedly confirmed by observing the behavior of infants, who, it is claimed, instinctively pursue pleasure and shun pain. This is also true of adults, thinks Epicurus, but in adults it is more difficult to see that this is true, since adults have much more complicated beliefs about what will bring them pleasure. But the Epicureans did spend a great deal of energy trying to make plausible the contention that all activity, even apparently self-sacrificing activity or activity done solely for the sake of virtue or what is noble, is in fact directed toward obtaining pleasure for oneself.

The second proof, which fits in well with Epicurus' empiricism, supposedly lies in one's introspective experience. One immediately perceives that pleasure is good and that pain is bad, in the same way that one immediately perceives that fire is hot; no further argument is needed to show the goodness of pleasure or the badness of pain. (Of course, this does not establish Epicurus' further contention that *only* pleasure is intrinsically valuable and *only* pain is intrinsically bad.)

Although all pleasures are good and all pains evil, Epicurus says that not all pleasures are choiceworthy or all pains to be avoided. Instead,

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one should calculate what is in one's long-term self-interest, and forgo what will bring pleasure in the short-term if doing so will ultimately lead to greater pleasure in the long-term. <…>

e. Justice

Epicurus is one of the first philosophers to give a well-developed contractarian theory of justice. Epicurus says that justice is an agreement "neither to harm nor be harmed," and that we have a preconception of justice as "what is useful in mutual associations." People enter into communities in order to gain protection from the dangers of the wild, and agreements concerning the behavior of the members of the community are needed in order for these communities to function, e.g., prohibitions of murder, regulations concerning the killing and eating of animals, and so on. Justice exists only where there are such agreements.

Like the virtues, justice is valued entirely on instrumental grounds, because of its utility for each of the members of society. Epicurus says that the main reason not to be unjust is that one will be punished if one gets caught, and that even if one does not get caught, the fear of being caught will still cause pain. However, he adds that the fear of punishment is needed mainly to keep fools in line, who otherwise would kill, steal, etc. The Epicurean wise man recognizes the usefulness of the laws, and since he does not desire great wealth, luxury goods, political power, or the like, he sees that he has no reason to engage in the conduct prohibited by the laws in any case.

Although justice only exists where there is an agreement about how to behave, that does not make justice entirely 'conventional,' if by 'conventional' we mean that any behavior dictated by the laws of a particular society is thereby just, and that the laws of a particular society are just for that society. Since the 'justice contract' is entered into for the purpose of securing what is useful for the members of the society, only laws that are actually useful are just. Thus, a prohibition of murder would be just, but antimiscegenation laws would not. Since what is useful can vary from place to place and time to time, what laws are just can likewise vary. <…>

Dirk Baltzly

Stoicism
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/)

Stoicism was one of the new philosophical movements of the Hellenistic period. The name derives from the porch (*stoa poikilê*) in the Agora at Athens decorated with mural paintings, where the members of the

school congregated, and their lectures were held. <…> The Stoics did, in fact, hold that emotions like fear or envy (or impassioned sexual attachments, or passionate love of anything whatsoever) either were, or arose from, false judgements and that the sage – a person who had attained moral and intellectual perfection – would not undergo them. The later Stoics of Roman Imperial times, Seneca and Epictetus, emphasise the doctrines (already central to the early Stoics' teachings) that the sage is utterly immune to misfortune and that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Our phrase 'stoic calm' perhaps encapsulates the general drift of these claims. It does not, however, hint at the even more radical ethical views which the Stoics defended, e.g. that only the sage is free while all others are slaves, or that all those who are morally vicious are equally so. (For other examples, see Cicero's brief essay 'Paradoxa Stoicorum'.) Though it seems clear that some Stoics took a kind of perverse joy in advocating views which seem so at odds with common sense, they did not do so simply to shock. Stoic ethics achieves a certain plausibility within the context of their physical theory and psychology, and within the framework of Greek ethical theory as that was handed down to them from Plato and Aristotle. It seems that they were well aware of the mutually interdependent nature of their philosophical views, likening philosophy itself to a living animal in which logic is bones and sinews; ethics and physics, the flesh and the soul respectively (another version reverses this assignment, making ethics the soul). Their views in logic and physics are no less distinctive and interesting than those in ethics itself. <…>

2. Philosophy and Life

When considering the doctrines of the Stoics, it is important to remember that they think of philosophy not as an interesting pastime or even a particular body of knowledge, but as a way of life. They define philosophy as a kind of practice or exercise (*askêsis*) in the expertise concerning what is beneficial (Aetius, 26A). Once we come to know what we and the world around us are really like, and especially the nature of value, we will be utterly transformed. This therapeutic aspect is common to their main competitors, the Epicureans, and perhaps helps to explain why both were eventually eclipsed by Christianity. The *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius provide a fascinating picture of a would-be Stoic sage at work on himself. The book, also called *To Himself*, is the emperor's diary. In it, he not only reminds himself of the content of important Stoic teaching but also reproaches himself when he realises that he has failed to incorporate this teaching into his life in some particular instance.

Today many people still turn to Stoicism as a form of psychological discipline. Stoicism has never been 'purely academic' and modern adaptations of Stoic thought seek to carry on this tradition of self-transformation.

3. Physical Theory

An examination of Stoic ontology might profitably begin with a passage from Plato''s *Sophist*. There (247d–e), Plato asks for a mark or indication of what is real or what has being. One answer which is mooted is that the capacity to act or be acted upon is the distinctive mark of real existence or 'that which is.' The Stoics accept this criterion and add the rider that only bodies can act or be acted upon. Thus, only bodies exist. However, they allow that there are other ways of appearing in the complete inventory of the world than by virtue of existing. <…>

In accord with this ontology, the Stoics, like the Epicureans, make God a corporeal entity, though not (as with the Epicureans) one made of everyday matter. But while the Epicureans think the gods are too busy being blessed and happy to be bothered with the governance of the universe (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus 123–4), the Stoic God is immanent throughout the whole of creation and directs its development down to the smallest detail. God is identical with one of the two ungenerated and indestructible first principles (*archai*) of the universe. One principle is matter which they regard as utterly unqualified and inert. It is that which is acted upon. God is identified with an eternal reason (*logos*, Diog. Laert. 44B) or intelligent designing fire (Aetius, 46A) which structures matter in accordance with Its plan. This plan is enacted time and time again, beginning from a state in which all is fire, through the generation of the elements, to the creation of the world we are familiar with, and eventually back to fire in a cycle of endless recurrence. The designing fire of the conflagration is likened to a sperm which contains the principles or stories of all the things which will subsequently develop (Aristocles in Eusebius, 46G). Under this guise, God is also called 'fate.' It is important to realise that the Stoic God does not craft its world in accordance with its plan from the outside, as the demiurge in Plato's *Timaeus* is described as doing. Rather, the history of the universe is determined by God's activity internal to it, shaping it with its differentiated characteristics. <…>

The first thing to develop from the conflagration are the elements. Of the four elements, the Stoics identify two as active (fire and air) and two as passive (water and earth). The active elements, or at least the principles of hot and cold, combine to form breath or pneuma. Pneuma,

in turn, is the 'sustaining cause' (*causa continens*, *synektikon aition*) of all existing bodies and guides the growth and development of animate bodies. What is a sustaining cause? The Stoics think that the universe is a plenum. Like Aristotle, they reject the existence of empty space or void (except that the universe as a whole is surrounded by it). Thus, one might reasonably ask, 'What marks any one object off from others surrounding it?' or, 'What keeps an object from constantly falling apart as it rubs elbows with other things in the crowd?' The answer is: pneuma. Pneuma, by its nature, has a simultaneous movement inward and outward which constitutes its inherent 'tensility.' (Perhaps this was suggested by the expansion and contraction associated with heat and cold.) Pneuma passes through all (other) bodies; in its outward motion it gives them the qualities that they have, and in its inward motion makes them unified objects (Nemesius, 47J). In this respect, pneuma plays something of the role of substantial form in Aristotle for this too makes the thing of which it is the form both 'some this,' i.e. an individual, and 'what it is' (*Metaph.* VII, 17). Because pneuma acts, it must be a body and it appears that the Stoics stressed the fact that its blending with matter is 'through and through' (Galen 47H, Alex. Aph. 48C). Perhaps as a result of this, they developed a theory of mixture which allowed for two bodies to be in the same place at the same time. It should be noted, however, that some scholars (e.g. Sorabji, 1988) think that the claim that pneuma is blended through the totality of matter is a conclusion that the Stoics' critics adversely drew about what some of their statements committed them to. Perhaps instead they proposed merely that pneuma is the matter of a body at a different level of description.

Pneuma comes in gradations and endows the bodies which it pervades with different qualities as a result. The pneuma which sustains an inanimate object is called (*LS*) a 'tenor' (*hexis*, lit. a holding). Pneuma in plants is, in addition, (*LS*) physique (*phusis*, lit. 'nature'). In animals, pneuma gets called also soul (*psychê*) and in rational animals pneuma is, besides, the commanding faculty (*hêgemonikon*) (Diog. Laert. 47O, Philo 47P) – that responsible for thinking, planning, deciding. The Stoics assign to 'physique' or 'nature' all the purely physiological life functions of a human animal (such as digestion, breathing, growth etc.) – self-movement from place to place is due to soul. Their account of the human soul (mind) is strongly monistic. Though they speak of the soul's faculties, these are parts of the commanding faculty associated with the physical sense organs (Aetius, 53H). Unlike the Platonic tri-partite soul, all impulses or desires are direct functions of the rational, commanding

faculty. This strongly monistic conception of the human soul has serious implications for Stoic epistemology and ethics. In the first case, our impressions of sense are affections of the commanding faculty. In mature rational animals, these impressions are thoughts, or representations with propositional content. Though a person may have no choice about whether she has a particular rational impression, there is another power of the commanding faculty which the Stoics call 'assent' and whether one assents to a rational impression is a matter of volition. To assent to an impression is to take its content as true. To withhold assent is to suspend judgement about whether it is true. Because both impression and assent are part of one and the same commanding faculty, there can be no conflict between separate and distinct rational and nonrational elements within oneself–a fight which reason might lose. <…>

Since pneuma is a body, there is a sense in which the Stoics have a materialist theory of mind. The pneuma which is a person's soul is subject to generation and destruction (Plutarch 53 C, Eusebius 53W). Unlike for the Epicureans, however, it does not follow from this that my soul will be destroyed at the time at which my body dies. <…> The Stoics equate virtue with wisdom and both with a kind of firmness or tensile strength within the commanding faculty of the soul (Arius Didymus 41H, Plutarch 61B, Galen 65T). Perhaps the thought was that the souls of the wise had a sufficient tensile strength that they could subsist as a distinct body on their own. <…>

Edward Moore

Neo-Platonism
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/neoplato/)

Neo-platonism (or Neoplatonism) is a modern term used to designate the period of Platonic philosophy beginning with the work of Plotinus and ending with the closing of the Platonic Academy by the Emperor Justinian in 529 C.E. This brand of Platonism, which is often described as 'mystical' or religious in nature, developed outside the mainstream of Academic Platonism. The origins of Neoplatonism can be traced back to the era of Hellenistic syncretism which spawned such movements and schools of thought as Gnosticism and the Hermetic tradition. A major factor in this syncretism, and one which had an immense influence on the development of Platonic thought, was the introduction of the Jewish Scriptures into Greek intellectual circles via the translation known as the *Septuagint*. The encounter between the creation narrative of Genesis and

the cosmology of Plato's *Timaeus* set in motion a long tradition of cosmological theorizing that finally culminated in the grand schema of Plotinus' *Enneads*. Plotinus' two major successors, Porphyry and Iamblichus, each developed, in their own way, certain isolated aspects of Plotinus' thought, but neither of them developed a rigorous philosophy to match that of their master. It was Proclus who, shortly before the closing of the Academy, bequeathed a systematic Platonic philosophy upon the world that in certain ways approached the sophistication of Plotinus. Finally, in the work of the so-called Pseudo-Dionysius, we find a grand synthesis of Platonic philosophy and Christian theology that was to exercise an immense influence on mediaeval mysticism and Renaissance Humanism.

1. What is Neoplatonism?

The term 'Neoplatonism' is a modern construction. Plotinus, who is often considered the 'founder' of Neoplatonism, would not have considered himself a "new" Platonist in any sense, but simply an expositor of the doctrines of Plato. That this required him to formulate an entirely new philosophical system would not have been viewed by him as a problem, for it was, in his eyes, precisely what the Platonic doctrine required. In a sense, this is true, for as early as the Old Academy we find Plato's successors struggling with the proper interpretation of his thought, and arriving at strikingly different conclusions. Also, in the Hellenistic era, certain Platonic ideas were taken up by thinkers of various loyalties – Jewish, Gnostic, Christian – and worked up into new forms of expression that varied quite considerably from what Plato actually wrote in his *Dialogues*. Should this lead us to the conclusion that these thinkers were any less 'loyal' to Plato than were the members of the Academy (in its various forms throughout the centuries preceding Plotinus)? No; for the multiple and often contradictory uses made of Platonic ideas is a testament to the universality of Plato's thought – that is, its ability to admit of a wide variety of interpretations and applications. In this sense, *Neo*-Platonism may be said to have begun immediately after Plato's death, when new approaches to his philosophy were being broached. Indeed, we already see a hint, in the doctrines of Xenocrates (the second head of the Old Academy) of a type of salvation theory involving the unification of the two parts of the human soul – the "Olympian" or heavenly, and the "Titanic" or earthly (Dillon 1977, p. 27). If we accept Frederick Copleston's description of Neoplatonism as "the intellectualist reply to the … yearning for personal salvation" (Copleston 1962, p. 216) we can

already locate the beginning of this reply as far back as the Old Academy, and Neoplatonism would then not have begun with Plotinus. However, it is not clear that Xenocrates' idea of salvation involved the individual; it is quite possible that he was referring to a unified human nature in an abstract sense. In any case, the early Hermetic-Gnostic tradition is certainly to an extent Platonic, and later Gnosticism and Christian *Logos* theology markedly so. If an intellectual reply to a general yearning for personal salvation is what characterizes Neoplatonism, then the highly intellectual Gnostics and Christians of the Late Hellenistic era must be given the title of Neoplatonists. However, if we are to be rigorous and define Neoplatonism as the synthesis of various more or less 'Platonistic' ideas into a grand expression of Platonic philosophy, then Plotinus must be considered the founder of Neoplatonism. Yet we must not forget that these Platonizing Christian, Gnostic, Jewish, and other 'pagan' thinkers provided the necessary speculative material to make this synthesis possible.

2. Plotinian Neoplatonism

The great third century thinker and 'founder' of Neoplatonism, Plotinus, is responsible for the grand synthesis of progressive Christian and Gnostic ideas with the traditional Platonic philosophy. He answered the challenge of accounting for the emergence of a seemingly inferior and flawed cosmos from the perfect mind of the divinity by declaring outright that all objective existence is but the external self-expression of an inherently contemplative deity known as the One (*to hen*), or the Good (*ta kalon*). Plotinus compares the expression of the superior godhead with the self-expression of the individual soul, which proceeds from the perfect conception of a Form (*eidos*), to the always flawed expression of this Form in the manner of a materially derived 'personality' that risks succumbing to the demands of divisive discursivity, and so becomes something less than divine. This diminution of the divine essence in temporality is but a necessary moment of the complete expression of the One. By elevating the experience of the individual soul to the status of an actualization of a divine Form, Plotinus succeeded, also, in preserving, if not the autonomy, at least the dignity and ontological necessity of *personality*. The Cosmos, according to Plotinus, is not a created order, planned by a deity on whom we can pass the charge of begetting evil; for the Cosmos is the self-expression of the Soul... Rather, the Cosmos, in Plotinian terms, is to be understood as the concrete result or 'product' of the Soul's experience of its own Mind (*nous*). Ideally, this concrete expression

should serve the Soul as a reference-point for its own self-conscious existence; however, the Soul all too easily falls into the error of valuing the expression over the principle (*arkhê*), which is the contemplation of the divine Forms. This error gives rise to evil, which is the purely subjective relation of the Soul (now divided) to the manifold and concrete forms of its expressive act. When the Soul, in the form of individual existents, becomes thus preoccupied with its experience, Nature comes into being, and the Cosmos takes on concrete form as the locus of personality.

a. Contemplation and Creation

Hearkening back, whether consciously or not, to the doctrine of Speusippus (Plato's successor in the Academy) that the One is utterly transcendent and "beyond being," and that the Dyad is the true first principle (Dillon 1977, p. 12), Plotinus declares that the One is "alone with itself" and ineffable (cf. *Enneads* VI.9.6 and V.2.1). The One does not act to produce a cosmos or a spiritual order, but simply generates from itself, effortlessly, a power (*dunamis*) which is at once the Intellect (*nous*) and the object of contemplation (*theôria*) of this Intellect. While Plotinus suggests that the One subsists by thinking itself as itself, the Intellect subsists through thinking itself as *other*, and therefore becomes divided within itself: this act of division within the Intellect is the production of Being, which is the very principle of expression or discursivity (*Ennead* V.1.7). For this reason, the Intellect stands as Plotinus' sole First Principle. At this point, the thinking or contemplation of the Intellect is divided up and ordered into thoughts, each of them subsisting in and for themselves, as autonomous reflections of the *dunamis* of the One. These are the Forms (*eidê*), and out of their inert unity there arises the Soul, whose task it is to think these Forms discursively and creatively, and to thereby produce or create a concrete, living expression of the divine Intellect. This activity of the Soul results in the production of numerous individual souls: living actualizations of the possibilities inherent in the Forms. Whereas the Intellect became divided within itself through contemplation, the Soul becomes divided outside of itself, through action (which is still contemplation, according to Plotinus, albeit the lowest type; cf. *Ennead* III.8.4), and this division constitutes the Cosmos, which is the expressive or creative act of the Soul, also referred to as Nature. When the individual soul reflects upon Nature as its own act, this soul is capable of attaining insight (*gnôsis*) into the essence of Intellect; however, when the soul views nature as something objective and external – that is, as something to be experienced or undergone, while forgetting that the soul itself

is the creator of this Nature – evil and suffering ensue. Let us now examine the manner in which Plotinus explains Nature as the locus of personality.

b. Nature and Personality

Contemplation, at the level of the Soul, is for Plotinus a two-way street. The Soul both contemplates, passively, the Intellect, and reflects upon its own contemplative act by producing Nature and the Cosmos. The individual souls that become immersed in Nature, as moments of the Soul's eternal act, will, ideally, gain a complete knowledge of the Soul in its unity, and even of the Intellect, by reflecting upon the concrete results of the Soul's act – that is, upon the externalized, sensible entities that comprise the physical Cosmos. This reflection, if carried by the individual soul with a memory of its provenance always in the foreground, will lead to a just governing of the physical Cosmos, which will make of it a perfect material image of the Intellectual Cosmos, i.e., the realm of the Forms (cf. *Enneads* IV.3.7 and IV.8.6). However, things don't always turn out so well, for individual souls often "go lower than is needful … in order to light the lower regions, but it is not good for them to go so far" (*Ennead* IV.3.17, tr. O'Brien 1964). For when the soul extends itself ever farther into the indeterminacy of materiality, it gradually loses memory of its divine origin, and comes to identify itself more and more with its surroundings – that is to say: the soul identifies itself with the *results* of the Soul's act, and forgets that it is, as part of this Soul, itself an agent of the act. This is tantamount to a relinquishing, by the soul, of its divine nature. When the soul has thus abandoned itself, it begins to accrue many alien encrustations, if you will, that make of it something less than divine. These encrustations are the 'accidents' (in the Aristotelian sense) of personality. And yet the soul is never completely lost, for, as Plotinus insists, the soul needs simply "think upon essential being" in order to return to itself, and continue to exist authentically as a governor of the Cosmos (*Ennead* IV.8.4–6). The memory of the personality that this wandering soul possessed must be forgotten in order for it to return completely to its divine nature; for if it were remembered, we would have to say, contradictorily, that the soul holds a memory of what occurred during its state of forgetfulness! So in a sense, Plotinus holds that individual personalities are not maintained at the level of Soul. However, if we understand personality as more than just a particular attitude attached to a concrete mode of existence, and rather view it as the sum total of experiences reflected upon in intellect, then souls most certainly retain

their personalities, even at the highest level, for they persist as thoughts within the divine Mind (cp. *Ennead* IV.8.5). The personality that one acquires in action (the lowest type of contemplation) is indeed forgotten and dissolved, but the 'personality' or *persistence in intellect* that one achieves through virtuous acts most definitely endures (*Ennead* IV.3.32).

Theme 4. Western Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy

Paul Vincent Spade

Medieval Philosophy

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-philosophy/)

Medieval philosophy is conventionally construed as the philosophy of Western Europe between the decline of classical pagan culture and the Renaissance. <…>

1. The Geographical and Chronological Boundaries of Medieval Philosophy

'Medieval philosophy' refers to philosophy in Western Europe during the "medieval" period, the so called "Middle Ages." The notion of a "Middle Age" (or plural "Middle Ages") was introduced in the fifteenth century for the period between the decline of classical pagan culture in Western Europe and what was taken to be its rediscovery during the Renaissance. The first known documented use of the expression (in the form *'media tempestas'*) is from 1469. (Robinson [1984], p. 748.)

The originators of the notion of the Middle Ages were thinking primarily of the so called "Latin West," the area, roughly speaking, of Roman Catholicism. While it is true that this region was to some extent a unit, culturally separate from its neighbors, it is also true that medieval philosophy was decisively influenced by ideas from the Greek East, from the Jewish philosophical tradition, and from Islam. If one takes medieval philosophy to include the Patristic period, as the present author prefers to do, then the area must be expanded to include, at least during the early centuries, Greek-speaking eastern Europe, as well as North Africa and parts of Asia Minor.

The chronological limits of medieval philosophy are equally imprecise. Henry [1967] takes it to begin with St. Augustine (354–430), as in effect do MacDonald and Kretzmann [1998]. On the other hand, Copleston [1950] and Gilson [1955] include the earlier Patristic period as well. At the other end of the period, things are even more imprecise. <…>

This perhaps generous interpretation of the chronological limits of medieval philosophy implies that it lasted at least from the Greek patristic author Justin Martyr (mid-second century) until well into the fifteenth century – more than half the entire history of philosophy generally. Clearly there is much to be discussed.

2. The Main Ingredients of Medieval Philosophy

Here is a recipe for producing medieval philosophy: Combine classical pagan philosophy, mainly Greek but also in its Roman versions, with the new Christian religion. Season with a variety of flavorings from the Jewish and Islamic intellectual heritages. Stir and simmer for 1300 years or more, until done.

This recipe produces a potent and volatile brew. For in fact many features of Christianity do not fit well into classical philosophical views. The notion of the Incarnation and the doctrine of the Trinity are obvious cases in point. But even before those doctrines were fully formulated, there were difficulties, so that an educated Christian in the early centuries would be hard pressed to know how to accommodate his religious views into the only philosophical tradition available. To take just one example, consider pagan philosophical theories of the soul. At first glance, it would appear that the Platonic tradition would be most appealing to an early Christian. And in fact it was. In the first place, the Platonic tradition was very concerned with the moral development of the soul. Again, that tradition saw the highest goal of a human being as some kind of mystical gazing on or union with the Form of the Good or the One; it would be easy to interpret this as the "face to face" encounter with God in the next life that St. Paul describes in 1 Cor. 13:12. Most important of all, Platonism held that the soul could exist apart from the body after death. This would obviously be appealing to Christians, who believed in an afterlife.

On the other hand, there was another crucial aspect of Christianity that simply made no sense to a Platonist. This was the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead at the end of the world. Platonism allowed for reincarnation, so there was no special theoretical problem for a Platonist about the sou's reentering the body. But for a Christian this resurrection was something to *look forward to;* it was a *good* thing. This would be incomprehensible from a Platonic viewpoint, for which "the body is the prison of the soul," and for which the task of the philosopher is to "learn how to die" so that he might be free from the distracting and corrupting influences of the body. No, for a Platonist is it best for the soul *not* to be in the body.

A Christian would therefore have a hard time being a straightforward Platonist about the soul. But neither could he be an straightforward Aristotelian. Aristotle's own views on the immortality of the soul are notoriously obscure, and he was often interpreted as denying it outright. All the harder, therefore, to make sense of the view that the resurrection of the dead at the end of the world is something to be joyfully expected.

This problem illustrates the kind of difficulties that emerge from the above "recipe" for medieval philosophy. An educated early Christian, striving to deal with his religion in terms of the only philosophical traditions he knew, would plainly have a lot of work to do. Such tensions may be regarded as the "motors" that drove much of philosophy throughout the period. In response to them, new concepts, new theories, and new distinctions were developed. Of course, once developed, these tools remained and indeed still remain available to be used in contexts that have nothing to do with Christian doctrine. <…>

4. From the Patristic Period to the Mid-Twelfth Century

"Patrology" or "patristics" is the study of the so called "Fathers (*patres*) of the Church." In this sense, 'fathers' does not mean priests, although of course many patristic authors *were* priests. Neither does it does mean "fathers" in the sense of "founding fathers," although many patristic authors were likewise foundational for everything that came afterward. Rather 'fathers' in this sense means "teachers". See, for example, St. Paul: "For though you might have ten thousand guardians in Christ, you do not have many fathers. Indeed, in Christ Jesus I became your father through the gospel". (1 Cor. 4:15) In early Christian usage, the term 'father' was applied primarily to the bishop, who had preeminent teaching authority within the Church. But gradually the word was extended until, much later, it came to include all early Christian writers who were taken to represent the authentic tradition of the Church. (Quasten [1950–86], I, p. 9.) The patristic period is generally taken to extend from the immediately post-Apostolic authors to either Gregory the Great (d. 604) or Isidore of Seville (d. 636) in the Latin West, and to John of Damascus (d. 749) in the Greek East. (Quasten [1950–86], I, 1.)

4.1. Augustine

By no means all patristic authors are of philosophical significance, but many of them definitely are. By far the most important is Saint Augustine (354–430) (…). Augustine is certainly the most important and influential philosopher of the Middle Ages, and one of the most influential philosophers of any time. <…> Yet despite his philosophical preeminence, Augustine was not, and did not think of himself as, a philosopher either by training or by profession. By training he was a rhetorician, by profession first a rhetorician and teacher of rhetoric… <…> What we find instead in Augustine is a man who is a "philosopher" in the original, etymological sense, a "lover a wisdom," one who is *searching* for it rather than one who writes as if he has found it and is now presenting it to us in systematic, argumentative form.

4.2. Boethius

After Augustine, the first thinker of philosophical note was Boethius (c. 480–524/525) (…). Boethius is no doubt best known today for *The Consolation of Philosophy*, a dialogue in five books between Boethius and "Lady Philosophy," an allegorical figure who appears to him in a vision while he is languishing in jail under sentence of death for treason. Boethius had occupied a high station in society and government. <…> In the *Consolation*, Boethius and Lady Philosophy discuss the problem of evil and the fickleness of fortune–a particularly pressing issue for Boethius, given the circumstances under which the work was written. But although the *Consolation* is justly famous, both in our own day and in the Middle Ages, Boethius's long-term importance probably rests more on his translations and commentary activity. For Boethius was well educated, and was one of the increasingly rare people in the West who knew Greek well, not just the language but the intellectual culture. He came up with the lofty goal to translate Plato and Aristotle into Latin, write commentaries on the whole of that material, and then write another work to show that Plato and Aristotle essentially said the same thing. <…> In addition to his translations, Boethius wrote a number of logical treatises of his own. <…> He also proved to be influential in the twelfth century and afterwards for the metaphysical views contained in a series of short studies known collectively as the *Theological Tractates*.

4.3. The Carolingian Period

After Boethius, as the classical Greco-Roman world grew ever more distant, philosophy – and to some extent culture generally – entered a period of relative stagnation, a period that lasted until after the year 1000. There was one short-lived bright spot, however, the late-eighth and early-ninth century court of Charlemagne (768–814) and his successors, the so called "Carolingian" period. The major philosophical figure in this period was John Scottus Eriugena (c. 800 – c. 877), an Irish monk who was at the court of Charles the Bald around 850 (…). Curiously, the knowledge of Greek was still not quite dead in Ireland even at this late date, and Eriugena brought a knowledge of the language with him. At the Carolingian court, Eriugena translated several Greek works into Latin…
<…>

4.5. Peter Abelard

By the early twelfth century, the revival of education that had begun shortly after the millennium was in full swing. During the first half of the century, the most important philosopher by far was undoubtedly

Peter Abelard (1079–1142) (…). He was also one of the most colorful figures in the entire history of philosophy. His affair with Héloise and his consequent castration are the stuff of legend, and his controversy with the much more traditional Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) has only enhanced his reputation among those who have viewed him (with considerable oversimplification) as a champion of reason over authority. His autobiographical *Story of My Adversities* (…) is a "good read" even today, and is one of the most intensely personal documents of the Middle Ages.

Abelard represents the full flower of "early medieval philosophy", just before the new translations of Aristotle and others transform everything. <…> His views on logic and what we would call philosophy of language are sophisticated and novel; indeed, he is a serious contender for the title of the greatest logician of the entire medieval period, early or late. <…> His writings on ethics put a new and very strong emphasis on the role of the agen's *intention* rather than exterior actions. He also wrote on theological topics such as Trinity.

Abelard's writings further amplify the tendency, already seen in Anselm, to increase the use of reasoning and argumentation in theology. But whereas Anselm had managed to deflect criticisms of this new approach in theology, Abelard's disputatious personality alarmed those who were more comfortable with the older style. He was subject to ecclesiastical censure during his lifetime, a fact that no doubt contributes to the relatively few explicit citations of him in the later Middle Ages. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that his influence was widespread.

4.6. General Characteristics of This Early Period

Throughout this early medieval period, we find many writers, usually of a broadly "Platonic" persuasion, who deal with philosophical topics in an unsystematic but far from shallow way that does not clearly distinguish philosophy from theology, or for that matter from "wisdom literature" generally. Frequently their views are presented by arguments that amount to an appeal to a "vision" of how things are ("Look, don't you see?"). This is simply a general although not universal observation about these authors, and should not be regarded as a philosophical limitation or defect. After all, some of the world's most important philosophy has been presented in such a "visionary" way. <…>

There are many exceptions to this generalization. Boethius's logical commentaries, for example, are purely philosophical and frequently genuinely argumentative, even if they are often obscure and inaccessible to

modern readers. Eriugena's *On the Division of Nature*, while definitely "visionary," is nevertheless quite systematic in its structure. And by the time of Anselm, the role of logical argumentation is beginning to grow. Certainly for Abelard the above generalization fails entirely.

Nevertheless, a big change is about to occur. Prior to Abelard, philosophy in the Middle Ages had not been an exclusively academic affair. It had been addressed for the most part to any well educated reader interested in the topics being discussed. <…> Philosophy becomes an increasingly specialized discipline, pursued by and for those whose livelihood is found only in educational institutions. Philosophy and theology become more clearly distinguished from one another; both become more systematic, rigorous and precise. <…>

5. The Twelfth Century and the Rise of Universities
5.1. New Translations

As part of the cultural revival described above, and from the late-eleventh century on, there was a new and increasing interest in having translations of previously unavailable texts, not all of them philosophical by any means. No doubt this new interest was prompted in part by Western Europe's exposure to the Greek and Islamic world during the First Crusade (beginning in 1095). But, for whatever reason, new translations soon began to appear from [Sicily, Constantinople and Spain]. <…>

5.1. New Forms of Education

As part of the revival that began after the turn of the millennium, new forms of education began to emerge in Western Europe. In general, we may distinguish four main types of educational practices in the Middle Ages: [monastic schools, individual masters, cathedral schools and universities.]. <…>

Parliament and the "university" are arguably the two great medieval institutions that have survived more or less intact to the present day. (...) Frequently, universities grew out of cathedral schools. Thus, the cathedral school at Paris developed by the early-thirteenth century into the University of Paris. An important cathedral school drew students from all over Europe. Such a school became known as a *studium generale*. Some of these *studia generalia* survived and became known as "universities." At first, the term *"universitas"* referred simply to the "entirety" or "universality" of scholars, both faculty and students, associated with the school. As the term gradually came to be used, a "university" was

one of these major, international schools that was distinguished from others by its possessing an official charter (granted by a royal or ecclesiastical authority), a set of statutes, and an established form of governing itself. <...> There were also universities in Italy; indeed, Bologna was the first university in all of Europe, and had the peculiarity of being a *student*-run university.

Universities were divided into "faculties." The four most common ones were the faculties of arts, law, medicine, and theology. Most universities had arts faculties, in addition to one or more of the others. The arts faculty was for the basic training of students, before they proceeded to one of the "higher" faculties. In effect, the arts faculty was the equivalent of the modern undergraduate program. As for the "higher" faculties, Bologna was primarily a university for the study of law. Others were best known for medicine. Paris had all four faculties, but the faculty of theology was considered the highest of the four.

In the medieval university, philosophy was cultivated first and foremost in the arts faculty. When the newly translated works of Aristotle first appeared at the University of Paris, for instance, it was in the faculty of arts. The works were clearly not law or medicine. (Some of them might be stretched a bit to count as medicine, but these were not the ones that were influential first.) Neither were they theology in the traditional sense of "Sacred Doctrine," although some of Aristotle's writings had important consequences for theology. Some of these consequences were thought to be dangerous for Christian doctrine, and they were. In 1210, a provincial synod at Paris ruled that Aristotle's "natural theology" could not be "read" in the faculty of arts at Paris. To "read" in this context means to "lecture on." It did not mean that students and masters couldn't study and discuss these works in private. <...>

6. The Thirteenth Century and Later

By their very nature, universities brought together masters and students from all over Europe and put them in close proximity. Not surprisingly, the result was a "boom" in academic study, including philosophy. <...>. Histories of medieval philosophy often treat Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–74), John Duns Scotus (c. 1265–1308), and William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) as the "big three" figures in the later medieval period; a few add Bonaventure (1221–74) as a fourth. <...>

First of all, not one of these three or four authors was French. Aquinas and Bonaventure were Italian, Scotus – as his name implies – was a Scot, and Ockham was English. All but Ockham spent at least part of

their careers at the University of Paris. This illustrates both the preeminence of the University of Paris in the thirteenth century and the increasing internationalization of education in the later Middle Ages in general. But it also illustrates another odd fact: the relative absence of Frenchmen as major players on the philosophical scene during this period, even at the premier university in France. <…>

<…> Beginning in the early-thirteenth century, several new orders were founded, notably the Franciscans (1209) and the Dominicans (1216), both of which became very prominent in late medieval universities. Aquinas was a Dominican, while Bonaventure, Scotus, and Ockham were Franciscans.

<…> …Aquinas soon became the semi-"official" philosopher and theologian of the Dominicans, a status that was enhanced in 1879 in Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, which called Aquinas "the chief and master of all the scholastic doctors," and urged that preference be given to Thomistic doctrine in Catholic schools (…). As a result, Aquinas enjoyed a far greater authority in the late-nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century than perhaps he ever did in the Middle Ages. To some extent, Bonaventure likewise came to be regarded as representing typically Franciscan views (…), and later on Scotus was highly respected and often favored among the Franciscans (…). Ockham is a special case. He was a controversial figure, mainly because of political disputes with the Pope that embroiled his later life (…). Nevertheless, as one of their own, the Franciscans have always been interested in him and in his writings. <…>

7. Some Main Topics in Medieval Philosophy

Medieval philosophy included all the main areas we think of as part of philosophy today. Nevertheless, certain topics stand out as worthy of special mention. To begin with, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that medieval philosophy invented the philosophy of religion. To be sure, ancient pagan philosophers sometimes talked about the nature of the gods. But a whole host of traditional problems in the philosophy of religion first took on in the Middle Ages the forms in which we still often discuss them today:

- The problem of the compatibility of the divine attributes.
- The problem of evil. Ancient philosophy had speculated on evil, but the particularly pressing form the problem takes on in Christianity, where an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent God freely created absolutely everything besides himself, first emerged in the Middle Ages.

• The problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge with human free will. Many medieval authors appealed to human free will in their response to the problem of evil, so that it was especially important to find some way to reconcile our free will with divine foreknowledge (…).

As for logic, … from the time of Abelard through at least the middle of the fourteenth century, if not later, the peculiarly medieval contributions to logic were developed and cultivated to a very high degree. It was no longer a matter of interpreting Aristotle, or commenting on the works of the "Old Logic" or the "New Logic"; wholly new genres of logical writing sprang up, and entirely new logical and semantic notions were developed. <…>

In natural philosophy and philosophy of science, medieval philosophy was of course very strongly–but not exclusively–influenced by Aristotle. <…> Particularly from the fourteenth century on, the increasing use of mathematical reasoning in natural philosophy would eventually pave the way for the rise of early modern science later on. <…>

Medieval epistemology was not, with some noteworthy exceptions, particularly worried over the problem of skepticism, over *whether* we have genuine knowledge (…). The tendency was to take it for granted that we do, and instead to ask about *how* this comes about: what are the mechanisms of cognition, concept formation, etc. Medieval epistemology, therefore, typically shades into what we would nowadays call philosophical psychology or philosophy of mind; after the recovery of Aristotle's *On the Soul*, it was regarded as a branch of the philosophy of nature <…>

Lorenzo Casini

Renaissance Philosophy
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/renaissa/)

The Renaissance, that is, the period that extends roughly from the middle of the fourteenth century to the beginning of the seventeen century, was a time of intense, all-encompassing, and, in many ways, distinctive philosophical activity. A fundamental assumption of the Renaissance movement was that the remains of classical antiquity constituted an invaluable source of excellence to which debased and decadent modern times could turn in order to repair the damage brought about since the fall of the Roman Empire. It was often assumed that God had given a single unified truth to humanity and that the works of ancient philosophers had preserved part of this original deposit of divine wisdom. This

idea not only laid the foundation for a scholarly culture that was centered on ancient texts and their interpretation, but also fostered an approach to textual interpretation that strove to harmonize and reconcile divergent philosophical accounts. Stimulated by newly available texts, one of the most important hallmarks of Renaissance philosophy is the increased interest in primary sources of Greek and Roman thought, which were previously unknown or little read. The renewed study of Neoplatonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism eroded faith in the universal truth of Aristotelian philosophy and widened the philosophical horizon, providing a rich seedbed from which modern science and modern philosophy gradually emerged. <…>

1. Aristotelianism

Improved access to a great deal of previously unknown literature from ancient Greece and Rome was an important aspect of Renaissance philosophy. The renewed study of Aristotle, however, was not so much because of the rediscovery of unknown texts, but because of a renewed interest in texts long translated into Latin but little studied, such as the *Poetics*, and especially because of novel approaches to well-known texts. From the early fifteenth century onwards, humanists devoted considerable time and energy to making Aristotelian texts clearer and more precise. In order to rediscover the meaning of Aristotle's thought, they updated the Scholastic translations of his works, read them in the original Greek, and analyzed them with philological techniques. <…>

Many Renaissance Aristotelians read Aristotle for scientific or secular reasons, with no direct interest in religious or theological questions. Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525), one of the most important and influential Aristotelian philosophers of the Renaissance, developed his views entirely within the framework of natural philosophy. In *De immortalitate animae* (*Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul*, 1516), arguing from the Aristotelian text, Pomponazzi maintained that proof of the intellect's ability to survive the death of the body must be found in an activity of the intellect that functions without any dependence on the body. In his view, no such activity can be found because the highest activity of the intellect, the attainment of universals in cognition, is always mediated by sense impression. Therefore, based solely on philosophical premises and Aristotelian principles, the conclusion is that the entire soul dies with the body. Pomponazzi's treatise aroused violent opposition and led to a spate of books being written against him. In 1520, he completed *De naturalium effectuum causis sive de incantationibus* (*On the Causes of Natural Effects or On Incantations*), whose main target was the popular belief that

miracles are produced by angels and demons. He excluded supernatural explanations from the domain of nature by establishing that it is possible to explain those extraordinary events commonly regarded as miracles in terms of a concatenation of natural causes. Another substantial work is *De fato, de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione* (*Five Books on Fate, Free Will and Predestination*), which is regarded as one of the most important works on the problems of freedom and determinism in the Renaissance. Pomponazzi considers whether the human will can be free, and he considers the conflicting points of view of philosophical determinism and Christian theology. <…>

2. Humanism

The humanist movement did not eliminate older approaches to philosophy, but contributed to change them in important ways, providing new information and new methods to the field. Humanists called for a radical change of philosophy and uncovered older texts that multiplied and hardened current philosophical discord. Some of the most salient features of humanist reform are the accurate study of texts in the original languages, the preference for ancient authors and commentators over medieval ones, and the avoidance of technical language in the interest of moral suasion and accessibility. Humanists stressed moral philosophy as the branch of philosophical studies that best met their needs. They addressed a general audience in an accessible manner and aimed to bring about an increase in public and private virtue. Regarding philosophy as a discipline allied to history, rhetoric, and philology, they expressed little interest in metaphysical or epistemological questions. Logic was subordinated to rhetoric and reshaped to serve the purposes of persuasion.

One of the seminal figures of the humanist movement was Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374). In *De sui ipsius et multorum aliorum ignorantia* (*On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others*), he elaborated what was to become the standard critique of Scholastic philosophy. One of his main objections to Scholastic Aristotelianism is that it is useless and ineffective in achieving the good life. Moreover, to cling to a single authority when all authorities are unreliable is simply foolish. <…> Petrarca returned to a conception of philosophy rooted in the classical tradition, and from his time onward, when professional humanists took interest in philosophy, they nearly always concerned themselves with ethical questions. Among those he influenced were Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406), Leonardo Bruni (c. 1370–1444) and Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459), all of whom promoted humanistic learning in distinctive ways.

One of the most original and important humanists of the Quattrocento was Lorenzo Valla (1406–1457). His most influential writing was *Elegantiae linguae Latinae* (*Elegances of the Latin Language*), a handbook of Latin language and style. He is also famous for having demonstrated, on the basis of linguistic and historical evidence, that the so-called Donation of Constantine, on which the secular rule of the papacy was based, was an early medieval forgery. His main philosophical work is *Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae* (*Reploughing of Dialectic and Philosophy*), an attack on major tenets of Aristotelian philosophy. The first book deals with the criticism of fundamental notions of metaphysics, ethics, and natural philosophy, while the remaining two books are devoted to dialectics.

Throughout the fifteenth and early sixteenth century, humanists were unanimous in their condemnation of university education and their contempt for Scholastic logic. Humanists such as Valla and Rudolph Agricola (1443–1485), whose main work is *De inventione dialectica* (*On Dialectical Invention*, 1479), set about to replace the Scholastic curriculum, based on syllogism and disputation, with a treatment of logic oriented toward the use of persuasion and *topics*, a technique of verbal association aiming at the invention and organization of material for arguments. According to Valla and Agricola, language is primarily a vehicle for communication and debate, and consequently arguments should be evaluated in terms of how effective and useful they are rather than in terms of formal validity. Accordingly, they subsumed the study of the Aristotelian theory of inference under a broader range of forms of argumentation. <…>

Humanism also supported Christian reform. The most important Christian humanist was the Dutch scholar Desiderius Erasmus (c.1466–1536). He was hostile to Scholasticism, which he did not consider a proper basis for Christian life, and put his erudition at the service of religion by promoting learned piety (*docta pietas*). In 1503, he published *Enchiridion militis christiani* (*Handbook of the Christian Soldier*), a guide to the Christian life addressed to laymen in need of spiritual guidance, in which he developed the concept of a *philosophia Christi*. His most famous work is *Moriae encomium* (*The Praise of Folly*), a satirical monologue first published in 1511 that touches upon a variety of social, political, intellectual, and religious issues. In 1524, he published *De libero arbitrio* (*On Free Will*), an open attack a one central doctrine of Martin Luther's theology: that the human will is enslaved by sin. Eras-

mus's analysis hinges on the interpretation of relevant biblical and patristic passages and reaches the conclusion that the human will is extremely weak, but able, with the help of divine grace, to choose the path of salvation.

Humanism also had an impact of overwhelming importance on the development of political thought. With *Institutio principis christiani* (*The Education of a Christian Prince*, 1516), Erasmus contributed to the popular genre of humanist advice books for princes. These manuals dealt with the proper ends of government and how best to attain them. Among humanists of the fourteenth century, the most usual proposal was that a strong monarchy should be the best form of government. Petrarca, in his account of princely government that was written in 1373 and took the form of a letter to Francesco da Carrara, argued that cities ought to be governed by princes who accept their office reluctantly and who pursue glory through virtuous actions. <…> Several authors exploited the tensions within the genre of "mirror for princes" in order to defend popular regimes. In *Laudatio Florentinae Urbis* (*Panegyric of the City of Florence*), Bruni maintained that justice can only be assured by a republican constitution. In his view, cities must be governed according to justice if they are to become glorious, and justice is impossible without liberty.

The most important text to challenge the assumptions of princely humanism, however, was *Il principe* (*The Prince*), written by the Florentine Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) in 1513, but not published until 1532. A fundamental belief among the humanists was that a ruler needs to cultivate a number of qualities, such as justice and other moral values, in order to acquire honour, glory, and fame. Machiavelli deviated from this view claiming that justice has no decisive place in politics. It is the ruler's prerogative to decide when to dispense violence and practice deception, no matter how wicked or immoral, as long as the peace of the city is maintained and his share of glory maximized. Machiavelli did not hold that princely regimes were superior to all others. In his less famous, but equally influential, *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio* (*Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livy*, 1531), he offers a defense of popular liberty and republican government that takes the ancient republic of Rome as its model.

3. Platonism

During the Renaissance, it gradually became possible to take a broader view of philosophy than the traditional Peripatetic framework permitted. No ancient revival had more impact on the history of philosophy than the recovery of Platonism. The rich doctrinal content and formal

elegance of Platonism made it a plausible competitor of the Peripatetic tradition. Renaissance Platonism was a product of humanism and marked a sharper break with medieval philosophy. Many Christians found Platonic philosophy safer and more attractive than Aristotelianism. The Neoplatonic conception of philosophy as a way toward union with God supplied many Renaissance Platonists with some of their richest inspiration. The Platonic dialogues were not seen as profane texts to be understood literally, but as sacred mysteries to be deciphered.

Platonism was brought to Italy by the Byzantine scholar George Gemistos Plethon (c. 1360–1454), who, during the Council of Florence in 1439, gave a series of lectures that he later reshaped as *De differentiis Aristotelis et Platonis* (*The Differences between Aristotle and Plato*). This work, which compared the doctrines of the two philosophers (to Aristotle's great disadvantage), initiated a controversy regarding the relative superiority of Plato and Aristotle. <…>

The most important Renaissance Platonist was Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499), who translated Plato's works into Latin and wrote commentaries on several of them. He also translated and commented on Plotinus's *Enneads* and translated treatises and commentaries by Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, Synesius, and other Neoplatonists. He considered Plato as part of a long tradition of ancient theology (*prisca theologia*) that was inaugurated by Hermes and Zoroaster, culminated with Plato, and continued with Plotinus and the other Neoplatonists. Like the ancient Neoplatonists, Ficino assimilated Aristotelian physics and metaphysics and adapted them to Platonic purposes. In his main philosophical treatise, *Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum* (*Platonic Theology on the Immortality of Souls*, 1482), he put forward his synthesis of Platonism and Christianity as a new theology and metaphysics, which, unlike that of many Scholastics, was explicitly opposed to Averroist secularism. Another work that became very popular was *De vita libri tres* (*Three Books on Life*, 1489) by Ficino; it deals with the health of professional scholars and presents a philosophical theory of natural magic.

One of Ficino's most distinguished associates was Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494). He is best known as the author of the celebrated *Oratio de hominis dignitate* (*Oration on the Dignity of Man*), which is often regarded as the manifesto of the new Renaissance thinking, but he also wrote several other prominent works. They include *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem* (*Disputations against Divinatory Astrology*), an influential diatribe against astrology; *De ente et uno* (*On Being and the One*), a short treatise attempting to reconcile Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysical views; as well as *Heptaplus*

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(*Seven Days of Creation*), a mystical interpretation of the Genesis creation myth. He was not a devout Neoplatonist like Ficino, but rather an Aristotelian by training and in many ways an eclectic by conviction. He wanted to combine Greek, Hebrew, Muslim, and Christian thought into a great synthesis, which he spelled out in nine hundred theses published as *Conclusiones* in 1486. He planned to defend them publicly in Rome, but three were found heretical and ten others suspect. He defended them in *Apologia,* which provoked the condemnation of the whole work by Pope Innocent VIII. Pico's consistent aim in his writings was to exalt the powers of human nature. To this end he defended the use of magic, which he described as the noblest part of natural science, and Kabbalah, a Jewish form of mysticism that was probably of Neoplatonic origin.

Platonic themes were also central to the thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), who linked his philosophical activity to the Neoplatonic tradition and authors such as Proclus and Pseudo-Dionysius. The main problem that runs through his works is how humans, as finite created beings, can think about the infinite and transcendent God. His best-known work is *De docta ignorantia* (*On Learned Ignorance*, 1440), which gives expression to his view that the human mind needs to realize its own necessary ignorance of what God is like, an ignorance that results from the ontological and cognitive disproportion between God and the finite human knower. Correlated to the doctrine of learned ignorance is that of the coincidence of opposites in God. All things coincide in God in the sense that God, as undifferentiated being, is beyond all opposition. Two other works that are closely connected to *De docta ignorantia* are *De coniecturis* (*On Conjectures*), in which he denies the possibility of exact knowledge, maintaining that all human knowledge is conjectural, and *Apologia docta ignorantiae* (*A Defense of Learned Ignorance*, 1449). In the latter, he makes clear that the doctrine of learned ignorance is not intended to deny knowledge of the existence of God, but only to deny all knowledge of God's nature. <…>

5. New Philosophies of Nature

In 1543, Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) published *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (*On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*), which proposed a new calculus of planetary motion based on several new hypotheses, such as heliocentrism and the motion of the earth. The first generation of readers underestimated the revolutionary character of the work and regarded the hypotheses of the work only as useful mathematical fictions. The result was that astronomers appreciated

and adopted some of Copernicus's mathematical models but rejected his cosmology. Yet, the Aristotelian representation of the universe did not remain unchallenged and new visions of nature, its principles, and its mode of operation started to emerge.

During the sixteenth century, there were many philosophers of nature who felt that Aristotle's system could no longer regulate honest inquiry into nature. Therefore, they stopped trying to adjust the Aristotelian system and turned their backs on it altogether. It is hard to imagine how early modern philosophers, such as Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655,) and René Descartes (1596–1650), could have cleared the ground for the scientific revolution without the work of *novatores* such as Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588), Francesco Patrizi (1529–1597), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), and Tommaso Campanella (1568–1639).

<…> …Campanella developed a profound distaste for Aristotelian philosophy and embraced the idea that nature should be explained through its own principles. He rejected the fundamental Aristotelian principle of hylomorphism and adopted instead Telesio's understanding of reality in terms of the principles of matter, heat, and cold, which he combined with Neoplatonic ideas derived from Ficino. His first published work was *Philosophia sensibus demonstrate* (*Philosophy as Demonstrated by the Senses*, 1591), an anti-Peripatetic polemic in defense of Telesio's system of natural philosophy. Thereafter, he was censured, tortured, and repeatedly imprisoned for his heresies. During the years of his incarceration, he composed many of his most famous works, such as *De sensu rerum et magia* (*On the Sense of Things and On Magic*, 1620), which sets out his vision of the natural world as a living organism and displays his keen interest in natural magic; *Ateismus triomphatus* (*Atheism Conquered*), a polemic against both reason of state and Machiavelli's conception of religion as a political invention; and *Apologia pro Galileo* (*Defense of Galileo*), a defense of the freedom of thought (*libertas philosophandi*) of Galileo and of Christian scientists in general. Campanella's most ambitious work is *Metaphysica* (1638), which constitutes the most comprehensive presentation of his philosophy and whose aim is to produce a new foundation for the entire encyclopedia of knowledge. His most celebrated work is the utopian treatise *La città del sole* (*The City of the Sun*), which describes an ideal model of society that, in contrast to the violence and disorder of the real world, is in harmony with nature.

In contrast to Telesio, who was a fervent critic of metaphysics and insisted on a purely empiricist approach in natural philosophy, Patrizi

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developed a program in which natural philosophy and cosmology were connected with their metaphysical and theological foundations. His *Discussiones peripateticae* (*Peripatetic Discussions*) provides a close comparison of the views of Aristotle and Plato on a wide range of philosophical issues, arguing that Plato's views are preferable on all counts. Inspired by such Platonic predecessors as Proclus and Ficino, Patrizi elaborated his own philosophical system in *Nova de universalis philosophia* (*The New Universal Philosophy*, 1591), which is divided in four parts: *Panaugia, Panarchia, Pampsychia,* and *Pancosmia.* He saw light as the basic metaphysical principle and interpreted the universe in terms of the diffusion of light. The fourth and last part of the work, in which he expounded his cosmology showing how the physical world derives its existence from God, is by far the most original and important. In it, he replaced the four Aristotelian elements with his own alternatives: space, light, heat, and humidity. Gassendi and Henry More (1614–1687) adopted his concept of space, which indirectly came to influence Newton.

A more radical cosmology was proposed by Bruno, who was an extremely prolific writer. His most significant works include those on the art of memory and the combinatory method of Ramon Llull, as well as the moral dialogues *Spaccio de la bestia trionfante* (*The Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast*, 1584), *Cabala del cavallo pegaseo* (*The Kabbalah of the Pegasean Horse*, 1585) and *De gl'heroici furori* (*The Heroic Frenzies*, 1585). Much of his fame rests on three cosmological dialogues published in 1584: *La cena de le ceneri* (*The Ash Wednesday Supper*), *De la causa, principio et uno* (*On the Cause, the Principle and the One*) and *De l'infinito, universo et mondi* (*On the Infinite, the Universe and the Worlds*). In these, with inspiration from Lucretius, the Neoplatonists, and, above all, Nicholas of Cusa, he elaborates a coherent and strongly articulated ontological monism. Individual beings are conceived as accidents or modes of a unique substance, that is, the universe, which he describes as an animate and infinitely extended unity containing innumerable worlds. Bruno adhered to Copernicus's cosmology but transformed it, postulating an infinite universe. Although an infinite universe was by no means his invention, he was the first to locate a heliocentric system in infinite space. In 1600, he was burned at the stake by the Inquisition for his heretical teachings.

Even though these new philosophies of nature anticipated some of the defining features of early modern thought, many of their methodological characteristics appeared to be inadequate in the face of new scientific developments. The methodology of Galileo Galilei (1564–1642)

and of the other pioneers of the new science was essentially mathematical. Moreover, the development of the new science took place by means of methodical observations and experiments, such as Galileo's telescopic discoveries and his experiments on inclined planes. The critique of Aristotle's teaching formulated by natural philosophers such as Telesio, Campanella, Patrizi, and Bruno undoubtedly helped to weaken it, but it was the new philosophy of the early seventeenth century that sealed the fate of the Aristotelian worldview and set the tone for a new age.

Theme 5. Modern Western Philosophy

Justin Skirry

Rene Descartes (1596–1650)
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/)

René Descartes is often credited with being the "Father of Modern Philosophy." This title is justified due both to his break with the traditional Scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy prevalent at his time and to his development and promotion of the new, mechanistic sciences. His fundamental break with Scholastic philosophy was twofold. First, Descartes thought that the Scholastics' method was prone to doubt given their reliance on sensation as the source for all knowledge. Second, he wanted to replace their final causal model of scientific explanation with the more modern, mechanistic model.

Descartes attempted to address the former issue via his method of doubt. His basic strategy was to consider false any belief that falls prey to even the slightest doubt. This "hyperbolic doubt" then serves to clear the way for what Descartes considers to be an unprejudiced search for the truth. This clearing of his previously held beliefs then puts him at an epistemological ground-zero. From here Descartes sets out to find something that lies beyond all doubt. He eventually discovers that "I exist" is impossible to doubt and is, therefore, absolutely certain. It is from this point that Descartes proceeds to demonstrate God's existence and that God cannot be a deceiver. This, in turn, serves to fix the certainty of everything that is clearly and distinctly understood and provides the epistemological foundation Descartes set out to find. <…>

3. The Modern Turn
a. Against Scholasticism

Descartes is often called the "Father of Modern Philosophy," implying that he provided the seed for a new philosophy that broke away from the old in important ways. This "old" philosophy is Aristotle's as it was appropriated and interpreted throughout the later medieval period. In fact, Aristotelianism was so entrenched in the intellectual institutions of Descartes' time that commentators argued that evidence for its the truth could be found in the Bible. Accordingly, if someone were to try to refute some main Aristotelian tenet, then he could be accused of holding a position contrary to the word of God and be punished. However, by Descartes' time, many had come out in some way against one Scholastic-

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Aristotelian thesis or other. So, when Descartes argued for the implementation of his modern system of philosophy, breaks with the Scholastic tradition were not unprecedented.

Descartes broke with this tradition in at least two fundamental ways. The first was his rejection of substantial forms as explanatory principles in physics. A substantial form was thought to be an immaterial principle of material organization that resulted in a particular thing of a certain kind. The main principle of substantial forms was the final cause or purpose of being that kind of thing. <…> Descartes rejected the use of substantial forms and their concomitant final causes in physics precisely for this reason. Indeed, his essay *Meteorology*, that appeared alongside the *Discourse on Method*, was intended to show that clearer and more fruitful explanations can be obtained without reference to substantial forms but only by way of deductions from the configuration and motion of parts. Hence, his point was to show that mechanistic principles are better suited for making progress in the physical sciences. Another reason Descartes rejected substantial forms and final causes in physics was his belief that these notions were the result of the confusion of the idea of the body with that of the mind. <…> His expulsion of the metaphysical principles of substantial forms and final causes helped clear the way for Descartes' new metaphysical principles on which his modern, mechanistic physics was based.

The second fundamental point of difference Descartes had with the Scholastics was his denial of the thesis that all knowledge must come from sensation. The Scholastics were devoted to the Aristotelian tenet that everyone is born with a clean slate, and that all material for intellectual understanding must be provided through sensation. Descartes, however, argued that since the senses sometimes deceive, they cannot be a reliable source for knowledge. Furthermore, the truth of propositions based on sensation is naturally probabilistic and the propositions, therefore, are doubtful premises when used in arguments. Descartes was deeply dissatisfied with such uncertain knowledge. He then replaced the uncertain premises derived from sensation with the absolute certainty of the clear and distinct ideas perceived by the mind alone, as will be explained below.

b. Descartes' Project

In the preface to the French edition of the *Principles of Philosophy*, Descartes uses a tree as a metaphor for his holistic view of philosophy. "The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced

to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals" (…). Although Descartes does not expand much more on this image, a few other insights into his overall project can be discerned. First, notice that metaphysics constitutes the roots securing the rest of the tree. For it is in Descartes' metaphysics where an absolutely certain and secure epistemological foundation is discovered. This, in turn, grounds knowledge of the geometrical properties of bodies, which is the basis for his physics. Second, physics constitutes the trunk of the tree, which grows up directly from the roots and provides the basis for the rest of the sciences. Third, the sciences of medicine, mechanics and morals grow out of the trunk of physics, which implies that these other sciences are just applications of his mechanistic science to particular subject areas. Finally, the fruits of the philosophy tree are mainly found on these three branches, which are the sciences most useful and beneficial to humankind. However, an endeavor this grand cannot be conducted haphazardly but should be carried out in an orderly and systematic way. Hence, before even attempting to plant this tree, Descartes must first figure out a method for doing so.

3. Method

Aristotle and subsequent medieval dialecticians set out a fairly large, though limited, set of acceptable argument forms known as "syllogisms" composed of a general or major premise, a particular or minor premise and a conclusion. Although Descartes recognized that these syllogistic forms preserve truth from premises to conclusion such that if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be true, he still found them faulty. First, these premises are supposed to be known when, in fact, they are merely believed, since they express only probabilities based on sensation. Accordingly, conclusions derived from merely probable premises can only be probable themselves, and, therefore, these probable syllogisms serve more to increase doubt rather than knowledge Moreover, the employment of this method by those steeped in the Scholastic tradition had led to such subtle conjectures and plausible arguments that counter-arguments were easily constructed, leading to profound confusion. As a result, the Scholastic tradition had become such a confusing web of arguments, counter-arguments and subtle distinctions that the truth often got lost in the cracks. <…>

Descartes sought to avoid these difficulties through the clarity and absolute certainty of geometrical-style demonstration. In geometry, theorems are deduced from a set of self-evident axioms and universally agreed upon definitions. Accordingly, direct apprehension of clear, simple and indubitable truths (or axioms) by intuition and deductions from

those truths can lead to new and indubitable knowledge. Descartes found this promising for several reasons. First, the ideas of geometry are clear and distinct, and therefore they are easily understood unlike the confused and obscure ideas of sensation. Second, the propositions constituting geometrical demonstrations are not probabilistic conjectures but are absolutely certain so as to be immune from doubt. This has the additional advantage that any proposition derived from some one or combination of these absolutely certain truths will itself be absolutely certain. Hence, geometry's rules of inference preserve absolutely certain truth from simple, indubitable and intuitively grasped axioms to their deductive consequences unlike the probable syllogisms of the Scholastics.

The choice of geometrical method was obvious for Descartes given his previous success in applying this method to other disciplines like optics. Yet his application of this method to philosophy was not unproblematic due to a revival of ancient arguments for global or radical skepticism based on the doubtfulness of human reasoning. But Descartes wanted to show that truths both intuitively grasped and deduced are beyond this possibility of doubt. His tactic was to show that, despite the best skeptical arguments, there is at least one intuitive truth that is beyond all doubt and from which the rest of human knowledge can be deduced. This is precisely the project of Descartes' seminal work, *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

<…> …Descartes called all of his previous beliefs into doubt through some of the best skeptical arguments of his day. But he was still not satisfied and decided to go a step further by considering false any belief that falls prey to even the slightest doubt. So, by the end of the *First Meditation*, Descartes finds himself in a whirlpool of false beliefs. However, it is important to realize that these doubts and the supposed falsehood of all his beliefs are for the sake of his method: he does not really believe that he is dreaming or is being deceived by an evil demon; he recognizes that his doubt is merely hyperbolic. But the point of this "methodological" or 'hyperbolic" doubt is to clear the mind of preconceived opinions that might obscure the truth. The goal then is to find something that cannot be doubted even though an evil demon is deceiving him and even though he is dreaming. This first indubitable truth will then serve as an intuitively grasped metaphysical "axiom" from which absolutely certain knowledge can be deduced. <…>.

4. The Mind
a. Cogito, ergo sum
In the *Second Meditation*, Descartes tries to establish absolute certainty in his famous reasoning: *Cogito, ergo sum* or "I think, therefore

I am." These *Meditations* are conducted from the first person perspective, from Descartes. However, he expects his reader to meditate along with him to see how his conclusions were reached. This is especially important in the *Second Meditation* where the intuitively grasped truth of "I exist" occurs. So the discussion here of this truth will take place from the first person or "I" perspective. All sensory beliefs had been found doubtful in the previous meditation, and therefore all such beliefs are now considered false. This includes the belief that I have a body endowed with sense organs. But does the supposed falsehood of this belief mean that I do not exist? No, for if I convinced myself that my beliefs are false, then surely there must be an "I" that was convinced. Moreover, even if I am being deceived by an evil demon, I must exist in order to be deceived at all. So "I must finally conclude that the proposition, 'I am,' 'I exist,' is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind" (…). This just means that the mere fact that I am thinking, regardless of whether or not what I am thinking is true or false, implies that there must be something engaged in that activity, namely an "I." Hence, "I exist" is an indubitable and, therefore, absolutely certain belief that serves as an axiom from which other, absolutely certain truths can be deduced.

b. The Nature of the Mind and its Ideas

The *Second Meditation* continues with Descartes asking, "What am I?" After discarding the traditional Scholastic-Aristotelian concept of a human being as a rational animal due to the inherent difficulties of defining "rational" and "animal," he finally concludes that he is a thinking thing, a mind: "A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sense perceptions" (…). In the *Principles*, part I, sections 32 and 48, Descartes distinguishes intellectual perception and volition as what properly belongs to the nature of the mind alone while imagination and sensation are, in some sense, faculties of the mind insofar as it is united with a body. So imagination and sensation are faculties of the mind in a weaker sense than intellect and will, since they require a body in order to perform their functions. Finally, in the *Sixth Meditation*, Descartes claims that the mind or "I" is a non-extended thing. Now, since extension is the nature of body, is a necessary feature of body, it follows that the mind is by its nature not a body but an immaterial thing. Therefore, what I am is an immaterial thinking thing with the faculties of intellect and will.

It is also important to notice that the mind is a substance and the modes of a thinking substance are its ideas. For Descartes a substance is

a thing requiring nothing else in order to exist. Strictly speaking, this applies only to God whose existence is his essence, but the term "substance" can be applied to creatures in a qualified sense. Minds are substances in that they require nothing except God's concurrence, in order to exist. But ideas are "modes" or "ways" of thinking, and, therefore, modes are not substances, since they must be the ideas of some mind or other. So, ideas require, in addition to God's concurrence, some created thinking substance in order to exist (…). Hence the mind is an immaterial thinking substance, while its ideas are its modes or ways of thinking.

Descartes continues on to distinguish three kinds of ideas at the beginning of the *Third Meditation*, namely those that are fabricated, adventitious, or innate. Fabricated ideas are mere inventions of the mind. Accordingly, the mind can control them so that they can be examined and set aside at will and their internal content can be changed. Adventitious ideas are sensations produced by some material thing existing externally to the mind. But, unlike fabrications, adventitious ideas cannot be examined and set aside at will nor can their internal content be manipulated by the mind. For example, no matter how hard one tries, if someone is standing next to a fire, she cannot help but feel the heat as heat. She cannot set aside the sensory idea of heat by merely willing it as we can do with our idea of Santa Claus, for example. She also cannot change its internal content so as to feel something other than heat–say, cold. Finally, innate ideas are placed in the mind by God at creation. These ideas can be examined and set aside at will but their internal content cannot be manipulated. Geometrical ideas are paradigm examples of innate ideas. For example, the idea of a triangle can be examined and set aside at will, but its internal content cannot be manipulated so as to cease being the idea of a three-sided figure. Other examples of innate ideas would be metaphysical principles like "what is done cannot be undone," the idea of the mind, and the idea of God. <…>

Jürgen Klein

Francis Bacon
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/francis-bacon/)

Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was one of the leading figures in natural philosophy and in the field of scientific methodology in the period of transition from the Renaissance to the early modern era. As a lawyer, member of Parliament, and Queen's Counsel, Bacon wrote on questions of law, state and religion, as well as on contemporary politics; but he also

published texts in which he speculated on possible conceptions of society, and he pondered questions of ethics (*Essays*) even in his works on natural philosophy (*The Advancement of Learning*).

After his studies at Trinity College, Cambridge and Gray's Inn, London, Bacon did not take up a post at a university, but instead tried to start a political career. Although his efforts were not crowned with success during the era of Queen Elizabeth, under James I he rose to the highest political office, Lord Chancellor. Bacon's international fame and influence spread during his last years, when he was able to focus his energies exclusively on his philosophical work, and even more so after his death, when English scientists of the Boyle circle (*Invisible College*) took up his idea of a cooperative research institution in their plans and preparations for establishing the Royal Society.

To the present day Bacon is well known for his treatises on empiricist natural philosophy (*The Advancement of Learning*, *Novum Organum Scientiarum*) and for his doctrine of the idols, which he put forward in his early writings, as well as for the idea of a modern research institute, which he described in *Nova Atlantis*. <…>

3. Natural Philosophy: Theory of the Idols and the System of Sciences
3.1. The Idols

Bacon's doctrine of the idols not only represents a stage in the history of theories of error (Brandt 1979) but also functions as an important theoretical element within the rise of modern empiricism. According to Bacon, the human mind is not a *tabula rasa*. Instead of an ideal plane for receiving an image of the world in toto, it is a crooked mirror, on account of implicit distortions (Bacon IV [1901], 428–34). He does not sketch a basic epistemology but underlines that the images in our mind right from the beginning do not render an objective picture of the true objects. Consequently, we have to improve our mind, i.e., free it from the idols, before we start any knowledge acquisition. <…>

Bacon deals with the idols in the Second Book of *The Advancement of Learning*, where he discusses *Arts intellectual* (Invention, Judgment, Memory, Tradition). <…> The caution he suggests in relation to the ambiguities in *elenches* is also recommended in face of the *idols*:

"there is yet a much more important and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not observed or enquired at all, and think good to place here, as that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle or snare the

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understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass, wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their true incidence, nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind …" (Bacon III [1887], 394–5)

<…> Idols are productions of the human imagination (caused by the crooked mirror of the human mind) and thus are nothing more than "untested generalities" (Malherbe 1996, 80).

In his Preface to the *Novum Organum* Bacon promises the introduction of a new method, which will restore the senses to their former rank (Bacon IV [1901], 17f.), begin the whole labor of the mind again, and open two sources and two distributions of learning, consisting of a method of cultivating the sciences and another of discovering them. This new beginning presupposes the discovery of the natural obstacles to efficient scientific analysis, namely seeing through the idols, so that the mind's function as the subject of knowledge acquisition comes into focus (Brandt 1979, 19).

According to Aphorism XXIII of the First Book, Bacon makes a distinction between the Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of the divine mind: whereas the former are for him nothing more than "certain empty dogmas", the latter show "the true signatures and marks set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature" (Bacon IV [1901], 51).

3.1.1 Idols of the Tribe. The Idols of the Tribe have their origin in the production of false concepts due to human nature, because the structure of human understanding is like a crooked mirror, which causes distorted reflections (of things in the external world).

3.1.2 Idols of the Cave. The Idols of the Cave consist of conceptions or doctrines which are dear to the individual who cherishes them, without possessing any evidence of their truth. These idols are due to the preconditioned system of every individual, comprising education, custom, or accidental or contingent experiences.

3.1.3 Idols of the Market Place. These idols are based on false conceptions which are derived from public human communication. They enter our minds quietly by a combination of words and names, so that it comes to pass that not only does reason govern words, but words react on our understanding.

3.1.4 Idols of the Theatre. According to the insight that the world is a stage, the Idols of the Theatre are prejudices stemming from received

or traditional philosophical systems. These systems resemble plays in so far as they render fictional worlds, which were never exposed to an experimental check or to a test by experience. The idols of the theatre thus have their origin in dogmatic philosophy or in wrong laws of demonstration.

Bacon ends his presentation of the idols in *Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphorism LXVIII, with the remark that men should abjure and renounce the qualities of idols, "and the understanding [must be] thoroughly freed and cleansed" (Bacon IV [1901], 69). He discusses the idols together with the problem of information gained through the senses, which must be corrected by the use of experiments (Bacon IV [1901], 27).

3.2. System of Sciences

<…> …His first major book, *The Advancement of Learning*. In this work Bacon presents a systematic survey of the extant realms of knowledge, combined with meticulous descriptions of deficiencies, leading to his new classification of knowledge. In *The Advancement* (Bacon III [1887], 282f.) a new function is given to *philosophia prima*, the necessity of which he had indicated in the *Novum Organum*, I, Aphorisms LXXIX–LXXX (Bacon IV [1901], 78–9). In both texts this function is attributed to *philosophia naturalis*, the basis for his concept of the unity of the sciences and thus of materialism.

Natural science is divided by Bacon into physics and metaphysics. The former investigates variable and particular causes, the latter reflects on general and constant ones, for which the term *form* is used. *Forms* are more general than the four Aristotelian causes and that is why Bacon's discussion of the forms of substances as the most general properties of matter is the last step for the human mind when investigating nature. Metaphysics is distinct from *philosophia prima*. The latter marks the position in the system where general categories of a general theory of science are treated as (1) universal categories of thought, (2) relevant for all disciplines. Final causes are discredited, since they lead to difficulties in science and tempt us to amalgamate theological and teleological points of doctrine. At the summit of Bacon's pyramid of knowledge are the laws of nature (the most general principles). At its base the pyramid starts with observations, moves on to invariant relations and then to more inclusive correlations until it reaches the stage of forms. The process of generalization ascends from natural history via physics towards metaphysics, whereas accidental correlations and relations are eliminated by the

method of exclusion. It must be emphasized that *metaphysics* has a special meaning for Bacon. This concept (1) excludes the infinity of individual experience by generalization with a teleological focus and (2) opens our mind to generate more possibilities for the efficient application of general laws. <…>

4. Scientific Method: The Project of the *Instauratio Magna*

The Great Instauration, Bacon's main work, was published in 1620 under the title: *Franciscus de Verulamio Summi Angliae Cancellaris Instauratio magna*. This great work remained a fragment, since Bacon was only able to finish parts of the planned outline. <…>

Bacon sees nature as a labyrinth, whose workings cannot be exclusively explained by reference to "excellence of wit" and "repetition of chance experiments":

Our steps must be guided by a clue, and see what way from the first perception of the sense must be laid out upon a sure plan. (Bacon IV [1901], 18)

Bacon's *Plan of the Work* runs as follows (Bacon IV [1901], 22):

1. *The Divisions of the Sciences.*

2. *The New Organon; or Directions concerning the Interpretation of Nature.*

3. *The Phenomena of the Universe; or a Natural and Experimental History for the foundation of Philosophy.*

4. *The Ladder of Intellect.*

5. *The Forerunners; or Anticipations of the New Philosophy.*

6. *The New Philosophy; or Active Science*.

<…>

5. Scientific Method: Novum Organum and the Theory of Induction

Already in his early text *Cogitata et Visa* (1607) Bacon dealt with his scientific method, which became famous under the name of *induction*. He repudiates the syllogistic method and defines his alternative procedure as one "which by slow and faithful toil gathers information from things and brings it into understanding" (Farrington 1964, 89). When later on he developed his method in detail, namely in his *Novum Organum* (1620), he still noted that "[of] induction the logicians seem hardly to have taken any serious thought, but they pass it by with a slight notice, and hasten to the formulae of disputation. I on the contrary reject demonstration by syllogism…" (Bacon IV [1901], 24).

Bacon's method appears as his conceptual plot, applied to all stages of knowledge, and at every phase the whole process has to be kept in mind. (Malherbe 1996, 76)

Induction implies ascending to axioms, as well as a descending to works, so that from axioms new particulars are gained and from these new axioms. The inductive method starts from sensible experience and moves via natural history (providing sense-data as guarantees) to lower axioms or propositions, which are derived from the tables of presentation or from the abstraction of notions. Bacon does not identify experience with everyday experience, but presupposes that method corrects and extends sense-data into facts, which go together with his setting up of tables (tables of presence and of absence and tables of comparison or of degrees, i.e., degrees of absence or presence). "Bacon's antipathy to simple enumeration as the universal method of science derived, first of all, from his preference for theories that deal with interior physical causes, which are not immediately observable" (Urbach 1987, 30 …). The last type can be supplemented by tables of counter-instances, which may suggest experiments:

To move from the sensible to the real requires the correction of the senses, the tables of natural history, the abstraction of propositions and the induction of notions. In other words, the full carrying out of the inductive method is needed. (Malherbe 1996, 85)

The sequence of methodical steps does not, however, end here, because Bacon assumes that from lower axioms more general ones can be derived (by induction). The complete process must be understood as the joining of the parts into a systematic chain. From the more general axioms Bacon strives to reach more fundamental laws of nature (knowledge of forms), which lead to practical deductions as new experiments or works (IV, 24–5). The decisive instruments in this process are the middle or 'living axioms,' which mediate between particulars and general axioms. For Bacon, induction can only be efficient if it is eliminative by exclusion, which goes beyond the remit of induction by simple enumeration. The inductive method helps the human mind to find a way to ascertain truthful knowledge. <…>

Bacon came to the fundamental insight that *facts* cannot be collected from nature, but must be constituted by methodical procedures, which have to be put into practice by scientists in order to ascertain the empirical basis for inductive generalizations. His induction, founded on collection, comparison, and exclusion of factual qualities in things and their interior structure, proved to be a revolutionary achievement within natural philosophy, for which no example in classical antiquity existed.

His *scala intellectus* has two contrary movements "upwards and downwards: from *axiomata* to *experimenta* and *opera* and back again" (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 236). Bacon's induction was construed and conceived as an instrument or method of discovery. <…> Finally, it cannot be denied that Bacon's methodological program of induction includes aspects of deduction and abstraction on the basis of negation and exclusion. Contemporary scholars have praised his inauguration of the theory of induction. <…>

William Uzgalis

John Locke
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/)

John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a British philosopher, Oxford academic and medical researcher. Locke's monumental *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689) is one of the first great defenses of empiricism and concerns itself with determining the limits of human understanding in respect to a wide spectrum of topics. It thus tells us in some detail what one can legitimately claim to know and what one cannot. Locke's association with Anthony Ashley Cooper (later the First Earl of Shaftesbury) led him to become successively a government official charged with collecting information about trade and colonies, economic writer, opposition political activist, and finally a revolutionary whose cause ultimately triumphed in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Among Locke's political works he is most famous for *The Second Treatise of Government* in which he argues that sovereignty resides in the people and explains the nature of legitimate government in terms of natural rights and the social contract. He is also famous for calling for the separation of Church and State in his *Letter Concerning Toleration.* Much of Locke's work is characterized by opposition to authoritarianism. This is apparent both on the level of the individual person and on the level of institutions such as government and church. For the individual, Locke wants each of us to use reason to search after truth rather than simply accept the opinion of authorities or be subject to superstition. He wants us to proportion assent to propositions to the evidence for them. On the level of institutions it becomes important to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate functions of institutions and to make the corresponding distinction for the uses of force by these institutions. Locke believes that using reason to try to grasp the truth, and determine the legitimate functions of institutions will optimize human flourishing for the

individual and society both in respect to its material and spiritual welfare. This in turn, amounts to following natural law and the fulfillment of the divine purpose for humanity.

     <…>

2. The Limits of Human Understanding

Locke is often classified as the first of the great English empiricists (ignoring the claims of Bacon and Hobbes). This reputation rests on Locke's greatest work, the monumental *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke explains his project in several places. Perhaps the most important of his goals is to determine the limits of human understanding. Locke writes:

"For I thought that the first Step towards satisfying the several Enquiries, the Mind of Man was apt to run into, was, to take a Survey of our own Understandings, examine our own Powers, and see to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected that we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure Possession of Truths, that most concerned us whilst we let loose our Thoughts into the vast Ocean of *Being*, as if all the boundless Extent, were the natural and undoubted Possessions of our Understandings, wherein there was nothing that escaped its Decisions, or that escaped its Comprehension. Thus Men, extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure Footing; 'tis no Wonder, that they raise Questions and multiply Disputes, which never coming to any clear Resolution, are proper to only continue and increase their Doubts, and to confirm them at last in a perfect Skepticism. Wheras were the Capacities of our Understanding well considered, the Extent of our Knowledge once discovered, and the Horizon found, which sets the boundary between the enlightened and the dark Parts of Things; between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, Men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avow'd Ignorance of the one; and employ their Thoughts and Discourse, with more Advantage and Satisfaction in the other". <…>

Some philosophers before Locke had suggested that it would be good to find the limits of the Understanding, but what Locke does is to carry out this project in detail. In the four books of the *Essay* Locke considers the sources and nature of human knowledge. Book I argues that we have no innate knowledge. (In this he resembles Berkeley and Hume, and differs from Descartes and Leibniz.) So, at birth, the human mind is a sort of blank slate on which experience writes. In Book II Locke claims

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that ideas are the materials of knowledge and all ideas come from experience. The term 'idea,' Locke tells us "…stands for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding, when a man thinks" (Essay I, 1, 8, p. 47). Experience is of two kinds, sensation and reflection. One of these – sensation – tells us about things and processes in the external world. The other – reflection – tells us about the operations of our own minds. Reflection is a sort of internal sense that makes us conscious of the mental processes we are engaged in. Some ideas we get only from sensation, some only from reflection and some from both.

Locke has an atomic or perhaps more accurately a corpuscular theory of ideas. There is, that is to say, an analogy between the way atoms or corpuscles combine into complexes to form physical objects and the way ideas combine. Ideas are either simple or complex. We cannot create simple ideas, we can only get them from experience. In this respect the mind is passive. Once the mind has a store of simple ideas, it can combine them into complex ideas of a variety of kinds. In this respect the mind is active. Thus, Locke subscribes to a version of the empiricist axiom that there is nothing in the intellect that was not previously in the senses – where the senses are broadened to include reflection. Book III deals with the nature of language, its connections with ideas and its role in knowledge. Book IV, the culmination of the previous reflections, explains the nature and limits of knowledge, probability, and the relation of reason and faith. <…>

2.5. Knowledge and Probability

Knowledge involves the seeing of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. What then is probability and how does it relate to knowledge? Locke writes:

"The Understanding Faculties being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but also for the Conduct of his Life, Man would be at a great loss, if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the Certainty of true *Knowledge*… Therefore, as God has set some Things in broad day-light; as he has given us some certain Knowledge… So in the greater part of our Concernment, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may say so, of Probability, suitable, I presume, to that State of Mediocrity and Probationership, he has been pleased to place us in here, wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption, we might by every day's Experience be made sensible of our short sightedness and liableness to Error…" <…>

So, apart from the few important things that we can know for certain, e.g. the existence of ourselves and God, the nature of mathematics

and morality broadly construed, for the most part we must lead our lives without knowledge. What then is probability? Locke writes:

"As Demonstration is the shewing of the agreement or disagreement of two Ideas, by the intervention of one or more Proofs, which have a constant, immutable, and visible connexion one with another: so Probability is nothing but the appearance of such an Agreement or Disagreement, by the intervention of Proofs, whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is or appears, for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition to be true, or false, rather than the contrary". <…>

Probable reasoning, on this account, is an argument, similar in certain ways to the demonstrative reasoning that produces knowledge but different also in certain crucial respects. It is an argument that provides evidence that leads the mind to judge a proposition true or false but without a guarantee that the judgment is correct. This kind of probable judgment comes in degrees, ranging from near demonstrations and certainty to unlikeliness and improbability to near the vicinity of impossibility. It is correlated with degrees of assent ranging from full assurance down to conjecture, doubt and distrust. <…>

4. The *Two Treatises of Government*

<…> We now know that the *Two Treatises of Government* were written during the Exclusion crisis and were probably intended to justify the general armed rising which the Country Party leaders were planning. It was a truly revolutionary work. Supposing that the *Two Treatises* may have been intended to explain and defend the revolutionary plot against Charles II and his brother, how does it do this?

The First Treatise of Government is a polemical work aimed at refuting the patriarchal version of the Divine Right of Kings doctrine put forth by Sir Robert Filmer. Locke singles out Filmer's contention that men are not "naturally free" as the key issue, for that is the "ground" or premise on which Filmer erects his argument for the claim that all "legitimate" government is "absolute monarchy." – kings being descended from the first man, Adam. Early in the First Treatise Locke denies that either scripture or reason supports Filmer's premise or arguments. In what follows, Locke minutely examines key Biblical passages.

The Second Treatise of Government provides Locke's positive theory of government – he explicitly says that he must do this "lest men fall into the dangerous belief that all government in the world is merely the product of force and violence." Locke's account involves several devices

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which were common in seventeenth and eighteenth century political philosophy – natural rights theory and the social contract. Natural rights are those rights which we are supposed to have as human beings before ever government comes into being. We might suppose, that like other animals, we have a natural right to struggle for our survival. Locke will argue that we have a right to the means to survive. When Locke comes to explain how government comes into being, he uses the idea that people agree that their condition in the state of nature is unsatisfactory, and so agree to transfer some of their rights to a central government, while retaining others. This is the theory of the social contract. There are many versions of natural rights theory and the social contract in seventeenth and eighteenth century European political philosophy, some conservative and some radical. Locke's version belongs on the radical side of the spectrum. These radical natural right theories influenced the ideologies of the American and French revolutions. <…>

4.3. The Social Contract Theory

Just as natural rights and natural law theory had a florescence in the 17th and 18th century, so did the social contract theory. Why is Locke a social contract theorist? Is it merely that this was one prevailing way of thinking about government at the time which Locke blindly adopted? I think the answer is that there is something about Locke's project which pushes him strongly in the direction of the social contract. One might hold that governments were originally instituted by force, and that no agreement was involved. Were Locke to adopt this view, he would be forced to go back on many of the things which are at the heart of his project in the *Second Treatise*. Remember that *The Second Treatise* provides Locke's positive theory of government, and that he explicitly says that he must provide an alternative to the view "that all government in the world is merely the product of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules than that of the beasts, where the strongest carries it..." So, while Locke might admit that some governments come about through force or violence, he would be destroying the most central and vital distinction, that between legitimate and illegitimate civil government, if he admitted that legitimate government can come about in this way. So, for Locke, legitimate government is instituted by the explicit consent of those governed. (...) Those who make this agreement transfer to the government their right of executing the law of nature and judging their own case. These are the powers which they give to the central government, and this is what makes the justice system of governments a legitimate function of such governments. <…>

It is entirely possible for the majority to confer the rule of the community on a king and his heirs, or a group of oligarchs or on a democratic assembly. Thus, the social contract is not inextricably linked to democracy. Still, a government of any kind must perform the legitimate function of a civil government.

4.4. The Function of Civil Government

Locke is now in a position to explain the function of a legitimate government and distinguish it from illegitimate government. The aim of such a legitimate government is to preserve, so far as possible, the rights to life, liberty, health and property of its citizens, and to prosecute and punish those of its citizens who violate the rights of others and to pursue the public good even where this may conflict with the rights of individuals. In doing this it provides something unavailable in the state of nature, an impartial judge to determine the severity of the crime, and to set a punishment proportionate to the crime. This is one of the main reasons why civil society is an improvement on the state of nature. An illegitimate government will fail to protect the rights to life, liberty, health and property of its subjects, and in the worst cases, such an illegitimate government will claim to be able to violate the rights of its subjects, that is it will claim to have despotic power over its subjects. Since Locke is arguing against the position of Sir Robert Filmer who held that patriarchal power and political power are the same, and that in effect these amount to despotic power, Locke is at pains to distinguish these three forms of power, and to show that they are not equivalent. Thus at the beginning of Chapter XV Of Paternal, Political and Despotic power considered together he writes: "Though I have had occasion to speak of these before, yet the great mistakes of late about government, having as I suppose arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another, it may not be amiss, to consider them together." Chapters VI and VII give Locke's account of paternal and political power respectively. Paternal power is limited. It lasts only through the minority of children, and has other limitations. Political power, derived as it is from the transfer of the power of individuals to enforce the law of nature, has with it the right to kill in the interest of preserving the rights of the citizens or otherwise supporting the public good. Despotic power, by contrast, implies the right to take the life, liberty, health and at least some of the property of any person subject to such a power . <…>

Tom Sorell

Thomas Hobbes
(Encyclopaedia Britannica)
(http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/268448/Thomas-Hobbes)

Thomas Hobbes (born April 5, 1588, Westport, Wiltshire, England – died December 4, 1679, Hardwick Hall, Derbyshire), English philosopher, scientist, and historian, best known for his political philosophy, especially as articulated in his masterpiece *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes viewed government primarily as a device for ensuring collective security. Political authority is justified by a hypothetical social contract among the many that vests in a sovereign person or entity the responsibility for the safety and well-being of all. In metaphysics, Hobbes defended materialism, the view that only material things are real. His scientific writings present all observed phenomena as the effects of matter in motion. Hobbes was not only a scientist in his own right but a great systematizer of the scientific findings of his contemporaries, including Galileo and Johannes Kepler. His enduring contribution is as a political philosopher who justified wide-ranging government powers on the basis of the self-interested consent of citizens. <…>

Hobbes's system

Theories that trace all observed effects to matter and motion are called mechanical. Hobbes was thus a mechanical materialist: he held that nothing but material things are real, and he thought that the subject matter of all the natural sciences consists of the motions of material things at different levels of generality. Geometry considers the effects of the motions of points, lines, and solids; pure mechanics deals with the motions of three-dimensional bodies in a full space, or plenum; physics deals with the motions of the parts of inanimate bodies insofar as they contribute to observed phenomena; and psychology deals with the effects of the internal motions of animate bodies on behaviour. The system of the natural sciences described in Hobbes's trilogy represents his understanding of the materialist principles on which all science is based.

The fact that Hobbes included politics as well as psychology within his system, however, has tended to overshadow his insistence on the autonomy of political understanding from natural-scientific understanding. According to Hobbes, politics does not need to be understood in terms of the motions of material things (although, ultimately, it can be); a certain

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kind of widely available self-knowledge is evidence enough of the human propensity to war. Although Hobbes is routinely read as having discerned the "laws of motion" for both human beings and human societies, the most that can plausibly be claimed is that he based his political philosophy on psychological principles that he thought could be illuminated by general laws of motion. <...>

Political philosophy

Hobbes presented his political philosophy in different forms for different audiences. *De Cive* states his theory in what he regarded as its most scientific form. Unlike *The Elements of Law*, which was composed in English for English parliamentarians – and which was written with local political challenges to Charles I in mind – *De Cive* was a Latin work for an audience of Continental savants who were interested in the "new" science – that is, the sort of science that did not appeal to the authority of the ancients but approached various problems with fresh principles of explanation.

De Cive's break from the ancient authority par excellence – Aristotle – could not have been more loudly advertised. After only a few paragraphs, Hobbes rejects one of the most famous theses of Aristotle's politics, namely that human beings are naturally suited to life in a polis and do not fully realize their natures until they exercise the role of citizen. Hobbes turns Aristotle's claim on its head: human beings, he insists, are by nature unsuited to political life. They naturally denigrate and compete with each other, are very easily swayed by the rhetoric of ambitious men, and think much more highly of themselves than of other people. In short, their passions magnify the value they place on their own interests, especially their near-term interests. At the same time, most people, in pursuing their own interests, do not have the ability to prevail over competitors. Nor can they appeal to some natural common standard of behaviour that everyone will feel obliged to abide by. There is no natural self-restraint, even when human beings are moderate in their appetites, for a ruthless and bloodthirsty few can make even the moderate feel forced to take violent preemptive action in order to avoid losing everything. The self-restraint even of the moderate, then, easily turns into aggression. In other words, no human being is above aggression and the anarchy that goes with it.

War comes more naturally to human beings than political order. Indeed, political order is possible only when human beings abandon their natural condition of judging and pursuing what seems best to each and

delegate this judgment to someone else. This delegation is effected when the many contract together to submit to a sovereign in return for physical safety and a modicum of well-being. Each of the many in effect says to the other: "I transfer my right of governing myself to X (the sovereign) if you do too." And the transfer is collectively entered into only on the understanding that it makes one less of a target of attack or dispossession than one would be in one's natural state. Although Hobbes did not assume that there was ever a real historical event in which a mutual promise was made to delegate self-government to a sovereign, he claimed that the best way to understand the state was to conceive of it as having resulted from such an agreement.

In Hobbes's social contract, the many trade liberty for safety. Liberty, with its standing invitation to local conflict and finally all-out war – a "war of every man against every man" – is overvalued in traditional political philosophy and popular opinion, according to Hobbes; it is better for people to transfer the right of governing themselves to the sovereign. Once transferred, however, this right of government is absolute, unless the many feel that their lives are threatened by submission. The sovereign determines who owns what, who will hold which public offices, how the economy will be regulated, what acts will be crimes, and what punishments criminals should receive. The sovereign is the supreme commander of the army, supreme interpreter of law, and supreme interpreter of scripture, with authority over any national church. It is unjust–a case of reneging on what one has agreed – for any subject to take issue with these arrangements, for, in the act of creating the state or by receiving its protection, one agrees to leave judgments about the means of collective well-being and security to the sovereign. The sovereign's laws and decrees and appointments to public office may be unpopular; they may even be wrong. But unless the sovereign fails so utterly that subjects feel that their condition would be no worse in the free-for-all outside the state, it is better for the subjects to endure the sovereign's rule.

It is better both prudentially and morally. Because no one can prudently welcome a greater risk of death, no one can prudently prefer total liberty to submission. Total liberty invites war, and submission is the best insurance against war. Morality too supports this conclusion, for, according to Hobbes, all the moral precepts enjoining virtuous behaviour can be understood as derivable from the fundamental moral precept that one should seek peace – that is to say, freedom from war – if it is safe to do so. Without peace, he observed, man lives in "continual fear, and danger of violent death," and what life he has is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,

and short." What Hobbes calls the "laws of nature," the system of moral rules by which everyone is bound, cannot be safely complied with outside the state, for the total liberty that people have outside the state includes the liberty to flout the moral requirements if one's survival seems to depend on it.

The sovereign is not a party to the social contract; he receives the obedience of the many as a free gift in their hope that he will see to their safety. The sovereign makes no promises to the many in order to win their submission. Indeed, because he does not transfer his right of self-government to anyone, he retains the total liberty that his subjects trade for safety. He is not bound by law, including his own laws. Nor does he do anything unjustly if he makes decisions about his subjects's safety and well-being that they do not like. <...>

Hobbes's masterpiece, *Leviathan* (1651), does not significantly depart from the view of *De Cive* concerning the relation between protection and obedience, but it devotes much more attention to the civil obligations of Christian believers and the proper and improper roles of a church within a state. Hobbes argues that believers do not endanger their prospects of salvation by obeying a sovereign's decrees to the letter, and he maintains that churches do not have any authority that is not granted by the civil sovereign.

Hobbes's political views exerted a discernible influence on his work in other fields, including historiography and legal theory. His political philosophy is chiefly concerned with the way in which government must be organized in order to avoid civil war <...>

William Bristow

Enlightenment
(plato.stanford.edu/entries/enlightenment/)

The Enlightenment is the period in the history of Western thought and culture, stretching roughly from the mid-decades of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, characterized by dramatic revolutions in science, philosophy, society and politics; these revolutions swept away the medieval world-view and ushered in our modern western world. Enlightenment thought *culminates* historically in the political upheaval of the French Revolution, in which the traditional hierarchical political and social orders (the French monarchy, the privileges of the French nobility, the political power and authority of the Catholic Church) were violently destroyed and replaced by a political and social order informed by the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and equality for all,

founded, ostensibly, upon principles of human reason. The Enlightenment *begins* with the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The rise of the new science progressively undermines not only the ancient geocentric conception of the cosmos, but, with it, the entire set of presuppositions that had served to constrain and guide philosophical inquiry. The dramatic success of the new science in explaining the natural world, in accounting for a wide variety of phenomena by appeal to a relatively small number of elegant mathematical formulae, promotes philosophy (in the broad sense of the time, which includes natural science) from a handmaiden of theology, constrained by its purposes and methods, to an independent force with the power and authority to challenge the old and construct the new, in the realms both of theory and practice, on the basis of its own principles. D'Alembert, a leading figure of the French Enlightenment, characterizes his eighteenth century, in the midst of it, as "the century of philosophy *par excellence*", because of the tremendous intellectual progress of the age, the advance of the sciences, and the enthusiasm for that progress, but also because of the characteristic expectation of the age that philosophy (in this broad sense) would dramatically improve human life.

The task of characterizing philosophy in (or of) the Enlightenment confronts the obstacle of the wide diversity of Enlightenment thought. The Enlightenment is associated with the French thinkers of the mid-decades of the eighteenth century, the so-called "*philosophes*", (Voltaire, Diderot, D'Alembert, Montesquieu, et cetera). The *philosophes* constitute an informal society of men of letters who collaborate on a loosely defined project of Enlightenment centered around the project of the Encyclopedia. But the Enlightenment has broader boundaries, both geographical and temporal, than this suggests. In addition to the French, there was a very significant Scottish Enlightenment (key figures were Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid) and a very significant German Enlightenment (*die Aufklärung*, key figures of which include Christian Wolff, Moses Mendelssohn, G. E. Lessing and Immanuel Kant). But all these Enlightenments were but particular nodes or centers in a far-flung and varied intellectual development. Given the variety, Enlightenment philosophy is characterized here in terms of general tendencies of thought, not in terms of specific doctrines or theories.

Only late in the development of the German Enlightenment, when the Enlightenment was near its end, does the movement become self-reflective; the question of "What is Enlightenment?" is debated in pamphlets and journals. In his famous definition of "enlightenment" in his essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?" (1784),

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which is his contribution to this debate, Immanuel Kant expresses many of the tendencies shared among Enlightenment philosophies of divergent doctrines. Kant defines "enlightenment" as humankind's release from its self-incurred immaturity; "immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding without the guidance of another." Enlightenment is the process of undertaking to think for oneself, to employ and rely on one's own intellectual capacities in determining what to believe and how to act. Enlightenment philosophers from across the geographical and temporal spectrum tend to have a great deal of confidence in humanity's intellectual powers, both to achieve systematic knowledge of nature and to serve as an authoritative guide in practical life. This confidence is generally paired with suspicion or hostility toward other forms or carriers of authority (such as tradition, superstition, prejudice, myth and miracles), insofar as these are seen to compete with the authority of reason. Enlightenment philosophy tends to stand in tension with established religion, insofar as the release from self-incurred immaturity in this age, daring to think for oneself, awakening one's intellectual powers, generally requires opposing the role of established religion in directing thought and action. The faith of the Enlightenment – if one may call it that – is that the process of enlightenment, of becoming progressively self-directed in thought and action through the awakening of one's intellectual powers, leads ultimately to a better, more fulfilled human existence. <…>

1. The True: Science, Epistemology and Metaphysics in the Enlightenment

In this era dedicated to human progress, the advancement of the natural sciences is regarded as the main exemplification of, and fuel for, such progress. Isaac Newton's epochal accomplishment in his *Principia Mathematica* (1687), which, very briefly described, consists in the comprehension of a diversity of physical phenomena – in particular the motions of heavenly bodies, together with the motions of sublunary bodies – in few relatively simple, universally applicable, mathematical laws, was a great stimulus to the intellectual activity of the eighteenth century and served as a model and inspiration for the researches of a number of Enlightenment thinkers. Newton's system strongly encourages the Enlightenment conception of nature as an orderly domain governed by strict mathematical-dynamical laws and the conception *of ourselves* as capable of knowing those laws and thus plumbing the secrets of nature through the exercise of our unaided faculties. – The conception of nature, and of how we know it, changes significantly with the rise of modern science.

It belongs centrally to the agenda of Enlightenment philosophy to contribute to the new knowledge of nature, and to provide a metaphysical framework within which to place and interpret this new knowledge.

1.1. Rationalism and the Enlightenment

René Descartes' rationalist system of philosophy is foundational for the Enlightenment in this regard. Descartes (1596–1650) undertakes to establish the sciences upon a secure metaphysical foundation. The famous method of doubt Descartes employs for this purpose exemplifies (in part through exaggerating) an attitude characteristic of the Enlightenment. According to Descartes, the investigator in foundational philosophical research ought to doubt all propositions that can be doubted. <...>

However dubious Descartes' grounding of all scientific knowledge in metaphysical knowledge of God, his system contributes significantly to the advance of natural science in the period. …He developed a conception of matter that enabled mechanical explanation of physical phenomena; and he developed some of the fundamental mathematical resources... Furthermore, his grounding of physics, and all knowledge, in a relatively simple and elegant rationalist metaphysics provides a model of a rigorous and complete secular system of knowledge. Though it is typical of the Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century (for example Voltaire in his *Letters on the English Nation*, 1734) to embrace Newton's physical system in preference to Descartes', Newton's system itself depends on Descartes' earlier work, a dependence of which Newton himself was aware.

Cartesian philosophy is also foundational for the Enlightenment through igniting various controversies in the latter decades of the seventeenth century that provide the context of intellectual tumult out of which the Enlightenment springs. Among these controversies are the following: Are mind and body two distinct sorts of substances, as Descartes argues, and if so, what is the nature of each, and how are they related to each other, both in the human being (which presumably "has" both a mind and a body) and in a unified world system? If matter is inert (as Descartes claims), what can be the source of motion and the nature of causality in the physical world? And of course the various epistemological problems: the problem of objectivity, the role of God in securing our knowledge, the doctrine of innate ideas, et cetera.

Baruch Spinoza's systematic rationalist metaphysics, which he develops in his *Ethics* (1677) in part in response to problems in the Carte-

sian system, is also an important basis for Enlightenment thought. Spinoza develops, in contrast to Cartesian dualism, an ontological monism according to which there is not only one *kind* of substance, but one substance, God or nature, with two attributes, corresponding to mind and body. Spinoza's denial, on the basis of strict philosophical reasoning, of the existence of a transcendent supreme being, his identification of God with nature, gives strong impetus to the strands of atheism and naturalism that thread through Enlightenment philosophy. Spinoza's rationalist principles also lead him to assert a strict determinism and to deny any role to final causes or teleology in explanation. (See Israel 2001.)

The rationalist metaphysics of Leibniz (1646–1716) is also foundational for the Enlightenment, particularly the German Enlightenment (*die Aufklärung*), which is founded to a great extent on the Leibnizean rationalist system of Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Leibniz articulates, and places at the head of metaphysics, the great rationalist principle, the principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything that exists has a sufficient reason for its existence. This principle exemplifies the faith, so important for the Enlightenment, that the universe is fully intelligible to us through the exercise of our natural powers of reason. The problem arises, in the face of skeptical questioning, of how this principle itself can be known or grounded. <…>

1.2. Empiricism and the Enlightenment

Despite the confidence in and enthusiasm for human reason in the Enlightenment – it is sometimes called "the Age of Reason" – the rise of empiricism, both in the practice of science and in the theory of knowledge, is characteristic of the period. The enthusiasm for reason in the Enlightenment is not for the faculty of reason as an independent source of knowledge (at least not primarily), which is actually put on the defensive in the period, but rather for the human cognitive faculties generally; the Age of Reason contrasts with an age of religious faith, not with an age of sense experience. <…>

Still, that the *Encyclopedia* of Diderot and D'Alembert is dedicated to three empiricists, Francis Bacon, John Locke and Isaac Newton, indicates the general ascendency of empiricism in the period. <…> Locke and Descartes both pursue a method in epistemology that brings with it the epistemological problem of objectivity. Both examine our knowledge by way of examining the ideas we encounter directly in our consciousness. This method comes to be called "the way of ideas". <…> The way of ideas implies the epistemological problem of how we can know that these ideas do in fact resemble their objects. How can we be sure that

these objects do not appear one way before the mind and exist in another way (or not at all) in reality outside the mind? George Berkeley, an empiricist philosopher influenced by John Locke, avoids the problem by asserting the metaphysics of idealism: the (apparently material) objects of perception are nothing but ideas before the mind. However, Berkeley's idealism is less influential in, and characteristic of, the Enlightenment, than the opposing positions of materialism and Cartesian dualism. Thomas Reid, a prominent member of the Scottish Enlightenment, responds to this epistemological problem in a way more characteristic of the Enlightenment in general. He attacks the way of ideas and argues that the immediate objects of our (sense) perception are the common (material) objects in our environment, not ideas in our mind. Reid mounts his defense of naïve realism as a defense of common sense over against the doctrines of the philosophers. The defense of common sense, and the related idea that the results of philosophy ought to be of use to common people, are characteristic ideas of the Enlightenment, particularly pronounced in the Scottish Enlightenment. <…>

1.4. Science of Man and Subjectivism in the Enlightenment

Though Hume finds himself struggling with skepticism in the conclusion of Book One of the *Treatise*, the project of the work as he outlines it is not to advance a skeptical viewpoint, but to establish a science of the mind. Hume is one of many Enlightenment thinkers who aspire to be the "Newton of the mind"; he aspires to establish the basic laws that govern the elements of the human mind in its operations. Alexander Pope's famous couplet in *An Essay on Man* (1733) ("Know then thyself, presume not God to scan. The proper study of mankind is man") expresses well the intense interest humanity gains in itself within the context of the Enlightenment, as a partial substitute for its traditional interest in God and the transcendent domain. Just as the sun replaces the earth as the center of our cosmos in Copernicus' cosmological system, so humanity itself replaces God at the center of humanity's consciousness in the Enlightenment. Given the Enlightenment's passion for science, the self-directed attention naturally takes the form of the rise of the scientific study of humanity in the period.

The enthusiasm for the scientific study of humanity in the period incorporates a tension or paradox concerning the place of humanity in the cosmos, as the cosmos is re-conceived in the context of Enlightenment philosophy and science. …The achievements of the natural sciences in general are the great pride of the Enlightenment, manifesting the

excellence of distinctively human capacities. The pride and self-assertiveness of humanity in the Enlightenment expresses itself, among other ways, in humanity's making the study of itself its central concern. On the other hand, the study of humanity in the Enlightenment typically yields a portrait of us that is the opposite of flattering or elevating. Instead of being represented as occupying a privileged place in nature, as made in the image of God, humanity is represented typically in the Enlightenment as a fully natural creature, devoid of free will, of an immortal soul, and of a non-natural faculty of intelligence or reason. The very title of J. O. de La Mettrie's *Man a Machine* (1748), for example, seems designed to deflate humanity's self-conception, and in this respect it is characteristic of the Enlightenment "science of man". It is true of a number of works of the Enlightenment, perhaps especially works in the more radical French Enlightenment – notable here are Helvétius's *Of the Spirit* (1758) and Baron d'Holbach's *System of Nature* (1770) – that they at once express the remarkable self-assertiveness of humanity characteristic of the Enlightenment in their scientific aspirations while at the same time painting a portrait of humanity that dramatically deflates its traditional self-image as occupying a privileged position in nature.

The methodology of epistemology in the period reflects a similar tension. Given the epistemological role of Descartes' famous "*cogito, ergo sum*" in his system of knowledge, one might see Descartes' epistemology as already marking the transition from an epistemology privileging knowledge of God to one that privileges self-knowledge instead. <…>

Immanuel Kant explicitly enacts a revolution in epistemology modeled on the Copernican in astronomy. As characteristic of Enlightenment epistemology, Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, second edition 1787) undertakes both to determine the limits of our knowledge, and at the same time to provide a foundation of scientific knowledge of nature, and he attempts to do this by examining our human faculties of knowledge critically. Even as he draws strict limits to rational knowledge, he attempts to defend reason as a faculty of knowledge, as playing a necessary role in natural science, in the face of skeptical challenges that reason faces in the period. According to Kant, scientific knowledge of nature is not merely knowledge of what *in fact* happens in nature, but knowledge of the causal laws of nature according to which what in fact happens *must* happen. <…> The generalized epistemological problem Kant addresses in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is: how is science possible (including natural science, mathematics, metaphysics), given

that all such knowledge must be (or include) knowledge of real, substantive (not merely logical or formal) necessities. Put in the terms Kant defines, the problem is: how is synthetic, *a priori* knowledge possible?

According to the Copernican Revolution in epistemology which Kant presents as the solution to this problem, objects must conform themselves to human knowledge rather than knowledge to objects. According to Kant's arguments, certain cognitive forms lie ready in the human mind – prominent examples are the pure concepts of substance and cause and the forms of intuition, space and time; given sensible representations must conform themselves to these forms in order for human experience (as empirical knowledge of nature) to be possible at all. According to Kant's epistemological revolution, we can acquire scientific knowledge of nature because we constitute it a priori according to certain cognitive forms; for example, we can know nature as a causally ordered domain because we originally synthesize a priori the given manifold of sensibility according to the category of causality, which has its source in the human mind.

Kant saves rational knowledge of nature by limiting rational knowledge to nature. According to Kant's argument, we can have rational knowledge only of the domain of possible experience, not of supersensible objects such as God and the soul. Moreover Kant's solution brings with it a kind of idealism: given the mind's role in constituting objects of experience, we know objects only as *appearances*, only as they are for us, not as they are in themselves. This is the subjectivism of Kant's epistemology. Kant's epistemology exemplifies Enlightenment thought by replacing the theocentric conception of knowledge of the rationalist tradition with an anthropocentric conception.

However, Kant means his system to make room for humanity's practical and religious aspirations toward the transcendent as well. According to Kant's idealism, the realm of nature is limited to a realm of appearances, and we can intelligibly think supersensible objects such as God, freedom and the soul, though we cannot have knowledge of them. Through the postulation of a realm of unknowable noumena (things in themselves) over against the realm of nature as a realm of appearances, Kant manages to make place for practical concepts that are central to our understanding of ourselves even while grounding our scientific knowledge of nature as a domain governed by deterministic causal laws. Though Kant's idealism is highly controversial from the outset, it represents the Enlightenment's most serious attempt to understand the cosmos in such a way that the Enlightenment's conception of nature and the Enlightenment's conception of ourselves (as morally free, as having dignity, as perfectible, et cetera) fit together in a single system.

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1.5. Emerging Sciences and the *Encyclopedia*

The commitment to careful observation and description of phenomena as the starting point of science, and then the success at explaining and accounting for observed phenomena through the method of induction, naturally leads to the development of new sciences for new domains in the Enlightenment. Many of the human and social sciences have their origins in the eighteenth century, in the context of the Enlightenment (e. g., history, anthropology, aesthetics, psychology, economics, even sociology), though most are only formally established as autonomous disciplines in universities later. The emergence of new sciences is aided by the development of new scientific tools, such as models for probabilistic reasoning, a kind of reasoning that gains new respect and application in the period. Despite the multiplication of sciences in the period, the ideal remains to comprehend the diversity of our scientific knowledge as a unified system of science; however, this ideal of unity is generally taken as regulative, as an ideal to emerge in the ever-receding end-state of science, rather than as enforced from the beginning by regimenting science under a priori principles.

As exemplifying these and other tendencies of the Enlightenment, one work deserves special mention: the *Encyclopedia*, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean La Rond d'Alembert. The *Encyclopedia* (subtitled: "*systematic dictionary of the sciences, arts and crafts*") was published in 28 volumes (17 of text, 11 of plates) over 21 years (1751–1772), and consists of over 70,000 articles, contributed by over 140 contributors, among them many of the luminaries of the French Enlightenment. The work aims to provide a compendium of existing human knowledge, a compendium to be transmitted to subsequent generations, a transmission intended to contribute to the progress and dissemination of human knowledge and to a positive transformation of human society. The orientation of the *Encyclopedia* is decidedly secular and implicitly anti-authoritarian. <…> The knowledge contained in the *Encyclopedia* is self-consciously social both in its production – insofar as it is immediately the product of what the title page calls "a society of men of letters" – and in its address – insofar as it is primarily meant as an instrument for the education and improvement of society. It is a striking feature of the *Encyclopedia*, and one by virtue of which it exemplifies the Baconian conception of science characteristic of the period, that its entries cover the whole range and scope of knowledge, from the most abstract theoretical to the most practical, mechanical and technical.

2. The Good: Political Theory, Ethical Theory and Religion in the Enlightenment

2.1. Political Theory

The Enlightenment is most identified with its political accomplishments. The era is marked by three political revolutions, which together lay the basis for modern, republican, constitutional democracies: The English Revolution (1688), the American Revolution (1775–83), and the French Revolution (1789–99). The success at explaining and understanding the natural world encourages the Enlightenment project of re-making the social/political world, in accord with the true models we allegedly find in our reason. Enlightenment philosophers find that the existing social and political orders do not withstand critical scrutiny; they find that existing political and social authority is shrouded in religious myth and mystery and founded on obscure traditions. The negative work of criticizing existing institutions is supplemented with the positive work of constructing in theory the model of institutions as they ought to be. We owe to this period the basic model of government founded upon the consent of the governed; the articulation of the political ideals of freedom and equality and the theory of their institutional realization; the articulation of a list of basic individual human rights to be respected and realized by any legitimate political system; the articulation and promotion of toleration of religious diversity as a virtue to be respected in a well ordered society; the conception of the basic political powers as organized in a system of checks and balances; and other now-familiar features of western democracies. However, for all the enduring accomplishments of Enlightenment political philosophy, it is not clear that human reason proves powerful enough to put a concrete, positive authoritative ideal in place of the ideals negated by rational criticism. As in the epistemological domain, reason shows its power more convincingly in criticizing authorities than in establishing them. Here too the question of the limits of reason is one of the main philosophical legacies of the period. These limits are arguably vividly illustrated by the course of the French Revolution. The explicit ideals of the French Revolution are the Enlightenment ideals of individual freedom and equality; but, as the revolutionaries attempt to devise rational, secular institutions to put in place of those they have violently overthrown, eventually they have recourse to violence and terror in order to control and govern the people. The devolution of the French Revolution into the Reign of Terror is perceived by many as proving the emptiness and hypocrisy of Enlightenment reason, and is one of the main factors which account for the end of the Enlightenment as an historical period.

The political revolutions of the Enlightenment, especially the French and the American, were informed and guided to a significant extent by prior political philosophy in the period. <...> According to the general social contract model, political authority is grounded in an agreement (often understood as ideal, rather than real) among individuals, each of whom aims in this agreement to advance his rational self-interest by establishing a common political authority over all. Thus, according to the general contract model (though this is more clear in later contract theorists such as Locke and Rousseau than in Hobbes himself), political authority is grounded not in conquest, natural or divinely instituted hierarchy, or in obscure myths and traditions, but rather in the rational consent of the governed. In initiating this model, Hobbes takes a naturalistic, scientific approach to the question of how political society ought to be organized (against the background of a clear-eyed, unsentimental conception of human nature), and thus decisively influences the Enlightenment process of secularization and rationalization in political and social philosophy.

Baruch Spinoza also greatly contributes to the development of Enlightenment political philosophy in its early years. Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1677) is his main work dedicated to political philosophy, but the metaphysical doctrines of the *Ethics* lay the groundwork for his influence on the age. Spinoza's arguments against Cartesian dualism and in favor of substance monism, the claim in particular that there can only be one substance, God or nature, was taken to have radical implications in the domains of politics, ethics and religion throughout the period. Spinoza's employment of philosophical reason leads to the radical conclusion of denying the existence of a transcendent, creator, providential, law-giving God; this establishes the opposition between the teachings of philosophy, on the one hand, and the traditional orienting practical beliefs (moral, religious, political) of the people, on the other hand, an opposition that is one important aspect of the culture of the Enlightenment. In his political writings, Spinoza, building on his rationalist naturalism, opposes superstition, argues for toleration and the subordination of religion to the state, and pronounces in favor of qualified democracy. Liberalism is perhaps the most characteristic political philosophy of the Enlightenment, and Spinoza is one of its originators. <...>

<...> According to the natural law tradition, as the Enlightenment makes use of it, we can know through the use of our unaided reason that we all – all human beings, universally – stand in particular moral relations to each other. The claim that we can apprehend through our unaided

reason a *universal* moral order exactly because moral qualities and relations (in particular human freedom and equality) belong to the nature of things, is attractive in the Enlightenment for obvious reasons. However, as noted above, the scientific apprehension of nature in the period does not support, and in fact opposes, the claim that the alleged moral qualities and relations (or, indeed, that *any* moral qualities and relations) are *natural*. According to a common Enlightenment assumption, as humankind clarifies the laws of nature through the advance of natural science and philosophy, the true moral and political order will be revealed with it. This view is expressed explicitly by the *philosophe* marquis de Condorcet, in his *Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (published posthumously in 1795 and which, perhaps better than any other work, lays out the paradigmatically Enlightenment view of history of the human race as a continual progress to perfection). <…> The question of how to ground our claims to natural freedom and equality is one of the main philosophical legacies of the Enlightenment.

The rise and development of liberalism in Enlightenment political thought has many relations with the rise of the mercantile class (the bourgeoisie) and the development of what comes to be called "civil society", the society characterized by work and trade in pursuit of private property. Locke's *Second Treatise* contributes greatly to the project of articulating a political philosophy to serve the interests and values of this ascending class. Locke claims that the end or purpose of political society is the preservation and protection of property (though he defines property broadly to include not only external property but life and liberties as well). According to Locke's famous account, persons acquire rightful ownership in external things that are originally given to us all by God as a common inheritance, independently of the state and prior to its involvement, insofar as we "mix our labor with them". The civil freedom that Locke defines, as something protected by the force of political laws, comes increasingly to be interpreted as the freedom to trade, to exchange without the interference of governmental regulation. Within the context of the Enlightenment, economic freedom is a salient interpretation of the individual freedom highly valued in the period. Adam Smith, a prominent member of the Scottish Enlightenment, describes in his *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (1776) some of the laws of civil society, as a sphere distinct from political society as such, and thus contributes significantly to the founding of political economy (later called merely "economics"). His is one of many voices in the Enlightenment advocating for free trade and for minimal government regulation of markets. The trading house floor, in which people of various

nationalities, languages, cultures, religions come together and trade, each in pursuit of his own self-interest, but, through this pursuit, supplying the wants of their respective nations and increasing its wealth, represents for some Enlightenment thinkers the benign, peaceful, universal rational order that they wish to see replace the violent, confessional strife that characterized the then-recent past of Europe.

However, the liberal conception of the government as properly protecting economic freedom of citizens and private property comes into conflict in the Enlightenment with the valuing of democracy. <…>

Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political theory, as presented in his *On the Social Contract* (1762), presents a contrast to the Lockean liberal model. Though commitment to the political ideals of freedom and equality constitutes a common ground for Enlightenment political philosophy, it is not clear not only how these values have a home in nature as Enlightenment science re-conceives it, but also how concretely to interpret each of these ideals and how properly to balance them against each other. … Rousseau argues that direct (pure) democracy is the only form of government in which human freedom can be realized. Human freedom, according to Rousseau's interpretation, is possible only through governance according to what he calls "the general will," which is the will of the body politic, formed through the original contract, concretely determined in an assembly in which all citizens participate. Rousseau's account intends to avert the evils of factions by structural elements of the original contract. The contract consists in the self-alienation by each associate of all rights and possessions to the body politic. Because each alienates all, each is an equal member of the body politic, and the terms and conditions are the same for all. The emergence of factions is avoided insofar as the good of each citizen is, and is understood to be, equally (because wholly) dependent on the general will. Legislation supports this identification with the general will by preserving the original equality established in the contract, prominently through maintaining a measure of economic equality. The (ideal) relation of the individual citizen to the state is quite different on Rousseau's account than on Locke's; in Rousseau's account, the individual must be actively engaged in political life in order to maintain the identification of his supremely authoritative will with the general will, whereas in Locke the emphasis is on the limits of governmental authority with respect to the expressions of the individual will. Though Locke's liberal model is more representative of the Enlightenment in general, Rousseau's political theory, which in some respects presents a revived classical model modified within the context of Enlightenment values, in effect poses many of the enduring questions

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regarding the meaning and interpretation of political freedom and equality within the modern state.

Both Madison and Rousseau, like most political thinkers of the period, are influenced by Baron de Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), which is one of the founding texts of modern political theory. Though Montesquieu's treatise belongs to the tradition of liberalism in political theory, given his scientific approach to social, legal and political systems, his influence extends beyond this tradition. Montesquieu argues that the system of legislation for a people varies appropriately with the particular circumstances of the people. He provides specific analysis of how climate, fertility of the soil, population size, et cetera, affect legislation. He famously distinguishes three main forms of governments: republics (which can either be democratic or aristocratic), monarchies and despotisms. He describes leading characteristics of each. His argument that functional democracies require the population to possess civic virtue in high measure, a virtue that consists in valuing public good above private interest, influences later Enlightenment theorists, including both Rousseau... He provides the basic structure and justification for the balance of political powers that Madison later incorporates into the U.S. Constitution.

2.2. Ethical Theory

Many of the leading issues and positions of contemporary philosophical ethics take shape within the Enlightenment. Prior to the Enlightenment in the West, ethical reflection begins from and orients itself around religious doctrines concerning God and the afterlife. The highest good of humanity, and, accordingly, the content and grounding of moral duties, are conceived in immediately religious terms. During the Enlightenment, this changes, certainly within philosophy, but to some significant degree, within the population of western society at large. As the processes of industrialization, urbanization, and dissemination of education advance in this period, happiness in this life, rather than union with God in the next, becomes the highest end for more and more people. Also, the violent religious wars that bloody Europe in the early modern period motivate the development of secular, this-worldly ethics, insofar as they indicate the failure of religious doctrines concerning God and the afterlife to establish a stable foundation for ethics. In the Enlightenment, philosophical thinkers confront the problem of developing ethical systems on a secular, broadly naturalistic basis for the first time since the rise

of Christianity eclipsed the great classical ethical systems. <…> The general philosophical problem emerges in the Enlightenment of how to understand the source and grounding of ethical duties, and how to conceive the highest good for human beings, within a secular, broadly naturalistic context, and within the context of a transformed understanding of the natural world.

In ethical thought, as in political theory, Hobbes' thought is an important provocation in the Enlightenment. Hobbes understands what is good, as the end of human action, to be "whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire," and evil to be "the object of his hate, and aversion," "there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves" (*Leviathan*, chapter 6). Hobbes' conception of human beings as fundamentally motivated by their perception of what is in their own best interest implies the challenge, important for Enlightenment moral philosophy, to construct moral duties of justice and benevolence out of such limited materials. The basis of human action that Hobbes posits is immediately intelligible and even shared with other animals to some extent; a set of moral duties constructed out of such a basis would be likewise intelligible, de-mystified, and fit within the larger scheme of nature. Bernard Mandeville is sometimes grouped with Hobbes in the Enlightenment, especially by critics of them both, because he too, in his popular *Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits* (1714), sees people as fundamentally motivated by their perceived self-interest, and then undertakes to tell a story about how moral virtue, which involves conquering one's own appetite and serving the interests of others, can be understood to arise out of this basis.

<…> Rationalist ethics so conceived faces the following obstacles in the Enlightenment. First, as implied above, it becomes increasingly implausible that the objective, mind-independent order is really as rationalist ethicists claim it to be. Second, even if the objective realm were ordered as the rationalist claims, it remains unclear how this order gives rise (on its own, as it were) to obligations binding on our wills. David Hume famously exposes the fallacy of deriving a prescriptive statement (that one ought to perform some action) from a description of how things stand in relation to each other in nature. Prima facie, there is a gap between the rationalist's objective order and a set of prescriptions binding on our wills; if a supreme legislator must be re-introduced in order to make the conformity of our actions to that objective order binding on our wills, then the alleged existence of the objective moral order does not do the work the account asks of it in the first place.

Alongside the rationalist strand of ethical philosophy in the Enlightenment, there is also a very significant empiricist strand. Empirical accounts of moral virtue in the period are distinguished, both by grounding moral virtue on an empirical study of human nature, and by grounding cognition of moral duties and moral motivation in human sensibility, rather than in reason. The Third Earl of Shaftesbury, author of the influential work *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711), is a founding figure of the empiricist strand. Shaftesbury… is provoked by Hobbes' egoism to provide a non-egoistic account of moral virtue. Shaftesbury conceives the core notion of the goodness of things teleologically: something is good if it contributes to the well-being or furtherance of the system of which it is a part. Individual animals are members of species, and therefore they are good as such insofar as they contribute to the well-being of the species of which they are a part. Thus, the good of things, including human beings, for Shaftesbury… is an objective quality that is knowable through reason. However, though we can know what is good through reason, Shaftesbury maintains that reason alone is not sufficient to motivate human action. Shaftesbury articulates the structure of a distinctively human moral sensibility. Moral sensibility depends on the faculty of reflection. When we reflect on first-order passions such as gratitude, kindness and pity, we find ourselves approving or liking them and disapproving or disliking their opposites. By virtue of our receptivity to such feelings, we are capable of virtue and have a sense of right and wrong. In this way, Shaftesbury defines the moral sense that plays a significant role in the theories of subsequent Enlightenment thinkers such as Francis Hutcheson and David Hume.

In the rationalist tradition, the conflict within the breast of the person between the requirements of morality and self-interest is canonically a conflict between the person's reason and her passions. Shaftesbury's identification of a moral sentiment in the nature of humanity renders this a conflict within sensibility itself, a conflict between different sentiments, between a self-interested sentiment and an unegoistic sentiment. <…>

While for Shaftesbury, at the beginning of the moral sense tradition, moral sense tracks a mind-independent order of value, David Hume, motivated in part by a more radical empiricism, is happy to let the objective order go. We have no access through reason to an independent order of value which moral sense would track. For Hume, morality is founded completely on our sentiments. Hume is often regarded as the main originator of so-called "ethical subjectivism", according to which moral judgments or evaluations (regarding actions or character) do not make claims

about independent facts but merely express the subject's feelings or attitudes with respect to actions or character. Such subjectivism is relieved of the difficult task of explaining how the objective order of values belongs to the natural world as it is being reconceived by natural science in the period; however, it faces the challenge of explaining how error and disagreement in moral judgments and evaluations are possible. Hume's account of the standards of moral judgment follows that of Hutcheson in relying centrally on the "natural" responses of an ideal observer or spectator.

<…> Typically, the French *philosophes* draw more radical or iconoclastic implications from the new "science of man" than English or Scottish Enlightenment figures. Claude-Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771) is typical here. In *De l'ésprit* (1758), Helvétius …claims that human beings are motivated in their actions only by the natural desire to maximize their own pleasure and minimize their pain. <…> Helvétius attempts to ground the moral equality of all human beings by portraying all human beings, whatever their standing in the social hierarchy, whatever their special talents and gifts, as equally products of the nature we share plus the variable influences of education and social environment. But, to critics, Helvétius's account portrays all human beings as equal only by virtue of portraying all as equally worthless (insofar as the claim to equality is grounded on all being equally determined by external factors). However, Helvétius's ideas, in *De l'ésprit* as well as in its posthumously published sequel *De l'homme* (1772), exert a great deal of influence, especially his case for the role of pleasure and pain in human motivation and the role of education and social incentives in shaping individuals into contributors to the social good. Helvétius is sometimes regarded as the father of modern utilitarianism through his articulation of the greatest happiness principle and through his influence on Bentham. <…>

If the French Enlightenment tends to advance this-worldly happiness as the highest good for human beings more insistently than the Enlightenment elsewhere, then Rousseau's voice is, in this as in other respects, a discordant voice in that context. Rousseau advances the cultivation and realization of *human freedom* as the highest end for human beings and thereby gives expression to another side of Enlightenment ethics. As Rousseau describes it, the capacity for individual self-determination puts us in a problematic relation to our natural desires and inclinations and to the realm of nature generally, insofar as that realm is constituted by mechanistic causation. Though Rousseau places a great deal of emphasis on human freedom, and makes significant contributions

to our understanding of ourselves as free, he does not address very seriously the problem of the place of human freedom in the cosmos as it is conceived within the context of Enlightenment naturalism.

However, Rousseau's writings help Kant to the articulation of a practical philosophy that addresses many of the tensions in the Enlightenment. Kant follows Rousseau, and disagrees with empiricism in ethics in the period, in emphasizing human freedom, rather than human happiness, as the central orienting concept of practical philosophy. Though Kant presents the moral principle as a principle of practical reason, his ethics also disagrees significantly with rationalist ethics in the period. According to Kant, rationalists ...do not understand us as autonomous in our moral activity. Through interpreting the faculty of the will itself as practical reason, Kant understands the moral principle as internally legislated, thus as not only compatible with freedom, but as equivalent to the principle of a free will, as a principle of autonomy. As noted above, rationalists in ethics in the period are challenged to explain how the objective moral order which reason in us allegedly discerns gives rise to valid prescriptions binding on our wills (the gap between *is* and *ought*). For Kant, the moral order is not independent of our will, but rather represents the formal constraints of willing as such. Kant's account thus both avoids the is-ought gap and interprets moral willing as expressive of our freedom.

Moreover, by virtue of his interpretation of the moral principle as the principle of pure practical reason, Kant is able to redeem the ordinary sense of moral requirements as over-riding, as potentially opposed to the claims of one's happiness, and thus as different in kind from the deliverances of prudential reasoning. This ordinary sense of moral requirements is not easily accommodated within the context of Enlightenment empiricism and naturalism. <…> …Kant attempts to show that morality "leads ineluctably to" religious belief (in the supersensible objects of God and of the immortal soul) while being essentially not founded on religious belief, thus again vindicating the ordinary understanding of morality while still furthering Enlightenment values and commitments.

2.3. Religion and the Enlightenment
Though the Enlightenment is sometimes represented as the enemy of religion, it is more accurate to see it as critically directed against various (arguably contingent) features of religion, such as superstition, enthusiasm, fanaticism and supernaturalism. Indeed the effort to discern and advocate for a religion purified of such features – a "rational" or "natural" religion – is more typical of the Enlightenment than opposition

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to religion as such. Even Voltaire, who is perhaps the most persistent, powerful, vocal Enlightenment critic of religion, directs his polemic mostly against the Catholic Church in France – "*l'infâme*" in his famous sign-off in his letters, "*Écrasez l'infâme*" ("Crush the infamous") refers to the Church, not to religion as such. However, controversy regarding the truth-value or reasonableness of religious belief in general, Christian belief in particular, and controversy regarding the proper place of religion in society, occupies a particularly central place in the Enlightenment. <…>

<…> It is convenient to discuss religion in the Enlightenment by presenting four characteristic forms of Enlightenment religion in turn: deism, religion of the heart, fideism and atheism.

Deism. Deism is the form of religion most associated with the Enlightenment. According to deism, we can know by the natural light of reason that the universe is created and governed by a supreme intelligence; however, although this supreme being has a plan for creation from the beginning, the being does not interfere with creation; the deist typically rejects miracles and reliance on special revelation as a source of religious doctrine and belief, in favor of the natural light of reason. Thus, a deist typically rejects the divinity of Christ, as repugnant to reason; the deist typically demotes the figure of Jesus from agent of miraculous redemption to extraordinary moral teacher. Deism is the form of religion fitted to the new discoveries in natural science, according to which the cosmos displays an intricate machine-like order; the deists suppose that the supposition of God is necessary as the source or author of this order. Though not a deist himself, Isaac Newton inadvertently encourages deism in his *Opticks* (1704) by arguing that we must infer from the order and beauty in the world to the existence of an intelligent supreme being as the cause of this order and beauty. <…>

Enlightenment deism first arises in England. In *On the Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), Locke aims to establish the compatibility of reason and the teachings of Christianity. Though Locke himself is (like Newton, like Clarke) not a deist, the major English deists who follow (John Toland, *Christianity Not Mysterious* [1696]); Anthony Collins, *A Discourse of Freethinking* [1713]; Matthew Tindal, *Christianity as Old as Creation* [1730]) are influenced by Locke's work. Voltaire carries deism across the channel to France and advocates for it there over his long literary career. Toward the end-stage, the farcical stage, of the French revolution, Robespierre institutes a form of deism, the so-called "Cult of the Supreme Being", as the official religion of the French state. Deism plays a role in the founding of the American republic as well. Many

of the founding fathers (Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Paine) author statements or tracts that are sympathetic to deism; and their deistic sympathies influence the place given (or not given) to religion in the new American state that they found.

Religion of the Heart. Opposition to deism derives sometimes from the perception of it as coldly rationalistic. The God of the deists, arrived at through a priori or empirical argument and referred to as the Prime Mover or Original Architect, is often perceived as distant and unconcerned with the daily struggles of human existence, and thus as not answering the human needs from which religion springs in the first place. Some important thinkers of the Enlightenment – notably Shaftesbury and Rousseau – present religion as founded on natural human sentiments, rather than on the operations of the intellect. Rousseau has his Savoyard Vicar declare, in his Profession of Faith in *Emile* (1762), that the idea of worshiping a beneficent deity arose in him initially as he reflected on his own situation in nature and his "heart began to glow with a sense of gratitude towards the author of our being". <…> This "natural" religion – opposed to the "artificial" religions enforced in the institutions – is often classed as a form of deism. But it deserves separate mention, because of its grounding in natural human sentiments, rather than in metaphysical or natural scientific problems of cosmology.

Fideism. Deism or natural religion of various sorts tends to rely on the claim that reason or human experience supports the hypothesis that there is a supreme being who created or authored the world. In one of the most important philosophical texts on natural religion to appear during the Enlightenment, David Hume's *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (published posthumously in 1779), this supposition is criticized relentlessly, incisively and in detail. Naturally, the critical, questioning attitude characteristic of the Enlightenment in general is directed against the arguments on which natural religion is based. <…>

Atheism. Atheism is more present in the French Enlightenment than elsewhere. In the writings of Denis Diderot, atheism is partly supported by an expansive, dynamic conception of nature. According to the viewpoint developed by Diderot, we ought to search for the principles of natural order within natural processes themselves, not in a supernatural being. <…> Atheism (combined with materialism) in the French Enlightenment is perhaps most identified with the Baron d'Holbach, whose *System of Nature* (1770) generated a great deal of controversy at the time for urging the case for atheism explicitly and emphatically. D'Holbach's system of nature is strongly influenced by Diderot's writings, though it displays less subtlety and dialectical sophistication.

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Though most Enlightenment thinkers hold that morality requires religion, in the sense that morality requires belief in a transcendent law-giver and in an after-life, d'Holbach (influenced in this respect by Spinoza, among others) makes the case for an ethical naturalism, an ethics that is free of any reference to a supernatural grounding or aspiration. Like Helvétius before him, d'Holbach presents an ethics in which virtue consists in enlightened self-interest. The metaphysical background of the ethics he presents is deterministic materialism. <…>

Bertrand Russel

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

(From: Russel B. History of Western Philosophy.
London : George Allen and Unwin, 1947. P. 757–768)

Hegel (1770–1831) was the culmination of the movement in German philosophy that started from Kant; although he often criticized Kant, his system could never have arisen if Kant's had not existed. His influence, though now diminishing, has been very great, not only or chiefly in Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, the leading academic philosophers, both in America and in Great Britain, were largely Hegelians. Outside of pure philosophy, many Protestant theologians adopted his doctrines, and his philosophy of history profoundly affected political theory. Marx, as everyone knows, was a disciple of Hegel in his youth, and retained in his own finished system some important Hegelian features. Even if (as I myself believe) almost all Hegel's doctrines are false, he still retains an importance which is not merely historical, as the best representative of a certain kind of philosophy which, in others, is less coherent and less comprehensive.

His life contained few events of importance. In youth he was much attracted to mysticism, and his later views may be regarded, to some extent, as an intellectualizing of what had first appeared to him as mystic insight. He taught philosophy, first as Privatdozent at Jena he mentions that he finished his Phenomenology of Mind there the day before the battle of Jena then at Nuremberg, then as professor at Heidelberg (1816–1818), and finally at Berlin from 1818 to his death. He was in later life a patriotic Prussian, a loyal servant of the State, who comfortably enjoyed his recognized philosophical pre-eminence; but in his youth he despised Prussia and admired Napoleon, to the extent of rejoicing in the French victory at Jena.

Hegel's philosophy is very difficult – he is, I should say, the hardest to understand of all the great philosophers. Before entering on any detail, a general characterization may prove helpful.

From his early interest in mysticism he retained a belief in the unreality of separateness; the world, in his view, was not a collection of hard units, whether atoms or souls, each completely self-subsistent. The apparent self-subsistence of finite things appeared to him to be an illusion; nothing, he held, is ultimately and completely real except the whole. But he differed from Parmenides and Spinoza in conceiving the whole, not as a simple substance, but as a complex system, of the sort that we should call an organism. The apparently separate things of which the world seems to be composed are not simply an illusion; each has a greater or lesser degree of reality, and its reality consists in an aspect of the whole, which is what it is seen to be when viewed truly. With this view goes naturally a disbelief in the reality of time and space as such, for these, if taken as completely real, involve separateness and multiplicity. All this must have come to him first as mystic "insight"; its intellectual elaboration, which is given in his books, must have come later.

Hegel asserts that the real is rational, and the rational is real. But when he says this he does not mean by "the real" what an empiricist would mean. He admits, and even urges, that what to the empiricist appear to be facts are, and must be, irrational; it is only after their apparent character has been transformed by viewing them as aspects of the whole that they are seen to be rational. Nevertheless, the identification of the real and the rational leads unavoidably to some of the complacency inseparable from the belief that "whatever is, is right"

The whole, in all its complexity, is called by Hegel "the Absolute". The Absolute is spiritual; Spinoza's view, that it has the attribute of extension as well as that of thought, is rejected.

Two things distinguish Hegel from other men who liave had a more or less similar metaphysical outlook. One of these is emphasis on logic: it is thought by Hegel that the nature of Reality can be deduced from the sole consideration that it must be not selfcontradictory. The other distinguishing feature (which is closely connected with the first) is the triadic movement called the "dialectic". <...>

Logic, as Hegel understands the word, is declared by him to be the same thing as metaphysics; it is something quite different from what is commonly called logic. His view is that any ordinary predicate, if taken as qualifying the whole of Reality, turns out to be self-contradictory. One might take as a crude example the theory of Parmenide, that the One,

which alone u real, is spherical. Nothing can be spherical unless it has a boundary, and it cannot have a boundary unless there is something (at least empty space) outside of it. Therefore to suppose the Universe as a whole to be spherical is self-contradictory. <...> Or let us take another illustration, still more crude far too much so to be used by Hegel. You may say, without apparent contradiction, that Mr. A is an uncle; but if you were to say that the Universe is an uncle, you would land yourself in difficulties. An uncle is a man who has a nephew, and the nephew is a separate person from the uncle; therefore an uncle cannot be the whole of Reality.

This illustration might also be used to illustrate the dialectic, which consists of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. First we say: "Reality is an uncle". This is the thesis. But the existence of an uncle implies that of a nephew. Since nothing really exists except the Absolute, and we are now committed to the existence of a nephew, we must conclude: "The Absolute is a nephew". This is the antithesis. But there is the same objection to this as to the view that the Absolute is an uncle; therefore we are driven to the view that the Absolute is the whole composed of uncle and nephew. This is the synthesis. But this synthesis is still unsatisfactory, because a man can be an uncle only if he has a brother or sister who is a parent of the nephew. Hence we are driven to enlarge our universe to include the brother or sister, with his wife or her husband. In this sort of way, so it is contended, we can be driven on, by the mere force of logic, from any suggested predicate of the Absolute to the final conclusion of the dialectic, which is called the "Absolute Idea". Throughout the whole process, there is an underlying assumption that nothing can be really true unless it is about Reality as a whole.

For this underlying assumption there is a basis in traditional logic, which assumes that every proposition has a subject and a predicate. According to this view, every fact consists in something having some property. It follows that relations cannot be real, since they involve two things, not one. "Uncle" is a relation, and a man may become an uncle without knowing it. In that case, from an empirical point of view, the man is unaffected by becoming an uncle; he has no quality which he did not have before, if by "quality" we understand something necessary to describing him as he is in himself, apart from his relations to other people and things. The only way in which the subject-predicate logic can avoid this difficulty is to say that the truth is not a property of the uncle alone, or of the nephew alone, but of the whole composed of uncle-and-nephew. Since everything, except the Whole, has relations to outside things, it follows that nothing quite true can be said about separate things, and that

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in fact only the Whole is real. This follows more directly from the fact that "A and B are two" is not a subject-predicate proposition, and therefore, on the basis of the traditional logic, there can be no such proposition.

There fore there are not as many as two things in the world; therefore the Whole, considered as a unity, is alone real. The above argument is not explicit in Hegel, but is implicit in his system, as in that of many other metaphysicians. A few examples of Hegel's dialectic method may serve to make it more intelligible. He begins the argument of his logic by the assumption that "the Absolute is Pure Being"; we assume that it just *is*, without assigning any qualities to it. But pure being without any qualities is nothing; therefore we are led to the antithesis: "The Absolute is Nothing". From this thesis and antithesis we pass on to the synthesis: the union of Being and Not-Being is Becoming, and so we say: "The Absolute is Becoming". This also, of course, won't do, because there has to be something that becomes. In this way our views of Reality develop by the continue correction of previous errors, all of which arose from undue abstraction, by taking something finite or limited as if it could be the whole. "The limitations of the finite do not come merely from without; its own nature is the cause of its abrogation, and by its own act it passes into its counterpart".

The process, according to Hegel, is essential to the understanding of the result. Each later stage of the dialectic contains all the earlier stages, as it were in solution; none of them is wholly superseded, but is given its proper place as a moment in the Whole. It is therefore impossible to reach the truth except by going through all the steps of the dialectic.

Knowledge as a whole has its triadic movement. It begins with sense-perception, in which there is only awareness of the object. Then, through sceptical criticism of the senses, it becomes purely subjective. At last, it reaches the stage of self-knowledge, in which subject and object are no longer distinct. Thus self-consciousness is the highest form of knowledge. This, of course, must be the case in Hegel's system, for the highest kind of knowledge must be that possessed by the Absolute, and as the Absolute is the Whole there is nothing outside itself for it to know.

In the best thinking, according to Hegel, thoughts become fluent and interfuse. Truth and falsehood are not sharply defined opposites, as is commonly supposed; nothing is wholly false, and nothing that we can know is wholly true. "We can know in a way that is false"; this happens when we attribute absolute truth to some detached piece of information. <…> For philosophy, "the truth is the whole", and nothing partial is quite

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true. "Reason", Hegel says, "is the conscious certainty of being all reality". This does not mean that a separate person is all reality; in his separateness he is not quite real, but what is real in him is his participation in Reality as a whole. In proportion as we become more rational, this participation is increased.

The Absolute Idea, with which the Logic ends, is something like Aristotle's God. It is thought thinking about itself. Clearly the Absolute cannot think about anything but itself, since there is nothing else, except to our partial and erroneous ways of apprehending Reality. We are told that Spirit is the only reality, and that its thought is reflected into itself by self-consciousness. The actual words in which the Absolute Idea is defined are very obscure. Wallace translates them as follows:

"The Absolute Idea. The idea, as unity of the Subjective and Objective Idea, is the notion of the Idea a notion whose object (*Gegenstand*) is the Idea as such, and for which the objective (*Objekt*) is Idea an Object which embraces all characteristics in its unity".

<…> The essence of the matter is, however, somewhat less complicated than Hegel makes it seem. The Absolute Idea is pure thought thinking about pure thought. This is all that God does throughout the ages truly a Professor's God. Hegel goes on to say: "This unity is consequently the absolute and all truth, the Idea which thinks itself".

I come now to a singular feature of Hegel's philosophy, which distinguishes it from the philosophy of Plato or Plotinus or Spinoza. Although ultimate reality is timeless, and time is merely an illusion generated by our inability to see the Whole, yet the time-process has an intimate relation to the purely logical process of the dialectic. World history, in fact, has advanced through the categories, from Pure Being in China (of which Hegel knew nothing except that it was) to the Absolute Idea, which seems to have been nearly, if not quite, realized in the Prussian State. I cannot see any justification, on the basis of his own metaphysic, for the view that world history repeats the transitions of the dialectic, yet that is the thesis which he developed in his Philosophy of History. It was an interesting thesis, giving unity and meaning to the revolutions of human affairs. Like other historical theories, it required, if it was to be made plausible, some distortion of facts and considerable ignorance. Hegel, like Mane and Spengler after him, possessed both these qualifications. <…>

The time-process, according to Hegel, is from the less to the more perfect, both in an ethical and in a logical sense. Indeed these two senses are, for him, not really distinguishable, for logical perfection consists in

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being a closely-knit whole, without ragged edges, without independent parts, but united, like a human body, or still more like a reasonable mind, into an organism whose pans are interdependent and all work together towards a single end; and this also constitutes ethical perfection. <...>

Spirit, and the course of its development, is the substantial object of the philosophy of history. The nature of Spirit may be understood by contrasting it with its opposite, namely Matter. The essence of matter is gravity; the essence of Spirit is Freedom. Matter is outside itself, whereas Spirit has its centre in itself. "Spirit is self-contained existence". If this is not clear, the following definition may be found more illuminating: "But what is Spirit? It is the one immutably homogeneous Infinite pure Identity which in its second phase separates itself from itself and makes this second aspect its own polar opposite, namely as existence for and in Self as contiyted with the Universal".

In the historical development of Spirit there have been three main phases: The Orientals, the Greeks and Romans, and the Germans. "The history of the world is the discipline of the uncontrolled natural will, bringing it into obedience to a universal principle and conferring subjective freedom. The East knew, and to the present day knows, only that *One* is free; the Greek and Roman world, that *some* are free; the German world knows that *All* are free." One might have supposed that democracy would be the appropriate form of government where all are free, but not so. Democracy and aristocracy alike belong to the stage where some are free, despotism to that where one is free, and *monarchy* to that in which all are free. This is connected with the very odd sense in which Hegel uses the word "freedom." For him (and so far we may agree) there is no freedom without law; but he tends to convert this, and to argue that wherever there is law there is freedom. Thus 'freedom' for him, means little more than the right to obey the law.

As might be expected, he assigns the highest role to the Germans in the terrestrial development of Spirit. "The German spirit is the spirit of the new world. Its aim is the realization of absolute Truth as the unlimited self-determination of freedom that freedom which has its own absolute form itself as its purport".

This is a very superfine brand of freedom. It does not mean that you will be able to keep out of a concentration camp. It does not imply democracy, or a free press, or any of the usual Liberal watchwords, which Hegel rejects with contempt. When Spirit gives laws to itself, it does so freely. To our mundane vision, it may seem that the Spirit that gives laws is embodied in the monarch, and the Spirit to which laws are given is embodied in his subjects. But from the point of view of the Absolute the

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distinction between monarch and subjects, like all other distinctions, is illusory, and when the monarch imprisons a liberal-minded subject, that is still Spirit freely determining itself. Hegel praises Rousseau for distinguishing between the general will and the will of all. One gathers that the monarch embodies the general will, whereas a parliamentary majority only embodies the will of all. A very convenient doctrine.

<…> So much is Germany glorified that one might expect to find it the final embodiment of the Absolute Idea, beyond which no further development would be possible. But this is not Hegel's view. On the contrary, he says that America is the land of the future, "where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the world's history shall reveal itself perhaps [he adds characteristically] in a contest between North and South America". He seems to think that everything important takes the form of war. If it were suggested to him that the attribution of America to world history might be the development of a society without extreme poverty, he would not be interested. On the contrary, he says that, as yet, there is no real State in America, because a real State requires a division of classes into rich and poor.

Nations, in Hegel, play the part that classes play in Marx. The principle of historical development, he says, is national genius. In every age, there is some one nation which is changed with the mission of carrying the world through the stage of the dialectic that it has reached. In our age, of course, this nation is Germany.

But in addition to nations, we must also take account of worldhistorical individuals; these are men in whose aims are embodied the dialectical transitions that are due to take place in their time. These men are heroes, and may justifiably contravene ordinary moral rules. Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon are given as examples. I doubt whether, in Hegel's opinion, a man could be a "hero" without being a military conqueror.

Hegel's emphasis on nations, together with his peculiar conception of 'freedom', explains his glorification of the State a very important aspect of his political philosophy, to which we must now turn our attention. His philosophy of the State is developed both in his *Philosophy of History* and in his *Philosophy of Law*. It is in the main compatible with his general metaphysic, but not necessitated by it; at certain points, however e.g., as regards the relations between States his admiration of the national State is carried so far as to become inconsistent with his general preference of wholes to parts.

<…> We are told in *The Philosophy of History* that "the State is the actually existing realized moral life", and that all the spiritual reality

possessed by a human being he possesses only through the State. "For his spiritual reality consists in this, that his own essence Reason is objectively present to him, that it possesses objective immediate existence for him. ... For truth is the unity of the universal and subjective Will, and the universal is to be found in the State, in its laws, its universal and rational arrangements. The State is the Divine Idea as it exists on earth". Again: "The State is the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form. ... The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its Freedom". <…>

It will be seen that Hegel claims for the State much the same position as St. Augustine and his Catholic successors claimed for the Church. <…>

The habit of speaking of "the State" as if there were only one, is misleading so long as there is no world State. Duty being, for Hegel, solely a relation of the individual to his State, no principle is left by which to moralize the relations between States. This Hegel recognizes. In external relations, he says, the State is an individual, and each State is independent as against the others. "Since in this independence the being-for-self of real spirit has its existence, it is the first freedom and highest honour of a people". He goes on to argue against any sort of League of Nations by which the independence of separate States might be limited. The duty of a citizen is entirely confined (so far as the external relations of his State are concerned) to upholding the substantial individuality and independence and sovereignty of his own State. It follows that war is not wholly an evil, or something that we should seek to abolish. The purpose of the State is not merely to uphold the life and property of the citizens, and this fact provides the moral justification of war, which is not to be regardedas an absolute evil or as accidental, or as having its cause in something that ought not to be. <…>

Todd Gooch

Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ludwig-feuerbach/)

For a number of years in the mid-nineteenth century Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) played an important role in the history of post-Hegelian German philosophy, and in the transition from idealism to various forms of naturalism, materialism and positivism that is one of the most notable developments of this period. <…> Although never without his admirers, who included several leading popularizers of scientific materialism in the second half the nineteenth century (…), Feuerbach's public

influence declined rapidly after the failed revolution of 1848/49 (in approximately inverse proportion to the rising popularity of Schopenhauer). Renewed philosophical attention paid to him in the middle of the twentieth century is largely attributable to the publication, beginning in the late 1920s, of Marx's early philosophical manuscripts, including *The German Ideology*, which revealed the extent of Feuerbach's influence on Marx and Engels during the period culminating in the composition of that historic work (1845–46).

Apart from this influence, and the continuing interest of his work as a theorist of religion, Feuerbach's importance for the history of modern philosophy is also due to the fact that the publication of *The Essence of Christianity* in 1841 can be taken, as it was by Engels, to symbolically mark the end of the period of classical German philosophy that had begun sixty years earlier with the appearance of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* – though some might want to question the assumption involved in this way of putting things that classical German philosophy culminated in the Hegelian system that Engels thought of Feuerbach as having overthrown. <…>

5. The "New" Philosophy

In the years following the appearance of *The Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach published two short philosophical manifestos, the "Preliminary Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy" (1842) and the *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* (1843), in which he called for a radical break with the tradition of modern speculative thought. In *Principles* he locates the origin of this tradition in the Cartesian philosophy, and specifically in "the abstraction from the sensuous [*Sinnlichkeit*], from matter" (…) through which the conception of the cogito first arose. Much of the content of *Principles* consists of a truncated survey of the history of modern philosophy, which purports to trace through a number of dialectical inversions a necessary development from the rationalistic theism of Descartes and Leibniz through the pantheism of Spinoza to the idealism of Kant and Fichte, culminating in Hegel's philosophy of identity. What this survey is primarily intended to show is that the fundamental tendency of this development has been toward the actualization and humanization of God or, alternatively, toward "the *divinization* of the *real*, of the *materially existent* – of materialism, empiricism, realism, humanism – [and] the negation of theology" (…). This survey is followed by a short "demonstration" of the historical necessity of the new philosophy, which takes the form of a critique of Hegel, and by the enumeration of several doctrines that distinguish the new philosophy from the old.

Whereas earlier rationalists had conceived of God as being entirely distinct from nature and possessing perfect knowledge untainted by materiality, and had furthermore "placed the effort and labor of abstraction and of self-liberation from the sensuous only in themselves," Feuerbach notes that Hegel was the first to transform "this subjective activity into the self-activity of the divine being," so that, like the heroes of pagan antiquity, God (or the Idea) must "fight through virtue for his divinity," and only comes to be for himself (or itself) at the end of a long and laborious process (...). This process, as it is described by Hegel at the end of the *Science of Logic*, involves the logical Idea "*freely releas[ing]* itself … [into] the *externality of space and time* existing absolutely on its own without the moment of subjectivity" (Hegel, 1969, 843). What Feuerbach refers to as "the liberation of the absolute from matter" is achieved as spirit gradually distinguishes itself from nature before attaining to the awareness of itself as absolute. Here, Feuerbach notes, "matter is indeed posited in God, that is, it is posited as God," and to posit matter as God is to affirm atheism and materialism, but insofar as the self-externalization of the Idea in nature is superseded in the course of the coming-to-be-for-itself of the Idea in the forms of subjective, objective and absolute spirit, this negation of "theology" (i. e. of God conceived as an immaterial being distinct from nature) is negated in turn. Hegel's philosophy thus represents, for Feuerbach, "the last magnificent attempt to restore Christianity, which was lost and wrecked, through philosophy … by identifying it with the negation of Christianity" (...).

Whereas the claim for the identity of thought and being was the cornerstone of the Hegelian philosophy in which Feuerbach finds the "old" philosophy perfected, one of the most characteristic features of the new philosophy is its rejection of this claim. Because the concept of pure being with which Hegel begins the Logic is an abstraction, Feuerbach argues, in the end Hegel succeeds only in reconciling thought with the thought of being, and not with being itself. The new philosophy affirms that being is distinct from, and prior to, thought, and that it is as various as is the panoply of individually existing beings, from which it cannot be intelligibly distinguished. "Thought comes from being, but being does not come from thought" (...). To say that something exists in actuality, Feuerbach maintains, is to say that it exists not only as a figment of someone's imagination, or as a mere determination of their consciousness, but that it exists for itself independently of consciousness. "Being is something in which not only I but also others, above all also the object itself, participate" (...). In affirming the distinction between being and thought, and that nature exists through itself, independently of thought, the new

philosophy also affirms the reality of time and space, and that real existence is finite, determinate, corporeal existence.

The old philosophy conceived of the cogito as "an abstract and merely a thinking being to whose essence the body does not belong" (…). The new philosophy, by contrast, affirms that, as a thinking subject, "I am a real, sensuous being and, indeed, the body in its totality is my ego, my essence itself" (ibid.). Although it remains unclear just what Feuerbach could mean in claiming that "the body in its totality is my ego," elsewhere he says that to affirm that the ego is corporeal "has no other meaning than that the ego is not only active but also passive … [and that] the passivity of the ego is the activity of the object" in such a way that "the object belongs to the innermost being of the ego" (…). Object and ego are, to use a Heideggerian term, *gleichursprunglich* or "equiprimordial." "It is through the body that the ego is not just an ego but also an object. To be embodied is to be in the world; it means to have so many senses, i.e. so many pores and naked surfaces. The body is nothing but the porous ego" (…).

If philosophical thought is to avoid remaining "a prisoner of the ego," Feuerbach insists, it "must begin with its *antithesis*, with its *alter ego*" (…). The antithesis of thought is sensation. Whereas in thinking it is the object that is determined by the thinking activity of the subject, in sense experience, he maintains, without much argument and with apparently little concern for the epistemological problems that preoccupied the British empiricists and Kant, the consciousness of the subject is determined by the activity of the object, which functions thus as a subject in its own right. What makes it possible for the ego to posit the object is only that, in positing the object as something distinct from itself, the ego is at the same time posited by the object. If, however, the "the object is not only something posited, but also (to continue in this abstract language) something which itself posits, then it is clear that the presuppositionless ego, which excludes the object from itself and negates it, is only a presupposition of the subjective ego against which the object must protest" (…).

It is not to the I, but to the not-I within the I, that real, sensuous objects are given. Memory is what first enables us to transform objects of sense experience into objects of thought, so that what is no longer present to the senses can nevertheless be present to consciousness. In doing so it allows us to transcend the limitations of time and space in thought, and to construct from a multitude of distinct sense experiences a conception of the universe as a whole, and of our relations to the various other

beings that exist in it. Feuerbach continues to affirm that, unlike the animals, "man" is a universal, cosmopolitan being, but he now maintains that we need not ascribe to human beings any unique supersensible faculty in order to affirm this truth, since "wherever a sense is elevated above the limits of particularity and its bondage to needs, it is elevated to an independent and theoretical significance and dignity; universal sense is intelligence [*Verstand*]; universal sensibility, mind [*Geistigkeit*]" (…). What distinguishes humans from the animals is not their possession of non-natural powers either of reason or volition, but the fact that human beings are "absolute sensualists" whose powers of observation and recollection extend to the whole of nature.

…Feuerbach signals in the "Preliminary Theses" and in *Principles* corresponds to a notable change in his evaluation of religion. In his polemical essays of the late 1830s and in *The Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach had unfavorably contrasted the "egoistic," practical standpoint of religion, which he associated with the unrestricted subjectivity of feeling (*Gemüt*) and imagination (*Phantasie*), with the theoretical standpoint of philosophy, which he associated with reason and objectivity. At the end of *Principles*, however, he informs his readers that the new philosophy, without ceasing to be theoretical, nevertheless has a fundamentally practical tendency, and that in this respect it "assumes the place of religion" and "is in truth itself religion" (…). This line of thought is developed somewhat further in an unpublished manuscript where Feuerbach observes that, in order to replace religion, philosophy must itself become religion in the sense that "it must, in a way suited to its own nature, incorporate the essence of religion or the advantage that religion possesses over philosophy" (…).

<…> Whereas previously he had summed up his "doctrine" in the slogan "*theology is anthropology*," by the end of the 1840s Feuerbach had augmented this slogan to include anthropology "*and physiology*" (…). *The Essence of Faith According to Luther* (1844) and *The Essence of Religion* (1845) are thus important not only for the changes they represent in Feuerbach's approach to religion, but also because it was in the course of these investigations that he came to define, to the limited extent that he succeeded in doing so, the terms of the philosophical anthropology with which he hoped to replace the "old" philosophy of spirit.

<…> …In *The Essence of Christianity*, he had contrasted the egoism and intolerance of faith (which he associated with the false, theological essence of religion) with the altruism and universality love (which he associated with the true, human essence of religion), in the Luther

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book Feuerbach emphasizes that faith in God is faith in a God who loves human beings, and he now interprets this faith as an indirect form of human self-affirmation. In faith, the believer affirms the existence of, as well as his or her confidence in, the goodness of God, who has promised him or her blessedness or freedom from the painful limitations of mortality. "Only a being who loves man and desires his happiness [*Seligkeit*] is an object of human worship, of religion" (…). The gods are the objects of worship and the recipients of sacrifice because they are the benefactors of human beings in the specific sense that they are imagined to have it in their power to satisfy fundamental human wishes, including the wish not to die.

In what seems to be a significant departure from, and not simply a supplement to, the theory of religion presented in *The Essence of Christianity*, where God was interpreted as an imaginary projection of the human species-essence, the central premise of *The Essence of Religion* is that the subjective ground of religion is the feeling of dependence (*Abhängigkeitsgefühl*), and that the original object of this feeling is nature, which Feuerbach defines at one point as "the sum of all the sensuous forces, things, and beings that man distinguishes from himself as other than human … [including] light, electricity, magnetism, air, water, fire, earth, animals, plants, [and] man insofar as he acts instinctively [*unwillkürlich*] and unconsciously" …). To say that human beings are dependent upon nature is to say, among other things, that nature, which is devoid of consciousness and intention, is what has caused human beings to exist, and that the same physical processes that have produced the human brain have also produced human consciousness. While all organisms are dependent upon nature for their existence, human beings are distinguished from other organisms by the extent of their conscious awareness of this dependence, which Feuerbach finds expressed in the earliest forms of cultic activity, including especially the offering of sacrifice to divine beings associated with various aspects of the natural world. To feel dependent upon something is in some sense to recognize oneself as distinct from that upon which one is dependent. It is in the dawning awareness of their dependence upon nature that human beings first begin to distinguish themselves from nature, without, however, thereby ceasing to be dependent upon it. The feeling of dependence in which religion originates is the feeling "that I am nothing without a *not-I* which is distinct from me yet intimately related to me, something *other*, which is at the same time my *own* being" (…).

<…> Among the many issues that remain unclear in Feuerbach's later writings is what the expression "human essence" can mean for him

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once he has abandoned the species-ontology of his earlier writings and declared himself a nominalist. That pivotal question aside, it is at least clear that in *Principles*, and in his later writings on ethics, Feuerbach continues to emphasize the importance of inter-subjectivity and of the I-Thou relationship, but that these are no longer conceived in idealistic terms, as they had been in his earlier writings. Human beings are essentially communal and dialogical beings, both with respect to our cognitive and linguistic capacities, and with respect to the range of moral sentiments we experience toward one another. But the communality in which the human essence is manifested is now said to be one that presupposes a real, "sensible" distinction between I and Thou.

Undoubtedly the central concept in Feuerbach's last works, which include the essay, "On Spiritualism and Materialism, Especially in Relation to the Freedom of the Will," and an incomplete essay on ethics, is the concept of the *Glückseligkeitstieb* or drive-to-happiness. Toward the end of the *Preliminary Theses*, after affirming that all science must be grounded in nature, and that doctrines not so grounded remain purely "hypothetical", Feuerbach had gone on to note that this is especially true of the doctrine of freedom, and he had assigned to the new philosophy the task of "naturalizing freedom" (…). <…>

The concepts of drive (*Trieb*), happiness, sensation and will are closely interrelated in the account of agency that Feuerbach sought to develop in these last writings. Feuerbach regards sensation as the "first condition of willing" (…), since without sensation there is no pain or need or sense of lack against which for the will to strive to assert itself. At one point he defines happiness as the "healthy, normal" state of contentment or wellbeing experienced by an organism that is able to satisfy the needs and drives that are constitutive of its "individual, characteristic nature and life" (…). The drive-to-happiness is a drive toward the overcoming of a multitude of painful limitations by which the finite, corporeal subject is afflicted, which can include "political brutality and despotism" (…). Every particular drive is a manifestation of the drive-to-happiness, and the different individual drives are named after the different objects in which people seek their happiness (…). Among the specific drives to which Feuerbach refers in his later writings are the drive-to-self-preservation, the sexual drive, the drive-to-enjoyment, the drive-to-activity and the drive-to-knowledge. Although he does not explicitly associate drives with the unconscious, Feuerbach does anticipate Nietzsche and Freud in regarding the body as the "ground" of both the will and of consciousness (…), and he emphasizes that action results from the force with which a dominant drive succeeds in subduing other conflicting drives that may

reassert themselves under altered circumstances (…). Feuerbach also occasionally distinguishes between healthy and unhealthy drives, though he has little to say about how these are to be distinguished.

Whereas happiness involves the experience of a sense of contentment on the part of a being that is able to satisfy the drives that are characteristic of its nature, the inability to satisfy these drives results in various forms of discontent, aggravation, pain and frustration. The German word "*Widerwille*" means disgust or repugnance, but literally it involves not-wanting or, etymologically, "willing against," and this, Feuerbach contends, is the most rudimentary form of willing. "Every malady (*Übel*), every unsatisfied drive, every unassuaged longing, every sense of absence [i.e. of a desired object] is an irritating or stimulating injury and negation of the drive-to-happiness innate in each living and sensing being, and the countervailing affirmation of the drive-to-happiness, accompanied by representations and consciousness, is what we call 'will' " (…). Freedom of the will, as Feuerbach conceives of it here, is freedom from the evils (*Übeln*) by which my drive-to-happiness is restricted, and is contingent upon the availability to me of the specific means required for overcoming these restrictions. <…>

Jonathan Wolff

Karl Marx

(plato.stanford.edu/entries/marx/#2.4)

Karl Marx (1818–1883) is best known not as a philosopher but as a revolutionary communist, whose works inspired the foundation of many communist regimes in the twentieth century. It is hard to think of many who have had as much influence in the creation of the modern world. Trained as a philosopher, Marx turned away from philosophy in his mid-twenties, towards economics and politics. However, in addition to his overtly philosophical early work, his later writings have many points of contact with contemporary philosophical debates, especially in the philosophy of history and the social sciences, and in moral and political philosophy. Historical materialism – Marx's theory of history – is centered around the idea that forms of society rise and fall as they further and then impede the development of human productive power. Marx sees the historical process as proceeding through a necessary series of modes of production, characterized by class struggle, culminating in communism. Marx's economic analysis of capitalism is based on his version of the labour theory of value, and includes the analysis of capitalist profit as the extraction of surplus value from the exploited proletariat.

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The analysis of history and economics come together in Marx's prediction of the inevitable economic breakdown of capitalism, to be replaced by communism. However Marx refused to speculate in detail about the nature of communism, arguing that it would arise through historical processes, and was not the realisation of a pre-determined moral ideal. <…>

2.4 'Theses on Feuerbach'

The Theses on Feuerbach contain one of Marx's most memorable remarks: "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it" (thesis 11). However the eleven theses as a whole provide, in the compass of a couple of pages, a remarkable digest of Marx's reaction to the philosophy of his day. <…>

In the first thesis Marx states his objections to 'all hitherto existing' materialism and idealism. Materialism is complimented for understanding the physical reality of the world, but is criticised for ignoring the active role of the human subject in creating the world we perceive. Idealism, at least as developed by Hegel, understands the active nature of the human subject, but confines it to thought or contemplation: the world is created through the categories we impose upon it. Marx combines the insights of both traditions to propose a view in which human beings do indeed create – or at least transform – the world they find themselves in, but this transformation happens not in thought but through actual material activity; not through the imposition of sublime concepts but through the sweat of their brow, with picks and shovels. This historical version of materialism, which transcends and thus rejects all existing philosophical thought, is the foundation of Marx's later theory of history. As Marx puts it in the 1844 Manuscripts, "Industry is the real historical relationship of nature … to man". This thought, derived from reflection on the history of philosophy, together with his experience of social and economic realities, as a journalist, sets the agenda for all Marx's future work. <…>

4. Theory of History

Marx did not set out his theory of history in great detail. Accordingly, it has to be constructed from a variety of texts, both those where he attempts to apply a theoretical analysis to past and future historical events, and those of a more purely theoretical nature. Of the latter, the 1859 Preface to *A Critique of Political Economy* has achieved canonical status. However, *The German Ideology*, co-written with Friedrich Engels in 1845, is a vital early source in which Marx first sets out the basics of the outlook of historical materialism. <…>

4.1. *The German Ideology*

In *The German Ideology* Marx and Engels contrast their new materialist method with the idealism which had characterised previous German thought. Accordingly, they take pains to set out the 'premises of the materialist method'. They start, they say, from 'real human beings', emphasising that human beings are essentially productive, in that they must produce their means of subsistence in order to satisfy their material needs. The satisfaction of needs engenders new needs of both a material and social kind, and forms of society arise corresponding to the state of development of human productive forces. Material life determines, or at least 'conditions' social life, and so the primary direction of social explanation is from material production to social forms, and thence to forms of consciousness. As the material means of production develop, 'modes of co-operation' or economic structures rise and fall, and eventually communism will become a real possibility once the plight of the workers and their awareness of an alternative motivates them sufficiently to become revolutionaries.

4.2. 1859 Preface

In the sketch of *The German Ideology*, all the key elements of historical materialism are present, even if the terminology is not yet that of Marx's more mature writings. Marx's statement in 1859 Preface renders much the same view in sharper form. <…> This is the thesis that the productive forces tend to develop, in the sense of becoming more powerful, over time. This states not that they always do develop, but that there is a tendency for them to do so. The productive forces are the means of production, together with productively applicable knowledge: technology, in other words. The next thesis is the primacy thesis, which has two aspects. The first states that the nature of the economic structure is explained by the level of development of the productive forces, and the second that the nature of the superstructure – the political and legal institutions of society – is explained by the nature of the economic structure. The nature of a society's ideology, which is to say the religious, artistic, moral and philosophical beliefs contained within society, is also explained in terms of its economic structure... Indeed many activities may well combine aspects of both the superstructure and ideology: a religion is constituted by both institutions and a set of beliefs.

Revolution and epoch change is understood as the consequence of an economic structure no longer being able to continue to develop the forces of production. At this point the development of the productive

forces is said to be fettered, and, according to the theory once an economic structure fetters development it will be revolutionised – 'burst asunder' – and eventually replaced with an economic structure better suited to preside over the continued development of the forces of production.

In outline, then, the theory has a pleasing simplicity and power. It seems plausible that human productive power develops over time, and plausible too that economic structures exist for as long as they develop the productive forces, but will be replaced when they are no longer capable of doing this. Yet severe problems emerge when we attempt to put more flesh on these bones.

4.3. Functional Explanation

<…> …In *The Communist Manifesto* Marx states that: 'The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production.' This appears to give causal and explanatory primacy to the economic structure – capitalism – which brings about the development of the forces of production. <…>

The key theoretical innovation is to appeal to the notion of functional explanation (also sometimes called 'consequence explanation'). The essential move is cheerfully to admit that the economic structure does indeed develop the productive forces, but to add that this, according to the theory, is precisely why we have capitalism (when we do). That is, if capitalism failed to develop the productive forces it would disappear. And, indeed, this fits beautifully with historical materialism. For Marx asserts that when an economic structure fails to develop the productive forces – when it 'fetters' the productive forces – it will be revolutionised and the epoch will change. So the idea of 'fettering' becomes the counterpart to the theory of functional explanation. Essentially fettering is what happens when the economic structure becomes dysfunctional. <…>

4.4. Rationality

The driving force of history… is the development of the productive forces, the most important of which is technology. But what is it that drives such development? Ultimately, …it is human rationality. Human beings have the ingenuity to apply themselves to develop means to address the scarcity they find. This on the face of it seems very reasonable. Yet there are difficulties. …Societies do not always do what would be rational for an individual to do. Co-ordination problems may stand in our way, and there may be structural barriers. Furthermore, it is relatively

rare for those who introduce new technologies to be motivated by the need to address scarcity. Rather, under capitalism, the profit motive is the key. Of course it might be argued that this is the social form that the material need to address scarcity takes under capitalism. But still one may raise the question whether the need to address scarcity always has the influence that it appears to have taken on in modern times. For example, a ruling class's absolute determination to hold on to power may have led to economically stagnant societies. Alternatively, it might be thought that a society may put religion or the protection of traditional ways of life ahead of economic needs. This goes to the heart of Marx's theory that man is an essentially productive being and that the locus of interaction with the world is industry. <…>

5. Morality

The issue of Marx and morality poses a conundrum. On reading Marx's works at all periods of his life, there appears to be the strongest possible distaste towards bourgeois capitalist society, and an undoubted endorsement of future communist society. Yet the terms of this antipathy and endorsement are far from clear. Despite expectations, Marx never says that capitalism is unjust. Neither does he say that communism would be a just form of society. In fact he takes pains to distance himself from those who engage in a discourse of justice, and makes a conscious attempt to exclude direct moral commentary in his own works. The puzzle is why this should be, given the weight of indirect moral commentary one finds.

There are, initially, separate questions, concerning Marx's attitude to capitalism and to communism. There are also separate questions concerning his attitude to ideas of justice, and to ideas of morality more broadly concerned. This, then, generates four questions: (1) Did Marx think capitalism unjust?; (2) did he think that capitalism could be morally criticised on other grounds?; (3) did he think that communism would be just? (4) did he think it could be morally approved of on other grounds? <…>

The initial argument that Marx must have thought that capitalism is unjust is based on the observation that Marx argued that all capitalist profit is ultimately derived from the exploitation of the worker. Capitalism's dirty secret is that it is not a realm of harmony and mutual benefit but a system in which one class systematically extracts profit from another. How could this fail to be unjust? Yet it is notable that Marx never

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concludes this, and in *Capital* he goes as far as to say that such exchange is 'by no means an injustice'.

First, it cannot explain why Marx never described capitalism as unjust, and second, it does not account for the distance Marx wanted to place between his own scientific socialism, and that of the utopian socialists who argued for the injustice of capitalism. Hence one cannot avoid the conclusion that the 'official' view of Marx is that capitalism is not unjust.

Nevertheless, this leaves us with a puzzle. Much of Marx's description of capitalism – his use of the words 'embezzlement', 'robbery' and 'exploitation' – belie the official account. Arguably, the only satisfactory way of understanding this issue is, once more, from G. A. Cohen, who proposes that Marx believed that capitalism was unjust, but did not believe that he believed it was unjust. In other words, Marx, like so many of us, did not have perfect knowledge of his own mind. In his explicit reflections on the justice of capitalism he was able to maintain his official view. But in less guarded moments his real view slips out, even if never in explicit language. Such an interpretation is bound to be controversial, but it makes good sense of the texts.

Whatever one concludes on the question of whether Marx thought capitalism unjust, it is, nevertheless, obvious that Marx thought that capitalism was not the best way for human beings to live. Here points made in his early writings remain present throughout his writings, if no longer connected to an explicit theory of alienation. The worker finds work a torment, suffers poverty, overwork and lack of fulfillment and freedom. People do not relate to each other as humans should.

Does this amount to a moral criticism of capitalism or not? In the absence of any special reason to argue otherwise, it simply seems obvious that Marx's critique is a moral one. Capitalism impedes human flourishing.

Marx, though, once more refrained from making this explicit; he seemed to show no interest in locating his criticism of capitalism in any of the traditions of moral philosophy, or explaining how he was generating a new tradition. There may have been two reasons for his caution. The first was that while there were bad things about capitalism, there is, from a world historical point of view, much good about it too. For without capitalism, communism would not be possible. Capitalism is to be transcended, not abolished, and this may be difficult to convey in the terms of moral philosophy.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, we need to return to the contrast between scientific and utopian socialism. The utopians appealed

to universal ideas of truth and justice to defend their proposed schemes, and their theory of transition was based on the idea that appealing to moral sensibilities would be the best, perhaps only, way of bringing about the new chosen society. Marx wanted to distance himself from this tradition of utopian thought, and the key point of distinction was to argue that the route to understanding the possibilities of human emancipation lay in the analysis of historical and social forces, not in morality. Hence, for Marx, any appeal to morality was theoretically a backward step.

This leads us now to Marx's assessment of communism. Would communism be a just society? In considering Marx's attitude to communism and justice there are really only two viable possibilities: either he thought that communism would be a just society or he thought that the concept of justice would not apply: that communism would transcend justice.

Communism is described by Marx, in the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, as a society in which each person should contribute according to their ability and receive according to their need. This certainly sounds like a theory of justice, and could be adopted as such. However it is possibly truer to Marx's thought to say that this is part of an account in which communism transcends justice...

If we start with the idea that the point of ideas of justice is to resolve disputes, then a society without disputes would have no need or place for justice. We can see this by reflecting upon Hume's idea of the circumstances of justice. Hume argued that if there was enormous material abundance – if everyone could have whatever they wanted without invading another's share – we would never have devised rules of justice. And, of course, Marx often suggested that communism would be a society of such abundance. But Hume also suggested that justice would not be needed in other circumstances; if there were complete fellow-feeling between all human beings. Again there would be no conflict and no need for justice. Of course, one can argue whether either material abundance or human fellow-feeling to this degree would be possible, but the point is that both arguments give a clear sense in which communism transcends justice.

Nevertheless we remain with the question of whether Marx thought that communism could be commended on other moral grounds. There are certainly reasons to believe that Marx did not want to make moral assessments at all, for example, in the *Communist Manifesto* he writes that "communism abolishes … all religion and all morality, rather than constituting them on a new basis". However, it may be that Marx here

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is taking morality in a rather narrow sense. On a broad understanding, in which morality, or perhaps better to say ethics, is concerning with the idea of living well, it seems that communism can be assessed favourably in this light. <…> Communism clearly advances human flourishing, in Marx's view. The only reason for denying that, in Marx's vision, it would amount to a good society is a theoretical antipathy to the word 'good'. And here the main point is that, in Marx's view, communism would not be brought about by high-minded benefactors of humanity. Quite possibly his determination to retain this point of difference between himself and the Utopian socialists led him to disparage the importance of morality to a degree that goes beyond the call of theoretical necessity.

Michel Bourdeau

Auguste Comte

(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comte/)

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) is the founder of positivism, a philosophical and political movement which enjoyed a very wide diffusion in the second half of the nineteenth century. It sank into an almost complete oblivion during the twentieth, when it was eclipsed by neopositivism. However, Comte's decision to develop successively a philosophy of mathematics, a philosophy of physics, a philosophy of chemistry and a philosophy of biology, makes him the first philosopher of science in the modern sense, and his constant attention to the social dimension of science resonates in many respects with current points of view. His political philosophy, on the other hand, is even less known, because it differs substantially from the classical political philosophy we have inherited.

Comte's most important works are (1) the *Course on Positive Philosophy* (1830–1842, six volumes, …; (2) the *System of Positive Polity, or Treatise on Sociology, Instituting the Religion of Humanity*, (1851–1854, four volumes); and (3) the *Early Writings* (1820–1829), where one can see the influence of Saint-Simon, for whom Comte served as secretary from 1817 to 1824. The *Early Writings* are still the best introduction to Comte's thought. In the *Course*, Comte said, science was transformed into philosophy; in the *System*, philosophy was transformed into religion. <…> Today's common conception of positivism corresponds mainly to what can be found in the *Course.*

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4. The Course on Positive Philosophy and the Friendship with Mill

…The *Course* pursues two goals. The first, a specific one, is a foundation for sociology, then called 'social physics'. The second, a general goal, is the coordination of the whole of positive knowledge. The structure of the work reflects this duality: the first three volumes examine the five fundamental sciences then in existence (mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology), and the final three volumes deal with the social sciences. Executing the two parts did not require the same amount of work. In the first case, the sciences had already been formed and it was just a matter of summarizing their main doctrinal and methodological points. In the other case, however, all was still to be done, and Comte was well aware that he was founding a new science.

4.1. The law of the three stages

The structure of the *Course* explains why the law of the three stages (which is often the only thing known about Comte) is stated twice. Properly speaking, the law belongs to dynamic sociology or theory of social progress, and this is why it serves as an introduction to the long history lessons in the fifth and sixth volumes. But it equally serves as an introduction to the work as a whole, to the extent that its author considers this law the best way to explain what positive philosophy is.

The law states that, in its development, humanity passes through three successive stages: the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. The first is the necessary starting point for the human mind; the last, its normal state; the second is but a transitory stage that makes possible the passage from the first to the last. In the theological stage, the human mind, in its search for the primary and final causes of phenomena, explains the apparent anomalies in the universe as interventions of supernatural agents. The second stage is only a simple modification of the first: the questions remain the same, but in the answers supernatural agents are replaced by abstract entities. In the positive state, the mind stops looking for causes of phenomena, and limits itself strictly to laws governing them; likewise, absolute notions are replaced by relative ones. Moreover, if one considers material development, the theological stage may also be called military, and the positive stage industrial; the metaphysical stage corresponds to a supremacy of the lawyers and jurists.

This relativism of the third stage is the most characteristic property of positivism. It is often mistakenly identified with scepticism, but our earlier remark about dogmatism prevents us from doing so.

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For Comte, science is a *"connaissance approchée"*: it comes closer and closer to truth, without reaching it. There is no place for absolute truth, but neither are there higher standards for the fixation of belief. Comte is here quite close to Peirce in his famous 1877 paper.

The law of the three stages belongs to those grand philosophies of history elaborated in the 19th century, which now seem quite alien to us (for a different opinion, see Schmaus (1982)). The idea of progress of Humanity appears to us as the expression of an optimism that the events of the 20th century have done much to reduce (Bourdeau 2006). More generally, the notion of a law of history is problematic (even though it did not seem so to Mill (1842, bk. VI, chap. X)). Already Durkheim felt forced to exclude social dynamics from sociology, in order to give it a truly scientific status. <...>

4.2. The classification of the sciences and philosophy of science

The second pillar of positive philosophy, the law of the classification of the sciences, has withstood the test of time much better than the law of the three stages. Of the various classifications that have been proposed, it is Comte's that is still the most popular today. This classification, too, structures the *Course*, which examines each of the six fundamental sciences – mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, sociology—in turn. It provides a way to do justice to the diversity of the sciences without thereby losing sight of their unity. This classification also makes Comte the founder of the philosophy of science in the modern sense. From Plato to Kant, reflection on science had always occupied a central place in philosophy, but the sciences had to be sufficiently developed for their diversity to manifest itself. It was thanks to his education at the *École Polytechnique* that Comte, from 1818, began to develop the concept of a philosophy of science. ...Comte's *Course* presented in sequence a philosophy of mathematics, of astronomy, of physics, of chemistry, of biology, and of sociology. Comte's classification is meant not to restore a chimerical unity, but to avoid the fragmentation of knowledge. Thanks to it, the sciences are related to one another in an encyclopedic scale that goes from the general to the particular, and from the simple to the complex: moving from mathematics to sociology, generality decreases and complexity increases.

The law of classification of the sciences also has a historical aspect: it gives us the order in which the sciences develop. For example, astronomy requires mathematics, and chemistry requires physics. Each science thus rests upon the one that precedes it. As Comte puts it, the higher depends on the lower, but is not its result. The recognition of an irreducible

diversity already contains a disavowal of reductionism (in Comte's wording: 'materialism'), which the classification allows one to make explicit. The positivist clearly sees that the tendency towards reductionism is fed by the development of scientific knowledge itself, where each science participates in the evolution of the next; but history also teaches us that each science, in order to secure its own subject matter, has to fight invasions by the preceding one. 'Thus it appears that Materialism is a danger inherent in the mode in which the scientific studies necessary as a preparation for Positivism were pursued. Each science tended to absorb the one next to it, on the grounds of having reached the positive stage earlier and more thoroughly.' <...>

...Comte's philosophy of science is based on a systematic difference between method and doctrine. These are, to use Comtean terminology, opposed to one another, as the logical point of view and the scientific point of view. Method is presented as superior to doctrine: scientific doctrines change (that is what "progress" means), but the value of science lies in its methods. At the level of doctrine, mathematics has a status of its own, well indicated in the second lesson, where it is presented last, and as if to make up for something forgotten. As much as it is itself a body of knowledge, it is an instrument of discovery in the other sciences, an 'organon' in the Aristotelian sense. Among the remaining sciences, leaving sociology aside for the moment, two occupy a pre-eminent place.

Astronomy and biology are, by their nature, the two principal branches of natural philosophy. They, the complement of each other, include the general system of our fundamental conceptions in their rational harmony. <...>

The positive method comes in different forms, according to the science where it is applied: in astronomy it is observation, in physics experimentation, in biology comparison. The same point of view is also behind the general theory of hypotheses in the 28th lesson, a centerpiece of the positive philosophy of science.

Finally, classification is the key to a theory of technology. The reason is that there exists a systematic connection between complexity and modifiability: the more complex a phenomenon is, the more modifiable it is. The order of nature is a modifiable order. Human action takes place within the limits fixed by nature and consists in replacing the natural order by an artificial one. Comte's education as an engineer had made him quite aware of the links between science and its applications, which he summarized in an oft-quoted slogan: 'From science comes prevision, from prevision comes action'. <...>

4.3. Sociology and its double status

Sociology has a double status. It is not just one science among the others, as though there is the science of society just as there is a science of living beings. Rather, sociology is the science that comes after all the others; and as the final science, it must assume the task of coordinating the development of the whole of knowledge. With sociology, positivity takes possession of the last domain that had heretofore escaped it and had been considered forever inaccessible to it. Many people thought that social phenomena are so complex that there can be no science of them. …The difference between natural philosophy and moral philosophy… according to Comte, this distinction, introduced by the Greeks, is abolished by the existence of sociology, and the unity that was lost with the birth of metaphysics restored (…).

Founding social science therefore constitutes a turn in the history of humanity. Until then, the positive spirit was characterized by the objective method, which works its way from the world to man; but as this goal has now been reached, it becomes possible to invert that direction and go from man to world, to adopt, in other words, the subjective method, which so far had been associated with the anthropomorphism of theology. To legitimize that method, it suffices to substitute sociology for theology, – which is equivalent to substituting the relative for the absolute… <…> Each science depends on the precedent; as the final science, sociology is the most dependent one. Human life depends for instance on astronomical conditions. Humanity depends also on each of us, on what we do and not do; on another sense, of course, each of us depends on humanity...

To bring out this eminent place of sociology is the principal aim of the *General Conclusions* of the *Course*. The 58th lesson raises the question of which science presides over the others on the encyclopedic scale. To guarantee the harmonious development of the various sciences taken together, the dominance of one among them has to be assumed. Until recently, that role had been played by mathematics, but 'it will not be forgotten that a cradle is not a throne' (…) (Bourdeau 2004). One should distinguish the first blossoming of the positive spirit from its systematic development. The human point of view, that is to say, the social point of view, is the only one that is truly universal; now that sociology is born, it is up to it to be in charge of the development of knowledge.

It goes without saying that Comte's idea of sociology was very different from the current one. To ensure the positivity of their discipline, sociologists have been quick to renounce its coordinating function, also known as encyclopedic or architectonic function, which characterizes

philosophy. With its place at the top of the scale, the sociology of the *Course* recapitulates the whole of knowledge, while the sciences that precede it are but one immense introduction to this final science. As a consequence, no one can become a sociologist without having had a solid encyclopedic education, one that has no place for economics or social mathematics, but, on the contrary, emphasizes biology, the first science that deals with organized beings. How far removed this is from today's sociology curriculum!

<…> Just as for Comte the philosophy of science is not a philosophy of nature but of the mind, he likewise values the history of science less as a subject in its own right than as the 'most important, yet so far most neglected part' of the development of Humanity (…). Each science is therefore examined twice in the *Course*: for its own sake, in the first three volumes; in its relations to the general development of society, in the final three. <…>

Paul Carls

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917)
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/durkheim/)

Émile Durkheim was a French sociologist who rose to prominence in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Along with Karl Marx and Max Weber, he is credited as being one of the principal founders of modern sociology. Chief among his claims is that society is a *sui generis* reality, or a reality unique to itself and irreducible to its composing parts. It is created when individual consciences interact and fuse together to create a synthetic reality that is completely new and greater than the sum of its parts. This reality can only be understood in sociological terms, and cannot be reduced to biological or psychological explanations. The fact that social life has this quality would form the foundation of another of Durkheim's claims, that human societies could be studied scientifically. For this purpose he developed a new methodology, which focuses on what Durkheim calls "social facts," or elements of collective life that exist independently of and are able to exert an influence on the individual.

Using this method, Durkheim published influential works on a number of topics. In these works he analyzes different social institutions and the roles they play in society, and as a result his work is often associated with the theoretical framework of structural functionalism. Durkheim is most well known as the author of *On the Division of Social Labor*, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, *Suicide*, and *The Elementary*

Forms of Religious Life. However, Durkheim also published a voluminous number of articles and reviews, and has had several of his lecture courses published posthumously.

When Durkheim began writing, sociology was not recognized as an independent field of study. As part of the campaign to change this he went to great lengths to separate sociology from all other disciplines, especially philosophy. In consequence, while Durkheim's influence in the social sciences has been extensive, his relationship with philosophy remains ambiguous. Nevertheless, Durkheim maintained that sociology and philosophy are in many ways complementary, going so far as to say that sociology has an advantage over philosophy, since his sociological method provides the means to study philosophical questions empirically, rather than metaphysically or theoretically. As a result, Durkheim often used sociology to approach topics that have traditionally been reserved for philosophical investigation.

For the purposes of this article, Durkheim's strictly sociological thought will be set aside to allow his contributions to philosophy to take prominence. These fall largely in the realms of the philosophy of religion, social theory, hermeneutics, the philosophy of language, morality, meta-ethics, and epistemology. Durkheim's deconstruction of the self, as well as his analysis of the crisis brought on by modernity and his projections about the future of Western civilization, also deserve significant consideration.

<…>

2. The Sociological Method: Society and the Study of Social Facts

According to Durkheim, all elements of society, including morality and religion, are products of history. As they do not have a transcendent origin and are part of the natural world, they can be studied scientifically. In particular, Durkheim viewed his sociology as the science of the genesis and functioning of institutions, with institutions being all of the beliefs and modes of conduct instituted by the collectivity. A fundamental element of this science is the sociological method, which Durkheim created specifically for this purpose.

The foundational claim for Durkheim's sociology, and what is to make up the subject matter for sociology, is the existence of what Durkheim calls social facts. A social fact, as defined in *Rules*, is "a category of facts which present very special characteristics: they consist of manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, which are invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control

over him." (Durkheim; 1982: 52) According to Durkheim, social facts have an objective reality that sociologists can study in a way similar to how other scientists, such as physicists, study the physical world. An important corollary to the above definition is that social facts are also *internal* to individuals, and it is only through individuals that social facts are able to exist. In this sense, externality means interior to individuals other than the individual subject. This leads to the seemingly paradoxical statement that social facts are both external and internal to the individual, a claim that has frequently been misunderstood and left Durkheim's work open to criticism.

In order to fully grasp how social facts are created and operate, it must be understood that for Durkheim, a society is not merely a group of individuals living in one particular geographical location. Rather, society is an ensemble of ideas, beliefs, and sentiments of all sorts that are realized through individuals; it indicates a reality that is produced when individuals interact with one another, resulting in the fusion of individual consciences. It is a *sui generis* reality, meaning that it is irreducible to its composing parts and unable to be explained by any means other than those proper to it. In other words, society is greater than the sum of its parts; it supercedes in complexity, depth, and richness, the existence of any one particular individual and is wholly new and different from the parts that make it up. This psychic reality is sometimes (…) referred to by Durkheim with the term *conscience collective*, which can alternately be translated into English as collective conscience or collective consciousness. What is more, society and social phenomena can only be explained in sociological terms, as the fusion of individual consciences that, once created, follows its own laws. It cannot be explained, for example, in biological or psychological terms, or be reduced to the material forms of a society and its immediate vital necessities, as is the case in historical materialism. Social facts are key, since they are what constitute and express the psychic reality that is society. Through them individuals acquire particular traits, such as a language, a monetary system, values, religious beliefs, tendencies for suicide, or technologies, that they would never have had living in total isolation.

In *Rules*, Durkheim delineates two different classes of social facts. The first class concerns social facts of a physiological, or operative, order. This set of social facts includes a society's legal code, religious beliefs, concept of beauty, monetary system, ways of dressing, or its language. In these cases it is easy to see how society imposes itself onto the individual from the outside. The first class of social facts also contains

currents of opinion, or social phenomena that express themselves through individual cases. Examples include rates of marriage, birth, suicide or migration patterns. In these cases, the operation of society on the individual is not so obvious. Nevertheless, these phenomena can be studied with the use of statistics, which accumulate individual cases into an aggregate and express a certain state of the collective mind. The second class of social facts is of a morphological, or structural, order. It is often concerned with the demographic and material conditions of life and includes the number, nature, and relation of the composing parts of a society, their geographical distribution, the extent and nature of their channels of communication, the shape and style of their buildings, and so forth. While at first glance it might not be evident how the second class of social facts is influenced by collective ways of thinking, acting, or feeling, they indeed have the same characteristics and the same elements of externality and constraint as the first class. In the end, Durkheim dismisses the distinction altogether, claiming that the second class of social facts are simply more crystalized forms of the first class of social facts, making the term 'social fact' a very flexible concept that comprises basically any and all social phenomena.

Durkheim then provides a set of rules for studying social facts. The first and most important rule is to treat social facts as things. What Durkheim means by this is that social facts have an existence independent of the knowing subject and that they impose themselves on the observer. Social facts can be recognized by the sign that they resist the action of individual will upon them; as products of the collectivity, changing social facts require laborious effort. The next rule for studying social facts is that the sociologist must clearly delimit and define the group of phenomena being researched. This structures the research and provides the object of study a condition of verifiability. The sociologist must also strive to be as objective towards the facts they are working on as possible and remove any subjective bias or attachment to what they are investigating. Finally, the sociologist must systematically discard any and all preconceptions and closely examine the facts before saying anything about them.

Durkheim applied these rules to empirical evidence he drew primarily from statistics, ethnography, and history. Durkheim treated this data in a rational way, which is to say that he applied the law of causality to it. At this, Durkheim introduced an important rationalist component to his sociological method, namely the idea that by using his rules, which work to eliminate subjective bias, human behavior can be explained

through observable cause and effect relationships. Accordingly, he often used a comparative-historical approach, which he saw as the core of the sociological method, to eliminate extraneous causes and find commonalities between different societies and their social facts. In so doing, he strove to find general laws that were universally applicable. Durkheim also argued that contemporary social facts could only be understood in relation to the social facts preceding and causing them. Accordingly, Durkheim followed the historical development of political, educational, religious, economic, and moral institutions, particularly those of Western society, and explicitly made a strict difference between historical analysis and sociology: whereas the historical method strives only to describe what happened in the past, sociology strives to explain the past. In other words, sociology searches for the causes and functions of social facts as they change over time.

In the early part of his career, Durkheim focused on the second class of social facts, or the structural organization of society. Later, social facts of the first class, such as suicide rates, religion, morality, or language became his primary topics of interest. As Durkheim's interests shifted, his notion of coercion also changed, as did his use of the word 'constraint'. In his later works, Durkheim focused more on questions of a normative nature, or how individuals come to think and act in similar ways, and less on actual physical or legal constraints. Here society still imposes itself onto the individual, but social facts are seen in a more positive light, as the enablers of human activity or as sources of strength for the individual. As time wore on Durkheim eventually ceased using the word constraint altogether.

a. Durkheim's Social Realism

An important, and often misunderstood, element of Durkheim's sociological method is to be found in what can be termed Durkheim's social realism, or the idea that society is an objectively real entity that exists independently and autonomously of any particular individual, a view that is epitomized by his prescription to treat social facts as things. Within this realist position there are two important claims. First, Durkheim makes an ontological claim concerning the *sui generis* reality of social facts. Second, Durkheim makes an epistemological and methodological claim, arguing that social facts should be treated as real objects, existing external to the researcher's mind, that can be determined by their ability to coerce behavior. Hence, Durkheim is arguing that social facts have particular properties of being and that they can be discovered and analyzed when the sociologist treats them in the proper, scientific way.

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<…> By stating the reality of the ideational realm of social facts in this way, Durkheim's social realism can be seen as an attempt to bridge diverging schools of philosophical thought, such as realism and nominalism, or empiricism and idealism. <…>

Joel Smith

Phenomenology

(http://www.iep.utm.edu/phenom/)

In its central use "phenomenology" names a movement in twentieth century philosophy. A second use of "phenomenology" common in contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be in them. Thus, it is sometimes said that emotional states have a phenomenology while belief states do not. For example, while there is something it is like to be angry, there is nothing it is like to believe that Paris is in France. Although the two uses of "phenomenology" are related, it is the first which is the current topic. Accordingly, "phenomenological" refers to a way of doing philosophy that is more or less closely related to the corresponding movement. Phenomenology utilizes a distinctive method to study the structural features of experience and of things as experienced. It is primarily a descriptive discipline and is undertaken in a way that is largely independent of scientific, including causal, explanations and accounts of the nature of experience. Topics discussed within the phenomenological tradition include the nature of intentionality, perception, time-consciousness, self-consciousness, awareness of the body and consciousness of others. Phenomenology is to be distinguished from phenomenalism, a position in epistemology which implies that all statements about physical objects are synonymous with statements about persons having certain sensations orsense-data. George Berkeley was a phenomenalist but not a phenomenologist.

Although elements of the twentieth century phenomenological movement can be found in earlier philosophers – such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Franz Brentano – phenomenology as a philosophical movement really began with the work of Edmund Husserl. Following Husserl, phenomenology was adapted, broadened and extended by, amongst others... Phenomenology has, at one time or another, been aligned with Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental philosophy, existentialism and the philosophy of mind and psychology.

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This article introduces some of the central aspects of the phenomenological method and also concrete phenomenological analyses of some of the topics that have greatly exercised phenomenologists.

1. Introduction

The work often considered to constitute the birth of phenomenology is Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (…). It contains Husserl's celebrated attack on psychologism, the view that logic can be reduced to psychology; an account of phenomenology as the descriptive study of the structural features of the varieties of experience; and a number of concrete phenomenological analyses, including those of meaning, part-whole relations and intentionality.

Logical Investigations seemed to pursue its agenda against a backdrop of metaphysical realism. In *Ideas I* (…), however, Husserl presented phenomenology as a form of transcendental idealism. <…> However, Husserl later claimed that he had always intended to be a transcendental idealist. In *Ideas I* Husserl offered a more nuanced account of the intentionality of consciousness, of the distinction between fact and essence and of the phenomenological as opposed to the natural attitude.

Heidegger was an assistant to Husserl who took phenomenology in a rather new direction. He married Husserl's concern for legitimating concepts through phenomenological description with an overriding interest in the question of the meaning of being, referring to his own phenomenological investigations as "fundamental ontology." His *Being and Time* (…) is one of the most influential texts on the development of European philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Relations between Husserl and Heidegger became strained, partly due to the divisive issue of National Socialism, but also due to significant philosophical differences. Thus, unlike his early works, Heidegger's later philosophy bears little relation to classical Husserlian phenomenology.

Although he published relatively little in his lifetime, Husserl was a prolific writer leaving a large number of manuscripts. Alongside Heidegger's interpretation of phenomenology, this unpublished work had a decisive influence on the development of French existentialist phenomenology. Taking its lead from Heidegger's account of authentic existence, Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* (…) developed a phenomenological account of consciousness, freedom and concrete human relations that perhaps defines the term "existentialism." <…>

Although none of the philosophers mentioned above can be thought of straightforwardly as classical Husserlian phenomenologists,

in each case Husserl sets the phenomenological agenda. This remains the case, with a great deal of the contemporary interest in both phenomenological methodology and phenomenological topics drawing inspiration from Husserl's work. Accordingly, Husserl's views are the touchstone in the following discussion of the topics, methods and significance of phenomenology.

2. Phenomenology Method

Husserlian phenomenology is a discipline to be undertaken according to a strict method. This method incorporates both the *phenomenological* and *eidetic reductions*.

a. Phenomena

Phenomenology is, as the word suggests, the science of phenomena. But this just raises the questions: "What are phenomena?" and "In what sense is phenomenology a science?".

In answering the first question, it is useful to briefly turn to Kant. Kant endorsed "transcendental idealism," distinguishing between *phenomena* (things as they appear) and *noumena* (things as they are in themselves), claiming that we can only know about the former (…). On one reading of Kant, appearances are in the mind, mental states of subjects. On another reading, appearances are things as they appear, worldly objects considered in a certain way.

Both of these understandings of the nature of phenomena can be found in the phenomenological literature. However, the most common view is that all of the major phenomenologists construe phenomena in the latter way: phenomena are things as they appear. They are not mental states but worldly things considered in a certain way. The Phenomenologists tend, however, to reject Kantian noumena. Also, importantly, it is not to be assumed that the relevant notion of appearing is limited to sensory experience. Experience (or intuition) can indeed be sensory but can, at least by Husserl's lights, be understood to encompass a much broader range of phenomena (…). Thus, for example, although not objects of sensory experience, phenomenology can offer an account of how the number series is given to intuition.

Phenomenology, then, is the study of things as they appear (phenomena). It is also often said to be descriptive rather than explanatory: a central task of phenomenology is to provide a clear, undistorted description of the ways things appear (…). This can be distinguished from the project of giving, for example, causal or evolutionary explanations, which would be the job of the natural sciences.

b. Phenomenological Reduction

In ordinary waking experience we take it for granted that the world around us exists independently of both us and our consciousness of it. This might be put by saying that we share an implicit belief in the independent existence of the world, and that this belief permeates and informs our everyday experience. Husserl refers to this positing of the world and entities within it as things which transcend our experience of them as "the natural attitude" (…). In *The Idea of Phenomenology*, Husserl introduces what he there refers to as "the epistemological reduction," according to which we are asked to supply this positing of a transcendent world with "an index of indifference" (…). In *Ideas I,* this becomes the "phenomenological epoché," according to which, "*We put out of action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude*; we parenthesize everything which that positing encompasses with respect to being" (…). This means that all judgements that posit the independent existence of the world or worldly entities, and all judgements that presuppose such judgements, are to be bracketed and no use is to be made of them in the course of engaging in phenomenological analysis. Importantly, Husserl claims that all of the empirical sciences posit the independent existence of the world, and so the claims of the sciences must be "put out of play" with no use being made of them by the phenomenologist.

This epoché is the most important part of the phenomenological reduction, the purpose of which is to open us up to the world of phenomena, how it is that the world and the entities within it are given. The reduction, then, is that which reveals to us the primary subject matter of phenomenology–the world *as given* and the givenness of the world; both objects and acts of consciousness.

There are a number of motivations for the view that phenomenology must operate within the confines of the phenomenological reduction. One is epistemological modesty. The subject matter of phenomenology is not held hostage to skepticism about the reality of the "external" world. Another is that the reduction allows the phenomenologist to offer a phenomenological analysis of the natural attitude itself. This is especially important if, as Husserl claims, the natural attitude is one of the presuppositions of scientific enquiry. Finally, there is the question of the purity of phenomenological description. It is possible that the implicit belief in the independent existence of the world will affect what we are likely to accept as an accurate description of the ways in which worldly things are given in experience. We may find ourselves describing things as "we know they must be" rather than how they are actually given.

The reduction, in part, enables the phenomenologist to go "back to the 'things themselves' "(…), meaning back to the ways that things are actually given in experience. Indeed, it is precisely here, in the realm of phenomena, that Husserl believes we will find that indubitable evidence that will ultimately serve as the foundation for every scientific discipline. As such, it is vital that we are able to look beyond the prejudices of common sense realism, and accept things as actually given. It is in this context that Husserl presents his Principle of All Principles which states that, "every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that everything originally (so to speak, in its 'personal' actuality) offered to us in 'intuition' is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it is presented there" (…).

c. Eidetic Reduction

The results of phenomenology are not intended to be a collection of particular facts about consciousness, but are rather supposed to be facts about the essential natures of phenomena and their modes of givenness. Phenomenologists do not merely aspire to offer accounts of what their own experiences of, say, material objects are like, but rather accounts of the essential features of material object perception as such. But how is this aspiration to be realized given that the method of phenomenology is descriptive, consisting in the careful description of experience? Doesn't this, necessarily, limit phenomenological results to facts about particular indviduals' experience, excluding the possibility of phenomenologically grounded general facts about experience as such?

The Husserlian answer to this difficulty is that the phenomenologist must perform a second reduction called "eidetic" reduction (because it involves a kind of vivid, imagistic intuition). The purpose of the eidetic reduction in Husserl's writings is to bracket any considerations concerning the contingent and accidental, and concentrate on (intuit) the essential natures or essences of the objects and acts of consciousness (…). This intuition of essences proceeds via what Husserl calls "free variation in imagination." We imagine variations on an object and ask, "What holds up amid such free variations of an original […] as the invariant, the necessary, universal form, the essential form, without which something of that kind […] would be altogether inconceivable?" (…). We will eventually come up against something that cannot be varied without destroying that object as an instance of its kind. The implicit claim here is that if it is inconceivable that an object of kind K might lack feature F, then F is a part of the essence of K.

Eidetic intuition is, in short, an a priori method of gaining knowledge of necessities. However, the result of the eidetic reduction is not just that we come to *knowledge* of essences, but that we come to *intuitive knowledge* of essences. Essences *show themselves* to us (*Wesensschau*)*,* although not to *sensory* intuition, but to *categorical* or *eidetic* intuition (…). It might be argued that Husserl's methods here are not so different from the standard methods of conceptual analysis: imaginative thought experiments (Zahavi 2003, 38–39).

    <…>

3. Intentionality

How is it that subjective mental processes (perceptions, thoughts, etc.) are able to reach beyond the subject and open us up to an objective world of both worldly entities and meanings? This question is one that occupied Husserl perhaps more than any other, and his account of the intentionality of consciousness is central to his attempted answer.

Intentionality is one of the central concepts of Phenomenology from Husserl onwards. As a first approximation, intentionality is *aboutness* or *directedness* as exemplified by mental states. For example, the belief that The Smiths were from Manchester is about both Manchester and The Smiths. One can also hope, desire, fear, remember, etc. that the Smiths were from Manchester.

Intentionality is, say many, the way that subjects are "in touch with" the world. Two points of terminology are worth noting. First, in contemporary non-phenomenological debates, "intentional" and its cognates is often used interchangeably with "representational" and its cognates. Second, although they are related, "intentionality" (with a "t") is not to be confused with "intensionality" (with an "s"). The former refers to aboutness (which is the current topic), the latter refers to failure of truth-preservation after substitution of co-referring terms.

George Papandreopoulos
Existentialism
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/)

Existentialism is a catch-all term for those philosophers who consider the nature of the human condition as a key philosophical problem and who share the view that this problem is best addressed through ontology. This very broad definition will be clarified by discussing seven key themes that existentialist thinkers address. Those philosophers considered existentialists are mostly from the continent of Europe, and date

from the 19th and 20th centuries. Outside philosophy, the existentialist movement is probably the most well-known philosophical movement, and at least two of its members are among the most famous philosophical personalities and widely read philosophical authors. It has certainly had considerable influence outside philosophy, for example on psychological theory and on the arts. Within philosophy, though, it is safe to say that this loose movement considered *as a whole* has not had a great impact, although individuals or ideas counted within it remain important. <…>

1. Key Themes of Existentialism

Although a highly diverse tradition of thought, seven themes can be identified that provide some sense of overall unity. <…>

a. Philosophy as a Way of Life

Philosophy should not be thought of primarily either as an attempt to investigate and understand the self or the world, or as a special occupation that concerns only a few. Rather, philosophy must be thought of as fully integrated within life. To be sure, there may need to be professional philosophers, who develop an elaborate set of methods and concepts (Sartre makes this point frequently) but life can be lived philosophically without a technical knowledge of philosophy. Existentialist thinkers tended to identify two historical antecedents for this notion. First, the ancient Greeks, and particularly the figure of Socrates but also the Stoics and Epicureans. <…> In the 19th and 20th centuries, the rapid expansion of industrialisation and advance in technology were often seen in terms of an alienation of the human from nature or from a properly natural way of living (for example, thinkers of German and English romanticism).

The second influence on thinking of philosophy as a way of life was German Idealism after Kant. Partly as a response to the 18th century Enlightenment, and under the influence of the Neoplatonists, Schelling and Hegel both thought of philosophy as an activity that is an integral part of the history of human beings, rather than outside of life and the world, looking on. <…> The concept of philosophy as a way of life manifests itself in existentialist thought in a number of ways. Let us give several examples, to which we will return in the sections that follow. First, the existentialists often undertook a critique of modern life in terms of the specialisation of both manual and intellectual labour. Specialisation included philosophy. One consequence of this is that many existentialist thinkers experimented with different styles or genres of writing in order to escape the effects of this specialisation. Second, a notion that we can

call 'immanence': philosophy studies life from the inside. For Kierkegaard, for example, the fundamental truths of my existence are not representations – not, that is, ideas, propositions or symbols the meaning of which can be separated from their origin. Rather, the truths of existence are immediately lived, felt and acted. Likewise, for Nietzsche and Heidegger, it is essential to recognise that the philosopher investigating human existence is, him or herself, an existing human. Third, the nature of life itself is a perennial existentialist concern and, more famously (in Heidegger and in Camus), also the significance of death.

b. Anxiety and Authenticity

A key idea here is that human existence is in some way 'on its own'; anxiety (or anguish) is the recognition of this fact. Anxiety here has two important implications. First, most generally, many existentialists tended to stress the significance of emotions or feelings, in so far as they were presumed to have a less culturally or intellectually mediated relation to one's individual and separate existence. This idea is found in Kierkegaard, as we mentioned above, and in Heidegger's discussion of 'mood'; it is also one reason why existentialism had an influence on psychology. Second, anxiety also stands for a form of existence that is recognition of being on its own. What is meant by 'being on its own' varies among philosophers. For example, it might mean the irrelevance (or even negative influence) of rational thought, moral values, or empirical evidence, when it comes to making fundamental decisions concerning one's existence. <…> Finally, being on its own might signify the uniqueness of human existence, and thus the fact that it cannot understand itself in terms of other kinds of existence (Heidegger and Sartre).

Related to anxiety is the concept of authenticity, which is let us say the existentialist spin on the Greek notion of 'the good life'. As we shall see, the authentic being would be able to recognise and affirm the nature of existence (…). Not, though, recognise the nature of existence as an intellectual fact, disengaged from life; but rather, the authentic being lives in accordance with this nature. The notion of authenticity is sometimes seen as connected to individualism. This is only reinforced by the contrast with a theme we will discuss below, that of the 'crowd'. Certainly, if authenticity involves 'being on one's own', then there would seem to be some kind of value in celebrating and sustaining one's difference and independence from others. However, many existentialists see individualism as a historical and cultural trend (for example Nietzsche), or dubious political value (Camus), rather than a necessary component

of authentic existence. Individualism tends to obscure the particular types of collectivity that various existentialists deem important.

For many existentialists, the conditions of the modern world make authenticity especially difficult. <…> Evaluating solely in terms of the measurable outcomes of production was seen as reinforcing the secularisation of the institutions of political, social or economic life; and reinforcing also the abandonment of any broader sense of the spiritual dimension (such an idea is found acutely in Emerson, and is akin to the concerns of Kierkegaard). Existentialists such as Martin Heidegger, Hanna Arendt or Gabriel Marcel viewed these social movements in terms of a narrowing of the possibilities of human thought to the instrumental or technological. This narrowing involved thinking of the world in terms of resources, and thinking of all human action as a making, or indeed as a machine-like 'function'.

c. Freedom

The next key theme is freedom. Freedom can usefully be linked to the concept of anguish, because my freedom is in part defined by the isolation of my decisions from any determination by a deity, or by previously existent values or knowledge. Many existentialists identified the 19th and 20th centuries as experiencing a crisis of values. This might be traced back to familiar reasons such as an increasingly secular society, or the rise of scientific or philosophical movements that questioned traditional accounts of value (for example Marxism or Darwinism), or the shattering experience of two world wars and the phenomenon of mass genocide. It is important to note, however, that for existentialism these historical conditions do not create the problem of anguish in the face of freedom, but merely cast it into higher relief. Likewise, freedom entails something like responsibility, for myself and for my actions. Given that my situation is one of being on its own – recognised in anxiety – then both my freedom and my responsibility are absolute. The isolation that we discussed above means that there is nothing else that acts through me, or that shoulders my responsibility. Likewise, unless human existence is to be understood as arbitrarily changing moment to moment, this freedom and responsibility must stretch across time. Thus, when I exist as an authentically free being, I assume responsibility for my whole life, for a 'project' or a 'commitment'. We should note here that many of the existentialists take on a broadly Kantian notion of freedom: freedom as *autonomy*. This means that freedom, rather than being randomness or arbitrariness, consists in the binding of oneself to a law, but a law that is

given by the self in recognition of its responsibilities. This borrowing from Kant, however, is heavily qualified by the next theme.

d. Situatedness

The next common theme we shall call 'situatedness'. Although my freedom is absolute, it always takes place in a particular context. My body and its characteristics, my circumstances in a historical world, and my past, all weigh upon freedom. This is what makes freedom meaningful. Suppose I tried to exist as free, while pretending to be in abstraction from the situation. In that case I will have no idea what possibilities are open to me and what choices need to be made, here and now. In such a case, my freedom will be naïve or illusory. This concrete notion of freedom has its philosophical genesis in Hegel, and is generally contrasted to the pure rational freedom described by Kant. Situatedness is related to a notion we discussed above under the heading of philosophy as a way of life: the necessity of viewing or understanding life and existence from the 'inside'. For example, many 19th century intellectuals were interested in ancient Greece, Rome, the Medieval period, or the orient, as alternative models of a less spoiled, more integrated form of life. Nietzsche, to be sure, shared these interests, but he did so not uncritically: because the human condition is characterised by being historically situated, it cannot simply turn back the clock or decide all at once to be other than it is (Sartre especially shares this view). Heidegger expresses a related point in this way: human existence cannot be abstracted from its world because being-in-the-world is part of the ontological structure of that existence. Many existentialists take my concretely individual body, and the specific type of life that my body lives, as a primary fact about me (for example, Nietzsche, Scheler or Merleau-Ponty). I must also be situated socially: each of my acts says something about how I view others but, reciprocally, each of their acts is a view about what I am. My freedom is always situated with respect to the judgements of others. This particular notion comes from Hegel's analysis of 'recognition', and is found especially in Sartre, de Beauvoir and Jaspers. Situatedness in general also has an important philosophical antecedent in Marx: economic and political conditions are not contingent features with respect to universal human nature, but condition that nature from the ground up.

e. Existence

Although, of course, existentialism takes its name from the philosophical theme of 'existence', this does not entail that there is homogeneity in the manner existence is to be understood. One point on which

there is agreement, though, is that the existence with which we should be concerned here is not just any existent thing, but *human existence*. There is thus an important difference between distinctively human existence and anything else, and human existence is not to be understood on the model of *things*, that is, as objects of knowledge. <…> Particularly in Kant, who stressed the primacy of the 'practical', and then in Fichte and early Schelling, we find the notion that human existence is *action*. Accordingly, in Nietzsche and Sartre we find the notion that the human being *is* all and only what that being *does*. My existence consists of forever bringing myself into being – and, correlatively, fleeing from the dead, inert thing that is the totality of my past actions. Although my acts are free, I am not free *not* to act; thus existence is characterised also by 'exigency' (Marcel). For many existentialists, authentic existence involves a certain tension be recognised and lived through, but not resolved: this tension might be between the animal and the rational (important in Nietzsche) or between facticity and transcendence (Sartre and de Beauvoir).

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the human sciences (such as psychology, sociology or economics) were coming to be recognised as powerful and legitimate sciences. To some extend at least their assumptions and methods seemed to be borrowed from the natural sciences. While philosophers such as Dilthey and later Gadamer were concerned to show that the human sciences had to have a distinctive method, the existentialists were inclined to go further. The free, situated human being is not an object of knowledge in the sense the human always exists as the possibility of transcending any knowledge of it. There is a clear relation between such an idea and the notion of the 'transcendence of the other' found in the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas.

f. Irrationality/Absurdity

Among the most famous ideas associated with existentialism is that of 'absurdity'. Human existence might be described as 'absurd' in one of the following senses. First, many existentialists argued that nature as a whole has no design, no reason for existing. Although the natural world can apparently be understood by physical science or metaphysics, this might be better thought of as 'description' than either understanding or explanation. Thus, the achievements of the natural sciences also empty nature of value and meaning. Unlike a created cosmos, for example, we cannot expect the scientifically described cosmos to answer our questions concerning value or meaning. Moreover, such description comes at the cost of a profound falsification of nature: namely, the positing of ideal entities such as 'laws of nature', or the conflation of all reality under

a single model of being. Human beings can and should become profoundly aware of this lack of reason and the impossibility of an immanent understanding of it. Camus, for example, argues that the basic scene of human existence is its confrontation with this mute irrationality. A second meaning of the absurd is this: my freedom will not only be undetermined by knowledge or reason, but from the point of view of the latter my freedom will even appear absurd. Absurdity is thus closely related to the theme of 'being on its own', which we discussed above under the heading of anxiety. Even if I choose to follow a law that I have given myself, my choice of law will appear absurd, and likewise will my continuously reaffirmed choice to follow it. Third, human existence as action is doomed to always destroy itself. A free action, once done, is no longer free; it has become an aspect of the world, a *thing*. The absurdity of human existence then seems to lie in the fact that in becoming myself (a free existence) I must be what I am not (a thing). If I do not face up to this absurdity, and choose to be or pretend to be thing-like, I exist inauthentically (the terms in this formulation are Sartre's).

g. The Crowd
Existentialism generally also carries a social or political dimension. Insofar as he or she is authentic, the freedom of the human being will show a certain 'resolution' or 'commitment', and this will involve also the being – and particularly the authentic being – of others. For example, Nietzsche thus speaks of his (or Zarathustra's) work in aiding the transformation of the human, and there is also in Nietzsche a striking analysis of the concept of friendship; for Heidegger, there must be an authentic mode of being-with others, although he does not develop this idea at length; the social and political aspect of authentic commitment is much more clear in Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus.

That is the positive side of the social or political dimension. However, leading up to this positive side, there is a description of the typical forms that inauthentic social or political existence takes. Many existentialists employ terms such as 'crowd', 'horde' (Scheler) or the 'masses' (José Ortega-y-Gasset). Nietzsche's deliberately provocative expression, 'the herd', portrays the bulk of humanity not only as animal, but as docile and domesticated animals. Notice that these are all collective terms: inauthenticity manifests itself as de-individuated or faceless. Instead of being formed authentically in freedom and anxiety, values are just accepted from others because 'that is what everybody does'. These terms often carry a definite historical resonance, embodying a critique of specifically modern modes of human existence. All of the following might be seen

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as either causes or symptoms of a world that is 'fallen' or 'broken' (Marcel): the technology of mass communication (Nietzsche is particularly scathing about newspapers and journalists; in *Two Ages*, Kierkegaard says something very similar), empty religious observances, the specialisation of labour and social roles, urbanisation and industrialisation. The theme of the crowd poses a question also to the positive social or political dimension of existentialism: how could a collective form of existence ever be anything other than inauthentic? The 19th and 20th century presented a number of mass political ideologies which might be seen as posing a particularly challenging environment for authentic and free existence. For example, nationalism came in for criticism particularly by Nietzsche. Socialism and communism: after World War II, Sartre was certainly a communist, but even then unafraid to criticise both the French communist party and the Soviet Union for rigid or inadequately revolutionary thinking. Democracy: Aristotle in book 5 of his *Politics* distinguishes between democracy and ochlocracy, which latter essentially means rule by those incapable of ruling even themselves. Many existentialists would identify the latter with the American and especially French concept of 'democracy'. Nietzsche and Ortega-y-Gasset both espoused a broadly *aristocratic* criterion for social and political leadership.

Theme 6. Modern Indian Philosophy

Priti Kumar Mitra

Bengal Renaissance

(http://www.banglapedia.org/HT/B_0472.htm)

It is claimed by many modern scholars that the early nineteenth century, and by some that the whole of the nineteenth century, had witnessed an intellectual awakening that deserves to be called a Renaissance in the European style. They believe that under the impact of British rule the Bengali intellect learned to raise questions about life and beliefs. The new outlook is said to have affected contemporary life very materially. The various protest movements, formation of societies and associations, religious reform movements, coming of new styles in Bengali literature, political consciousness, and other emergent socio-political phenomena have been argued to be the positive symptoms of a Renaissance. The advocates of the Renaissance theory trace the origin of this phenomenon in the newly acquired European knowledge (especially philosophy, history, science and literature) through education in English. Although it immediately affected a small portion of the upper stratum of Bengal Hindu society only, it eventually spread to Muslims (rather partially) and others as well as to other parts of the subcontinent before the century closed.

Renaissance minds included Raja Rammohun Roy (1774–1833), Henry Louis Vivian Derozio (1809–1831) and his radical disciples, Debendranath Tagore (1817–1905) and his followers, Akshay Kumar Datta (1820–86), Iswarchandra Vidyasagar (1820–1891), Michael Madhusudan Dutt (1824–1873), Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay (1838–1894), and Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902). Western ideas influencing renaissance thinkers and activists included rationalism, humanism, utilitarianism, scientism, individualism, positivism, Darwinism, socialism, and nationalism. Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Isaac Newton (1642–1727), Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), Thomas Paine (1737–1809), August Comte (1798–1857), Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) are only a few among Modern Western thinkers who found followers and admirers among the thinkers of renascent Bengal. Institutions such as the Asiatic society of Bengal (est.1784), Baptist Mission of Serampore (1800), Fort William College (1800), Hindu College (1817), Calcutta School Book Society (1817), Calcutta Medical College (1835), University of Calcutta (1857) contributed significantly to the Renaissance.

Two of the expressions of the Renaissance were (1) the appearance of a large number of newspapers and periodicals and (2) the growth of numerous societies, associations and organisations. These in turn served as so many forums for different dialogues and exchanges that the Renaissance produced. However, the most spectacular expression of the Renaissance was a number of reform movements, both religious and social. The other major expression was a secular struggle for rational freethinking. Growth of modern Bengali literature, spread of Western education and ideas, fervent and diverse intellectual inquiry were the results of the Renaissance. The Bengal Renaissance produced an engagement with nationalism, and nationalism in turn questioned the foreign subjugation of the country.

Rammohun Roy, who was well versed in Sanskrit, Arabic, Persian and Western learning, started with a rationalist tract (Tuhfat-ul-Muwahhidin [Gift for Monotheists] 1803–04) to protest dogmatic religiosity. Later on, he would combine rationalism with utilitarianism to fashion Semitic-type monotheism and develop a programme for removal of social injustice and intellectual stupor. In a fifteen-year (1815–1830) controversy with Hindus and Christians he apparently defeated polytheism and Trinitarianism to establish his Brahmo monotheism. He also opened a century-long fight for social justice, particularly the emancipation of Hindu women. The colonial government, led by Governor General William Bentinck, abolished the practice of *sati* (custom of burning Hindu widows on their husbands' funeral pyres) in 1829 and Rammohun supported the enactment. Roy also fought for freedom of press, and advocated a secular and scientific education policy with Western curricula.

Henry Derozio, a free thinker, taught European history and literature at the Hindu College (1826–1831) and inspired about a dozen disciples to think rationally and independently. Eager readers as they were of Tom Paine's Age of Reason and Rights of Man these young men, known collectively as young bengal, propagated their radical ideas for some fifteen years (1828–1843) in a society called the Academic Association (1828). They were associated with at least six periodicals – *Parthenon* (1830), *East Indian* (1831), *Enquirer* (1831–1834), *Jnananvesan* (1831–1840), *Hindu Pioneer* (1835–1840) and *Bengal Spectator* (1842–43). For the first few years their chief target of attack was traditional Hinduism. Laterly, they concentrated on the failings of the colonial Government.

Unlike Rammohun and his followers, the Derozians depended on pure reason and no spirituality. They described the Rammohunites as 'half-liberals'. This conflict became more spectacular when in the late

forties Brahmo leader Debendranath Tagore and the exponent of science Akshay Kumar Datta fell out on the question of infallibility of scripture. In fact, Tagore inherited Rammohun's spiritualism while his rationalism and scientism inspired Datta. Akshay Kumar attempted to transform Brahmoism into Deism and replace revelation with the scientific exploration of nature. In the 1850s the conflict assumed a triangular shape with humanist Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar serving as the third arm. Vidyasagar's humanism got on well with Datta's scientific rationalism, but both met in Tagore's spiritualism a most formidable enemy.

This very significant conflict ended in the expulsion of Datta from the Brahmo fold. Turning agnostic, Akshay Kumar Datta would drive into the history of Indian religion and philosophy with rationalism, objectivity, and critical spirit. This is a syndrome that marks the lives of many renascent intellectuals in nineteenth century Bengal. Vidyasagar, on the other hand, remained an agnostic (sort of atheist even) and, after the successful completion of his Hindu Widow Remarriage Movement (1855–1856), an act that legalised such remarriage in 1856 led another movement in the sixties against hyperpolygamy of *kulin* Brahmans. In this case and also in his efforts to spread female education success was thwarted not only by orthodox reaction but also by the colonial Government's refusal to cooperate. The sceptic-agnostic-atheist tradition developed by Derozio, his disciples, Akshay Kumar, and Vidyasagar reached a finale in the positivist Krishna Kamal Bhattacharya (1840–1932), who professed atheism. Historically, this development is immensely significant because, long after the seventh-century nastika (atheist) thinker Jayarashi Bhatta, these deniers were the first to revive the tradition of Indian materialism.

Vidyasagar and Akshay K. Datta together created modern Bengali prose on the foundations laid by the Pandits of Fort William College, by certain missionaries of the Serampore Baptist Church, as well as by Rammohun Roy and his opponents. The prose would then be flourishing in different forms through the works of Pearychand Mitra (1814–83), Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, and Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). In poetry and drama the iconoclast Michael Madhusudan Dutt, a 'Derozian' in spirit, broke conventions to introduce blank verse, sonnet, individualism, worldliness, patriotism, prominence of female characters, and sharper conflicts in drama. A host of playwrights and poets of inferior abilities quickly followed him.

Apart from literature, the fields of science, history and philosophy were cultivated by scholars such as Madhusudan Gupta (1800–56, the

first Hindu to dissect a human dead body), Mahendra Lal Sarkar (1833–1904), Jagadishchandra Bose (1858–1937), Prafullachandra Roy (1861–1944), Rajendralal Mitra (1822–1891), Romeshchunder Dutt (1848–1909), Dwijendranath Tagore (1840–1926), and Krishna Kamal Bhattacharya. Bhai Girishchandra Sen (1835–1910) concentrated on Islamic studies and authored numerous books and biographies to illustrate the Islamic tradition. He crowned his life's work with an annotated translation of the Quran (1886), the first such work in Bangla. Akshay Kumar Datta illustrates yet another characteristic of the Renaissance. Like the philosophers of the French Enlightenment, he and other intellectuals of the Bengal Renaissance also, in most cases, were amateur explorers in various fields rather than steadfast specialists concentrating on one specific area. Rajendra Lal Mitra's *Vividhartha-Sangraha* (1850s) and *Rahasya-Sandarbha* (1860s) and Bankim Chandra's *Bangadarshan* (1870s) along with many others bear testimony to this observation.

The Bengal Renaissance proper covered the first six decades of the nineteenth century during which the driving principle was rationalism, the chief purpose was reform, and the reformers' general target was some aspect of Hinduism. The last four decades were dominated by nationalism, the purpose being regeneration, and the targeted opponent being the British colonial establishment. Rationalists could not long remain blind to the fact of the country's subjugation by foreigners. Then such fateful events as the 'Black Act' (a proposed law to end the racist practice of not enabling Indian judges to try cases against White defendants) controversy, the Great Revolt of 1857–1858, and the Indigo Uprising (1859–1860) goaded thoughtful Bengalis to take the nationalist path. The idea caught their imagination in the sixties and a number of Brahmos including Nabagopal Mitra (1841–1894), Rajnarayan Bose (1826–1899), Debendranath Tagore and his children inaugurated a 'Hindu' nationalism through the Hindu Mela (1867–1881) and a seminar on Hindu Dharmer Shresthatva (1872).

These efforts led to an intellectual movement known as Neo-Hinduism that sought to rejuvenate Hinduism with the help of a critical reappreciation of Hindu classics as well as the sciences of Europe. Among exponents of Neo-Hinduism were Bhudev Mukhopadhyay (1825–1894), Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay, Swami Vivekandanda, and Brahmabandhab Upadhyay (1861–1907). Offering a pantheistic rejoinder to the challenge of monotheism from Brahmos and Christians the Neo-Hindu ideologues set aside social reformism in favour of the idea of conservation/regeneration/growth through education, social service, political and economic activities, as well as intellectual pursuits. They, in

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general, also promoted the idea of political freedom through armed struggle and adored the motherland as the Mother Goddess. Hindu nationalism gave way to more rational secular Indian nationalism that took shape through such organisations as the India League (1857), Indian Association (1876), National Conference (1883), and the Indian National Congress (1885).

<…> According to many post-modernist scholars, the term 'Renaissance' for Bengal context is a mislabelling in the sense that it was a phenomenon occasioned by the colonial government's administrative and educational measures consciously intended to produce a class of the kind we find in the nineteenth century. The class was very tiny and limited to a section of the upper class urban Hindus and its thinking and activities had little or no effect on Bengal society in general. Muslim society remained unaffected by it and so was non-urban Hindu society.

Tatiana G. Skorokhodova
Neo-Vedantism in the Bengal Renaissance:
Genesis, Foundations and Development in XIX Century

I. INTRODUCTION: ORIGIN OF NEO-VEDANTISM

Development of Indian philosophy in Modernity connected with socio-cultural processes of Indian-Western dialogue in colonial period. These ones had generated intensive reconsiderations of native Indian heritage of thought and practice in comparison with the Western culture. Generally, Modern Indian philosophy indebted for its origin to intellectual and reformist activity of the Indian Renaissance personalities. The Indian Renaissance was the epoch of socio-cultural renascence in different regions of British India. It was a complex of intellectual, socio-practical and cultural transformations in traditional society, which began to include in Modern world. This complex had been firstly, created in Bengal – the most developed of colonial India provinces situated on a far periphery of traditional society and turned in a meeting-point of the West and the East. The Bengal Renaissance was the core of the Indian Renaissance in religious, philosophical, social, political, literary and art movements and achievements. It were Bengal intellectuals who began to create

new philosophy in India. In Modern India the most influential and respected philosophical tradition have been recognized Vedanta or, more correctly, its new version called Neo-Vedantism. In XIX century Bengal intellectuals had made choice of Vedanta, from all multiplicity of Indian traditional schools.

Why had Bengal thinkers made a choice of Vedanta? An answer lays in a broad cultural context of Indian-Western interaction in a sphere of thought. The main problem for thinkers from Rammohun Roy (1772–1833) to Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) was a searching for indigenous cultural basis of India's development in Modernity. The basis ought to serve a renovation of society and culture as well as understanding and adoption of key Western achievements. In other words, it ought to be the base of Indian-Western synthesis in thought and culture. From the intention appeared philosophizing of spiritual, moral and social-political problems in Indian mind and life of people.

The present condition of Indian society – especially of Hindu community – in colonial situation was considered by Bengal thinkers as serious decline in comparison with dynamic development of the West. The first reformer and philosopher of Modern India Rammohun Roy had connected this decline with 'Hindu idolatry' and its antihuman practice – burning widows, infanticide, child marriage, polygamy – and superstitions; he estimated ones as "…the moral debasement of a race who… are capable of better things; whose susceptibility, patience, and mildness of character, render them worthy of a better destiny" [Roy 1982, P. 74]. Rammohun had seen the reasons of the condition first of all in spiritual sphere, in religious consciousness of his coreligionists.

Bengal thinkers' striving to elevate the spiritual sphere of society can be explained by influence of many factors. They had an experience of contemplation and understanding of Other religions (Christianity and Islam) along with their own Hindu faith. The brightest example of one is Rammohun Roy, who was brought up in Vaishnav family and in early childhood was very devout [Collet 1962, P. 5]. Owing to his Islamic education in Patna, he had the experience of contemplation of the other religion. Then he was impressed by Christianity and had studied the Bible. The preference of monotheism as base of any religion helps him to create the idea of Hinduism as monotheistic religion [See: Dasgupta 2012, 39–71]. In Bengal thinkers' consciousness had been built the triple dialogue of religions, what helped to create an attractive image of Hinduism and Indian culture, as well as to create general universalist approach in Neo-Vedantism. Moreover, Bengal thinkers had been influenced by traditional Sanskrit and Modern English educations. Sanskrit education

gave the knowledge of Scriptures and philosophical heritage, English one offered modern patterns of thinking and acting along with European thought heritage. The special factor was European Oriental studies in Indian culture and history, especially, Indian antiquity [See: Ibid, 7–38; 5]. Both traditional education and European's interest to Indian culture had stimulated a process which J. Nehru later described as 'Discovery of India' by her own intellectuals.

The intellectuals' need for authoritative support in Hindu tradition had motivated to find the sacred texts as grounding of religious, moral and social novation. But the tradition of Hinduism was many-sided and broad. It put the question of choice from texts and traditions the most adequate for the support to novations and reforms. Searching for the textual support, Rammohun Roy and his adherents and spiritual heirs turned to the heritage of Indian 'Axial age' (K. Jaspers), viz. the Upaniṣads, then Bhagavadgita and Badarayana's Vedanta-sutra. Particularly, it was the discovery of basic philosophical ideas of Vedanta as 'end of Vedas' (Upaniṣads) as well as orthodox dārṣana with its ideas of Brahman–atman (soul) identity, anti-ritualism and path of knowledge for liberation.

Bengal thinkers have made the choice of Vedanta from orthodox schools, because unorthodox (nastika) dārṣanas were not suitable for modern practical purposes. From orthodox dārṣanas nyāya dominated in thinking of orthodox Brahmins, and in scholastic of Bengal, as well its pair Vaiśeṣika. Sāṅkhya was de facto atheistic; being theistic, Yoga was concerned with physical and spiritual practices Mīmāṃsā deals with ritual and its meanings. From all dārṣanas Vedanta was theistic and offered a broad possibilities for reflections on spiritual themes and also for thinking on ethical, social and cultural themes. The choice of Vedanta permitted to hold a succession to tradition – in spite of independent position of each thinker. No one of Bengal thinkers belongs to orthodox schools, transmittable by traditional method from a teacher to pupil. The distance from orthodoxy allowed to create new version of ancient Vedanta.

II. GENESIS OF NEO-VEDANTISM: RAMMOHUN ROY

W. Halbfass remembers, that '…the role of the Vedanta as a source of authority was ambivalent in Bengal in the period around 1800. The Navyanyāya was predominant in scholastic teaching, and the systematic study of the Vedanta did not play a conspicuous role', but Rammohun had special genuine self-understanding as 'Vedantin' [Halbfass 1988, 214]: he was educated in Benares, estimated center of the Vedanta learning. After settling in Calcutta, Rammohun had published 'Vedantic' works: Vedanta Grantha, Vedantasara (in Bengali, 1815), Abridgement

of Vedanta (in English, 1816), translations of Upaniṣads – Isa, Kena (both in 1816), Mundaka and Katha (1817) into English and Bengali. His interpretation of Vedanta laid in the foundation not only of his religious ontology, but of anthropology, ethics and partially social thought.

His first intention was to appeal to Vedas authority for an explanation of true essence of Hinduism – as Rammohun himself understood its spirit – it was intended for his coreligionists. Rammohun presented Badarayana's Vedanta-sutra as 'The Resolution of all the Vedas" because of full body of Vedic literature 'written in the most elevated and metaphorical style' [Roy 1977, 261]. While at present Hindus "firmly believe in the real existence of innumerable gods and goddesses", their idolatry 'destroys the texture of society' and moral consciousness [Ibid, 262–263], Rammohun calls to read the Scriptures for contemplate with and worship to One omnipresent and omnipotent God of Vedas. Thus, the philosopher reduced all Vedic complex to early Upaniṣads with its conception of Brahman, which integrated into Vedanta-sutra. Rendering basic content of Badarayana's Vedanta, Rammohun created key ideas of new version of Vedanta – neither Advaitic (absolute monism), nor Viśiṣṭādvaitic (qualified Non-Dualism).

Though 'the accurate and positive knowledge of the Supreme Being (Brahman – T.S.) is not within the boundary of comprehension' [Ibid, 264], Rammohun gives Him both apophatic and cataphatic definitions, and creates synthetic Vedanta. Apophatic definition appears from Upaniṣadic phrases ('bears no figure nor form', 'His existence had no cause' etc.) [Ibid, 268], but cataphatic ones belongs to Rammohun. He describes Brahman as Creator, Preserver and Destroyer of the Universe, and also as Author, Creator of Nature, Lord of Universe and the Truth (Om tat Sat). This notion of Brahman is the foundation of 'the Creed' of Neo-Vedantism.

Rammohun postulates the combination of faith in one God with knowledge of Him. The knowledge is attainable both apophatically – through enumeration of 'not this' ('na iti, na iti'), and through comprehension of His Creation: 'We see the multifarious, wonderful universe, as well as the birth, existence, and annihilation of its different parts; hence, we naturally infer the existence of a Being who regulates the whole, and call him the Supreme' [Ibid, 264]. The organic part of Rammohun's Vedanta is rejection of rituals, ceremonies, food rules etc.; these must be replaced by 'hearing and thinking of Him', 'practice of devotion', adoration and 'command over our passions and over the external senses of the body and good acts' [Ibid, 271]. Vedantic traditional jnāna

(knowledge) and bhakti (love) are united with moral life and ethics. The later can be explained by Christian influences on Rammohun.

These key foundation Rammohun develops in his interpretation of Upaniṣads. The introductory parts to ones English translations content his Vedantic ideas.

1) Brahman is 'the sole Regulator of the Universe', invisible 'Intellectual principle… entirely distinct from matter and its affections'. And 'nothing is absent from God, and nothing bears real existence except by the volition of God, whose existence is the sole support of the conceived existence of the universe' [Roy 1982, I, 63, 21, 45, 69]. This in the basic of monism philosophy, monotheism in reform practice because of rejection of all pantheon of Hindu gods. The high belief in unity of God Rammohun postulates as the sole path to eternal beatitude for each man and all humanity [Ibid, 67].

2) Human soul is a part of the Supreme Being, who is 'the sole Origin of individual intellect' [Ibid, 45]. Rammohun does not say on Brahman–atman identity; his understanding of human is more definitive. He says on limited physical powers of man, while 'ratio and moral faculties' embrace 'a wide sphere of action, and possessing a capability of almost boundless improvement' [Ibid, 73]. Idea of improvement is one of most important for Rammohun, and he adds the path of ethical life to traditional jnāna and bhakti path to God – 'rendering benefit to his fellow-creatures' for gaining happiness and final beatitude [Ibid, 73].

3) The essential characteristics of God are the goodness and mercy. The Supreme Being is 'to whom the motives of our actions and secrets of our hearts are well-known' [Ibid, 37, 46]. Therefore, from imperative of knowledge of God come moral principles of human life in the world. Rammohun's monotheism and monism is ethical: God have defined the good goals for his creations, these ones suppose religious service to Him in high forms and love and thinking on Him, righteous live and good service to fellows. There are two groups of human duties: 'the rational performance of your duty to your sole Creator, and to your fellow creatures, and also to pay true respect to those who think and act righteously' [Ibid, 71]. This ideas inspire Rammohun to fight with polytheism which replace good by evils – in idea of strict following to ritual and caste rules, as well as traditional morality which held 'performance of a few idle ceremonies' 'as a sufficient atonement for all those crimes' – murder, theft, perjury etc. – but punished the least aberration from diet and other caste rules. Rammohun says on the true sin as 'evil thoughts proceeding from

the heart, quite unconnected with observances as to diet and other matters of form' [Ibid, 46]. Consequently, Rammohun claims compassion, humility and mercy in human relations.

Thus, Rammohun had created the foundations of Neo-Vedanta which essential novelty was in grounding of ethical nature of Brahman as well as anthropological ideas such as value of human being as God's creation and high estimation of his earthly life. Besides, Rammohun in his Vedanta had created the ethics of religious humanism, which overcomes the alienation of high content of earthly life and opens the path to freedom of person.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF NEO-VEDANTISM

Rammohun's religious-philosophical considerations resulted in basic ideas became the foundation of his 'Brahmo Samaj' (1828, 'Society of [believers in] One God'). Its leader Devendranath Tagore (1818–1905) continued the reflections on Vedanta. Based on Upaniṣads he said on Brahman as eternal, 'formless, the very essence of intelligence, omnipresent, beyond all thought or speech' [Tagore 1909, 20]. God is origin of good, knowledge, wisdom, life, energy; eternal joy etc.; through deep introspection human comes to knowledge of Atman/Self as his own spiritual essence. Devendranath Tagore desired 'preach the Brahma Dharma as based upon the Vedanta', understood as Upaniṣads, 'the crowning point and essence of all the Vedas' [Ibid, 40].

Devendranath was strict follower of Rammohun in the rejection of any forms of polytheism and idolatry. After deep learning of Vedic Samhitas, he had rejected, firstly, Vedas because of sanctioning karmakanda (rituals) and, secondly, the Upaniṣads as wide collections of texts from ancient to pre-colonicl periods. The 'thorny tangle of Upanishads' did not permit to 'lay the foundation of the Brahma Dharma' [Ibid, 74]. Devendranath's strong position was the differentiation of Brahman as an object of devotion and the believer as subject of one: 'He is the worshipful, I am His worshipper; He is my Master, I am His servant; He is my Father, I am His son. This was my guiding principle' [Ibid, 23]. Thence, he rejected Brahman-atman identity ('I am He' and 'Thou art That') in Upaniṣads as well as Śaṅkara's ādvaita. He propose to follow spiritual revelation, therefore, 'Brahma reigned in the pure heart alone. The pure, unsophisticated heart was the seat of Brahmaism. We could accept those texts only of the Upanishads which accorded with that heart' [Ibid, 75]. Devendranath refused from Śaṅkara's māyā, because both God and universe are real as absolute and relative truths [Ibid, 85]. As a result, he had

created Brahmi-Upaniṣad and a book of moral precepts ('Brahma Dharma Grantha') based predominantly on Bhagavadgita and Manu [Ibid, 80–84].

Devendranath's novation was in liberation from formal authorities of Scriptures and classical tracts and commentaries for free contemplation and realization of truth. His Vedanta is Viśiṣṭādvaitic: Brahman is before all Creator of the world and a human being, who is in active interactions with Him. Brahmo Vedantism was imbibed by Devendranath's son Rabindranath Tagore in his poetry and philosophical works.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic approach was very attractive for traditional religious consciousness, which concentrated upon God – human relations. The approach became the core for development of specific 'synthetic' Vedanta integrated its different schools into dialectic unity.

The integration of schools was postulated and explained by Bengal mystic, saint and inspired preacher Ramakrishna Paramahamsa (Gadadhar Chattopadhyay, 1836–1886). A son of poor village Brahmin, he had experienced in samadhi (ecstasy) different religious practice of Hinduism and other religions (Christianity, Islam and Buddhism) and preached the essential unity of all religions. Punjab Brahmin Totapuri had initiated him in ādvaita-sadhana – mystical Brahman–atman identity. Ramakrishna's interpretation of Vedanta bases on understanding: 'Brahman alone is Reality, and all else is unreal' and 'the Rishis of olden times renounced everything and then contemplated Satchidananda, the Indivisible Brahman' [Bhuteshananda 2006–2007, I, 116, 254]. The preacher describes Absolute as unity of dialectical oppositions – transcendent and immanent, having form and formless, impersonal and personal. Ramakrishna's universal monism of ādvaita combined with idea of reality of the world, which is result of lila (God's play). The world is real, being incarnation of High reality; simultaneously, the one is unreal, when human realizes his own atman as a child of God, who appears in human soul more than else.

Ramakrishna represents three Vedanta schools as successive stages of rational reflections of a believer in God. These ones are equally true, because human spiritual path is from simple stages of realization of God to complicated stages. Dvaita-vedanta dualism suits for human who is in first stages of knowledge: Brahman is personal God (Ishwara) and jīva (soul) is not identical with Him. By Ramakrishna's words, 'I'm Thine, yet Thou art not mine' and an example: 'The waves belohgs to ocean, and never ocean to the waves' [Ibid, II, 232]. Viśiṣṭādvaita also is reconciled with ādvaita: 'I accept His māyā and also his various appearances;

I accept the diversity created by māyā as also the non-dual Principle devoid of all diversity' [Ibid, I, 332]. It is second stage of Vedanta – qualified non-dualism. Ādvaita's identity atman with Brahman is natural for human-brāhmojnāni who is able to go into samadhi: 'Reaching the seventh plane, the mind is annihilated… What he feels, then cannot be described in words' [Ibid, 200]. The third stage – ādvaita is highest stage of realization of God, who is 'pure mind, pure intelligence, and pure Atman are one and the same' [Ibid, 546].

Openly synthesized three branches of Vedanta into one, Ramakrishna had formed the core for Neo-Vedanta system, developed by his famous pupil, philosopher Swami Vivekananda (Narendranath Dutta, 1861–1902). He turned Vedanta into universal, all-embraced and literally "omnipresent" philosophy, which could be found in each religion, philosophy and culture as its foundation and meaning.

Vedanta for Vivekananda is the end of Vedas and monistic philosophical school, which 'In the course of time the Vedanta prevailed, and all the various sects of India that now exist can be referred to one or other of its schools' [Vivekananda 1998–2002, II, 239]. Vivekananda represents Vedanta as integral and universal knowledge of Indian civilization – both ancient and contemporary – which embraces all dārṣanas (including nāstika Buddhism and Jainism) and organically unites three branches of classical Vedanta [Ibid, 239–259] as stages of God-knowing. The philosopher repeats and develops three key ideas by Rammohun Roy: Brahman as Supreme Being, atman as part of him in human soul and moral character of God.

The concept of unity of Universe Vivekananda bases on ādvaita: One free (without cause) eternal Absolute (nirgūna-Brahman) determines physical, spiritual and moral unity of the world. He 'has become the universe by coming through time, space, and causation', and 'the degeneration of the Absolute into the phenomenal, and not before; that our will, our desire and all these things always come after that'. Time, space, and causation are God's māyā in which appears changes composed of the universe [Ibid, 130–136]. The philosopher concludes: 'The Vedanta says there is nothing that is not God' [Ibid, 321]. The rejection of idea of illusion of the world issued the affirmation of high meaning of social, historical and cultural being of human.

Vivekananda solves key Neo-Vedanta problem of human through identifying him with God: 'The body is not the Real Man, neither is the mind, for the mind waxes and wanes. It is the Spirit beyond, which alone can live for ever. … So this infinite Unit is unchangeable, immovable,

absolute, and this is the Real Man. Our reality, therefore, consists in the Universal and not in the limited. These are old delusions, however comfortable they are, to think that we are little limited beings, constantly changing. People are frightened when they are told that they are Universal Being, everywhere present' [Ibid, 79–80]. Human is potentially divine, and meaning of his existence is in realizing and appearance of Divinity, his real nature, and in gaining freedom in earthly life. It determinates the greatness of human in the world – really, new idea, which is main leading motive of Vivekananda's Vedanta. Misery and dependence of human in the world prevent him to strive for happiness and freedom. The cause of misery philosopher saw in absence of knowledge: 'The misery that we suffer comes from ignorance, from non-discrimination between the real and the unreal. We all take the bad for the good, the dream for the reality. Soul is the only reality, and we have forgotten it' [Ibid, I, 287].

Discrimination (viveka) is the method of rational knowledge of absolute truth for absolute happiness and freedom. According to Vivekananda, man freed in earthly life (jīvanmūkta) is not ascetic but human ready for service for other people. Another method to gain knowledge is ethical behavior, which Vivekananda builds on altruistic imperative. He says: 'Ethics always says, 'Not I, but thou.' Its motto is, "Not self, but non-self." The vain ideas of individualism, to which man clings when he is trying to find that Infinite Power or that Infinite Pleasure through the senses, have to be given up – say the laws of ethics. You have to put yourself last, and others before you. … Ethics says, "I must hold myself last." Thus, all codes of ethics are based upon this renunciation' [Ibid, II, 62–63]. The moral foundation of path to freedom combines from 'universal moral norms' – love, mercy, good, rightness and non-violence.

In Vivekananda's Vedanta are united two dārṣanas which were not pair-schools in classical period: Vedanta and Yoga. In new-made pair the first is philosophical theory of the universe, foundation of Indian spiritual tradition and culture, and Yoga is practical path to freedom. If Ramakrishna have proposed three marga/yoga for modern people – karma (action, work), jnāna and bhakti, Vivekananda adds raja-yoga (classical yoga from Patanjali system) of psycho-physical trainings. In his famous 'Four Yogas' (1893–1896) philosopher places into foreground karma-yoga as path of disinterested active work. This yoga suits for all people including agnostics and atheists. The easiest yoga is bhakti, the way of love to God and all the world, and jnāna is most difficult. According to Vivekananda, all yogas confirm universal Vedantic truth and permit to develop of both human and society.

Neo-Vedanta laid down in his social-philosophical views, in which he says on social aspects of freedom. Briefly, all human groups, strata, communities and societies are aspiring to freedom, and the aspiration is embodied in striving for a progress, to command over inner and outer nature, even in a struggle, conflicts and wars. That's why, philosopher proposes fight against social evils – traditional and modern – and active social service for development of society.

Swami Vivekananda's Vedanta system can be called complex philosophy, united ontology, epistemology, anthropology, ethics and social philosophy. His Neo-Vedanta became the starting-point for development of Indian philosophy in XX century.

IV. CONCLUSION

Neo-Vedantism presents the synthetic phenomena in Modern Indian philosophy. Bengal thinkers treat Vedanta in non-dogmatic and free manner. From the one hand, Neo-Vedanta appeared and developed as the continuation of influential theistic system of classical philosophy – the most suitable to Modern needs in cultural and social spheres. The diversity of schools in classical Vedanta is unessential for new thinkers, because they turned to the spirit of idealistic monism opposed to the letter of religious practice and orthodox thinking. Also it was the break with scholastics of other schools which did not permit to think on urgent philosophical and cultural question. From the other hand, Neo-Vedanta was re-built based on humanistic approach: the key theme of it became human being-in-world as ethically correlated with Brahman. The approach turns to ethical and social problems – consequently, all New-Vedantist thinkers were creators of Indian social thought. Creative transformation of Vedanta permitted to integrate Modern ideas into native tradition and simultaneously to save the spirit of Indian thinking in Modernity.

Michael Hawley
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975)
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/radhakri/)

As an academic, philosopher, and statesman, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) was one of the most recognized and influential Indian thinkers in academic circles in the 20th century. Throughout his life and extensive writing career, Radhakrishnan sought to define, defend, and promulgate his religion, a religion he variously identified as Hinduism, Vedanta, and the religion of the Spirit. He sought to demonstrate

that his Hinduism was both philosophically coherent and ethically viable. Radhakrishnan's concern for experience and his extensive knowledge of the Western philosophical and literary traditions has earned him the reputation of being a bridge-builder between India and the West. He often appears to feel at home in the Indian as well as the Western philosophical contexts, and draws from both Western and Indian sources throughout his writing. <…> His lengthy writing career and his many published works have been influential in shaping the West's understanding of Hinduism, India, and the East.

<…>

2. Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
a. Metaphysics

Radhakrishnan located his metaphysics within the Advaita (non-dual) Vedanta tradition (*sampradaya*). And like other Vedantins before him, Radhakrishnan wrote commentaries on the Prasthana traya (that is, main primary texts of Vedanta): the *Upanisads* (1953), *Brahma Sutra* (1959), and the *Bhagavadgita* (1948).

As an Advaitin, Radhakrishnan embraced a metaphysical idealism. But Radhakrishnan's idealism was such that it recognized the reality and diversity of the world of experience (*prakṛti*) while at the same time preserving the notion of a wholly transcendent Absolute (Brahman), an Absolute that is identical to the self (Atman). While the world of experience and of everyday things is certainly not ultimate reality as it is subject to change and is characterized by finitude and multiplicity, it nonetheless has its origin and support in the Absolute (Brahman) which is free from all limits, diversity, and distinctions (*nirguṇa*). Brahman is the source of the world and its manifestations, but these modes do not affect the integrity of Brahman.

In this vein, Radhakrishnan did not merely reiterate the metaphysics of Śaṅkara (8th century C.E.), arguably Advaita Vedanta's most prominent and enduring figure, but sought to reinterpret Advaita for present needs. <…>

b. Epistemology: Intuition and the Varieties of Experience
<…>
i. Intuition

Radhakrishnan associates a vast constellation of terms with intuition. At its best, intuition is an "integral experience". Radhakrishnan uses the term "integral" in at least three ways. First, intuition is integral in the sense that it coordinates and synthesizes all other experiences. It integrates all other experiences into a more unified whole. Second, intuition

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is integral as it forms the basis of all other experiences. In other words, Radhakrishnan holds that all experiences are at bottom intuitional. Third, intuition is integral in the sense that the results of the experience are integrated into the life of the individual. For Radhakrishnan, intuition finds expression in the world of action and social relations.

At times Radhakrishnan prefers to emphasize the "mystical" and "spiritual" quality of intuition as attested to by the expressions "religious experience" (…), "religious consciousness" (…), "mystical experience" (…), "spiritual idealism" (…)… But it is the creative potency of intuition, designated by Radhakrishnan's reference to the "creative center" of the individual (…), "creative intuition" (…), "creative spirit" (…), and "creative energy" (…), that is the lynchpin for Radhakrishnan's understanding of intuition. As Radhakrishnan understands it, all progress is the result of the creative potency of intuition.

For Radhakrishnan, intuition is a distinct form of experience. Intuition is of a self-certifying character (*svatassiddha*). It is sufficient and complete. It is self-established (*svatasiddha*), self-evidencing (*svāsaṃvedya*), and self-luminous (*svayam-prakāsa*) (…). Intuition entails pure comprehension, entire significance, complete validity (…). It is both truth-filled and truth-bearing (…).

Intuition is the ultimate form of experience for Radhakrishnan. It is ultimate in the sense that intuition constitutes the fullest and therefore the most authentic realization of the Real (Brahman). The ultimacy of intuition is also accounted for by Radhakrishnan in that it is the ground of all other forms of experience. <…>

ii. Varieties of Experience
1) Cognitive Experience. Radhakrishnan recognizes three categories of cognitive experience: sense experience, discursive reasoning, and intuitive apprehension. For Radhakrishnan all of these forms of experience contribute, in varying degrees, to a knowledge of the real (Brahman), and as such have their basis in intuition.

Sense Experience. Of the cognitive forms of knowledge, Radhakrishnan suggests that sensory knowledge is in one respect closest to intuition, for it is in the act of sensing that one is in "direct contact" with the object. Sense experience "helps us to know the outer characters of the external world. By means of it we acquire an acquaintance with the sensible qualities of the objects" <…>

Discursive Reasoning, and the logical knowledge it produces, is subsequent to sensory experience (perception). "Logical knowledge

is obtained by the processes of analysis and synthesis. Unlike sense perception which Radhakrishnan claims to be closer to direct knowledge, logical knowledge "is indirect and symbolic in its character. It helps us to handle and control the object and its workings" (…). <…>

Intuitive Apprehension. Radhakrishnan argues against what he sees as the prevalent (Western) temptation to reduce the intuitive to the logical. While logic deals with facts already known, intuition goes beyond logic to reveal previously unseen connections between facts. "The art of discovery is confused with the logic of proof and an artificial simplification of the deeper movements of thought results. We forget that we invent by intuition though we prove by logic" (…). Intuition not only clarifies the relations between facts and seemingly discordant systems, but lends itself to the discovery of new knowledge which then becomes an appropriate subject of philosophical inquiry and logical analysis. <…>

…Radhakrishnan holds that the "creative insight is not the final link in a chain of reasoning. If it were that, it would not strike us as "inspired in its origin" (…). Intuition is not the end, but part of an ever-developing and ever-dynamic process of realization. There is, for Radhakrishnan, a continual system of "checks and balances" between intuition and the logical method of discursive reasoning. Cognitive intuitions "are not substitutes for thought, they are challenges to intelligence. Mere intuitions are blind while intellectual work is empty. All processes are partly intuitive and partly intellectual. There is no gulf between the two" (…).

2) Psychic Experience. Perhaps the most understudied dimension of Radhakrishnan's interpretations of experience is his recognition of "supernormal" experiences. As early as his first volume of *Indian Philosophy* (1923), Radhakrishnan affirms the validity of what he identifies as "psychic phenomena". Radhakrishnan accounts for such experiences in terms of a highly developed sensitivity to intuition. "The mind of man," Radhakrishnan explains, "has the three aspects of subconscious, the conscious, and the superconscious, and the 'abnormal' psychic phenomena, called by the different names of ecstasy, genius, inspiration, madness, are the workings of the superconscious mind" (…). Such experiences are not "abnormal" according to Radhakrishnan, nor are they unscientific. Rather, they are the products of carefully controlled mental experiments. In the Indian past, "The psychic experiences, such as telepathy and clairvoyance, were considered to be neither abnormal nor miraculous. They are not the products of diseased minds or inspiration from

the gods, but powers which the human mind can exhibit under carefully ascertained conditions" (…). Psychic intuitions are not askew with Radhakrishnan's understanding of the intellect. In fact, they are evidence of the remarkable heights to which the undeveloped, limited intellect is capable. They are, for Radhakrishnan, accomplishments rather than failures of human consciousness. <…>

3) Aesthetic Experience. "All art," Radhakrishnan declares, "is the expression of experience in some medium" (…). However, the artistic experience should not be confused with its expression. While the experience itself is ineffable, the challenge for the artist is to give the experience concrete expression. "The success of art is measured by the extent to which it is able to render experiences of one dimension into terms of another. (…) For Radhakrishnan, art born out of a "creative contemplation which is a process of travail of the spirit is an authentic "crystallization of a life process" (…). At its ultimate and in its essence, the "poetical character is derived from the creative intuition (that is, integral intuition) which holds sound, suggestion and sense in organic solution" (…).

In Radhakrishnan's view, without the intuitive experience, art becomes mechanical and a rehearsal of old themes. Such "art" is an exercise in (re)production rather than a communication of the artist's intuitive encounter with reality. "Technique without inspiration," Radhakrishnan declares, "is barren. Intellectual powers, sense facts and imaginative fancies may result in clever verses, repetition of old themes, but they are only manufactured poetry" (…). It is not simply a difference of quality but a "difference of kind in the source itself" (…). For Radhakrishnan, true art is an expression of the whole personality, seized as it was with the creative impulse of the universe.

<…> For Radhakrishnan, artistic expression is dynamic. Having had the experience, the artist attempts to recall it. The recollection of the intuition, Radhakrishnan believes, is not a plodding reconstruction, nor one of dispassionate analysis. Rather, there is an emotional vibrancy: "The experience is recollected not in tranquility… but in excitement" (…). To put the matter somewhat differently, the emotional vibrancy of the aesthetic experience gives one knowledge by being rather than knowledge by knowing (…).

Art and Science

There is in Radhakrishnan's mind a "scientific" temperament to genuine artistic expression. In what might be called the science of art, Radhakrishnan believes that the "experience or the vision is the artist's

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counterpart to the scientific discovery of a principle or law" (…). There is a concordance of agendas in art and science. "What the scientist does when he discovers a new law is to give a new ordering to observed facts. The artist is engaged in a similar task. He gives new meaning to our experience and organizes it in a different way due to his perception of subtler qualities in reality" (…).

Despite this synthetic impulse, Radhakrishnan is careful to explain that the two disciplines are not wholly the same. The difference turns on what he sees as the predominantly aesthetic and qualitative nature of artistic expression. "Poetic truth is different from scientific truth since it reveals the real in its qualitative uniqueness and not in its quantitative universality" (…). Presumably, Radhakrishnan means that, unlike the universal laws with which science attempts to grapple, art is much more subjective, not in its creative origin, but in its expression. A further distinction between the two may lend further insight into Radhakrishnan's open appreciation for the poetic medium. "Poetry," he believes, "is the language of the soul, while prose is the language of science. The former is the language of mystery, of devotion, of religion. Prose lays bare its whole meaning to the intelligence, while poetry plunges us in the mysterium tremendum of life and suggests the truths that cannot be stated" (…).

4) Ethical Experience. Not surprisingly, intuition finds a place in Radhakrishnan's ethics. For Radhakrishnan, ethical experiences are profoundly transformative. The experience resolves dilemmas and harmonizes seemingly discordant paths of possible action. "If the new harmony glimpsed in the moments of insight is to be achieved, the old order of habits must be renounced" (…). Moral intuitions result in "a redemption of our loyalties and a remaking of our personalities" (…).

That Radhakrishnan conceives of the ethical development of the individual as a form of conversion is noteworthy as it underscores Radhakrishnan's identification of ethics and religion. For Radhakrishnan, an ethical transformation of the kind brought about by intuition is akin to religious growth and heightened realization. The force of this view is underscored by Radhakrishnan's willing acceptance of the interchangeability of the terms "intuition" and "religious experience".

Of course, not all ethical decisions or actions possess the quality of being guided by an intuitive impulse. Radhakrishnan willingly concedes that the vast majority of moral decisions are the result of conformity to well-established moral codes. However, it is in times of moral crisis that the creative force of ethical intuitions come to the fore. In a less famous,

though thematically reminiscent analogy, Radhakrishnan accounts for growth of moral consciousness in terms of the creative intuitive impulse: "In the chessboard of life, the different pieces have powers which vary with the context and the possibilities of their combination are numerous and unpredictable. The sound player has a sense of right and feels that, if he does not follow it, he will be false to himself. In any critical situation the forward move is a creative act" (…).

By definition, moral actions are socially rooted. As such the effects of ethical intuitions are played out on the social stage. While the intuition itself is an individual achievement, Radhakrishnan's view is that the intuition must be not only translated into positive and creative action but shared with others. There is a sense of urgency, if not inevitability, about this. Radhakrishnan tells us one "cannot afford to be absolutely silent" (…) and the saints "love because they cannot help it" (…).

The impulse to share the moral insight provides an opportunity to test the validity of the intuition against reason. The moral hero, as Radhakrishnan puts it, does not live by intuition alone. The intuitive experience, while it is the creative guiding impulse behind all moral progress, must be checked and tested against reason. There is a "scientific" and "experimental" dimension to Radhakrishnan's understanding of ethical behavior. Those whose lives are profoundly transformed and who are guided by the ethical experience are, for Radhakrishnan, moral heroes. To Radhakrishnan's mind, the moral hero, guided as he or she is by the ethical experience, who carves out an adventurous path is akin to the discoverer who brings order into the scattered elements of a science or the artist who composes a piece of music or designs buildings" (…). In a sense, there is very much an art and science to ethical living. <…>

5) Religious Experience. For the sake of clarity, we must at the outset make a tentative distinction between religious experience on the one hand and integral experience on the other. Radhakrishnan's distinction between "religion" and "religions" will be helpful here. At its most basic, religions, for Radhakrishnan, represent the various interpretations of experience, while integral experience is the essence of all religions. "If experience is the soul of religion, expression is the body through which it fulfills its destiny. We have the spiritual facts and their interpretations by which they are communicated to others" (…). "It is the distinction between immediacy and thought. Intuitions abide, while interpretations change" (…). But the interpretations should not be confused

with the experiences themselves. For Radhakrishnan, "conceptual expressions are tentative and provisional… [because] the intellectual accounts… are constructed theories of experience" (…). And he cautions us to "distinguish between the immediate experience or intuition which might conceivably be infallible and the interpretation which is mixed up with it" (…).

For Radhakrishnan, the creeds and theological formulations of religion are but intellectual representations and symbols of experience. "The idea of God," Radhakrishnan affirms, "is an interpretation of experience" (…). It follows here that religious experiences are, for Radhakrishnan, context relative and therefore imperfect. They are informed by and experienced through specific cultural, historical, linguistic and religious lenses. Because of their contextuality and subsequent intellectualization, experiences in the religious sphere are limited. It is in this sense that we may refer to experiences which occur under the auspices of one or other of the religions as "religious experiences". Radhakrishnan spends little time dealing with "religious experiences" as they occur in specific religious traditions. And what little he does say is used to demonstrate the theological preconditioning and "religious" relativity of such experiences. However, "religious experiences" have value for Radhakrishnan insofar as they offer the possibility of heightening one's religious consciousness and bringing one into ever closer proximity to "religious intuition". <…>

To Radhakrishnan's mind, religious intuition is not only an autonomous form of experience, but a form of experience which informs and validates all spheres of life and experience. Philosophical, artistic, and ethical values of truth, beauty, and goodness are not known through the senses or by reason. Rather, "they are apprehended by intuition or faith…" (…). For Radhakrishnan, religious intuition informs, conjoins, and transcends an otherwise fragmentary consciousness.

Informing Radhakrishnan's interpretation of religious intuition is his affirmation of the identity of the self and ultimate reality. Throughout his life, Radhakrishnan interpreted the Upaniṣadic mahavakya, *tat tvam asi*, as a declaration of the non-duality (advaita) of Atman and Brahman. His advaitic interpretation allows him to affirm the ineffability of the truth behind the formula. Radhakrishnan readily appropriates his acceptance of the non-dual experience to his interpretation of religious intuition. Radhakrishnan not only claimed to find support for his views in the Upaniṣads, but believed that, correctly understood, the ancient sages

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expounded his interpretation of religious intuition. Any attempt at interpretation of the intuition could only approximate the truth of the experience itself. As the ultimate realization, religious intuition must not only account for and bring together all other forms of experience, but must overcome the distinctions between them. Radhakrishnan goes so far as to claim that intuition of this sort is the essence of religion. All religions are informed by it, though all fail to varying degrees to interpret it. "Here we find the essence of religion, which is a synthetic realization of life. The religious man has the knowledge that everything is significant, the feeling that there is harmony underneath the conflicts and the power to realize the significance and the harmony" (…).

With this, the present discussion of intuition and the varieties of experience has come full circle. Radhakrishnan identifies intuition – in all its contextual varieties – with integral experience. The two expressions are, for Radhakrishnan, synonymous. Integral experience coordinates and synthesizes the range of life's experiences. It furnishes the individual with an ever-deepening awareness of and appreciation for the unity of Reality. As an intuition, integral experience is not only the basis of all experience but the source of all creative ingenuity, whether such innovation be philosophical, scientific, moral, artistic, or religious. Moreover, not only does integral experience find expression in these various spheres of life, but such expression, Radhakrishnan believes, quickens the intuitive and creative impulse among those it touches.

c. Religious Pluralism

Radhakrishnan's hierarchy of religions is well-known. "Hinduism," Radhakrishnan affirms, "accepts all religious notions as facts and arranges them in the order of their more or less intrinsic significance": "The worshippers of the Absolute are the highest in rank; second to them are the worshippers of the personal God; then come the worshippers of the incarnations like Rama, Kṛṣṇa, Buddha; below them are those who worship ancestors, deities and sages, and the lowest of all are the worshippers of the petty forces and spirits" (…).

Radhakrishnan uses his distinctions between experience and interpretation, between religion and religions, to correlate his brand of Hinduism (that is, Advaita Vedanta) with religion itself. "Religion," Radhakrishnan holds, is "a kind of life or experience." It is an insight into the nature of reality (*darsana*), or experience of reality (*anubhava*). It is "a specific attitude of the self, itself and not other" (…). In a short, but revealing passage, Radhakrishnan characterizes religion in terms of "personal experience." It is "an independent functioning of the human mind,

something unique, possessing and autonomous character. It is something inward and personal which unifies all values and organizes all experiences. It is the reaction to the whole of man to the whole of reality. [It] may be called spiritual life, as distinct from a merely intellectual or moral or aesthetic activity or a combination of them" (…).

For Radhakrishnan, integral intuitions are the authority for, and the soul of, religion (…). It is here that we find a critical coalescence of ideas in Radhakrishnan's thinking. If, as Radhakrishnan claims, personal intuitive experience and inner realization are the defining features of Advaita Vedanta, and those same features are the "authority" and "soul" of religion as he understands it, Radhakrishnan is able to affirm with the confidence he does: "The Vedanta is not a religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance" (…).

For Radhakrishnan, Hinduism at its Vedantic best is religion. Other religions, including what Radhakrishnan understands as lower forms of Hinduism, are interpretations of Advaita Vedanta. Religion and religions are related in Radhakrishnan's mind as are experience and interpretation. The various religions are merely interpretations of his Vedanta. In a sense, Radhakrishnan "Hinduizes" all religions. Radhakrishnan appropriates traditional exegetical categories to clarify further the relationship: "We have spiritual facts and their interpretations by which they are communicated to others, śruti or what is heard, and smṛti or what is remembered. Śaṅkara equates them with pratyakṣa or intuition and anumana or inference. It is the distinction between immediacy and thought. Intuitions abide, while interpretations change" (…).

The apologetic force of this brief statement is clear. For Radhakrishnan, the intuitive, experiential immediacy of Advaita Vedanta is the genuine authority for all religions, and all religions as intellectually mediated interpretations derive from and must ultimately defer to Advaita Vedanta. Put succinctly: "While the experiential character of religion is emphasized in the Hindu faith, every religion at its best falls back on it" (…).

For Radhakrishnan, the religions are not on an even footing in their approximations and interpretations of a common experience. To the extent that all traditions are informed by what Radhakrishnan claims to be a common ground of experience (that is, Advaita Vedanta), each religion has value. At the same time, all religions as interpretations leave room for development and spiritual progress. "While no tradition coincides with experience, every tradition is essentially unique and valuable. While all traditions are of value, none is finally binding" (…). Moreover, according to Radhakrishnan, the value of each religion is determined by its proximity to Radhakrishnan's understanding of Vedanta.

Theme 7. Russian Philosophy

Aillen Kelly

Russian philosophy

(Kelly, Aileen. Russian philosophy // E. Craig (Ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. London: Routledge. Retrieved April 24, 2014. from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/E042)

Russian thought is best approached without fixed preconceptions about the nature and proper boundaries of philosophy. Conditions of extreme political oppression and economic backwardness are not conducive to the flowering of philosophy as a purely theoretical discipline; academic philosophy was hence a latecomer on the Russian scene, and those (such as the Neo-Kantians of the end of the nineteenth century…) who devoted themselves to questions of ontology and epistemology were widely condemned for their failure to address the country's pressing social problems. Since Peter the Great's project of Westernization, Russian philosophy has been primarily the creation of writers and critics who derived their ideals and values from European sources and focused on ethics, social theory and the philosophy of history, in the belief that (as Marx put it in his 'Theses on Feuerbach') philosophers had hitherto merely interpreted the world: the task was now to change it. This passionate social commitment generated much doctrinaire fanaticism, but it also inspired the iconoclastic tendency made philosophically respectable by Nietzsche: the revaluation of values from an ironic outsider's perspective. The principal contribution of Russian thinkers to world culture has so far consisted not in systems, but in experiments in the theory and practice of human emancipation. Some of these led to the Russian Revolution, while others furnished remarkably accurate predictions of the nature of utopia in power. Like Dostoevskii's character Shigalyov who, starting from the ideal of absolute freedom, arrived by a strict logical progression at the necessity of absolute despotism, Russian philosophers have specialized in thinking through (and sometimes acting out) the practical implications of the most seductive visions of liberty that Europe has produced over the last 200 hundred years.

1. The development of Russian philosophy

What Nikolay Berdiaev called the 'Russian Idea' – the eschatological quest that is the most distinctive feature of Russian philosophy – can be explained in terms of Russian history. The Mongol yoke from the

twelfth to the fourteenth century cut Russia off from Byzantium (from which it had received Christianity) and from Europe: it had no part in the ferment of the Renaissance. Its rise as a unified state under the Moscow Tsardom followed closely on the fall of the Orthodox Byzantine Empire, and the emerging sense of Russian national identity incorporated a messianic element in the form of the monk Philotheus' theory of Moscow as the 'Third Rome', successor to Rome and Constantinople as guardian of Christ's truth in its purity (…). 'There will not be a fourth', ran the prophecy: the Russian Empire would last until the end of the world. Russian thought remained dominated by the Greek patristic tradition until the eighteenth century, when the Kievan thinker Grigory Skovoroda (sometimes described as Russia's first philosopher) developed a religious vision based on a synthesis of ancient and patristic thought. He had no following; by the mid-century Russia's intellectual centre was St Petersburg, where Catherine the Great, building on the achievements of her predecessor Peter, sought to promote a Western secular culture among the educated elite with the aid of French Enlightenment ideas. But representatives of the 'Russian Enlightenment' were severely punished when they dared to cite the *philosophes'* concepts of rationality and justice in criticism of the political status quo (…). The persecution of advanced ideas (which served to strengthen the nascent intelligentsia's self-image as the cultural and moral leaders of their society) reached its height under Nicolas I (1825–1855), when philosophy departments were closed in the universities, and thought went underground. Western ideas were the subject of intense debate in small informal circles of students, writers and critics, the most famous of which in Moscow and St Petersburg furnished the philosophical education of such intellectual leaders as the future socialists Alexander Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin, the novelist and liberal Ivan Turgenev, the literary critic Vissarion Belinsky (from whose 'social criticism' Soviet Socialist Realism claimed descent), and the future Slavophile religious philosophers Ivan Kireevskii and Alexey Khomiakov (…). As a critic has noted: 'In the West there is theology and there is philosophy; Russian thought, however, is a third concept'; one which (in the tsarist intellectual underground as in its Soviet successor) embraced novelists, poets, critics, religious and political thinkers – all bound together by their commitment to the goals of freedom and justice.

In the 1830s these beleaguered individuals encountered German Idealism: an event of decisive significance for the future development of Russian thought. The teleological structures of idealist thought provided Russian intellectuals with a redemptive interpretation of their conflicts and struggles as a necessary stage in the dialectical movement of history

towards a transcendent state of harmony. Idealism (notably in its Hegelian forms …) left its mark on the vocabulary of subsequent Russian philosophy, but its principal legacy was the belief, shared by the vast majority of Russian thinkers, that an 'integral worldview', a coherent and unified vision of the historical process and its goal, was the essential framework both for personal moral development and social theorizing. The question of history's goal became a matter for intense debate among the intelligentsia with the publication in 1836 of Pyotr Chaadaev's 'Philosophical Letter', which posed Russia's relationship to the West as a central philosophical problem, maintaining that Russia's historical separation from the culture of Western Christianity precluded its participation in the movement of history towards the establishment of a universal Christian society. Chaadaev's version of the march of progress was much indebted to French Catholic conservatism, while the nationalist riposte to his ideas drew heavily on the Romantics' critique of the Age of Reason and Schelling's organic conception of nationhood: the Slavophiles held that Western culture was in a state of terminal moral and social decline, suffering from an excess of rationalism, which had led to social atomization and the fragmentation of the individual psyche (…). These divisions could be healed only by religious faith in its purest form, Russian Orthodoxy, whose spirit of organic 'togetherness', uncontaminated by Western rationalism, they presented as a model for Russian society and a beacon for mankind. They thereby laid the foundations of a distinctively Russian tradition of cultural and religious messianism which includes Dostoevskii's political writings, the Pan-Slavist and Eurasian movements (…), and the apocalyptic vision of Berdiaev, whose philosophy was highly popular among the Soviet underground.

Secular and Westernist thinkers tended to be scarcely less messianic in their response to Chaadaev's pessimism. The first philosophers of Russian liberalism (…) interpreted their country's past and future development in the light of Hegel's doctrine of the necessary movement of all human societies towards the incarnation of Reason in the modern constitutional state, while the Russian radical tradition was shaped successively by the eschatological visions of the French utopian socialists, the Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. Herzen defined the distinctive characteristic of Russian radical thought as the 'implacable spirit of negation' with which, unrestrained by the European's deference to the past, it applied itself to the task of freeing mankind from the transcendent authorities invented by religion and philosophy; and the radical populist tradition that he founded argued that the 'privilege of backwardness', by permitting Russia to learn both from the achievements and the mistakes of the

West, had placed it in the vanguard of mankind's movement towards liberty.

Russian religious philosophers tended to see themselves as prophets, pointing the way to the regeneration of human societies through the spiritual transformation of individuals. Vladimir Solovyov (regarded by many Russians as their greatest philosopher) believed that his country's mission was to bring into being the Kingdom of God on Earth in the form of a liberal theocracy, which would integrate knowledge and social practice and unite the human race under the spiritual rule of the Pope and the secular rule of the Russian tsar. His metaphysics of 'All-Unity' was a dominant force in the revival of religious and idealist philosophy in Russia in the early twentieth century, inspiring an entire generation of thinkers who sought to reinterpret Christian dogma in ways that emphasized the links of spiritual culture and religious faith with institutional and social reform, and progress in all other aspects of human endeavour. Among them were leading Russian émigré philosophers after 1917, such as Semyon Frank, Sergei Bulgakov (who sought to create a new culture in which Orthodox Christianity would infuse every area of Russian life), Nikolai Berdiaev (who was strongly influenced by the messianic motifs in Solovyov), and Hessen, who offered a Neo-Kantian and Westernist interpretation of the notion of 'All-Unity'. A number of émigré philosophers (notably Ivan Ilyin and Boris Vysheslavtsev) interpreted Bolshevism as the expression of a spiritual crisis in modern industrialized cultures. Many blamed the Russian Revolution on infection from a culturally bankrupt West which (echoing the Slavophiles, Dostoevsky and Leontiev) they presented as corrupted by rationalism, positivism, atheism and self-centred individualism (although few have gone as far as the fiercely polemical Alexey Losev who, up until his death in the Soviet Union in 1988, maintained that electric light expressed the spiritual emptiness of 'Americanism and machine-production'). Most maintained historiosophical optimism throughout the catastrophes of the first half of the twentieth century, which Berdiaev saw as a precondition for messianic regeneration, while Hessen believed that religious and cultural values would emerge triumphant from the carnage in a dialectical *Aufhebung*.

2. Major themes in Russian philosophy

The main impetus of Russian philosophy has always been towards the future, as its representatives strained to discern the features of the 'new man' (the term favoured by the left from the 1860s, with the addition of the adjective 'Soviet' after 1917), or the 'integral personality', as

Slavophiles and neo-idealists preferred to describe the individual who would one day be free from the cognitive and moral defects that had hitherto prevented mankind from realizing its potential. The nature of these flaws and the specifications of the regenerated human being were the subject of bitter disputes between rival movements. Even on the left, models of the 'new man' varied widely, from the narrow rationalist who was the ideal of the 'nihilists' of the 1860s (…) and subsequently of Vladimir Lenin_and Georgy Plekhanov, to Bakunin's eternal rebel, who would embody the spontaneous spirit of freedom in defiance of all established authorities and orders. At the end of the nineteenth century, in the cultural ferment produced by new movements in philosophy and the arts emanating from the West, radical thinkers began *en masse* to renounce their predominantly rationalist models of the individual and society in period of Russian Religious-Philosophical Renaissance. Nietzsche's Superman had a pervasive influence on the ensuing 'revaluation of values', undertaken with the aim of formulating moral and social ideals that would embrace the manysidedness of human creativity (…). Some radical philosophers (such as Berdiaev and Frank), in the process of moving from Marxism to neo-idealism, sought to reconcile Nietzsche's aesthetic immoralism with Christian ethics, while the 'Empiriocriticist' group of Bolsheviks attempted to inject Russian Marxist philosophy with an element of heroic voluntarism by synthesizing it with Nietzschean self-affirmation and the pragmatism of Ernst Mach (…). Nietzschean influences combined with the mechanistic scientism of Soviet Marxism in the Soviet model of the 'new man' (whose qualities Lysenko's genetics suggested could be inherited by successive generations). In the post-Stalin 'thaw' some Soviet philosophers, including Evald Ilyenkov and Merab Mamardashvili, began a critical rereading of Marx's texts from an anthropocentric standpoint which emphasized the unpredictable and limitless potential of human consciousness (…).

This open-ended view of progress (officially encouraged in the Gorbachev period) is uncommon in Russian philosophy, where epistemological scepticism is more often to be encountered in uneasy combinations with eschatological faith. Like other rootless groups, Russian intellectuals were drawn to compensating certainties that seemed capable of resisting their corrosive critique. The radical humanism of much Russian thought placed it at the forefront of the developing critical insistence on the context-dependent nature of truth; but many thinkers who attacked the claims of systems and dogmas to encompass and explain the experi-

ence and creative needs of living individuals in specific historical contexts, nevertheless retained a belief in a final, ideal state of being in which the fragmentation of knowledge would be overcome and all human purposes would coincide: a condition for whose principles some looked to science, others to religious revelation. The nihilists, who rejected metaphysics and all that could not be proven by rational and empirical methods, fervently believed that progress would inevitably lead to the restoration of a natural state of harmony between the individual and society. The empiriocriticist movement within Russian Marxism opposed the idolatry of formulas with the claim that experience and practice were the sole criteria of truth, but the group's leading philosopher, A. Bogdanov, looked forward to a metascience that would unify the fragmented world of knowledge by reducing 'all the discontinuities of our experience to a principle of continuity', predicting that under communism, when all would share the same modes of organizing experience, the phenomenon of individuals with separate mental worlds would cease to exist. Solovyov's pervasive influence on subsequent Russian religious idealism owed much to the charms of his vision of 'integral knowledge' and 'integral life' in an 'integral society'. Religious and socialist motifs were combined in some visions of an earthly paradise, such as Bulgakov's 'Christian Socialism', or Maxim Gorky's and Anatoly Lunarcharsky's creed of 'God-building', which called for worship of the collective humanity of the socialist future. In the revolutionary ferment of the first two decades of the twentieth century many religious and radical philosophers, together with Symbolist writers and poets, envisaged the leap to the harmonious future in apocalyptic terms: the novelist and critic Dmitry Merezhkovsky prophesied the coming of a 'New Christianity' which would unite Christian faith with pagan self-affirmation in a morality beyond good and evil (…). In the aftermath of 1917 some thinkers (notably Berdiaev and members of the Eurasian movement) found consolation in apocalyptic fantasies of a new light from the East shining on the ruins of European culture.

Herzen memorably ascribed such doctrinaire utopianism to the Russian tendency to march 'in fearless ranks to the very limit and beyond it, in step with the dialectic, but out of step with the truth'. The most original and subversive Russian thinker, he was the first of a significant minority who directed the iconoclastic thrust of Russian philosophy against all forms, without exception, of messianic faith. Contending that there was no basis in experience for the belief in a purposeful universe on which the great optimistic systems of the nineteenth century were

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built, he urged his contemporaries to adapt their categories to the flow of life, to accept (and even welcome) the dominant role of contingency in human existence, on the grounds that individual freedom and responsibility were possible only in an unprogrammed world.Herzen's critique of the claims of metaphysical systems to predict or regulate the course of history was echoed by the 'subjective sociology' developed by N. Mikhailovsky and Pyotr Lavrov in opposition to the deterministic scientism of the dominant Russian radical tradition. Leo Tolstoi_pointed to the chanciness of life and history in order to demonstrate the inadequacy of all attempts to formulate general rules for human societies; Dostoevsky confronted the systematizers with the lived experience of human freedom as the ability to be unpredictable; in their symposium of 1909 (frequently cited in the West as a pioneering analysis of the psychology of political utopianism) the neo-idealists of the *Signposts* movement explored the ways in which obsession with an ideal future impoverishes and distorts perception of the historical present (…).

Under the Soviet system a few representatives of this anti-utopian tradition ingeniously evaded the pressure on philosophers (backed up by the doctrine of the 'partyness' of truth …) to endorse the official myths of utopia in power. The history of the novel form was the vehicle for Bakhtin's reflections on the 'unfinalizability' of human existence (…M. M.Bakhtin); similar insights were expressed by the cultural-historical school of psychology established by Leo Vygotsky, who drew on Marx to counter the mechanistic determinism of Soviet Marxist philosophy with a view of consciousness as a cultural artefact capable of self-transcendence and self-renewal. In the 1960s Soviet psychologists and philosophers such as Ilyenkov helped to revive an interest in ethics with their emphasis on the individual as the centre of moral agency, while in its historical studies of culture as a system of semiotic signs, the Moscow-Tartu school brought a richly documented and undoctrinaire approach to important moral and political topics.

The insights of some of these individuals and movements into the attractions and delusions of utopian thought are lent added conviction by their own often spectacularly unsuccessful efforts to overcome what Nietzsche called 'the craving for metaphysical comfort'. Tolstoy was torn all his life beween his pluralist vision and his need for dogmatic moral certainties, while Dostoevskii in his last years preached an astonishingly crude variety of religio-political messianism. The humanism of some later religious philosophers (including the *Signposts* authors Berdiaev and Bulgakov) is hard to reconcile with their eschatological impatience.