Т. Г. Скороходова

AREAS OF PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

Учебно-методическое пособие

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Р е ц е н з е н т

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Представлены материалы, позволяющие изучать области фи-
лософского знания. Приведены темы и задачи семинаров, тексты
для чтения и работы с ними, вопросы к экзамену и список литера-
туры и интернет-ресурсов для самостоятельной работы обучаю-
щихся.
Издание предназначено для семинарских занятий студентов,
изучающих курс философии на английском языке.

Tutorial book contents the materials for study areas of philosoph-
ical enquiry. The one is intended for practical classes of students of Phi-
losophy in English gives the theme questions and tasks, texts for read-
ings and work, questions for the exam and list of literature and Internet-
sites for individual student work.

CONTENTS

SUBJECT'S SYLLABUS

Theme 1. Ontology.

Ontology as philosophical conception on the being. Being category in a philosophy. Being problem's aspects. Unity and diversity of world. Particularity of reasoning about the being. Being as universal, peculiar and individual. Being of Nature (of things, processes, states). Human's being. Being of Society. Being of material and spiritual. Бытие материального и духовного. Ontology in the system of philosophical knowledge. Ontology in Indian philosophical schools. Ancient Greek ontology and its particularity. Western classical ontology. Non-classical ontology in XXth century. Main ontological problems and categories.

Theme 2. Anthropology.

Anthropology as philosophical science. Human as object of as philosophical analysis. Anthropogenesis: natural sciences and philosophical aspects. Biological and social in human being. Body and spirit foundations of person. Typologies of human being. Individual, individuality, personality. The Human and his relations with the World. The activity as essence of human being. The Problem of Other (I and You). The Problem of society (I and We) The Human and Nature. The Human and the Culture. Fundamentals of the human being: irreducibility, non-predetermination, indispensability, uniqueness, ineffability. Human's being phenomena: freedom, happiness, suffering, love, creativity, work, play, belief, death. The meaning of life. Metaphysics and sociology of Human's Being.

Theme 3. Axiology.

Axiology is theory of values. Genesis of axiology as peculiar sub-discipline in philosophy: I. Kant, W. Windelband, H. Rickert, W. Dilthey, O. Spengler. The category of value. Regulating character of values. Values and estimates. Values, imperatives and norms. Values in a system of culture. Individual and social values, its combination. Freedom and rights of a person. Moral values. The universal, the peculiar and the national in the morality. "The golden rule of a morality". Morality and religion. Religious values. National and world religion. Political and legal values. Aesthetic values.

Theme 4. Philosophy of Consciousness.

The category of consciousness. Consciousness' problem in philosophy. Natural scientific and philosophical interpretation of consciousness. Correlation of categories "consciousness", "thinking", "mind", "intellect", "mentality". Genesis of human consciousness. Language and communication's role in development of consciousness. Social nature of consciousness. Consciousness as highest structuring and controlling activity. Structure and forms of consciousness. Self-consciousness. Objectivity and reflectivity of consciousness.

Theme 5. Epistemology.

Genesis and development of cognition. Cognition as philosophical analysis' object. Classical and Non-classical interpretations of cognition. Cognition as comprehension of Truth. Truth and its criteria. Category and structure of knowledge. Sensual and rational cognition, its unity in a Modern cognitive model. Notion as general form of rational cognition. General rational methods of cognition: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction, generalization, comparison, idealization. Observation, measurement and experiment in cognition. Creation and intuition. Explanation and understanding. Science and scientific knowledge: peculiar evidences. Nature sciences and humanities: features and models.

Theme 6. Philosophy of Nature.

Nature as philosophical thinking's object. Forms of perceiving of nature in the history of culture. Abiotic and biotic nature. Problem of life: its value and origin. Biology and philosophy in cognition of a life and the living. Natural and artificial environment. Nature and Human intercourse. "Second nature". Harmony and conflict between nature and culture. Destruction of a natural environment and the global ecological problem in the Modern world. Ecological safety.

Theme 7. Social philosophy.

Correlation of natural and social worlds. Social reality. Forms of social reality's being: space and time. Category of society as sociocultural system. Sub-systems, components and elements of society. Social relations. Solidarity and conflict, equality and difference, parity and

hierarchy, power and dependency, power and property. Social communities and social institutions is components of social reality. Society reproducing process and its types. Approaches to society interpretation in a history of philosophy. Main periods in the development of social-philosophical thought. Models of a social reality: the realistic, the naturalistic, the active, the phenomenological. Philosophy of history and Social philosophy. Society's functioning and development in the time. Category of historicism. History as a process. Historical time's models: cyclic, linear and pendulum. History and freedom. Social progress' hypothesis. Modernization problem and a choice of aims in development of modern societies. Global problems in modern time in Philosophy of history context.

Theme 8. Philosophy of Culture.

Philosophical category of culture. Culture as social life phenomenon. Interpretation of culture. Culture and values. Complex of inter-related programs of thinking, sense and behavior. Development of culture. Sources and mechanisms of sociocultural changes. Culture and civilization. Tradition and novation in culture. Inner and external determination in culture. Spheres of culture: language, literature, morality, social norms, religion, philosophy, science, technics. Social function of a culture, Correlation of universal and national in a culture. Diversity of culture. Dialogue of culture as phenomenon. West–East intercourse.

Main goals of mastering subject

1) Formation of entire representation about philosophy as kind of knowledge, which seeks to create the holistic picture of the world and methodology of its cognition.
2) Consideration of the most important philosophical traditions and Modern philosophical thought.
3) Introducing into the main spheres of philosophical knowledge and its basic categories.
4) Understanding of philosophers' role in the formulation and solution of contemporary problems.

Instructional guidance for individual students' work

Themes for individual student's work repeat and deepen lecture themes and help to develop appropriate knowledge, skills and application.

The individual work on all discipline themes includes the preparation for class study, writing essay, preparation for achievement tests assessment and the exam.

Preparation for class study includes reading of lecture abstract, working with the textbooks and add literature (with abstracting of the topic content), formulating own position on debated issue (if debating provided). Reading of philosophical text-sources or the articles on the topic can be provided for explication of the main ideas.

Writing essay are provides the individual study of philosophical systems or questions and its describing on the paper (write or print forms are possible). Volume of essays is from 7 to 10 pages in print variant and from 10 to 15 lists in wrote variant. Concludes in the essay is required. Students must be able to generalize and to conclude on the described.

Preparation for achievement tests assessment includes working with the lecture abstracts, the textbooks and practical class abstract on the considered themes.

PRACTICAL CLASSES SCHEDULE

Theme 1. Ontology.

Purposes: 1) Create the general representation of ontology as the area of philosophical enquiry, its domain and the method and the role in cognition. 2) Reveal the world-view significance of the ontology for the human and society.

The questions

1. Ontology as philosophical conception on the being.
2. Being of Nature (of things, processes, states).
3. Human's being and being of society.
4. Ontological problems and its resolving different philosophical tradition (Indian, Ancient Greek, Western classical and Non-classical ontology).

Task

1) Read the text of the articles.
2) Write out main definition of ontology.
3) What problems exists in the area of philosophical knowledge?
4) List degrees, kinds and properties of being. Definite them.

Theme 2. Anthropology

Purposes: 1) Introduce the content of anthropology as the area of philosophical enquiry. 2) Reveal the world-view significance of anthropological questions and problems. 3) Represent the main trends of anthropology and its categorical apparatus.

The questions

1. Anthropology as philosophical science. Human as object of as philosophical analysis. Fundamentals of the human being.
2. Anthropogenesis: natural sciences and philosophical aspects. Biological and social in human being.
3. Typologies of human being. Individual, individuality, personality.
4. The Human and his relations with the World. The Problem of Other (I and You). The Problem of society (I and We). The Human and Nature. The Human and the Culture.
5. Human's being phenomena. The meaning of life.

Task

1) Read the text of the articles.

2) Write out main definitions, ideas and philosophical problems in the sphere.

3) Formulate your own answer to the question on the nature and essence of man.

4) Discuss the main ideas of philosophical anthropology.

Essay themes

1. Freedom of Human.
2. Happiness and suffering of the Human.
3. The Human and creativity
4. The Human and Nature.
5. The Human and Society.
6. The Human and the Culture.
7. Freedom and rights of a person.

Theme 3. Axiology

Purposes: 1) Introduce the problem area of axiology in connection of value theories. 2) Representl the world-view significance of the study of value and its meaning in human and social life. 3) Describe the language and categories of axiological discourse.

The questions

1. Genesis of axiology as peculiar sub-discipline in philosophy.

2. Axiology is theory of values. The category of value. Values in a system of culture.

3. Regulating character of values. Individual and social values, its combination.

4. Types of values: moral, religious, political and legal, aesthetic.

Task

1) Read the text of the articles.

2) Write out main definitions of axiology, value and ethics

3) Mark main notions of the theme and definite them.

4) Discuss the examples of ethical problem in human and social life.

Essay themes

1. Moral values.
2. Religious values.
3. Aesthetic values.
4. Political values.
5. Legal values.

Theme 4. Philosophy of Consciousness.

Purposes: 1) Define the main spheres of philosophy of consciousness. 2) Describe the structure and forms of human consciousness. 3) Discuss the social hature of consciousness.

The questions

1. Consciousness' problem in philosophy. Natural scientific and philosophical interpretation of consciousness.
2. Genesis of human consciousness. Structure and forms of consciousness.
3. Social nature of consciousness.
4. Consciousness as highest structuring and controlling activity. Self- consciousness.

Task

1) Read the text of the article.
2) Write out main terms and approaches to understanding of consciousness.
3) Mark contemporary theotries of consciousness and try to summarize its cintent briefly.
4) Compare your results in discussion.

Theme 5. Epistemology.

Purposes: 1) Define the problem area of epistemology and describe its trends 2) Describe the structure of knowledge; 3) Present the general rational methods of cognition.

The questions

1. Genesis and development of cognition. Cognition as object of philosophical analysis.

2. Cognition as comprehension of Truth. Truth and its criteria.

3. Category and structure of knowledge.

4. Sensual and rational cognition, its unity in a Modern cognitive model.

5. Notion as general form of rational cognition.

6. General rational methods of cognition: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction, generalization, comparison, idealization, observation, measurement and experiment.

7. Science and scientific knowledge: peculiar evidences.

8. Nature sciences and humanities: features and models. Explanation and understanding.

Task

1) Read the text of the articles.

2) Write out main terms, notions, and its definitions.

3) List the sources and problems in epistemology, Try to definite them briefly.

4) Compare your results in discussion.

Theme 6. Philosophy of Nature.

Purposes: 1) Offer the general presentation of philosophy of nature as a field of knowledge. 2) Describe the complex interaction between Hhuman and nature. 3) Define global ecological problems in contemporary world.

The questions

1. Nature as philosophical thinking's object. Forms of perceiving of nature in the history of culture.

2. Abiotic and biotic nature. Problem of life: its value and origin.

3. Nature and Human intercourse. Harmony and conflict between nature and culture.

4. Destruction of a natural environment and the global ecological problem in the Modern world.

Task

1) Read the text of the articles.

2) Write out main notions and its definitions.

3) Mark main trends of philosophical study of nature.

Theme 7. Social philosophy.

Purposes: 1) Describe the problematic field of social philosophy. 2) Give the defibition and content of philosophy of history. 3) Introduce the notion of society as socio-cultural system.

The questions

1. Approaches to society interpretation in a history of philosophy: main periods in the development of social-philosophical thought.

2. Social reality and its forms of being: space and time. Society reproducing process.

3. Society as sociocultural system. Its sub-systems, components and elements.

4. Models of a social reality: the realistic, the naturalistic, the active, the phenomenological.

5. Philosophy of history: society's functioning and development in the time. Historical time's models: cyclic, linear and pendulum.

6. Social progress' hypothesis. Modernization problem and a choice of aims in development of modern societies.

7. Global problems in modern time in philosophy of history context.

Task

1) Read the text of the articles.

2) Write out main notions and its definitions conscerning to the society.

3) What questions and problems are discussed in the field of social philosophy?

4) What questions and problems are discussed in the field of political philosophy?

Essay themes

1. Approaches to society interpretation in a history of philosophy.
2. Social relations.
3. Social communities as components of social reality.
4. Social institutions is components of social reality.
5. Social structure of society.
6. Problem of social progress.

Theme 8. Philosophy of Culture.

Purposes: 1) Create the general representation of philosophy of culture. 2) Present the significant trends in the area of philosophy and its categorical apparatus. 3) Give a notion of culture-s development.

The questions

1. Philosophical category of culture. Interpretation of culture, its social function.
2. Development of culture. Tradition and novation, universal and national in a culture.
3. Spheres of culture: language, literature, morality, social norms, religion, philosophy, science, technics.
4. Diversity of culture. Dialogue of culture as phenomenon. West–East intercourse.

Task

1) Read the text of the articles.
2) Write out main notions and definitions.
3) List the main problems of philosophical study of culture.

Essay themes

1. Culture as social life phenomenon.
2. Culture and civilization.
3. Sources and mechanisms of sociocultural changes.
4. Language as sphere of culture.
5. Literature as sphere of culture.
6. Art as sphere of culture.
7. Religion as sphere of culture.
8. Philosophy as sphere of culture.
9. Science as sphere of culture.
10. Technics as sphere of culture.

PROVISIONAL LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR THE EXAM

1. Ontology as philosophical conception on the Being.

2. Being of Nature (of things, processes, states). Human's being and being of society.

3. Ontological problems and its resolving different philosophical tradition (Indian, Ancient Greek, Western classical and Non-classical ontology).

4. Anthropology as philosophical science. Human as object of as philosophical analysis. Fundamentals of the human being.

5. Anthropogenesis: natural sciences and philosophical aspects. The biological and the social in human being. Fundamentals of the human being.

6. Typologies of human being. Body and spirit foundations of person. Individual, individuality, personality.

7. The Human and his relations with the World. The Problem of Other (I and You). The Problem of society (I and We). The Human's relations to the Nature and the Culture.

8. Human's being phenomena. The meaning of life.

9. Genesis of axiology as peculiar sub-discipline in philosophy: I. Kant, W. Windelband, H. Rickert, W. Dilthey, O. Spengler.

10. Axiology is theory of values. The category of value. Values in a system of culture.

11. Regulating character of values. Individual and social values, its combination.

12. Types of values: moral, religious, political and legal, aesthetic.

13. Consciousness' problem in philosophy. Natural scientific and philosophical interpretation of consciousness.

14. Genesis of human consciousness. Social nature of consciousness.

15. Consciousness as highest structuring and controlling activity. Structure and forms of consciousness.

16. Genesis and development of cognition. Cognition as philosophical analysis' object.

17. Cognition as comprehension of Truth. Truth and its criteria.

18. Category and structure of knowledge. Sensual and rational cognition, its unity in a Modern cognitive model.

19. General rational methods of cognition: analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, abstraction, generalization, comparison, idealization, observation, measurement and experiment.

20. Science and scientific knowledge. Nature sciences and humanities: features and models.

21. Nature as philosophical thinking's object. Forms of nature perceiving in the history of culture.

22. Abiotic and biotic nature. Problem of life: its value and origin.

23. Nature and Human intercourse. Harmony and conflict between nature and culture.

24. Destruction of a natural environment and the global ecological problem in the Modern world.

25. Approaches to society interpretation in a history of philosophy: main periods in the development of social-philosophical thought.

26. Social reality and its forms of being: space and time. Society reproducing process.

27. Society as sociocultural system. Sub-systems, components and elements of society.

28. Models of a social reality: the realistic and the naturalistic.

29. Models of a social reality: the active and the phenomenological.

30. Philosophy of history: society's functioning and development in the time.

31. Social progress' hypothesis. Modernization problem and a choice of aims in development of modern societies.

32. Global problems in Modern time in philosophy of history context.

33. Philosophical category of culture. Interpretation of culture, its social function.

34. Development of culture. Tradition and novation, universal and national in a culture.

35. Spheres of culture: language, literature, morality, social norms, religion, philosophy, science, technics.

36. Diversity of culture. Dialogue of culture as phenomenon. West–East intercourse.

LITERATURE FOR THE COURSE

a) Basic reading.
1. Cave, P. Philosophy: a Beginner's Guide / P. Cave. – Oxford : Oneworld, 2012.
2. Perry, J. Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings / J. Perry, J. M. Fischer, M. Bratman. – N.Y. : Oxford University Press, 2013.
3. Stewart, D. Fundamentals of Philosophy / D. Stewart, H. Gene Blocker, J. Petrick. – 7th Edition. – Boston : Prentice Hall, 2010.

б) Supplementary reading.
1. Hocking William Ernest, Blanshard Brand, Hendel Charles William, Randall John Herman. Preface to Philosophy. Textbook. – N.Y. : Macmillan, 1947.
2. Nuttall, J. An Introduction to Philosophy Cambridge / J. Nuttall. – UK : Polity; Malden, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 2002.
3. Solomon, R. C. World Philosophy: a Etext with Readings / R. C. Solomon, K. M. Higgins. – N.Y. : McGraw-Hill, 1995.
4. Velasquez, M. Philosophy: A Text with Readings / M. Velasquez. – 7th ed. – Belmont, CA : Wadsworth Pub. Co., 1999.

в) Software and internet resources
1. URL: https://archive.org/
2. URL: http://global.britannica.com/
3. URL: http://www.dmoz.org/Society/Philosophy/
4. URL: http://www.iep.utm.edu/
5. URL: http://ocw.nd.edu/philosophy
6. URL: http://www.pdcnet.org/wp/
7. URL: http://philosophy.ru/
8. URL: http://philpapers.org/
9. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/
10. URL: www.rep.routledge.com/

TEXTS FOR READINGS ON THE THEMES

Theme 1. Ontology

Thomas Hofweber
Logic and Ontology
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/

1. Introduction

Both logic and ontology are important areas of philosophy covering large, diverse, and active research projects. These two areas overlap from time to time and problems or questions arise that concern both. <…> …The philosophical disciplines of logic and of ontology are themselves quite diverse and there is thus the possibility of many points of intersection. In the following we will first distinguish different philosophical projects that are covered under the terms "logic" and "ontology". <…>

'Logic' and 'ontology' are big words in philosophy, and different philosophers have used them in different ways. Depending on what these philosophers mean by these words, and, of course, depending on the philosopher's views, sometimes there are striking claims to be found in the philosophical literature about their relationship. <…>

3. Ontology
3.1. Different conceptions of ontology

As a first approximation, ontology is the study of what there is. Some contest this formulation of what ontology is, so it's only a first approximation. Many classical philosophical problems are problems in ontology: the question whether or not there is a god, or the problem of the existence of universals, etc. These are all problems in ontology in the sense that they deal with whether or not a certain thing, or more broadly entity, exists. But ontology is usually also taken to encompass problems about the most general features and relations of the entities which do exist. There are also a number of classic philosophical problems that are problems in ontology understood this way. For example, the problem of how a universal relates to a particular that has it (assuming there are universals and particulars), or the problem of how an event like John eating a cookie relates to the particulars John and the cookie, and the relation of eating, assuming there are events, particulars and relations. These kinds of problems quickly turn into metaphysics more generally, which is the philosophical discipline that encompasses ontology as one of its parts.

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The borders here are a little fuzzy. But we have at least two parts to the overall philosophical project of ontology: first, say what there is, what exists, what the stuff is reality is made out off, secondly, say what the most general features and relations of these things are.

This way of looking at ontology comes with two sets of problems which leads to the philosophical discipline of ontology being more complex than just answering the above questions. The first set of problems is that it isn't clear how to approach answering these questions. This leads to the debate about ontological commitment. The second set of problems is that it isn't so clear what these questions really are. This leads to the philosophical debate about meta-ontology. Lets look at them in turn.

One of the troubles with ontology is that it not only isn't clear what there is, it also isn't so clear how to settle questions about what there is, at least not for the kinds of things that have traditionally been of special interest to philosophers: numbers, properties, God, etc. Ontology is thus a philosophical discipline that encompasses besides the study of what there is and the study of the general features of what there is also the study of what is involved in settling questions about what there is in general, especially for the philosophically tricky cases. How we can find out what there is isn't an easy question to answer. It seems simple enough for regular objects that we can perceive with our eyes, like my house keys, but how should we decide it for such things as, say, numbers or properties? One first step to making progress on this question is to see if what we believe already rationally settles this question. That is to say, given that we have certain beliefs, do these beliefs already bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to such questions as 'Are there numbers?' If our beliefs bring with them a rational commitment to an answer to an ontological question about the existence of certain entities then we can say that we are committed to the existence of these entities. What precisely is required for such a commitment to occur is subject to debate, a debate we will look at momentarily. To find out what one is committed to with a particular set of beliefs, or acceptance of a particular theory of the world, is part of the larger discipline of ontology.

Besides it not being so clear what it is to commit yourself to an answer to an ontological question, it also isn't so clear what an ontological question really is, and thus what it is that ontology is supposed to accomplish. To figure this out is the task of meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology construed narrowly, but the study of what ontology is. However, like most philosophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed. Nonetheless it is helpful to

separate it out as a special part of ontology. Many of the philosophically most fundamental questions about ontology really are meta-ontological questions. Meta-ontology has not been too popular in the last couple of decades, partly because one meta-ontological view, the one often associated with Quine, has been accepted as the correct one, but this acceptance has been challenged in recent years in a variety of ways. One motivation for the study of meta-ontology is simply the question of what question ontology aims to answer. Take the case of numbers, for example. What is the question that we should aim to answer in ontology if we want to find out if there are numbers, that is, if reality contains numbers besides whatever else it is made up from? This way of putting it suggest an easy answer: 'Are there numbers?' But this question seems like an easy one to answer. An answer to it is implied, it seems, by trivial mathematics, say that the number 7 is less than the number 8. If the latter, then there is a number which is less than 8, namely 7, and thus there is at least one number. Can ontology be that easy? The study of meta-ontology will have to determine, amongst others, if 'Are there numbers?' really is the question that the discipline of ontology is supposed to answer, and more generally, what ontology is supposed to do. We will pursue these questions below. As we will see, several philosophers think that ontology is supposed to answer a different question than what there is, but they often disagree on what that question is.

The larger discipline of ontology can thus be seen as having four parts:

- (O1) the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to;
- (O2) the study of what there is;
- (O3) the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways;
- (O4) the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.

3.2. How the different conceptions of ontology are related to each other

The relationship between these four seems rather straightforward. (O4) will have to say how the other three are supposed to be understood. In particular, it will have to tell us if the question to be answered in (O2) indeed is the question what there is, which was taken above to be only a

first approximation for how to state what ontology is supposed to do. Maybe it is supposed to answer the question what is real instead, or what is fundamental, some other question. Whatever one says here will also affect how one should understand (O1). We will at first work with what is the most common way to understand (O2) and (O1), and discuss alternatives in turn. If (O1) has the result that the beliefs we share commit us to a certain kind of entity then this requires us either to accept an answer to a question about what there is in the sense of (O2) or to revise our beliefs. If we accept that there is such an entity in (O2) then this invites questions in (O3) about its nature and the general relations it has to other things we also accept. On the other hand, investigations in (O3) into the nature of entities that we are not committed to and that we have no reason to believe exist would seem like a rather speculative project, though, of course, it could still be fun and interesting.

Edward Craig

Metaphysics

https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/metaphysics

Metaphysics is a broad area of philosophy marked out by two types of inquiry. The first aims to be the most general investigation possible into the nature of reality: are there principles applying to everything that is real, to all that is? – if we abstract from the particular nature of existing things that which distinguishes them from each other, what can we know about them merely in virtue of the fact that they exist? The second type of inquiry seeks to uncover what is ultimately real, frequently offering answers in sharp contrast to our everyday experience of the world. Understood in terms of these two questions, metaphysics is very closely related to ontology, which is usually taken to involve both 'what is existence (being)?' and 'what (fundamentally distinct) types of thing exist?' (…).

The two questions are not the same, since someone quite unworried by the possibility that the world might really be otherwise than it appears (and therefore regarding the second investigation as a completely trivial one) might still be engaged by the question of whether there were any general truths applicable to all existing things. But although different, the questions are related: one might well expect a philosopher's answer to the first to provide at least the underpinnings of their answer to the second. Aristotle proposed the first of these investigations. He called it 'first philosophy', sometimes also 'the science of being' (more-or-less what 'ontology' means); but at some point in antiquity his writings on the topic

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came to be known as the 'metaphysics' – from the Greek for 'after natural things', that is, what comes after the study of nature. This is as much as we know of the origin of the word (…). It would, however, be quite wrong to think of metaphysics as a uniquely 'Western' phenomenon. Classical Indian philosophy, and especially Buddhism, is also a very rich source (…).

1. General metaphysics

Any attempt on either question will find itself using, and investigating, the concepts of being and existence (…). It will then be natural to ask whether there are any further, more detailed classifications under which everything real falls, and a positive answer to this question brings us to a doctrine of categories (…). The historical picture here is complex, however. The two main exponents of such a doctrine are Aristotle and Kant. In Aristotle's case it is unclear whether he saw it as a doctrine about things and their basic properties or about language and its basic predicates; whereas Kant quite explicitly used his categories as features of our way of thinking, and so applied them only to things as they appear to us, not as they really or ultimately are (see Kant, I.). Following on from Kant, Hegel consciously gave his categories both roles, and arranged his answer to the other metaphysical question (about the true underlying nature of reality) so as to make this possible (…).

An early, extremely influential view about reality seen in the most general light is that it consists of things and their properties – individual things, often called particulars, and properties, often called universals, that can belong to many such individuals (…). Very closely allied to this notion of an individual is the concept of substance, that in which properties 'inhere' (see Substance). This line of thought (which incidentally had a biological version in the concepts of individual creatures and their species) gave rise to one of the most famous metaphysical controversies: whether universals are real entities or not (…). In different ways, Plato and Aristotle had each held the affirmative view; nominalism is the general term for the various versions of the negative position (…).

The clash between realists and nominalists over universals can serve to illustrate a widespread feature of metaphysical debate. Whatever entities, forces and so on may be proposed, there will be a *prima facie* option between regarding them as real beings, genuine constituents of the world and, as it were, downgrading them to fictions or projections of our own ways of speaking and thinking (…). This was, broadly speaking, how nominalists wished to treat universals; comparable debates exist concerning causality (…), moral value (…) and necessity and possibility (see

Necessary truth and convention) – to name a few examples. Some have even proposed that the categories (see above) espoused in the Western tradition are reflections of the grammar of Indo-European languages, and have no further ontological status (…).

Wittgenstein famously wrote that the world is the totality of facts, not of things, so bringing to prominence another concept of the greatest generality (…). Presumably he had it in mind that exactly the same things, differently related to each other, could form very different worlds; so that it is not things but the states of affairs or facts they enter into which determine how things are. The apparent obviousness of the formula 'if it is true that p then it is a fact that 'p', makes it seem that facts are in one way or another closely related to truth (…) – although it should be said that not every philosophical view of the nature of truth is a metaphysical one, since some see it as just a linguistic device (see Truth, deflationary theories of) and some as a reflection, not of how the world is, but of human needs and purposes (…).

Space and time, as well as being somewhat elusive in their own nature, are further obvious candidates for being features of everything that exists (…). But that is controversial, as the debate about the existence of abstract objects testifies (…). We commonly speak, at least, as if we thought that numbers exist, but not as if we thought that they have any spatio-temporal properties (…). Kant regarded his things-in-themselves as neither spatial nor temporal; and some have urged us to think of God in the same way (…). There are accounts of the mind which allow mental states to have temporal, but deny them spatial properties (…).

Be all this as it may, even if not literally everything, then virtually everything of which we have experience is in time. Temporality is therefore one of the phenomena that should be the subject of any investigation which aspires to maximum generality. Hence, so is change (…). And when we consider change, and ask the other typically metaphysical question about it ('what is really going on when something changes?') we find ourselves faced with two types of answer. One type would have it that a change is an alteration in the properties of some enduring thing (see Continuants). The other would deny any such entity, holding instead that what we really have is merely a sequence of states, a sequence which shows enough internal coherence to make upon us the impression of one continuing thing (…). The former will tend to promote 'thing' and 'substance' to the ranks of the most basic metaphysical categories; the latter will incline towards events and processes (…). It is here that questions about identity over time become acute, particularly in the special case of those continuants (or, perhaps, processes), which are persons (…).

Two major historical tendencies in metaphysics have been idealism and materialism, the former presenting reality as ultimately mental or spiritual, the latter regarding it as wholly material (…). In proposing a single ultimate principle both are monistic (…). They have not had the field entirely to themselves. A minor competitor has been neutral monism, which takes mind and matter to be different manifestations of something in itself neither one nor the other (…). More importantly, many metaphysical systems have been dualist, taking both to be fundamental, and neither to be a form of the other (…). Both traditions are ancient. In modern times idealism received its most intensive treatment in the nineteenth century (…); in the second half of the twentieth century, materialism has been in the ascendant. A doctrine is also found according to which all matter, without actually being mental in nature, has certain mental properties (…).

2. Specific metaphysics

There is also metaphysics that arises in reference to particular subject matters, this being therefore metaphysical primarily with regard to the second question (what are things ultimately like? – or, what kinds of thing ultimately exist?) rather than the first. One of the most obvious cases, and historically the most prominent, is theology; we have already mentioned the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of mathematics and the theory of values. Less obviously, metaphysical issues also intrude on the philosophy of language and logic, as happens when it is suggested that any satisfactory theory of meaning will have to posit the existence of intensional entities, or that any meaningful language will have to mirror the structure of the world (seeIntensional entities; Logical atomism). The political theorist or social scientist who holds that successful explanation in the social sphere must proceed from properties of societies not reducible to properties of the individuals who make them up (thereby making a society an entity that is in a sense more basic than its members) raises a metaphysical issue (see Holism and individualism in history and social science). Metaphysics, as demarcated by the second question, can pop up anywhere.

The relationship with metaphysics is, however, particularly close in the case of science and the philosophy of science. Aristotle seems to have understood his 'first philosophy' as continuous with what is now called his physics, and indeed it can be said that the more fundamental branches of natural science are a kind of metaphysics as it is characterized here. For they are typically concerned with the discovery of laws and entities

that are completely general, in the sense that everything is composed of entities and obeys laws. The differences are primarily epistemological ones, the balance of a priori considerations and empirical detail used by scientists and philosophers in supporting their respective ontological claims. The *subject matter* of these claims can even sometimes coincide: during the 1980s the reality of possible worlds other than the actual one was maintained by a number of writers for a variety of reasons, some of them recognizably 'scientific', some recognizably 'philosophical' (…). And whereas we find everywhere in metaphysics a debate over whether claims should be given a realist or an antirealist interpretation, in the philosophy of science we find a parallel controversy over the status of the entities featuring in scientific theories (…).

It is true that there has been considerable reluctance to acknowledge any such continuity. A principal source of this reluctance has been logical positivism, with its division of propositions into those which are empirically verifiable and meaningful, and those which are not so verifiable and are either analytic or meaningless, followed up by its equation of science with the former and metaphysics with the latter (…). When combined with the belief that analytic truths record nothing about the world, but only about linguistic convention, this yields a total rejection of all metaphysics – let alone of any continuity with science. But apart from the fact that this line of thought requires acceptance of the principle about meaninglessness, it also makes a dubious epistemological assumption: that what we call science never uses non-empirical arguments, and that what we regard as metaphysics never draws on empirical premises. Enemies of obscurantism need not commit themselves to any of this; they can recognize the continuity between science and metaphysics without robbing anyone of the vocabulary in which to be rude about the more extravagant, ill-evidenced, even barely meaningful forms which, in the view of some, metaphysics has sometimes taken.

Even the philosopher with a low opinion of the prospects for traditional metaphysics can believe that there is a general framework which we in fact use for thinking about reality, and can undertake to describe and explore it. This project, which can claim an illustrious ancestor in Kant, has in the twentieth century sometimes been called descriptive metaphysics, though what it inquires into are our most general patterns of thought, and the nature of things themselves only indirectly, if at all. Though quite compatible with a low estimate of traditional metaphysics as defined by our two primary questions, it does imply that there is a small but fairly stable core of human thought for it to investigate. Hence it collides with the view of those who deny that there is any such thing (…).

Ch. A. Dubray

Ontology or General Metaphysics[1]

I. Being in General

The term 'being' is a participle used substantively. It expresses the most abstract and most universal idea, the simplest in ideal contents and the widest in its range of application. As it includes only the most common feature of all realities, it has the smallest connotation, and therefore the greatest extension.

Hence being cannot be defined, since to define is to unfold the connotation of an idea and, in the strictly logical definition, to indicate the proximate genus and the specific difference. As being is the highest and the most abstract idea, it has no genus; moreover any difference by which one would try to specify it would itself be some form of being. Nor is a definition necessary, for every mind understands at least vaguely the meaning of being, of thing, of reality. It is whatever exists or is capable of existing; whatever can be thought of positively; whatever is opposed to mere nothingness.

The negation of all being leads to the idea of absolute nothingness; the negation of a special being, to the idea of relative nothingness, such as blindness, death, etc. The comparison of being with nothingness leads at once to the principle of contradiction, which opposes being to its negation, and states that the same thing cannot at the same time and from the same point of view be and not be.

Although the idea of being is the most abstract, it represents something real. All existing beings are concrete, determined by many quantitative and qualitative characteristics, but these are overlooked in order to consider them only as beings. Ontology deals with real, not with logical being such as, for instance, the idea of nothingness, the relation of genus and species, the copula of a judgment, the relation of antecedent to conclusion in a syllogism. And among real objects, Ontology deals primarily with substances or beings existing in themselves, secondarily with accidents, which are a being's beings and exist only in the substance which they modify.

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[1] This text was written from the point of view of religious worldwiew, but contained important characteristics of the being.

II. Degrees and kinds of being.

1. Actus and Potentia. (a) The obvious facts of change, growth, development, imply the distinction between being as actuality and being as potency. The former signifies the complete, achieved, perfected being; the latter, the imperfect, incomplete, determinable being. Thus actus *is a perfection, a determination; potentia, a capacity, an aptitude in* regard to certain determinations which a being has not yet actually received or an activity which it is not actually exercising. The term 'faculty' has the same meaning as potentia, but is generally restricted to the mind. Potentia is therefore something positive and real, not a mere negation or absence, and it is used as the basis of real differences among beings. Thus we find in the acorn a potency to become an oak; in the sleeping man a potency to see, hear; reason; in oxygen and hydrogen a potency to combine into water; in the marble a potency to be carved into a statue; in the sculptor a potency to give to the marble its artistic shape. The developed oak, the act of reasoning, the water, the statue, the sculptor's actions, are the corresponding actualities.

(b) Hence, when referring to the same reality, the terms *actus-potentia* are mutually exclusive, since one implies its presence and the other its absence. But, as all creatures are capable of change, of further determination, of higher perfection, a mixture of many actualities and potencies is found in all, varying with every species and individual. There is more potency in the child than in the adult, yet the adult is capable of still higher perfection, is subject to many changes, and therefore possesses a multitude of potencies. <…>

…At one extreme of reality is found primary matter, which of itself has no determination whatever, and is indifferent to receive any determining substantial form and, in this sense can be said to have a certain negative infinity of indetermination. [In religious philosophy,] At the other extreme, God is a pure actuality, wholly determined by the positive infinity of all His perfections. Between these are the realities of the world with various degrees of perfection and of potency.

(c) *Actus* and *potentia* are *entitative* when they refer to what a thing is or is capable of becoming; *active*, when they refer to what a thing does or is able to do. The *potential* may be *proximate* or *remote* according as it can at once be followed by the actus, or requires transitional steps leading to it. The young child has only a remote potentia to study geometry; the adult may do so at once. Yet the beginner is not ready to master immediately the theorems of the third or fourth chapter, and the proximity and remoteness have many degrees.

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(d) *No potentia* can be known in itself, but only *through the knowledge of the corresponding actus*. The knowledge of what is meant by seeing, by a spherical shape, by an oak, by ice or vapor, is required in order to understand the corresponding potencies of a man, of a piece of wax, of an acorn, of water.

(e) In a given being, the patency must precede the corresponding actuality, since it means a positive aptitude to acquire it. Since, however, no being changes of itself but only owing to the activity of some other being, there could be no real *potentiae* and no real changes without a previous being *in actu*.

2. Existent and Possible Being. *Potentia* is not the same as possible being, for it supposes a real, although determinable and perfectible, subject in which it resides, while possibility of being means the *abstract capacity of the subject itself to exist*. A possible being as such is therefore simply an idea, the elements of which involve no contradiction. Yet possible being is not absolute nothingness, for nothingness is incapable of existence, and there is a real difference between the possible and the impossible.

Possibility is *intrinsic* when it means only the compatibility of the constitutive notes or ideal factors of a being; it is *extrinsic* when there are causes that are capable of bringing to existence a being already intrinsically possible. [In religious philosophy,] as God is omnipotent, He can give existence to whatever is in trinsically possible, but the causality of creatures is limited, and many things possible in themselves are not actually feasible. Not so many years ago flying machines, X-rays, wireless telegraph and telephone, were merely intrinsic possibilities which man had not yet been able to produce. Which things are possible, and under which conditions they are possible, the mind is often unable to decide. But where there is intrinsic impossibility, i.e. contradiction in the notes which the mind tries to bring together, there is absolute nothingness, and therefore necessarily extrinsic impossibility, not only with regard to creatures, but even with regard to God, who, for instance, cannot make a square circle, or a triangle whose angles together would not equal two right angles.

Hence the proximate reason of intrinsic possibility is found in the relations of compatibility which the mind perceives among its ideas. The ultimate reason is found in God who is the fulness of being, and the exemplar which things can imitate and participate in various degrees.

3. Essence and Existence. Existence is opposed to mere possibility and implies that, in the case of creatures, since they do not exist by themselves, a thing is not simply potential in its causes, but is actual. Essence

is conceived as receiving, or being actualized by, existence. The only difference between essence and possibility is that, while possibility excludes existence, essence neither excludes nor includes it, but by a process of abstraction overlooks or passes over the question of existence. The question: What is a thing? is answered primarily by assigning to this thing its constitutive notes, its individual or specific characteristics, i.e. by indicating its essence. Essence is really identical with nature, but while essence emphasizes the static or entitative aspect, nature emphasizes the dynamic or active aspect. To call one thing essential to another means that the latter can not exist without the former. Body and soul are the elements of the physical essence of man; animality and rationality, the elements of his logical essence or definition. But it is not essential to man to be six feet tall, to know chemistry, to play baseball, etc. A triangle is essentially a plane geometrical figure bounded by three straight lines; an equilateral triangle has essentially its three sides equal to one another; in neither case is the length of the sides or the area of the figure essential. <...>

In some cases it is possible to know the specific essences of things. Thus the essence of a chemical compound may be known by reference to its component elements; the essence of man is known by observation and reasoning. But in many cases also we have to be satisfied with the knowledge of generic essences, that is, of something that really belongs to the essence but includes several species, and to the genus we add properties and characteristic activities. Thus, I may know that certain beings belong to the genus animal without knowing their specific differences, or that a substance is a mineral without being able to give a strict definition of it.

4. Substance and Accident. (a) Beings *exist in them selves or require other beings in which they inhere*. The former are substances, the latter accidents. In a substantial being, substance, essence, and nature are identical, and differ only according to the point of view from which the being is considered. Substance and accidents always go together, and together form the concrete being, but generally the substance is more permanent and its accidents are more easily changeable. Substance then by itself is not a concrete core of reality supporting other concrete realities or accidents, but the concrete being is the substance affected by its accidents. Nor is it an inert support; it is also a nature, hence essentially dynamic, and it manifests itself by its activities. The distinction of substance and accidents is therefore known by the mental analysis of a concrete reality.

The denial of the reality of substances and the reduction of all realities to phenomena (Phenomenalism) or groups of qualities, is generally

the result of a misunderstanding of the true meaning of substance, and leads to the impossibility of accounting for the existence of the phenomena themselves. What was said elsewhere of the mind applies to all realities.

Aristotle numbers ten categories, or highest genera of realities, namely substance and nine accidents. Some of these have only a secondary importance, and the most important have already been considered elsewhere: quantity, quality, place, time, efficiency, in Cosmology. Hence a few words will be added here on relation and on causes in general.

(6) To consider a thing as *absolute* is to consider it *in itself* without any essential reference to anything else. To consider it as *relative* is *to consider it together with something else* in such a way that a relation essentially supposes two or several things, i.e. the terms of the relation, and a reason why they are referred to one another, i.e. the foundation of the relation. Thus a line in itself has a certain absolute length, but a relation of equality in length supposes several lines; a man possesses a certain feature, but in order to speak of similarity it is necessary to have several men with the same feature; steam may be understood by itself, but there must be some machine in order to speak of it as causing motion.

Relations may be merely *logical*, when they are made by the mind, and have no reality outside our ideas; thus the relations between predicables in Logic; or *real*, when they are present independently of the mind. Thus whether I know it or not, two lines are really equal, or one is twice as long as the other; two individuals are really first cousins because they have the same grandparents, or brothers because they have the same parents. Real relations are based on quantity and measurement, like equality and inequality, anteriority, simultaneousness; on qualities, like resemblance, contrast; on action and causality, like cause and effect, father and son, cousin and cousin.

When the foundation of the relation is found in both related terms, the relation is called *mutual*, and this may be of the *same* or of *different* denomination. Thus equal-equal, cousin-cousin, like-like, are real and of the same denomination; father – son, greater – smaller, cause – effect, superior – inferior, anterior – posterior, are also real, but of different denomination. When the foundation is real in only one of the two related terms, the relation is non-mutual or mixed. Thus the knowing mind is really related to the known object, for knowledge is a reality in the mind; but the object does not acquire anything real by becoming known, and does not depend on its being known. [In religious philosophy,] Again the creature really depends on God, but God does not depend on creatures.

God alone is absolute in the strict sense. It is only by a process of abstraction that creatures are considered by the mind in their absolute reality, for all have essentially many real relations to one another and to God.

(c) The term 'cause' when used without qualification, is generally applied to the efficient cause, which by its activity produces some change. But cause may be understood in a broader sense as whatever in any way contributes positively to the production of a being. In this sense four kinds of causes may be distinguished[2]. Two are intrinsic and constitute the being itself, namely the *material cause* as *the indetermined but determinable principle*, and the *formal cause* as *the determining principle*; and two are extrinsic and contribute to the production of a being from without, either by *the exercise of activity – efficient cause – or as a motive*, *purpose, direction, guidance – final cause*. Thus bricks, stones, lumber (material cause) are disposed in a certain order to form a house (formal cause) by masons and carpenters (efficient cause) who work to earn a living (final cause). On paper with ink (material cause), a man (efficient cause) writes certain symbols of ideas (formal cause) to avenge an insult or acquire glory (final cause).

Efficient causality may be very complex, for, in addition to the *principal* cause, it may include several *instrumental* causes, which have an aptitude of their own e.g. a saw or a cornet have not the same aptitude as a knife or a violin but use this aptitude only under the impulsion and direction of some principal cause. Efficient causality, whether principal or instrumental, is distinct from a mere condition, i.e. a circumstance without which the cause could not exercise its activity, and from an occasion, i.e. a special opportunity or favorable circumstance which induces man to act. Openings in the wall of a room are *conditions* required for the entrance of light, and hence for the visibility and color qualities of objects within the room; night and seclusion may be *occasions* of a theft. It is not always easy to distinguish a cause from a mere condition. Thus the organ blower is really the cause of the physical sound, that is of the air vibrations, and the musician by pressing on the keys simply allows the air to pass into certain pipes; yet, as we are not interested so much in the physical sound as in the order and harmony of simultaneous and successive sounds, we call the musician the efficient cause of the music.

The "action" of the efficient cause is correlative to the " passion" of the being that receives this action. In fact, action and passion are one and the same reality viewed from two different aspects and in two different substances. For one being to act means that another is acted upon.

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[2] According to Thomas Aquinas.

III. Properties og Being

Being as such has three attributes that are not only inseparable from it but really identical with it, namely, unity, truth, and goodness. These transcend all modes of being, have the same universal extension as being itself, and are therefore called transcendental attributes. They are but being itself apprehended from three points of view.

1. Every Being Is One, i.e. every being is *undivided*. If it is simple it is not only undivided but also indivisible. If it is composed of parts or elements it is divisible, but these parts or elements must be together undividedly in order that we may have the being. Hence this form of unity, called transcendental unity, does not imply a comparison of a being with any other; it does not imply otherness, but is merely the fact that a being must have all its constitutive elements.

Essential unity refers to the possession of whatever is required to constitute the essence. If a being is simple, like the human soul, this essential unity is obvious; if it is composite, like man or any material substance, it must possess all that is essential to it, e.g. body and soul, animality and rationality. *Accidental* unity results either from the union of a substance with its accidents, e.g. of a man with his science, size, features; or from the union of several distinct substances, as a forest from many trees, a house from many materials, a watch from many parts.

Transcendental unity is not to be identified with mathematical unity, which is the principle of multitude, or of the measure of multitude, namely number. This supposes otherness, the division of one being from, and comparison with, other beings.

(a) *Identity*, in a broad sense, signifies *the agreement of several things*, either in essence, e.g. two men have the same human nature; or in quantity, and then it is equality; or in quality, and then it is similarity. In a strict sense, it means *the agreement of a thing with itself,* and is opposed to diversity and to change either in nature or in accidents. At anyone time there is necessarily identity (idem ens) of a thing with itself, but there may be successive changes, and hence successive diversity.

(b) *Distinction* is opposed to identity and means that *one being is not another*, either in substance or in accidents. A distinction is purely *mental* or *logical* when one and the same reality is known by several concepts that may represent different aspects and have different degrees of explicitness; thus the distinction between man and rational animal. It is *real* when things are distinct apart from the conceptions the mind forms of them: thus several stones, men, trees. It is *virtual* when it exists only in the mind, but when, although reality is one, it offers a foundation on

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which the distinction rests, e.g. the distinction between animal and rational nature in man; the distinction among the different attributes of God who is essentially simple. Hence real distinction does not necessarily mean separation or separability: several realities may have characteristics that prevent them from being identical, and yet it may be impossible for them to exist separately, e.g. matter and form, substance and shape, man and his science.

2. Every Being Is True, i.e. possesses *ontological* truth (This statement means simply (i) that every being is truly what it is, even though the mind should mistake it for something else; (2) that it is *knowable* by the mind even though the mind, in consequence of its own weakness and rashness or in consequence of a misleading similarity among objects, may fall into error. False teeth are, for instance, true porcelain; a false friend, a true betrayer; a false diamond, true glass; a false coin, truly a counterfeit made of an inferior metal. When things have appearances that easily deceive the mind, when they bear such a resemblance to other things a? to be easily mistaken for them, when they are imitations of a standard to which we compare them, we call them false. But this does not affect their ontological truth; they are true in themselves, but lead the mind to false judgments or to logical falsity.

3. Every Being Is Good, i.e. primarily every being possesses some intrinsic goodness *in itself* and *for itself*, some perfection, some *actus*; and secondarily every being is or may be good *for some other being* with whose tendencies its own actuality may harmonize. Evidently every being is not good for every other, for at times there is clearly opposition and conflict of tendencies and activities; nor do we always know that a being is good for any other. Yet in many cases we see that things are adapted to one another, that there is a general order and harmony in the world; and even when we do not know it we suspect that every being has in some respects its utility and may serve some good purpose. But every being is intrinsically good inasmuch as it strives for its own end, by the use of its activities, according to its own nature. This question is closely connected with that of teleology since an end is always a good.

No reality is evil in itself, but it may be evil for another, that is, evil arises from a conflict of tendencies. The germs that cause pneumonia are good in themselves, perhaps may be good for some other beings and even in some respects for man himself, but when they invade his lungs, their own good, their multiplication, their thriving, prevent some vital functions of the organism from being exercised as they should, and thus evil arises from this relation of antagonism. Fire in itself is good as the rapid combination of a substance with oxygen. It is also good for the man who

is cold or wants to cook his food; evil for the man whom it burns or whose property it destroys.

Additional Data on Ontology

http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Ontology

Ontology is a major branch of philosophy and a central part of metaphysics that studies questions of being or existence. The questions include a wide range of issues concerning being or existence such as: the meaning of being or what it means "to be" for each of such beings as physical entities, souls, God, values, numbers, time, space, imaginary objects, and others; what is real existence; why something exits rather than nothing.

<…> The term "ontology" is, however, a modern coinage by Jacob Lorhard (Lorhardus) (1591–1609) and Rudolph Göckel (Goclenius) (1547–1628), as a compound of 'on' (Greek ὤν, genitive ὄντος: *of being* (part. of εἶναι: '*to be*')) and "-logy" or "logos" (-λογία: *science, study, theory*).

Some questions of ontology

Examples of ontological questions include:

• Why does anything exist, rather than nothingness? (a question raised by Leibniz)

• What constitutes the *identity* of an object? When does an object go *out* of existence, as opposed to *changing*?

• Is existence an event, flux, process? Or is it something static, stable, or unchanging?

• How is existence related to time and space? What is and kind of being is time and space? Is it a being or something else?

• What features are essential, as opposed to merely accidental, attributes of a given object? What are an object's properties or relations and how are they related to the object itself?

• What could it mean to say that non-physical objects (such as times, numbers, souls, deities, values, imaginative objects) exist? What is existence?

• What is a physical object? Can one give an account of what it means to say that a physical object exists?

• Is existence a property? What does it mean to say something exists or does not exist? Is existence properly a predicate? Are sentences expressing the existence or non-existence of something properly called propositions?

<…>

Some questions of being in Pre-Socratic philosophy:
Heraclitus and Parmenides

Questions of being began as early as sixth century B.C.E. by Pre-Socratics in Ancient Greece. Heraclitus and Parmenides, for example, inquired into the ultimate nature of existence and arrived at two contrasting views. On one hand, Heraclitus affirmed change as the ultimate nature of things. Heraclitus viewed being as a "process" and argued that there is nothing unchanging in the world. He symbolized the status of ever-changing nature of being as "fire". The existence of fire lies in its activities so as other beings do. There is nothing, he argued, that is not changing. On the other hand, Parmenides denied that there is any real change in the universe and argued that we can not even speak of any change without presupposing some unchanging self-identity. We can observe changes only in appearance but they are merely appearances of the unchanging reality. If we use an analogy to understand his view, we can take the example of matter in physics. While a given energy can appear in various forms such as heat or mass, the totality of the energy of a given material remains the same. One may also argue that if there is nothing unchanging, we cannot even claim any permanent principle including the principle of change itself. Is being an ever-changing event, flux, and a temporal process? Or is it immutable, a-temporal, and stable existence? This is one of perennial issues in ontology. Pre-Socratic philosophers discussed various other questions of being but they did not conceptualized ontology as a distinct area of inquiry.

Ontological questions have also been raised and debated by thinkers in the ancient civilizations of India and China, in some cases perhaps predating the Greek thinkers who have become associated with the concept.

Aristotle: ontology as the "First Philosophy"

Plato developed his own perspectives but not as a distinctive area of study. It was Aristotle who made the conceptual distinction and established ontology as a branch of philosophy. Aristotle understood that there are many senses of being or various senses when we say something "exists". For example, when we say "God exists", "a book exits", "there is justice", "numbers exist", "laws exist", "time exists". "I exist", "life exits", and what we mean by "exist" and "to-be' are not equivocal. Aristotle called the studies of 'being as being' the First Philosophy and his First Philosophy was closely tied to Theology as the study of a supreme being.

Thomas Aquinas incorporated Aristotelian ontology into Christian ideas and developed Christian philosophy and theology; issues of ontology became the subject matters of Scholasticism in the Middle Ages.

Modern philosophy

The term Ontology is, however, a fairly modern term. While the etymology is Greek, the oldest extant record of the word itself is the Latin form *ontologia,* which appeared in 1661, in the work *Ogdoas Scholastica* by Jacob Lorhard *(Lorhardus)* and in 1631 in the *Lexicon philosophicum* by Rudolf Goclenius (Rudolph Göckel or Goclenius). Goclenius, a German logician, however, used ontology, in a limited sense, as an abstract studies of physical entities and did not mean a general studies of being. It was Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665) who used ontology in the sense of a universal studies of being, which was closer to Aristotelian sense.

The first occurrence in English of "ontology" as recorded by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) appears in Bailey's dictionary of 1721, which defines ontology as "an Account of being in the Abstract". However its appearance in a dictionary indicates it was in use already at that time. It is likely the word was first used in its Latin form by philosophers based on the Latin roots, which themselves are based on the Greek. Clauberg also used the word "ontosophia"as well as ontology.

It was, however, Christian Wolff who played the foundational role in addressing ontology in the sense of the universal study of being. Philosophy is defined by him as the science of the possible and divided it, according to the two faculties of the human individual, into theoretical and practical parts. Logic, sometimes called philosophia rationales, forms the introduction or propaedeutic to both. Theoretical philosophy has for its parts ontology or *philosophia prima*, cosmology, rational psychology and natural theology; ontology examines the existent in general, psychology of the soul as a simple non-extended substance, cosmology of the world as a whole, and rational theology of the existence and attributes of God. Wolff's conceptual distinction was succeeded by Kant.

Medieval philosophy generally accepted two sources of knowledge: revelation and reason (natural light). Descartes rejected revelation as the legitimate source of knowledge and preserved reason alone. Thinkers after him similarly raised questions of the legitimate source of knowledge and human capacities of knowledge. Theory of knowledge or Epistemology gradually became dominant and it superseded ontology. In other words, before we discuss the questions of being, the questions of the limit of our knowledge or the limit of what we can know became the

primary issue. Kant established the primacy of epistemology in theoretical studies of philosophy and rejected traditional ontology, which Wolff developed, as "dogmatism".

In the middle of nineteenth century, Neo-Scholasticism emerged and they re-introduced Thomistic ontology. In the twentieth century, ontology was revived by Husserl and other phenomenologists.

Contemporary philosophy

Husserl (1859–1938) was the founder of a new philosophical movement called phenomenology. He realized that there are various senses of being on one hand, and our perceptual capacities are also multifaceted. Since he was a student of Franz Brentano (1838–1917), Husserl probably learned Aristotelian ontology from Brentano. Brentano's *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles)* was one of the monumental studies of Aristotle's ontology.

Husserl was dissatisfied with the narrow, one-sided view of being in modern philosophy. He criticized that modern philosophers presupposed sense perception as the primary cognitive faculty and physically sensible qualities as the primary quality of being. In other words, the model of being was taken from a material object. Husserl argued that faculties of mind are far diverse and they include feeling, sensing, imagining, reasoning, believing, loving, willing, hoping, and so on. The framework of modern philosophy did not capture this multifaceted faculties of mind. Each object equally presents its existence in multifaceted ways. Husserl developed phenomenology as a philosophical methodology to describe diverse senses of being. Husserl attempted to establish what he called "Formal Ontology" within his own phenomenological framework. Nicolai Hartmann (1882– 950) also developed "Critical Ontology" within phenomenological tradition.

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) made a decisive impact on the revival of ontology in the twentieth century. He combined phenomenology and hermeneutics and developed "hermeneutic phenomenology" as his philosophical methodology to approach the questions of being. While Husserl developed phenomenology as the analysis of consciousness and a philosophical discipline that clarifies the essential principles of being, Heidegger took a different path. Heidegger argued that since human understanding is always interpretive, hermeneutics (a discipline that deals with arts and methods of interpretation) is indispensable for philosophical studies.

Heidegger took the human being as the access point to the question of being. To highlight man's existence, he called man 'Dasein". He pointed out that the human being is a kind of being whose sense of being (meaning of life) or non-being (death) is always at stake. Heidegger carried out an existential analysis of Dasein in one of his major works, *Being and Time.* In it, Heidegger attempted to clarify the intricate relationships among being, time, life, death, conscience, man's original (authentic) and non-original (in-authentic) way of existence, interconnectedness of beings, teleological relationships among beings, hermeneutics, and other fundamental questions of ontology. He was critical of traditional ontologies since Aristotle as well the entire tradition of Western philosophy. His quest for a new path of thinking led him to the studies of poetic language in his later carrier.

After Heidegger, Sartre and other phenomenologists also approached the question of being.

Philosophers in the tradition of Analytic philosophy approached the questions of being through the analysis of languages including the extensive use of logic.

Theme 2. Anthropology

William Ernest Hocking
What is Man

A. Man and Animal
1. Man's Unique Interest in Himself

There is no sure way of telling what animals think about. But it seems safe to say that the human being gives more thought than any other animal to imself. He alone keeps diaries, uses mirrors, writes histories, makes innumerable comments on human nature, and develops such sciences as psychology and sociology. He alone speculates on the origin of his species on the earth, on what happens to the individual soul after death, and on what is to be the destiny of the race in the long future of the planet.

This interest of man in himself is a justified interest. Purely as a biological study, the human body is the most complex and interesting of all organic forms. There are animals that live longer; but there are none that live so much during their lifetime, and none which are capable of so great variety in behavior. No other creature has found ways of living in all climates, from equator to arctic zones. No other fits himself out with clothing, varying from season to season, place to place, and fashion to fashion. No other uses his sense organs to improve on his sense organs until he can hear his own whispers around the world and bring both the incredibly minute and the incredibly remote into his field of sight. No other land animal projects himself for long journeys under water and through the air. All this variety is a result of one asset — the human mind, with its inner resources of imagination. Is there any limit to these resources?

Some are ready to say that there is no limit, that the human mind is "infinite". This sounds more enthusiastic than instructive. Yet in one sense it is literally true. An individual may come to the end of his inventiveness. But the race never gives up. It keeps returning to old problems and getting new ideas for solving them.

Some old Greek thinker gave his people a bit of advice in two words, "Know thyself", a precept which they cherished among the Seven Great Sayings (Plato. Socrates Defence of Himself). Why did this seem

to them so important? Partly because the natural trend of human curiosity is outward: man begins his more systematic inquiries with the objects of nature and contents himself, at first, with rather casual self-observation, embodied in proverbs and folklore. Partly, however, because self-knowledge, taken seriously, proves to be difficult. On the face of it, nothing should be easier to know than ourselves, and certainly nothing is more accessible. Everyone has a sample of human nature in his own person, body and mind; and surely every man knows his own mind: no one else can tell him how he feels and thinks. In another sense, every man is a puzzle to himself: there are things about him which his friends may know better than he does. He may be overconfident, and they can point out the dangers of conceit; he may be overdiffident, and they can give him self-assurance. And there are other riddles of human nature to which no one yet knows the final answer: why human beings feel as they do, entertain wishes, take likings or aversions, become excited or hold steady, remember some things and forget others, have nagging anxieties or queer private superstitions or hunches about this or that or strange bursts of confidence. For that matter, our simplest mental operations – attending, learning, forming habits, imagining, deciding – are still not fully explained by any science.

The simplest of all tasks connected with self-knowledge ought to be, one would think, to report what is in the mind at any moment, since what we mean by the mind is simply the activity of knowing, feeling, deciding, and so on, which makes up the "stream of consciousness". It might be worth trying, to make up a swift inventory of what is "in your mind" just now, under such heads as:

Sensations, clear and obscure	Expectations
Feelings, agreeable and disagreeable	Thoughts
Tendencies to action	Imaginations
Memories	Beliefs

You will come on a number of difficulties. How much of what you remember is in your mind? How much of what you know? How much of what you think and believe? If these things are not in mind at the moment, where are they? Perhaps we could use the idea of "subconsciousness" to include what we very well know but are not always thinking of? The word "mind" must cover both the conscious and the subconscious.

But the chief puzzle of human nature is its doubleness. It is both *mind* and *body*. These two are fused into one being so closely that it is

impossible to say where the joint is! And yet the words "mind" and "body" do not mean the same thing.

The body can be seen; no one will claim that he can see the mind. The body can be handled, weighed, measured, but not the mind. If anyone is under the momentary illusion that the brain and the mind are the same, let him consider whether he is prepared to take the chemical analysis of the mind, as he can of the brain.

But if we are not to think of the mind as a measurable object in space, how are we to think of it? A great deal of your philosophy will depend on how you answer this question.

There is a certain awkwardness in thinking about the mind, because the mind is usually occupied in thinkmg about other things, such as physical shapes. To think about the mind would therefore be to think about the thinking. Or, to complete the phrase, it would be to think about the thinking about other things. It is not surprising, then, that when men first began to think seriously about the mind, they conceived of it as a fine substance, like vapor or breath, spread through the body or concentrated in the heart. And we, on the same principle, are likely to think of the mind as having at least the physical attribute of location and consider it as being within the skull, as a functional activity of the brain. These conceptions trip over the fact that the mind is not the physical object thought about, but simply the thinking of that object. The difficulty is that the mind is so near to us, so identical with ourselves; and even here we are using the spatial metaphor of "near" to express the intimacy of mental process!

It is enough at present to see (a) that mind and body are not the same; (b) that they are inseparably joined in the living person; (c) that, to think truly of our own mind, we must manage to think of thinking; (d) that since we cannot directly perceive the thinking of other people, we have to get at their minds by way of their bodies, their gestures, expressions of emotion, language. In the same way, we interpret the minds of animals.

2. Resemblances between Man and Animal

Men have always been interested in the resemblances between themselves and animals. In ancient times, they were inclined to read the likeness backward: animals are surprisingly like men.

In modern times, they have been more inclined to read it forward: men are surprisingly like animals. The animal stories of India, Aesop's fables, the Uncle Remus stories use animals as exaggerating some trait in human nature; lion and fox become universal symbols of courage and

cunning. So far as animals are like ourselves in mentality we can understand them, tame them, use them, and occasionally feel flattered when we win the confidence of a wild or timorous beast. As the bodily shape of the animal diverges from our own, the sense of understanding weakens. We feel remote from the psychology of the lobster, whereas the ape is almost too much like us for comfort, one reason no doubt why he is given a semidivine status by some Hindus.

During the last century, science has been interested in reading the continuities between animals and men, emphasizing everything in man that could be regarded as inherited from an animal ancestry.^ Instead of holding to the traditional contrast, that man is governed by reason and animals by instinct, science has been busy showing traces of reason in animals and remnants of instinct in man. The word "instinct" needs watching. If the scientist uses it at all, he does not mean by it a mysterious and infallible guide to successful action. He means a complex series of actions (like the nest-building processes of birds or the stalking behavior of cats and hounds), which is hereditary in the sense that it is carried through, with little or no instruction, very much in the same way by all m.embers of the species, to a result important for the life history of the animal.

Using the word "instinct" in this way, we find that the instinctive "round of life" in most higher animals strongly resembles the broad outlines and motives of human life. There are at least three main elements in such a round: rwtrilion, including all the animal arts of getting food; reproduction, including the preliminary arts of wooing and preparing the shelter; and the parental impulse, directed to the care and rearing of offspring. It seems evident that all three of these impulses ought to be present, together with strong cravings and emotional satisfactions, if a species of animals is not to lose out in the struggle for survival. The human species would be no exception to this rule.

Accordingly, if we ask the question "What is it that human beings most care about?" we find that nature has already taken care of a good part of the answer. There is no need to instruct a boy, during the years when he is burning to grow up to man's powers and estate, that he has a "nutritive instinct" as an aid to getting command of his own capacities. There is no need to tell him, later on, that he wants to make a living (as a further stage of this same nutritive instinct). Or, still later, to find a mate, to beget children, care for them, and educate them. So far, the shape of human life corresponds fairly well with the animal program.

The picture is, of course, incomplete. In both man and animal there are two powerful auxiliary instincts, commonly referred to as fear and

anger, leading respectively to flight or combat. Neither of these belongs to the regular routine of life (except in the case of beasts of prey); but when they are needed, they can use all the reserves of energy that nature is prepared to pour into their operation. There is also an instinct of curiosity, strong in animals that live more by their wits than by their physical powers, especially the ruminants (deer, cattle), apes, and man. And there is an important group of social instincts for social animals, including the simple gregariousness whereby birds of a feather and beasts of a stripe find their own sort, certain impulses to dominate or to follow leaders, and (especially strong in man) an impulse to achieve standing in one's community, for the benefit of his family as of himself. This last-named impulse tends to grow in relative influence toward the latter end of life, when the nutritive instinct (with its development into "acquisitiveness") and the reproductive and parental instincts have achieved their ends. All of these impulses have roots in the animal kingdom, including (I suspect) the social concern for community standing, if one can judge by the occasional behavior of swagger cocks or champion bucks.

If we take all these facts together, the biological view of human nature based on resemblances between man and animal does throw much light on why we are as we are. For the nineteenth century, it was the great source of illumination.

But it leaves many questions unanswered.

For example, human interests do not limit themselves to what aids survival. No doubt hunger aids survival; but this does not explain why eating and cookery develop into fine arts. The human eye is an aid to survival, but who limits his interest in what he sees to what aids survival? Or in what he hears? How does music aid survival? So with curiosity. It is through knowledge, as Bacon said, that we master nature; but when has curiosity stopped at that point? It is hard to tell how the added reach of the 200-inch reflector at Mount Palomar will aid human survival. We shall be able to investigate with that telescope ten times the volume of space hitherto accessible to our instruments. Someday, some of this knowledge may be useful; but that is not why we take the trouble. It is because we want to know what is there, and how the new data will affect our ideas of the laws of the astro-physical universe. Human interest outruns any biological concern.

Again, no man feels bound to stick to the biological pattern. Many deliberately break away from it. In some, scientific curiosity or ambition or some special lifework displaces all family attachments. Others turn down the whole biological invitation, taking the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, as devotees of a religious life. There are some failures

in these ambitious efforts to spurn ambition; but there are some remarkable successes which show that the thing is possible. Biology does not tell us how it is possible; there are no voluntary ascetics among the animals.

The truth seems to be that the human mind is interested in survival rather as an afterthought. A man eats because he likes food; survival happens as an incidental result. The mind's interests are its own, not nature's; they tear away from every biological limitation. It may devote itself to ends which are clearly at odds with its biological welfare. In the interest of a friendship, a social loyalty, the fulfillment of an agreement, the testing of a medical theory, a man may deliberately risk his life. Here the biological explanation gives out.

In truth, the whole plausibility of this explanation vanishes if we ask the question whose answer has been taken for granted: why should any one want to survive? As a fact, we usually do want to survive; but that fact does not answer the question. If the only value of human existence is to take one's part in a round of life which repeats itself forever, the outlook may even become repellent. Unless the whole series of biological generations moves toward something, the sense drops out of the picture, and the sum of it is an incessant and profitless treadmill. The animal never asks this question; he makes no mental picture of the species, still less of any goal for the species. But the human being is definitely not content with the animal round: he insists in seeing some sense in the total trend of things.

For all these reasons, any real understanding of the human being and his interests must go on to consider the differences between man and the animals. Man can understand the animals; the animal can but dimly understand man, for whatever is most characteristic of the human being passes him completely by.

3. Differences between Man and Animal

Most definitions of man begin with the words "Man is an Animal". They then proceed to mention what they regard as the most important difference which separates him from the other animals. Thus, Aristotle defined man as the animal that reasons. He also proposed that man is the "political animal", i.e., the animal that builds societies going beyond the family to the more impersonal groupings of the village and the state. He added the remark that man is political because he has language.

This seems to run afoul of the fact that all social animals – bees, ants, birds, ruminants – have some form of speech or communication. But Aristotle goes on to explain that human language contains signs for gen-

eral ideas, such as "justice"; and that without such ideas the kind of political society human beings build would be impossible. Animal societies often have a remarkable organization, and the conduct of their members is "lawful" in the sense of following definite lines of instinct; but we have no reason to suppose that any of them think out rules and change them from time to time, still less that they try to think out an idea of justice. On second thought, we can agree that Aristotle has lighted on an important point of difference.

Many other definitions have been proposed, more or less seriously. Man is the animal that laughs. Man is the animal that draws pictures. Man is the self-conscious animal. Man is the animal capable of shame, since no other animal shows signs of apology for its natural processes. Another definition comes nearer the center of the target: man is the animal with a moral sense; he is therefore capable of remorse and indeed of so much moral suffering that we occasionally fancy that a return to the animal condition would be a relief.

But however man may overdo his moral anxieties, he would not willingly part with his capacity for being discontented with himself; for it is only through this characteristic discontent that his long history is distinguished from that of every other animal species by its progressiveness. Man's compunction is part of the secret of his growth. This brings us close to a definition of long standing – that man is the animal with a soul. This is an important proposal, but difficult until we know what is meant by the soul. We shall return to it.

Meantime, having before us numerous mental differences between man and animal, let us inquire more systematically, beginning with the main physiological differences.

4. Physiological Differences between Man and Animal

(a) Man Is Mediocre, Nondescript, and Unfinished. In physique, man is a mediocre animal. He has no great strength, no great speed of motion, no great keenness of eye, ear, or smell. He has no impressive organs of offense (as tusks, horns, claws) nor of defense (as tough hide or carapace). Nor has he special organic tools, such as the elephant's trunk or the beaver's tail.

He is nondescript in the sense that he is not marked out by nature for any distinctive way of life or habitat. The hippopotamus is designed for a river beast; man is only in a broad sense terrestrial. And he is unfinished at birth; his instincts do not carry him at once into successful techniques. A newborn calf will find its legs within a few minutes; the human infant struggles for months with the problem of locomotion.

This very unfinishedness is an advantage: it is man's opportunity for free adaptation to various and changing circumstances. Not having a fixed biological chart of living, he puts his own finishing touches on native impulse by shaping habits to the situation at hand. He can neither spin a web nor build a nest, but his shelters can be igloos, tepees, or thatch-huts as occasion requires.

(b) *Man Is Balanced*. The muscles of his front and back work opposite each other to hold him upright. This allows him not only a free pair of arms and a quick change of direction, but also an easy all-around survey. This is a physical symbol of his mental trait of "looking before and after" – using his memory of the past to anticipate the future.

In a similar way, some of his major instinctive impulses are balanced by counterimpulses, conferring a certain poise in place of animal impetuosity. Unless his impulses of acquisition, mating, and pugnacity had some kind of inner brake, it is hard to see how a stable social order on any large scale could have been started. In the case of pugnacity, there is an evident check even

when the prudential element of fear is in abeyance. There is a restraint to be overcome before one passes from the exchange of words to the exchange of blows, a reluctance to break in on the habitual bodily inviolability of another individual. For the sex impulse also there is a well-marked sex-reticence, which not only makes necessary the universal arts of approach but leaves normal men and women for the greater part of the time sexquiescent. For sex also, as for pugnacity, a certain set toward bodily isolation has to be overcome.

This kind of balance does not limit the energy of action, once action is started. It simply interposes a moment of hesitation; and hesitation gives a chance for the question: What on the whole do I prefer to do? Thus balance confers an element of freedom from the insistence of any one of the competing impulses.

(c) **Man Is Unified**. These numerous instinctive drives of which we have been speaking give the impression that the human self is rather a collection than a single being. Each instinct-name indicates a natural interest, and we get the idea that each of these has to be satisfied in due turn if we are to have a happy normal existence. On this showing, the human self appears more or less passive, being controlled now by hunger, now by fear, now by the ambition for social standing, as if each instinct were a self-operating force, an impression deepened by the word "drive." Animal life bears out this picture: each impulse has its place in the daily routine. There is a time for foraging, for domesticity, for sleep, and some time left to do nothing at all. No beast is oppressed by a crowded program.

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But in truth the human being is neither so passive a creature nor so multiple. Take him in the midst of a day's work, with a crowd of impulses and interests competing for attention, and the illusion vanishes. Play impulses, love-making, food-getting are shunted off; nothing gets a hearing unless it belongs to the job in hand. It is not the impulses that fight it out among themselves; it is the man who decides. If there is any drive in the case, it is the man's own drive. It has a singleness and steadiness to which we give the name "purpose". Purpose is something of which the animal is incapable; man's capacity for it is recorded in unity of the organization of his nervous system.

For the high development of the human brain signifies, among other things, that whatever excitements serve as "stimuli" to the reflexes which enter into instinctive behavior report themselves to that center, submitting themselves to the consent, modification, or veto of that center. They do not run through wholly separate tracts either of nerve or muscle. They can gain their go-signal only as they combine with, or enhance, the going centralprocess, which corresponds physiologically to the purposive drive of the man.

This does not mean that purpose rides over instinct and pushes it out of the way. It means rather that purpose uses instinct. All the native impulses are a sort of raw material which can contribute to purpose. For in spite of their separate names, they arc not wholly separate, even in their satisfactions. For example, curiosity is one impulse, and sociability is another. A man who shuts himself up in his laboratory to finish an experiment appears to be turning his back on sociability in order to satisfy his own curiosity. But is he? If his experiment brings out a new piece of truth which becomes common property, is he not satisfying his social interest also? But this matter is so fundamental for our understanding of human nature that we must give it separate attention.

5. The Several Impulses as Branches of One Impulse

Within the last two centuries, it has been frequently asserted, notably by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud, that all impulses (or desires) are forms of one impulse (or desire). Schopenhauer included animals in his theory and held that all instincts are forms of the "will to live". Thus hunger is (consciously or unconsciously) a craving for bodily life and vigor. Pugnacity and fear are positive and negative ways of asserting the will to live in the presence of danger. Sex love carries a promise of adding to individual life but overshoots its mark and leads the individual to spend himself in contributing to the life of the race – in Schopenhauer's view a radical mistake!

There was a deep insight here. But long before Schopenhauer, a Greek thinker had seen that all impulses are forms of one, and had given it a better interpretation. Plato saw that man is not satisfied with living; he asks the further question, Life /or what? Plato's answer is, for creating or reproducing what we love. All desires, he teaches in the most profound psychological analysis of ancient and of most modern times, are forms of love; and all love is an impulse to create, stirred by a vision of beauty, whether of persons or of ideas. There is something ineffably humble about love, for it confesses poverty, a want of something; and yet there is also something ineffably proud about it, for it feels in itself the same capacity as that of the artist to give durable form to his vision or that of the legislator to coin into law his idea of a better social order. Plato's belief was that this kind of creation is what all desire really wants.

Now strangely enough, the man who in recent times has most nearly caught this platonic idea is Nietzsche. He saw, as Plato did, that the "will to live" is not enough to satisfy a man; living must he for something. His idea was that our deepest impulse is the need to have and exercise power; he therefore proposed to substitute the "will to power" or the "will to live". Unfortunately he was not so clear as to what he meant by it: sometimes he seems to mean vehement self-assertion; sometimes vehement self-sacrifice for bringing about a better human type; sometimes he touches the edge of Plato's perception of the creative power that lurks in love.

We can learn from all of these thinkers; but we must put things in our own way. That which men most care about is to count for something; what they most dread is to be futile, to be a cipher, to be wasted. There is no universal will to power in the sense of a craving to dominate others. But there is a universal will to power in the sense of a craving to achieve, to give scope to one's ability, to contribute to the human scene through one's ideas or work. The distinction is between power over and power for. With this understanding we need not shun the phrase, "the will to power".

Now our thesis is that when we see what the man is driving at, we see what all the several instincts are driving at. Their drives merge in the central stream of his will. Take "fear". Nothing could look less like a will to power! Yet the whole business of fear is to get a man out of a place where he is powerless into one where his powers can count. Take "curiosity"; it makes for knowledge, and knowledge, for a being who can exert power through ideas, is itself a form of power. Sex love is in part what Plato thought it was – a premonition of creative power; but he thought it was a preliminary and imperfect stage of creativity through ideas; it is

more than that. It is the discovery of a present power to assume charge of another life and with that life to bring forth others, establishing a small society in which all those ideas can be put to work. Love is the most concrete form of the will to power for others. Thus all the major impulses work toward a common end. And in so far as that end is achieved, all those separate impulses are by that fact satisfied, and none of them requires a separate satisfaction.

To put it in a nutshell, an animal can be satisfied if it lives through the usual round of momentary activities and successes; a man can be satisfied only if he can create. And conversely, he can make out a satisfactory life if he has one adequate region of effectiveness, one full-sized outlet for his will to power. He can get on with a minimum of the success of special drives provided he can accomplish something, leave an effect in the world which is his effect. And if he has no such efficiency, no amount of sidelong satisfactions can make him content.

This is why man is at once so vulnerable to social approval or disapproval and at the same time so able to stand by himself and to sacrifice almost anything to promote an idea which he believes needs his support or championship. This is the great thing about human nature, so easily overlooked by those who take their cues from animal impulse — its capacity for fanaticism. It is this sort of fanaticism which gave this country its first occupants. It was this force in them which, when we look at the fields they cleared, the miles of stone wall they built, the deep wells they drove into glacial till, the granite rocks they shaped and built into cellar walls and even pigpens, leads us to say, "They were men", and feel anything but sorry for them. Any set of values or satisfactions falls short of being human unless it is built around a self-respecting purpose that calls out the peculiar powers of the individual.

6. Whether Man Can Be Defined as the Animal with a Soul

We are now ready to pick up the question raised a little way back about the "soul". The soul, we thought, has something to do with the human capacity for self-criticism; it has also something to do with the sort of fanaticism we have been speaking of. We wish to consider what is meant by the soul. Let us approach this question by way of a trivial trait of human nature – man's capacity to be bored.

In the Near East one often sees donkeys following a circular path all day long as they work the shaft of a water-wheel. Their attitude expresses patience but not boredom. To arrian, this type of work would be provocative first of tedium, then of rebellion, then of insanity. Why? Because the man's imagination would be busy with the things he was not

doing. Again, animals, if they know they are going to die – which is doubtful – are not bothered by that fact. They make no will; they take out no insurance; they accept each day as so much time in hand and quite literally take no thought for the morrow. Man takes careful account of how much time he has and has *not*.

This means that man's mind sees things on their negative as well as on their positive side. And this is a result of seeing them as parts oj wholes; for in the light of a totality, every partial fact has two reckonings – what it is and what it is not, what it lacks of being complete. Oftentimes the negative reckoning is the more important side of the truth. No animal is worried by its ignorance; for man, the knowledge of how much he does not know is his perpetual incentive to learn. He grows because on all sides he is aware of the unachieved. When we have a creature whose thought takes account of wholes, we have a radical step, perhaps the most radical step, in mental history.

If so, man can be defined as the animal who thinks in terms of totalities. Some word for "all" and some word for "the world" are found in all languages. There are also words for the negatives "not all", "absence", "emptiness", "silence", "nothing", "not enough". These terms separate human from all animal language. Man's early ideas of the whole of things, the universe, provide it with an imaginary rim, a limit of space, a beginning and an end in time. But as his restless thought experiments with this rim, he keeps moving it outward and finally faces the notion of "endlessness", of "infinitude". Now the term "soul" has been used to indicate that there is an important gap between the animal and the human mind. And this gap has commonly been placed in man's moral nature, his capacity for self-judgment, and for "hitching his wagon to a star". I suggest that these qualities depend on the power we have now observed – the capacity to think of things and of himself in the frame of the whole in which they are placed, the infinite universe. With this understanding we may literally define man as the animal with a soul.

Sometimes the soul has been regarded as separate from the "mind", a sort of duplicate personality, with powers of a higher order than those of the ordinary self of the day's work. Such a separate and separable soul psychology has not been able to find; and some psychologists have hastened to conclude that there is no such thing as a soul, that the idea is at once useless and superstitious. This anti-soul temper has been useful in reminding us that no soul could be of any use to us which was not identical with our self. It is not something else than the mind; it is the mind reaching out to its limit. It is not a different person; it can only be a different mode of activity. *The soul is the self of man engaged in getting its bearings in the total universe.*

Once we see this, as the defining difference of the human mind, we understand many of the other attempted definitions. We understand why man is the animal that writes biographies and histories; for when a group of creatures begins to accumulate what it learns in the form of a tradition, that is a sign of a need to build up a total of knowledge adequate to a total world. And if it is said that man is the animal that laughs, we understand that while many an animal shows signs of glee, it is only man who can feel the sometimes ludicrous contrast between his limited powers and the infinite reach of his thought. And if man is said to be the animal capable of fanaticism in the service of an idea, we can understand that it is only the life of an idea that can give scope to a will to power reaching beyond one's own life into the vistas of the time ahead.

B. The Cultural Achievements of Man and their Perils.
7. Man as the Maker of Culture

Seeking to extend his control through the future, man has a vested interest in whatever is permanent. He takes a peculiar pleasure in any product of his own which he thinks will last. Some of his earliest works are durable simply because they are hard, like his flint implements. But for some of them the materials were chosen because he considered them durable – his stone monuments, tombs, and architecture, his metallic tablets, ornaments, and sacred vessels. Even his paper he may have thought a permanent material; some of his papyri, in the easy climate of Egypt, have lasted upwards of four thousand years. One of the oldest, the Papyrus Prisse, dates from about 2500 B.C.

But the products which have proved most durable are of a much more fragile fabric, namely, his ideas. When an idea "takes hold" in a social group, is remembered and transmitted, especially when it modifies the habits of the group, it may become practically imperishable. No one knows just how the domestication of animals began, but at one time, many thousands of years ago, it was a new idea which revolutionized human economy; and all the subsequent arts of taming and breeding beasts, however altered in technique, continue the life of that notion.

What we call culture is that working of ideas into the patterns of social life so that the freer human interests are not only maintained but developed continuously – the sciences, the technical arts, the fine arts, the customs and laws, the history and the religion.

It is not the purpose of a study of philosophy to tell the fascinating story of human culture; that is for the growing science of anthropology and for the special histories of the several arts and sciences. The business

of philosophy is with the judgment of culture, as a part of our knowledge of man: What does it mean? How much have we achieved? How much is left to do? Have we run into mistakes? Are we in danger?

During the past century, there was very little disposition to ask the last two questions about our so-called western civilization. We had come a long way, and we were doing well. We looked ahead with self-confidence. Science was carrying on a successful campaign against the remaining mysteries of the universe and the remaining ills of human life. It knew how to proceed, and the goal was not too far beyond sight. The political situation seemed to confirm this complacency. The Orient continued to accept the leadership of the West. It is true that China had its periods of fitful and futile revolt against foreigners in general. It is true, also, that there were disturbances in Russia, and that Tolstoi was little satisfied with anything in the established order around him, not even with politics or religion. But Japan was well-disposed to learn of the West and to enter quietly the avenues of trade. India was presenting no problem. No one appeared to realize that revolutionary forces were gathering throughout the East which in a dozen years would unseat the Manchus in China and mark the beginning of a critical challenge by the Orient, not only of its own old ways but also of the ways of the West.

The war of 1914 confirmed in the mind of many a thoughtful observer, both in the Orient and in the West, the view that western culture was in some way unsound. Oriental scholars began to bethink themselves that their own cultures, though they had been long stagnant, had nevertheless shown stability superior to anything else in the world. Indian civilization had been continuous since 1500 B.C. and Chinese civilization since perhaps 3000 B.C. Some argued that western individualism was wrong, some that industrialism was wrong, some that the faith in science was wrong, some that the whole spirit of material strength was wTong, some that western religion was wrong. On November 11, 1931, a new Buddhist temple was opened at Sarnath, near Benares in India. At the ceremony a Hindu pundit, head of the Sanskrit College in Calcutta, made an address in which he said that while Christianity professed to be a religion of good will among men, the late war had shown its lack of conviction; only Buddhism had succeeded in actually spreading that spirit. But already Japan, a Buddhist-Shintoist power, had begun in Manchuria to tear down the old fabric of Asiatic peace.

We can therefore not approach the study of the meaning of human culture in a spirit of self-congratulation nor in the belief that something called "evolution" or "progress" is bound to take place. Neither shall we assume, with Spengler, that our civilization is necessarily in for disaster.

Our problem is to examine its factors for the good they promise and to praise where praise is due. But we must also recognize the general rule of experience, that every advance brings new problems and new dangers. If we wish our best achievements to be secure, we must know wliat is permanently valid in them, what is subject to error, and where vigilance is required.

Frederick A. Olafson

Philosophical anthropology

http://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophical-anthropology

Pilosophical anthropology, discipline within philosophy that seeks to unify the several empirical investigations of human nature in an effort to understand individuals as both creatures of their environment and creators of their own values.

Origins and terminology

In the 18th century, "anthropology" was the branch of philosophy that gave an account of human nature. At that time, almost everything in the domain of systematic knowledge was understood to be a branch of philosophy. Physics, for example, was still known as "natural philosophy," and the study of economics had developed as a part of "moral philosophy." At the same time, anthropology was not where the main work of philosophy was done. As a branch of philosophy it served, instead, as a kind of review of the implications for human nature of philosophically more central doctrines, and it may have incorporated a good deal of empirical material that would now be thought of as belonging to psychology. Because the field of study was a part of philosophy, it did not have to be explicitly so described.

By the end of the 19th century, anthropology and many other disciplines had established their independence from philosophy. Anthropology emerged as a branch of the social sciences that studied the biological and evolutionary history of human beings (physical anthropology), as well as the culture and society that distinguished *Homo sapiens* from other animal species (cultural anthropology). In their study of social and cultural institutions and practices, anthropologists typically focused on the less highly developed societies, further distinguishing anthropology from sociology.

As a result of these developments, the term *philosophical anthropology* is not in familiar use among anthropologists and would probably

not meet with any ready comprehension from philosophers either, at least in the English-speaking world. When anthropology is conceived in contemporary terms, philosophical thought might come within its purview only as an element in the culture of some society that is under study, but it would be very unlikely to have any part to play in an anthropologist's work or in the way human nature is conceived for the purposes of that work. To put the matter somewhat differently, anthropology is now regarded as an empirical scientific discipline, and, as such, it discounts the relevance of philosophical theories of human nature. The inference here is that philosophical (as opposed to empirical) anthropology would almost certainly be bad anthropology. <…>

The concept of the "soul-mind"

Despite the terminological changes that developed over time, philosophers who have considered questions of human nature have demonstrated substantial continuity in the types of issues they have studied. In both old and new approaches, the principal focus of philosophical interest has been a feature of human nature that has long been central to self-understanding. In simple terms, it is the recognition that human beings have minds—or, in more traditional parlance, souls. Long before recorded history, the soul was understood to be that part of human nature that made life, motion, and sentience possible. Since at least the 19th century the actuality of the soul has been hotly contested in Western philosophy, usually in the name of science, especially as the vital functions once attributed to it were gradually explained by normal physical and physiological processes.

But even though its defenders no longer apply the term widely, the concept of the soul has endured. Within philosophy it has been progressively refined to the point of being transformed into the concept of mind as that part of human nature wherein intellectual and moral powers reside. At the same time, many of the ideas traditionally associated with the soul – immortality, for example – have been largely abandoned by philosophy or assigned to religion. Among a wider public, however, the word *soul* is arguably more familiar and comprehensible than *mind*, especially as an expression of what humans conceive of as their "inner reality." For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, the two terms will be used in their appropriate contexts and, occasionally, in a compound form, the "soul-mind."

The challenge of materialism

Despite the aforementioned continuity between ancient and modern philosophical accounts of the soul-mind, there is in fact a major difference between the two. During the 19th century the long-standing concept of the mind as an entity distinct from the body was challenged, causing it (as well as the concept of the soul) to become problematic in a new and quite radical way. Appealing to the authority of the natural sciences, the challenge issued in an explicitly materialist theory of human nature and of all the functions that had traditionally been thought of as "mental." These developments in turn helped to determine the current situation confronting philosophical anthropology, in which it must decide whether or not to join a widening scientific and philosophical consensus on these matters.

In a sense, materialism itself can be treated as a new thesis within philosophical anthropology, and due note will be taken of it as such. Even so, it should also be noted that the philosophers who side with the new materialism do not refer to themselves as "philosophical anthropologists" but usually simply as "philosophers of mind." It does appear, moreover, that those who do describe themselves as philosophical anthropologists remain committed to working out a conception of human personality that centres on the notion of a soul-mind, as well as on the various notions of intellectual, moral, and spiritual life that traditionally have been associated with it. As such a project, philosophical anthropology now has the status of what, in another context, the English political theorist W.B. Gallie called an "essentially contested concept."

The fundamental issue between philosophical anthropologists who are sympathetic to materialism and those who are not is whether the discipline must espouse a materialist ontology if it is not to be dismissed as "unscientific." That issue in turn raises the further question of whether a consistently materialist theory of human nature is really possible.

In dealing with these questions, it is important to acknowledge the deep affiliation of the traditional philosophical conception of human nature with the intuitive understanding that human beings have of themselves and of their fellow human beings. In that understanding, an attitude that is known to philosophers as direct, or "naive," realism is well established. Philosophers regard it as naive because it claims that humans perceive things in the world directly and without the mediation of any impression, idea, or representation. Because no provision is made for any such direct apprehension in the scientific worldview, the concept has been summarily dismissed. More generally, intuitive distinctions of this kind

do not fare well within scientific thinking, which recognizes facts only when all their components can be reduced to a common level of physical process. Although, historically, philosophy has shared this distrust of commonsense distinctions and has not hesitated to override them with constructions of its own, contemporary philosophical anthropology typically treats such intuitions with more respect. It does not simply dismiss them as crude errors, and it does not treat the fact that they may be irreconcilable with assumptions made by the natural sciences as the last word on the subject. Wherever possible, it tries, instead, to incorporate them into a defensible conception of human nature that leaves the work of the sciences standing, though not necessarily within the kind of ontological framework that scientists may think is required.

There is a wide variety of views as to how this can best be done, but these do not seem to engage the attention of many contemporary philosophers. As Socrates discovered, many philosophers have regarded the natural world and its processes as being at least as interesting, if not more so, than the human mind and its vagaries. That attitude has maintained itself down to the present day and may even have become more extreme. The name of Socrates does, however, suggest a positive affinity for philosophical anthropology with humanism as a mode of thought that is animated by a strong sense of both the moral and the human importance of achieving an understanding of human nature. It can also be argued that interest in the character of one's own being has been a major motive of philosophical inquiry as a whole. Humans do not, after all, ask large philosophical questions primarily in their capacity as workers in a specialized field of inquiry; rather, they ask them as human beings who feel the need to understand their own lives in as wide a context as possible. It may be that a candid identification of philosophical anthropology with that degree of humane interest would express its character better than an official designation of it as a subfield within the bureaucratized world of academic philosophy. It would then be, in effect, the philosophical rationale for the understanding of human nature that humanism has represented, typically without offering much in the way of supporting argument.

Early conceptions of the soul

The earliest origins of the concept of the soul are hidden in a remote prehistoric past. Human beings undoubtedly lived then, as most still do, in a state of deep absorption in the world around them. This has always made it very difficult to turn attention to whatever it may be about human beings themselves that makes it possible for them to "have a world" at all.

What seems to have struck these early human beings most forcefully was the difference between what is alive and what is dead. This was the distinction that the idea of soul was originally designed to express. The soul was a life-principle, and, as such, it was regarded as something that leaves the body at death. As indicated by a variety of Indo-European words for soul, such as the Sanskrit *atman* and the Greek *psyche*, it was often identified with breath; it was not so much immaterial as it was a finer, attenuated form of matter

As thinking about these issues progressed, a variety of functions were assigned to the soul, which gradually came to be conceived as a kind of container in which the functions resided. The soul was what human thoughts and feelings were "in," and it was itself each person's inner reality. This connotation of inwardness survives to this day. The soul was considered a distinct individual entity – not unlike an organ of the body, but also very different, because its location in the body could not be determined. Furthermore, the concept of soul seemed familiar because it was spoken of in the way people speak about ordinary "things." It also appears to have been modeled on familiar objects in the sense that, in perception, every property of an object outside the mind corresponded to a counterpart property within the mind; this was joined by the assumption that the latter somehow reproduced the former. In this way, each soul-mind came to be understood as one more entity in the world, yet one with the unique quality of containing simulacra of the other entities.

One of the facts that the soul-mind was supposed to account for was the knowledge that humans had of the world around them. However oblivious early humans may have been to the notion of themselves as "subjects," they did not overlook the role that sense organs play in perception. It was sometimes thought – and children still often imagine – that rays of some kind emanate from the eyes and meet other rays emanating from the perceived object halfway, where perception supposedly occurs. Eventually, however, perception came to be understood as a process outside the body that reaches a sense organ and then produces some kind of facsimile of the object in the person whose sense organ has been affected. Knowledge is thus the production of a copy (or something like it) in the mind of the object that is outside it. Just how and where this occurred was unknown, but various parts of the body were usually held to be the locus of both perception and the other functions that were later referred to as "mental."

The cognitive function thus assigned to the soul could be addressed to many different kinds of objects, and the emphasis given to one or the other of these has varied substantially from one period in the history of

thought to another. The natural world was the immediate object of both perception and thought, but it was not long before God came to be considered an even more important object of knowledge. Indeed, knowledge of God eventually came to be regarded by some philosophers as a necessary condition for any other knowledge the soul might have, including that of the natural world. Still another object of knowledge for the soul was the soul itself; its ability to take itself, reflexively, as the object of its own awareness has been cited as one of its most remarkable characteristics.

Of these three types of knowledge – of the external world, of God, and of the soul itself – it is the first that has received most attention from philosophers. Although that priority of interest will be observed in this discussion, the other kinds of knowledge will be touched on in appropriate contexts. (…) But if the soul-mind had all of these different cognitive capabilities, it could not be a purely receptive or passive entity. It had its own spontaneity even in the area of cognition, where it could draw inferences about things or events not immediately present in space or time. Even more important, the soul-mind had the power to make decisions and undertake actions, and accordingly it held responsibility for the moral quality of those decisions and actions. The relation between judgments of the moral quality of action and other so-called "factual" knowledge was also much debated. <…>

A great many thinkers have contributed in one way or another to the philosophical understanding of human nature. In the history of Western thought, however, there has been a discernible series of turning points that are of special importance for appreciating the situation of philosophical anthropology at the present time. The first of these occurred in ancient Greece and coincided with the beginning of the Western philosophical tradition. The idea of the soul received its first major philosophical statement in Plato's tripartite theory of the soul as consisting of reason, spirit, and appetite (…). A second turning point came in the modern period, between the 17th and 19th centuries, when René Descartes and succeeding philosophers pursued what was later called "the way of ideas" as a means of working out the skeptical possibilities inherent in the models of mind they had inherited from antiquity. They were followed by others who tried to reconstruct the concept of mind on a very different basis. A third such juncture, which occurred in the 19th century but extends into the present, amounted to a full-blown crisis in humankind's understanding of itself. <…>

<…> Modern science and the demotion of mind

A much more powerful ground of opposition to the ethos of idealism, as well as to many of its principal themes, was the fact that it was simply too much at odds with the rising tide of scientific progress in the late 19th century. If its most authentic inspiration was to show that the relation of "mind" and "nature" is one of a dialectical tension in which neither can wholly subsume the other, in actual practice it all too often sounded as though it were celebrating an absorption of the natural world by "thought." Idealism was, therefore, at a decisive disadvantage in its relation to naturalism, a philosophical position closely attuned to the culture of science. Furthermore, naturalism dominated the thought of the 20th century and showed little interest in the traditional themes of philosophical anthropology and even less in the mind-centred conception of human nature with which philosophical anthropology was identified.

The most powerful and influential opposition to these ideas came from scientific developments that appeared to show conclusively that the exceptional status accorded to human nature had been invalidated. Three such movements of thought had an especially significant effect on the way human nature was coming to be conceived: the Darwinian theory of evolution, Freudian psychoanalysis, and the development of artificial intelligence (AI). These movements could hardly have been more different from each other, and while many would refuse to accord any real scientific status to Freud's theories, it is hard to deny that, at the very least, psychoanalysis identified a stratum of human thought and experience that had never been incorporated into prevailing accounts of human nature. What is important here is the fact that, however different these three movements may have been, they shared a strong inclination toward demoting the conscious mind from its privileged position within human self-understanding and assigning a determining role to some very different part of human nature.

Evolution

In the first instance, the theory of evolution claimed that the various species of living things have a natural rather than a divine origin. These species evolve through random changes that occur in their members, though these changes themselves are not per se inheritable, as the French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck had supposed. In one way or another, such changes can influence an animal's chances of survival and of reproducing itself. In this way, a process of natural selection takes place from which the human species itself emerged.

As a theory of human nature, evolution had a humbling effect on the pride associated with claims that humans held a privileged status among living things. Yet it did not have any direct bearing on the traditionally held distinction between the body and the mind. It was, in fact, hard to imagine what further influence evolution could have in the human case without appealing to changes that in one way or another would be of a mental character. All of this made evolutionary thought more of a threat to religious beliefs than to philosophical accounts of human nature, because the latter did not require any special assumptions regarding how the human species was formed.

Yet when evolutionary theory joined forces with genetics, as it did in the 20th century, it became possible to point to something within the human body – genes – that accounted for the heritable traits and mutations that occur in humans and in all living things. The inference has been widely drawn that human genetic makeup determines matters that had previously been thought to be controlled by rational thought and moral decision making. Now that the human genome has been completely sequenced, it may appear as though all the categories that have defined moral personality have been displaced by DNA, the organic chemical in which genetic information is encoded.

This at least has been the popular understanding of these developments, and apparently that of some professional students of these matters as well. Some of the latter have gone so far as to claim that the only meaningful possibility of human self-transcendence is that of passing one's own genes into the next generation. These developments have been carried further by the emergence of evolutionary psychology, which equates the mind with the brain and views it as progressively modified by the same kinds of evolutionary changes that occur in all living things.

Psychoanalytic theory has had a similarly displacing effect on human self-understanding. Although Freud originally conceived psychological processes in terms of energy exchanges within a physiological system, his mature theory was couched in a language of mind and consciousness that he modified for his own purposes. Since he was talking about matters of which humans are not normally aware and which cannot, therefore, be located in consciousness, he was forced to postulate the existence of what he called the "unconscious mind." On its face, this term–normally used in its abbreviated form, the <u>unconscious</u> – is an oxymoron, since consciousness, understood as awareness, has always been the defining attribute of the mind.

This fact has sometimes been thought to justify a peremptory dismissal of Freud's entire project. But it would be a mistake to deny on a

priori grounds the reality of the facts to which Freud was calling attention. The issue is rather one of finding an appropriate way of conceptualizing the kinds of facts that have been described in this way – a way that does not entail these incongruities. Neither Freud nor his followers appear to have been interested in conceptual issues of this kind. Psychoanalytic theory has continued to deal in facts about intentions, motives, and feelings as though they belonged to a rather mysterious realm of which humans – in their "conscious minds"– remain quite unaware. As a result, a rather crude picture established itself of the conscious mind operating under the control of an external agency. At least in the popular understanding of Freud's views, this further discredited even the ideal of rationality in human affairs by interpreting anything people might say as being mere surface manifestations of some unavowed and unconscious motive.

Artificial intelligence

Originating in the work of the British mathematician and logician Alan Turing, artificial intelligence involves the effort to produce machines (in most cases, computers) that are capable of executing tasks formerly thought to require human intelligence and thus mind. The distinction between computer hardware (the actual physical makeup of these machines) and software (the sets of instructions or programs by which computers perform these tasks) has become the effective replacement for the old philosophical distinction between body and mind. Of the three scientific movements reviewed here, AI represents the most ambitious challenge to traditional conceptions of the soul-mind, because it is the one most explicitly associated with a materialist account of human beings. Thus far, however, the accomplishments of AI have been meagre. It has produced a chess-playing machine that has defeated the reigning world champion, but in areas such as language translation, where context is far more nuanced than it is in chess, the results have been uneven.

It is evident that the highest aspiration of supporters of AI is the production of an artificial human being. Even now, its partisans describe themselves and other human beings with metaphors drawn from their work with these machines; they talk, for example, about their own "memory banks." These scientists have identified certain human problem-solving capabilities that can be reduced to a finite number of steps performed by a computer-guided robot; they then generalize this picture of human intelligence as computational activity and conceive of themselves on the model of the machines they have produced in this way. What goes missing in all this is any attempt to characterize the broader human

context from which these capabilities have been abstracted and to determine whether there is anything – emotions, for example–that cannot be assimilated to the computational model. However, because the only general conception that is available to them of what a human being is like seems to them to be hopelessly outdated and ineptly philosophical, they conclude that the picture they are constructing is the only possible scientific one. They therefore maintain that science is necessarily materialist and that every departure from materialism is without cognitive legitimacy.

Phenomenology as a response to materialism

All this raises a question as to what resources may be available to any philosophical anthropology that proposes to represent that broader human context. In the English-speaking world there appears to be a widely shared disposition to assume that philosophy can be accommodated within a materialist framework, provided that the issues it deals with are couched in linguistic or broadly scientific terms rather than in purely mentalistic ones. The only large movement of thought that has not joined in this consensus, in fact, is phenomenology. Thus, if philosophical anthropology has affinities anywhere in contemporary philosophy, it is reasonable to assume that they are with the thought of some of the principal representatives of that movement. On closer inspection, however, it may seem doubtful that this is the case, since most phenomenologists have opposed the conception of the human subject as a soul or a mind. The history of this opposition thus deserves further attention.

Foundations of phenomenology

The phenomenological movement was founded by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl, whose influence on other philosophers drawn to phenomenology was both positive and negative. He wanted to advance beyond the work of Descartes by developing a "pure" concept of consciousness that would not be understood as a kind of thing or substance nor described with inappropriate metaphors (such as *impression*) from the natural world. In order to block all such false assimilations, Husserl held that it was necessary to set aside the very existence of the natural world – not in the sense of denying it outright but rather in the sense of not assuming it as a given or counting on it for the purpose of describing consciousness. What would be left to work with would be states of pure consciousness – states that, under normal conditions, are largely directed toward what exists in the world but which for these purposes must be taken simply as what is thought–that is, as meanings.

The exclusion of the natural world from this inquiry into consciousness also applied to the human self as an inhabitant of that world. This was the "empirical" self – the one with a name and a birthday and all kinds of involvements in the natural world. Husserl contrasted this everyday empirical self with a "transcendental" self – one that is more or less identical with the pure consciousness that is left by the exclusions he called for. It has been purged of everything that tends to confuse it with the body or anything else that is physical in character. The transcendental self is also the form of consciousness that registers whatever truths are accessible to humans about the world and about themselves. As such, it cannot be subject to any external or causal influence, because such influence would itself be registered by this transcendental consciousness.

Although Husserl insisted that his reduction of the world to its role in consciousness was purely methodological, he never canceled the suspension of belief that this reduction required. As a result, no status ever accrued to natural reality other than that to which it had been reduced–the status, namely, of something meant by pure consciousness. Although Husserl wanted to avoid a Cartesian dualism of mind and body, he spoke of a "sphere of immanence" that contained everything that belonged to consciousness. This sounded remarkably like what was supposed to have been "in" the mind as a mental substance under the Cartesian dispensation. Moreover, such a transcendental subject would plainly not itself be in the world whose existence it was suspending; thus another feature of dualism was reproduced in Husserl's philosophy. It is hardly surprising that he eventually described his own thought as "transcendental idealism."

Heidegger and humanism

Rejecting this kind of transcendentalism, the thinkers who followed Husserl came to be known as "existential" phenomenologists, because they treated the existence of the natural world as the great incontestable datum for their analysis of consciousness. Without doubt, the most original and influential among them was Martin Heidegger. Any temptation to classify him as sympathetic to humanistic or anthropological concerns, however, was negated by his *Letter on Humanism* (1947), which he wrote in response to a lecture by the French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre. Sartre had argued that existential philosophy of the kind he had appropriated in good part from Heidegger had a humanistic character. Heidegger repudiated this suggestion by identifying humanism with a seriously deficient account of human being that reduces humankind to the status of an entity

of a special kind. Heidegger also made it very clear that his own work should not be confused with philosophical anthropology. Yet, at the same time and in the same essay, he appeared willing to reinstate the honorifics that he believed the proponents of humanism had improperly applied to a misconceived human nature, provided that that nature was correctly understood in the terms he was himself proposing.

Paradoxical as it may seem, this invites the thought that Heidegger's critique of humanism – and, by implication, of philosophical anthropology itself – can serve constructive rather than destructive purposes. The question thus posed is whether Heidegger's conception of human being can replace the flawed conceptual apparatus on which philosophical anthropology has relied and thereby provide it with a means of handling its current crisis more effectively.

The concept of *Dasein*

For Heidegger, the human subject had to be reconceived in an altogether new way, as "being-in-the-world." Because this notion represented the very opposite of the Cartesian "thing that thinks," the idea of consciousness as representing the mind's internal awareness of its own states had to be dropped. With it went the assumption that specific mental states were needed to mediate the relation of the mind to everything outside it. The human subject was not a mind that was capable only of representing the world to itself and whose linkage with its body was merely a contingent one. According to Heidegger, human being should instead be conceived as *Dasein*, a common German word usually translated in English as "existence" but which also literally means "being there." By using it as a replacement for "consciousness" and "mind," Heidegger intended to suggest that a human being is in the world in the mode of "uncovering" and is thus disclosing other entities as well as itself. *Dasein* is, in other words, the "there" – or the locus – of being and thus the metaphorical place where entities "show themselves" as what they are. Instead of being sealed off within a specially designed compartment within a human being, the functions that have been misdescribed as "mental" now become the defining characteristics of human existence.

There is one major difference between Heidegger's account of human being and the humanistic inspiration of much philosophical anthropology. In his early work *Being and Time* (1927), Heidegger had interpreted the disclosive function of *Dasein* as being closely bound up with its own active character and with the anticipatory temporality–its being referentially always "out ahead of itself" – that differs so significantly

from the sequential character of world-time. This strongly pragmatic strain later yielded to a conception of the access to being as a kind of gift that humans are privileged to receive. There are also strong suggestions in his later writings that his earlier view had been contaminated by a certain subjectivist tendency–the idea that man is quite literally the "measure of all things" and, as such, the designer and author of being itself rather than its humble recipient.

It is plain that any humanism associated with Heidegger would necessarily avoid the heroic rhetoric that so often celebrated the uniqueness of "man" in the past. No traditional humanism, however, could endorse his conception of the near-complete passivity of humans in their commerce with being, and in this light it may be the case that not Heidegger but Sartre was closer to the authentic spirit of humanism.

What is perhaps most interesting about Heidegger's concept of *Dasein* is that it is a concept of a human being as a whole rather than of a mind or of a human being as a compound of mind and body. The primary significance of this unitary treatment of human being is that it does not sequester the principal functions of a human being in a rather mysteriously conceived part thereof. This represents a genuine alternative to both the body-cum-soul conception of human being and to the straightforward identification of human beings with their bodies, which is the approach taken by most contemporary philosophers.

The Heideggerian alternative

If the Heideggerian alternative were ever to be widely understood and accepted, it would amount to a great transformation of both the philosophical anthropology that Heidegger rejected and, it may be surmised, of philosophy as well. The essential thesis that defines this alternative is that a human being is a unitary entity and that, as such, it is neither a material nor a mental thing. It is "in" the world as Cartesian minds are not, and it "has" a world as neither familiar objects like hammers nor relatively exotic ones like protons or black holes do. This thesis does not entail that there must be something wrong with what the natural sciences say in their own idiom about the human organism or anything else; it simply means that the materialist approach does not constitute an exhaustive account of human nature, and it misses altogether (when it does not positively obscure) what a human being is.

Stated more concretely, a human being inhabits the world as what might be called a milieu or presence, and it is itself at bottom simply the fact that "there is" a world. This is the deeply familiar but conceptually

elusive fact that is prior to and presupposed by all the further distinctions between what is "objective" and what is "subjective." Even more significantly, this fact also puts an end to the entire notion of the soul-mind as an inner domain from which others are forever locked out. There are, of course, many such "others"– i.e., human beings who share this world with each other in a mode that is quite different from the coexistence of objects within the world. They do so, moreover, as active beings for whom there is always something that can either be done or not done at any given point in their lives. These actions and nonactions generate an order of fact that is distinctively different from natural reality and that has a moral dimension that the latter altogether lacks.

It needs to be understood that these facts about human beings as beings-in-the-world, which tend to be dismissed on the grounds of their supposedly "subjective" character, are, in fact, the very characteristics of human beings that make it possible for them to have a world at all. As such, they set the context within which the more ontologically restricted processes of the so-called natural world take place. Another way of saying this is to point out that the term *nature*, as conceived and delimited by a materialist ontology, cannot contain human beings, because it strips them of precisely the characteristics by which they are able to disclose the world instead of being mere pieces of it. As a result, the theory of the world that natural scientists elaborate stands alone as though it had no human author. This is the ideal of "objectivity" carried to its ultimate and perverse extreme.

What is clear is that the materialist picture of the world, considering all that it leaves out, is extremely rickety and correspondingly vulnerable. If philosophical anthropology is indeed an authentic form of humanism, it now has a great opportunity to propose another version of the way things are, one in which humans can recognize themselves better than they can through any strictly materialist approach.

Theme 3. Axiology

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Axiology

Axiology (from Greek *axios,* "worthy"; *logos,* "science"), also called THEORY OF VALUE, the philosophical study of goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms. Its significance lies (1) in the considerable expansion that it has given to the meaning of the term value and (2) in the unification that it has provided for the study of a variety of questions – economic, moral, aesthetic, and even logical–that had often been considered in relative isolation.

The term "value" originally meant the worth of something, chiefly in the economic sense of exchange value, as in the work of the 18th-century political economist Adam Smith. A broad extension of the meaning of value to wider areas of philosophical interest occurred during the 19th century under the influence of a variety of thinkers and schools: the Neo-Kantians Rudolf Hermann Lotze and Albrecht Ritschl; Friedrich Nietzsche, author of a theory of the transvaluation of all values; Alexius Meinong and Christian von Ehrenfels; and Eduard von Hartmann, philosopher of the unconscious, whose *Grundriss der Axiologie* (1909; "Outline of Axiology") first used the term in a title. Hugo Münsterberg, often regarded as the founder of applied psychology, and Wilbur Marshall Urban, whose *Valuation, Its Nature and Laws* (1909) was the first treatise on this topic in English, introduced the movement to the United States. Ralph Barton Perry's book *General Theory of Value* (1926) has been called the magnum opus of the new approach. A value, he theorized, is "any object of any interest." Later, he explored eight "realms" of value: morality, religion, art, science, economics, politics, law, and custom.

A distinction is commonly made between instrumental and intrinsic value – between what is good as a means and what is good as an end. John Dewey, in *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922) and *Theory of Valuation* (1939), presented a pragmatic interpretation and tried to break down this distinction between means and ends, though the latter effort was more likely a way of emphasizing the point that many actual things in human life – such as health, knowledge, and virtue – are good in both senses. Other philosophers, such as C.I. Lewis, Georg Henrik von Wright, and W.K. Frankena, have multiplied the distinctions – differentiating, for example, between instrumental value (being good for some purpose) and

technical value (being good at doing something) or between contributory value (being good as part of a whole) and final value (being good as a whole).

Many different answers are given to the question "What is intrinsically good?" Hedonists say it is pleasure; Pragmatists, satisfaction, growth, or adjustment; Kantians, a good will; Humanists, harmonious self-realization; Christians, the love of God. Pluralists, such as G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, Max Scheler, and Ralph Barton Perry, argue that there are any number of intrinsically good things. Moore, a founding father of Analytic philosophy, developed a theory of organic wholes, holding that the value of an aggregate of things depends upon how they are combined.

Because "fact" symbolizes objectivity and "value" suggests subjectivity, the relationship of value to fact is of fundamental importance in developing any theory of the objectivity of value and of value judgments. Whereas such descriptive sciences as sociology, psychology, anthropology, and comparative religion all attempt to give a factual description of what is actually valued, as well as causal explanations of similarities and differences between the valuations, it remains the philosopher's task to ask about their objective validity. The philosopher asks whether something is of value because it is desired, as subjectivists such as Perry hold, or whether it is desired because it has value, as objectivists such as Moore and Nicolai Hartmann claim. In both approaches, value judgments are assumed to have a cognitive status, and the approaches differ only on whether a value exists as a property of something independently of human interest in it or desire for it. Noncognitivists, on the other hand, deny the cognitive status of value judgments, holding that their main function is either emotive, as the positivist A. J. Ayer maintains, or prescriptive, as the analyst R.M. Hare holds. Existentialists, such as Jean-Paul Sartre, emphasizing freedom, decision, and choice of one's values, also appear to reject any logical or ontological connection between value and fact.

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Value Theory
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/

The term "value theory" is used in at least three different ways in philosophy. In its broadest sense, "value theory" is a catch-all label used to encompass all branches of moral philosophy, social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and sometimes feminist philosophy and the philosophy of religion – whatever areas of philosophy are deemed to encompass

some "evaluative" aspect. In its narrowest sense, "value theory" is used for a relatively narrow area of normative ethical theory particularly, but not exclusively, of concern to consequentialists. In this narrow sense, "value theory" is roughly synonymous with "axiology". Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are. For instance, a traditional question of axiology concerns whether the objects of value are subjective psychological states, or objective states of the world.

But in a more useful sense, "value theory" designates the area of moral philosophy that is concerned with theoretical questions about value and goodness of all varieties – the theory of value. The theory of value, so construed, encompasses axiology, but also includes many other questions about the nature of value and its relation to other moral categories. The division of moral theory into the theory of value, as contrasting with other areas of investigation, cross-cuts the traditional classification of moral theory into normative and metaethical inquiry, but is a worthy distinction in its own right; theoretical questions about value constitute a core domain of interest in moral theory, often cross the boundaries between the normative and the metaethical, and have a distinguished history of investigation. This article surveys a range of the questions which come up in the theory of value, and attempts to impose some structure on the terrain by including some observations about how they are related to one another.

1. Basic Questions

The theory of value begins with a subject matter. It is hard to specify in some general way exactly what counts, but it certainly includes what we are talking about when we say any of the following sorts of things:

"pleasure is good/bad"; "it would be good/bad if you did that"; "she is good/bad for him"; "too much cholesterol is good/bad for your health"; "that is a good/bad knife"; "Jack is a good/bad thief"; "he's a good/bad man"; "it's good/bad that you came"; "it would be better/worse if you didn't"; "lettuce is better/worse for you than Oreos"; "my new can opener is better/worse than my old one"; "Mack is a better/worse thief than Jack"; "it's better/worse for it to end now, than for us to get caught later"; "best/worst of all, would be if they won the World Series *and* kept all of their players for next year"; "celery is the best/worst thing for your health"; "Mack is the best/worst thief around"

The word "value" doesn't appear anywhere on this list; it is full, however, of "good", "better", and "best", and correspondingly of "bad",

"worse", and "worst". And these words are used in a number of different kinds of constructions, of which we may take these four to be the main exemplars:

1. Pleasure is good.
2. It is good that you came.
3. She is good for him.
4. That is a good knife.

Sentences like 1, in which "good" is predicated of a mass term, constitute a central part of traditional axiology, in which philosophers have wanted to know what things (of which there can be more or less) are good. I'll stipulatively call them value claims, and use the word "stuff" for the kind of thing of which they predicate value (like pleasure, knowledge, and money). Sentences like 2 make claims about what I'll (again stipulatively) call goodness *simpliciter*; this is the kind of goodness appealed to by traditional utilitarianism. Sentences like 3 are *good for* sentences, and when the subject following "for" is a person, we usually take them to be claims about welfare or well-being. And sentences like 4 are what, following Geach [1960], I'll call *attributive* uses of "good", because "good" functions as a predicate modifier, rather than as a predicate in its own right.

Many of the basic issues in the theory of value begin with questions or assumptions about how these various kinds of claim are related to one another. Some of these are introduced in the next two sections, focusing in 1.1 on the relationship between our four kinds of sentences, and focusing in 1.2 on the relationship between "good" and "better", and between "good" and "bad".

1.1. Varieties of Goodness

Claims about good *simpliciter* are those which have garnered the most attention in moral philosophy. This is partly because as it is usually understood, these are the "good" claims that consequentialists hold to have a bearing on what we ought to do. Consequentialism, so understood, is the view that you ought to do whatever action is such that things would be best if you did it. This leaves, however, a wide variety of possible theories about how such claims are related to other kinds of "good" claim.

1.1.1. *Good* Simpliciter *and* Good For

For example, consider a simple *point of view* theory, according to which what is good *simpliciter* differs from what is good for Jack, in that being good for Jack is being good from a certain point of view – Jack's – whereas being good *simpliciter* is being good from a more general point

of view – the point of view of the universe. The point of view theory reduces both *good for* and good *simpliciter* to *good from the point of view of*, and understands good *simpliciter* claims as about the point of view of the universe. One problem for this view is to make sense of what sort of thing points of view could be, such that Jack and the universe are both the kinds of thing to have one.

According to a different sort of theory, the *agglomerative theory*, goodness *simpliciter* is just what you get by "adding up" what is good for all of the various people that there are. Rawls seems to attribute this view to utilitarians, but much more work would have to be done in order to make it precise. We sometimes say things like, "wearing that outfit in the sun all day is not going to be good for your tan line", but your tan line is not one of the things whose good it seems plausible to "add up" in order to get what is good *simpliciter*. Certainly it is not one of the things whose good classical utilitarians would want to add up. So the fact that sapient and even sentient beings are not the only kinds of thing that things can be good or bad for sets an important constraint both on accounts of the *good for* relation, and on theories about how it is related to good *simpliciter*.

In his refutation of egoism, G. E. Moore attributed the converse theory to egoists – that what is good for Jack (or "in Jack's good") is just what is good and in Jack's possession, or alternatively, what it is good that Jack possesses. Moore didn't argue against these theses directly, but he did show that they cannot be combined with universalizable egoism. It is now generally recognized that to avoid Moore's arguments, egoists need only to reject these analyses of *good for*.

1.1.2. Attributive Good

Other kinds of views understand good *simpliciter* in terms of attributive good. What, after all, are the kinds of things to which we attribute goodness *simpliciter*? According to many philosophers, it is to propositions, or states of affairs. This is supported by a cursory study of the examples we have considered, in which what is being said to be good appears to be picked out by complementizers like "if", "that", and "for": "it would be good if you did that"; "it's good that you came"; "it's better for it to end now". If complementizer phrases denote propositions or possible states of affairs, then it is reasonable to conjecture that being good *simpliciter* is being a good state of affairs, and hence that it is a special case of attributive good. <…>

A number of philosophers have denied that there is any such thing as goodness *simpliciter*, and it has sometimes been argued that this whole

way of talking is an invention of utilitarian moral philosophers. Peter Geach, for example, insists that apparent good *simpliciter* sentences are really simply elliptical attributive good sentences, and Judith Jarvis Thomson has argued that they are really simply elliptical *good for* sentences. Both Geach and Thomson seek to undermine consequentialist theories by denying them a subject matter. This strategy is problematic, however. For example, suppose that Geach is right, but only because the last-mentioned theory is correct, and being good *simpliciter* is just being a good state of affairs. Then consequentialists can still have their subject matter – it simply turns out to be a special case of the more general phenomenon of attributive good.

Other philosophers have used the examples of attributive good and *good for* in order to advance arguments against noncognitivist metaethical theories (…). The basic outlines of such an argument go like this: noncognitivist theories are designed to deal with good *simpliciter*, but have some kind of difficulties accounting for attributive good or for *good for*. Hence, there is a general problem with noncognitivist theories, or at least a significant lacuna they leave. It has similarly been worried that noncognitivist theories will have problems accounting for so-called "agent-relative" value [see section 4], again, apparently, because of its relational nature. There is no place to consider this claim here, but note that it would be surprising if relational uses of "good" like these were in fact a deep or special problem for noncognitivism; Hare's account in *The Language of Morals* was specifically about attributive uses of "good", and it is not clear why relational noncognitive attitudes should be harder to make sense of than relational beliefs.

1.1.3. Relational Strategies

In an extension of the strategies just discussed, some theorists have proposed views of "good" which aspire to treat all of good *simpliciter*, *good for*, and attributive good as special cases. A paradigm of this approach is the "end-relational" theory of Paul Ziff and Stephen Finlay. According to Ziff, all claims about goodness are relative to ends or purposes, and "good for" and attributive "good" sentences are simply different ways of making these purposes (more or less) explicit. Talk about what is good for Jack, for example, makes the purpose of Jack's being happy (say) explicit, while talk about what is a good knife makes our usual purposes for knives (cutting things, say) explicit. The claim about goodness is then relativized accordingly.

Views adopting this strategy need to develop in detail answers to just what, exactly, the further, relational, parameter on "good" is. Some

hold that it is *ends*, while others say things like "aims". A filled-out version of this view must also be able to tell us the *mechanics* of how these ends can be made explicit in "good for" and attributive "good" claims, and needs to really make sense of both of those kinds of claim as of one very general kind. And, of course, this sort of view yields the prediction that non-explicitly relativized "good" sentences – including those used throughout moral philosophy – are really only true or false once the end parameter is specified, perhaps by context.

This means that this view is open to the objection that it fails to account for a central class of uses of "good" in ethics, which by all evidence are *non*-relative, and for which the linguistic data do not support the hypothesis that they are context-sensitive. J.L. Mackie held a view like this one and embraced this result – Mackie's [1977] error theory about "good" extended only to such putative non-relational senses of "good". Though he grants that there are such uses of "good", Mackie concludes that they are mistaken. Finlay [2004], in contrast, argues that he can use ordinary pragmatic effects in order to explain the appearances. The apparently non-relational senses of "good", Finlay argues, really are relational, and his theory aspires to explain why they seem otherwise.

1.1.4. What's Special About Value Claims

The sentences I have called "value claims" present special complications. Unlike the other sorts of "good" sentences, they do not appear to admit, in a natural way, of comparisons. Suppose, for example, with G.E. Moore, that pleasure is good and knowledge is good. Which, we might ask, is better? This question does not appear to make very much sense, until we fix on some *amount* of pleasure and some *amount* of knowledge. But if Sue is a good dancer and Huw is a good dancer, then it makes perfect sense to ask who is the better dancer, and without needing to fix on any particular *amount* of dancing – much less on any amount of Sue or Huw. In general, just as the kinds of thing that can be tall are the same kinds of thing as can be taller than each other, the kinds of thing that can be good are the same kinds of thing as can be better than one another. But the sentences that we are calling "value claims", which predicate "good" of some stuff, appear not to be like this.

One possible response to this observation, if it is taken seriously, is to conclude that so-called "value claims" have a different kind of logical form or structure. One way of implementing this idea, the *good-first* theory, is to suppose that "pleasure is good" means something roughly like, "(other things equal) it is better for there to be more pleasure", rather than, "pleasure is better than most things (in some relevant comparison class)",

on a model with "Sue is a good dancer", which means roughly, "Sue is a better dancer than most (in some relevant comparison class)". According to a very different kind of theory, the *value-first* theory, when we say that pleasure is good, we are saying that pleasure is a value, and things are better just in case there is more of the things which are values. These two theories offer competing orders of explanation for the same phenomenon. The good-first theory analyzes value claims in terms of "good" simpliciter, while the value-first theory analyzes "good" *simpliciter* in terms of value claims. The good-first theory corresponds to the thesis that states of affairs are the "primary bearers" of value; the value-first theory corresponds to the alternative thesis that it is things like pleasure or goodness (or perhaps their instances) that are the "primary bearers" of value.

1.2. Good, Better, Bad
1.2.1. Good *and* Better

On a natural view, the relationship between "good", "better", and "best" would seem to be the same as that between "tall", "taller", and "tallest". "Tall" is a gradable adjective, and "taller" is its comparative form. On standard views, gradable adjectives are analyzed in terms of their comparative form. At bottom is the relation of being *taller than*, and someone is the tallest woman, just in case she is taller than every woman. Similarly, someone is tall, just in case she is taller than a contextually appropriate standard, or taller than sufficiently many (this many be vague) in some contextually appropriate comparison class.

Much moral philosophy appears to assume that things are very different for "good", "better", and "best". Instead of treating "better than" as basic, and something as being good just in case it is better than sufficiently many in some comparison class, philosophers very often assume, or write as if they assume, that "good" is basic. For example, many theorists have proposed analyses of *what it is*to be good, which are incompatible with the claim that "good" is to be understood in terms of "better". In the absence of some reason to think that "good" is very different from "tall", however, this may be a very peculiar kind of claim to make, and it may distort some other issues in the theory of value.

1.2.2. Value

Moreover, it is difficult to see how one could do things the other way around, and understand "better" in terms of "good". Jon is a better sprinter than Jan not because it is more the case that Jon is a good sprinter than that Jan is a good sprinter – they are both excellent sprinters, so neither one of these is more the case than the other. It is, however, possible

to see how to understand both "good" and "better" in terms of value. If good is to better as tall is to taller, then the analogue of value should intuitively be height. One person is taller than another just in case her height is greater; similarly, one state of affairs is better than another just in case its value is greater. If we postulate something called "value" to play this role, then it is natural (though not obligatory) to identify value with amounts of *values* – amounts of things like pleasure or knowledge, which "value" claims claim to be good.

But this move appears to be implausible or unnecessary when applied to attributive "good". It is not particularly plausible that there is such a thing as can-opener value, such that one can-opener is better than another just in case it has more can-opener value. In general, not all comparatives need be analyzable in terms of something like height, of which there can be literally more or less. Take, for example, the case of "scary". The analogy with height would yield the prediction that if one horror film is scarier than another, it is because it has more of something – scariness – than the other. This may be right, but it is not obviously so. If it is not, then the analogy need not hold for "good" and its cognates, either. In this case, it may be that being better than does not merely amount to having more value than.

1.2.3. Good *and* Bad

These questions, moreover, are related to others. For example, "better" would appear to be the inverse relation of "worse". A is better than B just in case B is worse than A. So if "good" is just "better than sufficiently many" and "bad" is just "worse than sufficiently many", all of the interesting facts in the neighborhood would seem to be captured by an assessment of what stands in the *better than* relation to what. The same point goes if to be good is just to be better than a contextually set standard. But it has been held by many moral philosophers that an inventory of what is better than what would still leave something interesting and important out: what is *good*.

If this is right, then it is one important motivation for denying that "good" can be understood in terms of "better". But it is important to be careful about this kind of argument. Suppose, for example, that, as is commonly held about "tall", the relevant comparison class or standard for "good" is somehow supplied by the context of utterance. Then to know whether "that is good" is true, you *do* need to know more than all of the facts about what is better than what – you also need to know something about the comparison class that is supplied by the context of utterance.

The assumption that "good" is context-dependent in this way may therefore itself be just the kind of thing to explain the intuition which drives the preceding argument.

2. Traditional Questions

Traditional axiology seeks to investigate what things are good, how good they are, and how their goodness is related to one another. Whatever we take the "primary bearers" of value to be, one of the central questions of traditional axiology is that of what stuffs are good: what is of value.

2.1. Intrinsic Value
2.1.1. What is Intrinsic Value?
Of course, the central question philosophers have been interested in, is that of what is of *intrinsic*value, which is taken to contrast with *instrumental* value. Paradigmatically, money is supposed to be good, but not intrinsically good: it is supposed to be good because it leads to other good things: HD TV's and houses in desirable school districts and vanilla lattes, for example. These things, in turn, may only be good for what they lead to: exciting NFL Sundays and adequate educations and caffeine highs, for example. And those things, in turn, may be good only for what they lead to, but eventually, it is argued, something must be good, and not just for what it leads to. Such things are said to be *intrinsically good*.

Philosophers' adoption of the term "intrinsic" for this distinction reflects a common theory, according to which whatever is non-instrumentally good must be good in virtue of its intrinsic properties. This idea is supported by a natural argument: if something is good only because it is related to something else, the argument goes, then it must be its relation to the other thing that is non-instrumentally good, and the thing itself is good only because it is needed in order to obtain this relation. The premise in this argument is highly controversial, and in fact many philosophers believe that something can be non-instrumentally good in virtue of its relation to something else. Consequently, sometimes the term "intrinsic" is reserved for what is good in virtue of its intrinsic properties, or for the view that *goodness* itself is an intrinsic property, and non-instrumental value is instead called "telic" or "final". I'll stick to "intrinsic", but keep in mind that intrinsic goodness may not be an intrinsic property, and that what is intrinsically good may turn out not to be so in virtue of its intrinsic properties. <…>

Instrumental value is also sometimes contrasted with "constitutive" value. The idea behind this distinction is that instrumental values lead

causally to intrinsic values, while constitutive values *amount* to intrinsic values. For example, my giving you money, or a latte, may causally result in your experiencing pleasure, whereas your experiencing pleasure may *constitute*, without causing, your being happy. For many purposes this distinction is not very important, and constitutive values can be thought, along with instrumental values, as things that are ways of getting something of intrinsic value. I'll use "instrumental" in a broad sense, to include such values.

2.1.2. What is the Intrinsic/Instrumental Distinction Among?

I have assumed, here, that the intrinsic/instrumental distinction is among what I have been calling "value claims", such as "pleasure is good", rather than among one of the other kinds of uses of "good" from part 1. It does not make sense, for example, to say that something is a good can opener, but only instrumentally, or that Sue is a good dancer, but only instrumentally. Perhaps it does make sense to say that vitamins are good for Jack, but only instrumentally; if that is right, then the instrumental/intrinsic distinction will be more general, and it may tell us something about the structure of and relationship between the different senses of "good", to look at which uses of "good" allow an intrinsic/instrumental distinction.

It is sometimes said that consequentialists, since they appeal to claims about what is good *simpliciter* in their explanatory theories, are committed to holding that states of affairs are the "primary" bearers of value, and hence are the only things of intrinsic value. This is not right. First, consequentialists can appeal in their explanatory moral theory to facts about what state of affairs would be best, without holding that states of affairs are the "primary" bearers of value; instead of having a "good-first" theory, they may have a "value-first" theory (see section 1.1.4), according to which states of affairs are good or bad *in virtue* of there being more things of value in them. Moreover, even those who take a "good-first" theory are not really committed to holding that it is states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable; states of affairs are not, after all, something that you can collect more or less of. So they are not really in parallel to pleasure or knowledge.

2.2. Monism/Pluralism

One of the oldest questions in the theory of value is that of whether there is more than one fundamental (intrinsic) value. Monists say "no", and pluralists say "yes". This question only makes sense as a question

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about intrinsic values; clearly there is more than one instrumental value, and monists and pluralists will disagree, in many cases, not over whether something is of value, but over whether its value is *intrinsic*. For example, as important as he held the value of knowledge to be, Mill was committed to holding that its value is instrumental, not intrinsic. G.E. Moore disagreed, holding that knowledge is indeed a value, but an intrinsic one, and this expanded Moore's list of basic values. Mill's theory famously has a pluralistic element as well, in contrast with Bentham's, but whether Mill properly counts as a pluralist about value depends on whether his view was that there is only one value – happiness – but two different kinds of pleasure which contribute to it, one more effectively than the other, or whether his view was that each kind of pleasure is a distinctive value. This point will be important in what follows.

2.2.1. Ontology and Explanation

At least three quite different sorts of issues are at stake in this debate. First is an ontological/explanatory issue. Some monists have held that a plural list of values would be explanatorily unsatisfactory. If pleasure and knowledge are both values, they have held, there remains a further question to be asked: why? If this question has an answer, some have thought, it must be because there is a further, more basic, value under which the explanation subsumes both pleasure and knowledge. Hence, pluralist theories are either explanatorily inadequate, or have not really located the basic intrinsic values.

This argument relies on a highly controversial principle about how an explanation of why something is a value must work – a very similar principle to that which was appealed to in the argument that intrinsic value must be an intrinsic property [section 2.1.1]. If this principle is false, then an explanatory theory of *why* both pleasure and knowledge are values can be offered which does not work by subsuming them under a further, more fundamental value. Reductive theories of *what it is* to be a value satisfy this description, and other kinds of theory may do so, as well. If one of these kinds of theory is correct, then even pluralists can offer an explanation of why the basic values that they appeal to are values.

2.2.2. Revisionary Commitments?

Moreover, against the monist, the pluralist can argue that the basic posits to which her theory appeals are not *different in kind* from those to which the monist appeals; they are only different in *number*. This leads to the second major issue that is at stake in the debate between monists

and pluralists. Monistic theories carry strong implications about what is of value. Given any monistic theory, everything that is of value must be either the one intrinsic value, or else must lead to the one intrinsic value. This means that if some things that are intuitively of value, such as knowledge, do not, in fact, always lead to what a theory holds to be the one intrinsic value (for example, pleasure), then the theory is committed to denying that these things are really always of value after all.

Confronted with these kinds of difficulties in subsuming everything that is pre-theoretically of value under one master value, pluralists don't fret: they simply add to their list of basic intrinsic values, and hence can be more confident in preserving the pre-theoretical phenomena. Monists, in contrast, have a choice. They can change their mind about the basic intrinsic value and try all over again, they can work on developing resourceful arguments that knowledge really does lead to pleasure, or they can bite the bullet and conclude that knowledge is really not, after all, always good, but only under certain specific conditions. If the explanatory commitments of the pluralist are not *different in kind* from those of the monist, but only different in *number*, then it is natural for the pluralist to think that this kind of slavish adherence to the number one is a kind of fetish it is better to do without, if we want to develop a theory that gets things *right*. This is a perspective that many historical pluralists have shared.

2.2.3. Incommensurability
The third important issue in the debate between monists and pluralists, and the most central over recent decades, is that over the relationship between pluralism and incommensurability. If one state of affairs is better than another just in case it contains more value than the other, and there are two or more basic intrinsic values, then it is not clear how two states of affairs can be compared, if one contains more of the first value, but the other contains more of the second. Which state of affairs is better, under such a circumstance? In contrast, if there is only one intrinsic value, then this can't happen: the state of affairs that is better is the one that has more of the basic intrinsic value, whatever that is.

Reasoning like this has led some philosophers to believe that pluralism is the key to explaining the complexity of real moral situations and the genuine tradeoffs that they involve. If some things really *are* incomparable or incommensurable, they reason, then pluralism about value could explain *why*. Very similar reasoning has led other philosophers, however, to the view that monism *has* to be right: practical wisdom requires being able to make choices, even in complicated situations, they

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argue. But that would be impossible, if the options available in some choice were incomparable in this way. So if pluralism leads to this kind of incomparability, then pluralism must be false.

In the next section, we'll consider the debate over the comparability of values on which this question hinges. But even if we grant all of the assumptions on both sides so far, monists have the better of these two arguments. Value pluralism may be *one* way to obtain incomparable options, but there could be other ways, even consistently with value monism. For example, take the interpretation of Mill on which he believes that there is only one intrinsic value – happiness – but that happiness is a complicated sort of thing, which can happen in each of two different ways – either through higher pleasures, or through lower pleasures. If Mill has this view, and holds, further, that it is in some cases indeterminate whether someone who has slightly more higher pleasures is happier than someone who has quite a few more lower pleasures, then he can explain why it is indeterminate whether it is better to be the first way or the second way, without having to appeal to pluralism in his theory of *value*. The pluralism would be within his theory of *happiness* alone.

2.3. Incommensurability/Incomparability
We have just seen that one of the issues at stake in the debate between monists and pluralists about value turns on the question (vaguely put) of whether values can be incomparable or incommensurable. This is consequently an area of active dispute in its own right. There are, in fact, many distinct issues in this debate, and sometimes several of them are run together.

2.3.1. Is there Weak Incomparability?
One of the most important questions at stake is whether it must always be true, for two states of affairs, that things would be better if the first obtained than if the second did, that things would be better if the second obtained than if the first did, or that things would be equally good if either obtained. The claim that it can sometimes happen that none of these is true is sometimes referred to as the claim of *incomparability*, in this case as applied to good *simpliciter*. Ruth Chang [2002] has argued that in addition to "better than", "worse than", and "equally good", there is a fourth "positive value relation", which she calls *parity*. Chang reserves the use of "incomparable" to apply more narrowly, to the possibility that in addition to none of the other three relations holding between them, it is possible that two states of affairs may fail even to be "on a

par". However, we can distinguish between *weak* incomparability, defined as above, and *strong* incomparability, further requiring the lack of parity, whatever that turns out to be. Since the notion of *parity* is itself a theoretical idea about how to account for what happens when the other three relations fail to obtain, a question which I won't pursue here, it will be weak incomparability that will interest us here.

It is important to distinguish the question of whether good *simpliciter* admits of incomparability from the question of whether *good for* and attributive good admit of incomparability. Many discussions of the incomparability of values proceed at a very abstract level, and interchange examples of each of these kinds of value claims. For example, a typical example of a purported incomparability might compare, say, Mozart to Rodin. Is Mozart a better artist than Rodin? Is Rodin a better artist than Mozart? Are they equally good? If none of these is the case, then we have an example of incomparability in attributive good, but not an example of incomparability in good*simpliciter*. These questions may be parallel or closely related, and investigation of each may be instructive in consideration of the other, but they still need to be kept separate.

For example, one important argument against the incomparability of value was mentioned in the previous section. It is that incomparability would rule out the possibility of practical wisdom, because practical wisdom requires the ability to make correct choices even in complicated choice situations. Choices are presumably between actions, or between possible consequences of those actions. So it could be that attributive good is sometimes incomparable, because neither Mozart nor Rodin is a better artist than the other and they are not equally good, but that good *simpliciter* is always comparable, so that there is always an answer as to which of two actions would lead to an outcome that is better.

2.3.2. What Happens when there is Weak Incomparability?

Even once it is agreed that good *simpliciter* is incomparable in this sense, many theories have been offered as to what that incomparability involves and why it exists. One important constraint on such theories is that they not predict more incomparabilities than we really observe. For example, though Rodin may not be a better or worse artist than Mozart, nor equally good, he is certainly a better artist than Salieri – even though Salieri, like Mozart, is a better composer than Rodin. This is a problem for the idea that incomparability can be explained by value pluralism. The argument from value pluralism to incomparability suggested that it would be impossible to compare any two states of affairs where one contained more of one basic value and the other contained more of another. But

cases like that of Rodin and Salieri show that the explanation of what is incomparable between Rodin and Mozart can't simply be that since Rodin is a better sculptor and Mozart is a better composer, there is no way of settling who is the better artist. If that were the correct explanation, then Rodin and Salieri would also be incomparable, but intuitively, they are not. Constraints like these can narrow down the viable theories about what is going on in cases of incomparability, and are evidence that incomparability is probably not going to be straightforwardly explained by value pluralism.

There are many other kinds of theses that go under the title of the incomparability or incommensurability of values. For example, some theories which posit lexical orderings are said to commit to "incomparabilities". Kant's thesis that rational agents have a dignity and not a price is often taken to be a thesis about a kind of incommensurability, as well. Some have interpreted Kant to be holding simply that respect for rational agents is of infinite value, or that it is to be lexically ordered over the value of anything else. Another thesis in the neighborhood, however, would be somewhat weaker. It might be that a human life is "above price" in the sense that killing one to save one is not an acceptable exchange, but that for some positive value of *n*, killing one to save *n* would be an acceptable exchange. On this view, there is no single "exchange value" for a life, because the value of a human life depends on whether you are "buying" or "selling" – it is higher when you are going to take it away, but lower when you are going to preserve it. Such a view would intelligibly count as a kind of "incommensurability", because it sets no single value on human lives.

<…>

James Fieser

Ethics

http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/

The field of ethics (or moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. *Metaethics* investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions? Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves. *Normative ethics* takes on a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards

that regulate right and wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our behavior on others. Finally, *applied ethics* involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war.

By using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics try to resolve these controversial issues. The lines of distinction between metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics are often blurry. For example, the issue of abortion is an applied ethical topic since it involves a specific type of controversial behavior. But it also depends on more general normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to life, which are litmus tests for determining the morality of that procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues such as, "where do rights come from?" and "what kind of beings have rights?"

1. Metaethics

The term "meta" means *after* or *beyond*, and, consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a removed, or bird's eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined area of moral philosophy. It covers issues from moral semantics to moral epistemology. Two issues, though, are prominent: (1) *metaphysical* issues concerning whether morality exists independently of humans, and (2) *psychological* issues concerning the underlying mental basis of our moral judgments and conduct.

a. Metaphysical Issues: Objectivism and Relativism

Metaphysics is the study of the kinds of things that exist in the universe. Some things in the universe are made of physical stuff, such as rocks; and perhaps other things are nonphysical in nature, such as thoughts, spirits, and gods. The metaphysical component of metaethics involves discovering specifically whether moral values are eternal truths that exist in a spirit-like realm, or simply human conventions. There are two general directions that discussions of this topic take, one *other-worldly* and one *this-worldly*.

Proponents of the other-worldly view typically hold that moral values are objective in the sense that they exist in a spirit-like realm beyond subjective human conventions. They also hold that they are absolute, or eternal, in that they never change, and also that they are universal insofar

as they apply to all rational creatures around the world and throughout time. The most dramatic example of this view is Plato, who was inspired by the field of mathematics. When we look at numbers and mathematical relations, such as 1+1=2, they seem to be timeless concepts that never change, and apply everywhere in the universe. Humans do not invent numbers, and humans cannot alter them. Plato explained the eternal character of mathematics by stating that they are *abstract entities* that exist in a spirit-like realm. He noted that moral values also are absolute truths and thus are also abstract, spirit-like entities. In this sense, for Plato, moral values are spiritual *objects*. Medieval philosophers commonly grouped all moral principles together under the heading of "eternal law' which were also frequently seen as spirit-like objects. 17th century British philosopher Samuel Clarke described them as spirit-like *relationships* rather than spirit-like objects. In either case, though, they exist in a spirit-like realm. A different other-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality is *divine commands* issuing from God's will. Sometimes called *voluntarism* (or divine command theory), this view was inspired by the notion of an all-powerful God who is in control of everything. God simply wills things, and they become reality. He wills the physical world into existence, he wills human life into existence and, similarly, he wills all moral values into existence. Proponents of this view, such as medieval philosopher William of Ockham, believe that God wills moral principles, such as "murder is wrong", and these exist in God's mind as commands. God informs humans of these commands by implanting us with moral intuitions or revealing these commands in scripture.

The second and more this-worldly approach to the metaphysical status of morality follows in the skeptical philosophical tradition, such as that articulated by Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and denies the objective status of moral values. Technically, skeptics did not reject moral values themselves, but only denied that values exist as spirit-like objects, or as divine commands in the mind of God. Moral values, they argued, are strictly human inventions, a position that has since been called *moral relativism*. There are two distinct forms of moral relativism. The first is *individual relativism*, which holds that individual people create their own moral standards. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, argued that the superhuman creates his or her morality distinct from and in reaction to the slave-like value system of the masses. The second is *cultural relativism* which maintains that morality is grounded in the approval of one's society - and not simply in the preferences of individual people. This view was advocated by Sextus, and in more recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William Graham Sumner. In addition to espousing skepticism

and relativism, this-worldly approaches to the metaphysical status of morality deny the absolute and universal nature of morality and hold instead that moral values in fact change from society to society throughout time and throughout the world. They frequently attempt to defend their position by citing examples of values that differ dramatically from one culture to another, such as attitudes about polygamy, homosexuality and human sacrifice.

b. Psychological Issues in Metaethics

A second area of metaethics involves the psychological basis of our moral judgments and conduct, particularly understanding what motivates us to be moral. We might explore this subject by asking the simple question, "Why be moral?" Even if I am aware of basic moral standards, such as don't kill and don't steal, this does not necessarily mean that I will be psychologically compelled to act on them. Some answers to the question "Why be moral?" are to avoid punishment, to gain praise, to attain happiness, to be dignified, or to fit in with society.

i. Egoism and Altruism

One important area of moral psychology concerns the inherent selfishness of humans. 17th century British philosopher Thomas Hobbes held that many, if not all, of our actions are prompted by selfish desires. Even if an action seems selfless, such as donating to charity, there are still selfish causes for this, such as experiencing power over other people. This view is called *psychological egoism* and maintains that self-oriented interests ultimately motivate all human actions. Closely related to psychological egoism is a view called *psychological hedonism* which is the view that *pleasure* is the specific driving force behind all of our actions. 18th century British philosopher Joseph Butler agreed that instinctive selfishness and pleasure prompt much of our conduct. However, Butler argued that we also have an inherent psychological capacity to show benevolence to others. This view is called *psychological altruism* and maintains that at least some of our actions are motivated by instinctive benevolence.

ii. Emotion and Reason

A second area of moral psychology involves a dispute concerning the role of reason in motivating moral actions. If, for example, I make the statement "abortion is morally wrong," am I making a rational assessment or only expressing my feelings? On the one side of the dispute, 18th century British philosopher David Hume argued that moral assessments involve our emotions, and not our reason. We can amass all the reasons we

want, but that alone will not constitute a moral assessment. We need a distinctly emotional reaction in order to make a moral pronouncement. Reason might be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume's words, "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions". Inspired by Hume's anti-rationalist views, some 20th century philosophers, most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly denied that moral assessments are factual descriptions. For example, although the statement "it is good to donate to charity" may on the surface look as though it is a factual description about charity, it is not. Instead, a moral utterance like this involves two things. First, I (the speaker) I am expressing my personal feelings of approval about charitable donations and I am in essence saying "Hooray for charity!" This is called the *emotive* element insofar as I am expressing my emotions about some specific behavior. Second, I (the speaker) am trying to get you to donate to charity and am essentially giving the command, "Donate to charity!" This is called the *prescriptive* element in the sense that I am prescribing some specific behavior.

From Hume's day forward, more rationally-minded philosophers have opposed these emotive theories of ethics (…) and instead argued that moral assessments are indeed acts of reason. 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant is a case in point. Although emotional factors often do influence our conduct, he argued, we should nevertheless resist that kind of sway. Instead, true moral action is motivated only by reason when it is free from emotions and desires. A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier (1958), was proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and prescriptivist theories of Ayer and others. Baier focuses more broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when making moral choices. All of our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or justification. If I claim that it is wrong to steal someone's car, then I should be able to justify my claim with some kind of argument. For example, I could argue that stealing Smith's car is wrong since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or put the thief at risk of getting caught. According to Baier, then, proper moral decision making involves giving the best reasons in support of one course of action versus another.

iii. Male and Female Morality

A third area of moral psychology focuses on whether there is a distinctly female approach to ethics that is grounded in the psychological differences between men and women. Discussions of this issue focus on two claims: (1) traditional morality is male-centered, and (2) there is a unique female perspective of the world which can be shaped into a value

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theory. According to many feminist philosophers, traditional morality is male-centered since it is modeled after practices that have been traditionally male-dominated, such as acquiring property, engaging in business contracts, and governing societies. The rigid systems of rules required for trade and government were then taken as models for the creation of equally rigid systems of moral rules, such as lists of rights and duties. Women, by contrast, have traditionally had a nurturing role by raising children and overseeing domestic life. These tasks require less rule following, and more spontaneous and creative action. Using the woman's experience as a model for moral theory, then, the basis of morality would be spontaneously caring for others as would be appropriate in each unique circumstance. On this model, the agent becomes part of the situation and acts caringly within that context. This stands in contrast with male-modeled morality where the agent is a mechanical actor who performs his required duty, but can remain distanced from and unaffected by the situation. A care-based approach to morality, as it is sometimes called, is offered by feminist ethicists as either a replacement for or a supplement to traditional male-modeled moral systems.

2. Normative Ethics

Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us. Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I would want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong. So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault, or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a *single principle* against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a *set* of foundational principles, or a set of good character traits.

The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only *one* ultimate criterion of moral conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. Three strategies will be noted here: (1) virtue theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories.

a. Virtue Theories

Many philosophers believe that morality consists of following precisely defined rules of conduct, such as "don't kill," or "don't steal." Presumably, I must learn these rules, and then make sure each of my actions

live up to the rules. Virtue ethics, however, places less emphasis on learning rules, and instead stresses the importance of developing *good habits of character*, such as benevolence (…). Once I've acquired benevolence, for example, I will then habitually act in a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is one of the oldest normative traditions in Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four virtues in particular, which were later called *cardinal virtues*: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. Other important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In addition to advocating good habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid acquiring bad character traits, or *vices*, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity. Virtue theory emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in one's youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young.

Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, which regulate our emotions. For example, in response to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop the virtue of courage which allows me to be firm when facing danger. Analyzing 11 specific virtues, Aristotle argued that most virtues fall at a mean between more extreme character traits. With courage, for example, if I do not have enough courage, I develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too much courage I develop the disposition of rashness which is also a vice. According to Aristotle, it is not an easy task to find the perfect mean between extreme character traits. In fact, we need assistance from our reason to do this. After Aristotle, medieval theologians supplemented Greek lists of virtues with three Christian ones, or *theological virtues*: faith, hope, and charity. Interest in virtue theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the 19th century with the rise of alternative moral theories below. In the mid 20th century virtue theory received special attention from philosophers who believed that more recent ethical theories were misguided for focusing too heavily on rules and actions, rather than on virtuous character traits. Alasdaire MacIntyre (1984) defended the central role of virtues in moral theory and argued that virtues are grounded in and emerge from within social traditions.

b. Duty Theories

Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care for our children, and to not commit murder. Duty theories base morality on specific, foundational principles of obligation. These theories are sometimes called *deontological*, from the Greek word *deon*, or duty, in view of the foundational nature of our duty or obligation. They are also sometimes called *nonconsequentialist* since these

principles are obligatory, irrespective of the consequences that might follow from our actions. For example, it is wrong to not care for our children even if it results in some great benefit, such as financial savings. There are four central duty theories.

The *first* is that championed by 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who classified dozens of duties under three headings: duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds:

1) a theoretical duty to know the existence and nature of God, and

2) a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God.

Concerning our duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts:

1) duties of the soul, which involve developing one's skills and talents, and

2) duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as we might through gluttony or drunkenness, and not killing oneself.

Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result of contracts between people. Absolute duties are of three sorts:

1. avoid wronging others,

2. treat people as equals, and

3. promote the good of others.

Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal one of which is the duty is to keep one's promises.

A *second* duty-based approach to ethics is *rights theory*. Most generally, a "right" is a justified claim against another person's behavior – such as my right to not be harmed by you (…). Rights and duties are related in such a way that the rights of one person implies the duties of another person. For example, if I have a right to payment of $10 by Smith, then Smith has a duty to pay me $10. This is called the correlativity of rights and duties. The most influential early account of rights theory is that of 17th century British philosopher John Locke, who argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's life, health, liberty or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following Locke, the United States Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others rights theorists maintained that we deduce other more specific rights from these, including the rights of property, movement, speech, and religious expression. There are four features traditionally associated with moral rights. First,

rights are *natural* insofar as they are not invented or created by governments. Second, they are *universal* insofar as they do not change from country to country. Third, they are *equal* in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of gender, race, or handicap. Fourth, they are *inalienable* which means that I cannot hand over my rights to another person, such as by selling myself into slavery.

A *third* duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle of duty. Influenced by Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing one's talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is a more foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident principle of reason that he calls the "categorical imperative." A categorical imperative, he argued, is fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that hinge on some personal desire that we have, for example, "If you want to get a good job, then you ought to go to college." By contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective of one's personal desires, such as "You ought to do X." Kant gives at least four versions of the categorical imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end. That is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments. For Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my neighbor's car since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually. Suicide, for example, would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single principle of duty.

A *fourth* and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which emphasizes *prima facie* duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our duties are "part of the fundamental nature of the universe." However, Ross's list of duties is much shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:

- *Fidelity*: the duty to keep promises
- *Reparation*: the duty to compensate others when we harm them
- *Gratitude*: the duty to thank those who help us

- *Justice*: the duty to recognize merit
- *Beneficence*: the duty to improve the conditions of others
- *Self-improvement*: the duty to improve our virtue and intelligence
- *Nonmaleficence*: the duty to not injure others

Ross recognizes that situations will arise when we must choose between two conflicting duties. In a classic example, suppose I borrow my neighbor's gun and promise to return it when he asks for it. One day, in a fit of rage, my neighbor pounds on my door and asks for the gun so that he can take vengeance on someone. On the one hand, the duty of fidelity obligates me to return the gun; on the other hand, the duty of nonmaleficence obligates me to avoid injuring others and thus not return the gun. According to Ross, I will intuitively know which of these duties is my *actual* duty, and which is my apparent or *prima facie* duty. In this case, my duty of nonmaleficence emerges as my actual duty and I should not return the gun.

c. Consequentialist Theories

It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences of our actions. According to consequentialism, correct moral conduct is determined *solely* by a cost-benefit analysis of an action's consequences:

Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable.

Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both the good and bad consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper. Consequentialist theories are sometimes called *teleological* theories, from the Greek word *telos*, or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality.

Consequentialist theories became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences of actions. Most versions of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In particular, competing consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:

• *Ethical Egoism*: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable *only to the agent* performing the action.

• *Ethical Altruism:* an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable *to everyone except the agent*.

• *Utilitarianism:* an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more favorable than unfavorable *to everyone*.

All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions for different groups of people. But, like all normative theories, the above three theories are rivals of each other. They also yield different conclusions. Consider the following example. A woman was traveling through a developing country when she witnessed a car in front of her run off the road and roll over several times. She asked the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated nervously past the scene. A few miles down the road the driver explained that in his country if someone assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person responsible for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held responsible for the death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually left unattended and often die from exposure to the country's harsh desert conditions. On the principle of ethical egoism, the woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences of her attempted assistance as *she* would be affected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be the morally proper choice. On the principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with the consequences of her action as *others* are affected, particularly the accident victim. Tallying only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice, irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her. On the principle of utilitarianism, she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here is less clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the overall benefit versus disbenefit of her action. <…>

3. Applied Ethics

Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral issues such as abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues have been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be considered an "applied ethical issue." First,

the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that there are significant groups of people both for and against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-by shooting, for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since everyone agrees that this practice is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of gun control would be an applied ethical issue since there are significant groups of people both for and against gun control.

The second requirement for an issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly moral issue. On any given day, the media presents us with an array of sensitive issues such as affirmative action policies, gays in the military, involuntary commitment of the mentally impaired, capitalistic versus socialistic business practices, public versus private health care systems, or energy conservation. Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important impact on society, they are not all moral issues. Some are only issues of social policy. The aim of social policy is to help make a given society run efficiently by devising conventions, such as traffic laws, tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more universally obligatory practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not confined to individual societies. Frequently, issues of social policy and morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially prohibited and immoral. However, the two groups of issues are often distinct. For example, many people would argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may not feel that there should be social policies regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies forbid residents in certain neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors are not offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident having a yard sale in one of these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as well.

<...>

a. Normative Principles in Applied Ethics

Arriving at a short list of representative normative principles is itself a challenging task. The principles selected must not be too narrowly focused, such as a version of act-egoism that might focus only on an action's short-term benefit. The principles must also be seen as having merit by people on both sides of an applied ethical issue. For this reason, principles that appeal to duty to God are not usually cited since this would have no impact on a nonbeliever engaged in the debate. The following principles are the ones most commonly appealed to in applied ethical discussions:

- *Personal benefit:* acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for the individual in question.
- *Social benefit:* acknowledge the extent to which an action produces beneficial consequences for society.
- *Principle of benevolence:* help those in need.
- *Principle of paternalism:* assist others in pursuing their best interests when they cannot do so themselves.
- *Principle of harm:* do not harm others.
- *Principle of honesty:* do not deceive others.
- *Principle of lawfulness:* do not violate the law.
- *Principle of autonomy:* acknowledge a person's freedom over his/her actions or physical body.
- *Principle of justice:* acknowledge a person's right to due process, fair compensation for harm done, and fair distribution of benefits.
- *Rights:* acknowledge a person's rights to life, information, privacy, free expression, and safety.

The above principles represent a spectrum of traditional normative principles and are derived from both consequentialist and duty-based approaches. The first two principles, personal benefit and social benefit, are consequentialist since they appeal to the consequences of an action as it affects the individual or society. The remaining principles are duty-based. The principles of benevolence, paternalism, harm, honesty, and lawfulness are based on duties we have toward others. The principles of autonomy, justice, and the various rights are based on moral rights. <…>

Theme 4. Philosophy of Consciousness

Rocco J. Gennaro

Consciousness
http://www.iep.utm.edu/consciou/

Explaining the nature of consciousness is one of the most important and perplexing areas of philosophy, but the concept is notoriously ambiguous. The abstract noun "consciousness" is not frequently used by itself in the contemporary literature, but is originally derived from the Latin *con* (with) and *scire* (to know). <...> The problem of consciousness is arguably the most central issue in current philosophy of mind and is also importantly related to major traditional topics in metaphysics, such as the possibility of immortality and the belief in free will. This article focuses on Western theories and conceptions of consciousness, especially as found in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind. <...>

1. Terminological Matters: Various Concepts of Consciousness
The concept of consciousness is notoriously ambiguous. It is important first to make several distinctions and to define related terms. The abstract noun "consciousness" is not often used in the contemporary literature, though it should be noted that it is originally derived from the Latin *con* (with) and *scire* (to know). Thus, "consciousness" has etymological ties to one's ability to know and perceive, and should not be confused with conscience, which has the much more specific moral connotation of knowing when one has done or is doing something wrong. Through consciousness, one can have knowledge of the external world or one's own mental states. The primary contemporary interest lies more in the use of the expressions "x is conscious" or "x is conscious of y." Under the former category, perhaps most important is the distinction between state and creature consciousness (Rosenthal 1993a). We sometimes speak of an individual mental state, such as a pain or perception, as conscious. On the other hand, we also often speak of organisms or creatures as conscious, such as when we say "human beings are conscious" or "dogs are conscious." Creature consciousness is also simply meant to refer to the fact that an organism is awake, as opposed to sleeping or in a coma. However, some kind of state consciousness is often implied by creature consciousness, that is, the organism is having conscious mental states. Due to the lack of a direct object in the expression "x is conscious," this is usually referred to as intransitive consciousness, in contrast to transitive

consciousness where the locution "x is conscious of y" is used (Rosenthal 1993a, 1997). Most contemporary theories of consciousness are aimed at explaining state consciousness; that is, explaining what makes a mental state a conscious mental state.

It might seem that "conscious" is synonymous with, say, "awareness" or "experience" or "attention." However, it is crucial to recognize that this is not generally accepted today. For example, though perhaps somewhat atypical, one might hold that there are even unconscious experiences, depending of course on how the term "experience" is defined (Carruthers 2000). More common is the belief that we can be aware of external objects in some unconscious sense, for example, during cases of subliminal perception. The expression "conscious awareness" does not therefore seem to be redundant. Finally, it is not clear that consciousness ought to be restricted to attention. It seems plausible to suppose that one is conscious (in some sense) of objects in one's peripheral visual field even though one is only attending to some narrow (focal) set of objects within that visual field.

Perhaps the most fundamental and commonly used notion of "conscious" is captured by Thomas Nagel's famous "what it is like" sense (Nagel 1974). When I am in a conscious mental state, there is "something it is like" for me to be in that state from the subjective or first-person point of view. When I am, for example, smelling a rose or having a conscious visual experience, there is something it "seems" or "feels" like from my perspective. An organism, such as a bat, is conscious if it is able to experience the outer world through its (echo-locatory) senses. There is also something it is like to be a conscious creature whereas there is nothing it is like to be, for example, a table or tree. This is primarily the sense of "conscious state" that will be used throughout this entry. There are still, though, a cluster of expressions and terms related to Nagel's sense, and some authors simply stipulate the way that they use such terms. For example, philosophers sometimes refer to conscious states as phenomenal or qualitative states. More technically, philosophers often view such states as having qualitative properties called "qualia" (…). There is significant disagreement over the nature, and even the existence, of qualia, but they are perhaps most frequently understood as the felt properties or qualities of conscious states.

Ned Block (1995) makes an often cited distinction between phenomenal consciousness (or "phenomenality") and access consciousness. The former is very much in line with the Nagelian notion described above. However, Block also defines the quite different notion of access consciousness in terms of a mental state's relationship with other mental

states; for example, a mental state's "availability for use in reasoning and rationality guiding speech and action" (Block 1995: 227). This would, for example, count a visual perception as (access) conscious not because it has the "what it's likeness" of phenomenal states, but rather because it carries visual information which is generally available for use by the organism, regardless of whether or not it has any qualitative properties. Access consciousness is therefore more of a functional notion; that is, concerned with what such states do. Although this concept of consciousness is certainly very important in cognitive science and philosophy of mind generally, not everyone agrees that access consciousness deserves to be called "consciousnesses" in any important sense. Block himself argues that neither sense of consciousness implies the other, while others urge that there is a more intimate connection between the two.

Finally, it is helpful to distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness, which plausibly involves some kind of awareness or consciousness of one's own mental states (instead of something out in the world). Self-consciousness arguably comes in degrees of sophistication ranging from minimal bodily self-awareness to the ability to reason and reflect on one's own mental states, such as one's beliefs and desires. Some important historical figures have even held that consciousness entails some form of self-consciousness (Kant; Sartre), a view shared by some contemporary philosophers (Gennaro 1996a, Kriegel 2004).

2. Some History on the Topic

Interest in the nature of conscious experience has no doubt been around for as long as there have been reflective humans. It would be impossible here to survey the entire history, but a few highlights are in order. In the history of Western philosophy, which is the focus of this entry, important writings on human nature and the soul and mind go back to ancient philosophers, such as Plato. More sophisticated work on the nature of consciousness and perception can be found in the work of Plato's most famous student Aristotle (see Caston 2002), and then throughout the later Medieval period. It is, however, with the work of René Descartes (1596–1650) and his successors in the early modern period of philosophy that consciousness and the relationship between the mind and body took center stage. As we shall see, Descartes argued that the mind is a non-physical substance distinct from the body. He also did not believe in the existence of unconscious mental states, a view certainly not widely held today. Descartes defined "thinking" very broadly to include virtually every kind of mental state and urged that consciousness is essential to

thought. Our mental states are, according to Descartes, infallibly transparent to introspection. John Locke (…) held a similar position regarding the connection between mentality and consciousness, but was far less committed on the exact metaphysical nature of the mind.

Perhaps the most important philosopher of the period explicitly to endorse the existence of unconscious mental states was G.W. Leibniz (…). Although Leibniz also believed in the immaterial nature of mental substances (which he called "monads"), he recognized the existence of what he called "petit perceptions," which are basically unconscious perceptions. He also importantly distinguished between perception and apperception, roughly the difference between outer-directed consciousness and self-consciousness (…). The most important detailed theory of mind in the early modern period was developed by Immanuel Kant. His main work *Critique of Pure Reason* (…) is as equally dense as it is important, and cannot easily be summarized in this context. Although he owes a great debt to his immediate predecessors, Kant is arguably the most important philosopher since Plato and Aristotle and is highly relevant today. Kant basically thought that an adequate account of phenomenal consciousness involved far more than any of his predecessors had considered. There are important mental structures which are "presupposed" in conscious experience, and Kant presented an elaborate theory as to what those structures are, which, in turn, had other important implications. He, like Leibniz, also saw the need to postulate the existence of unconscious mental states and mechanisms in order to provide an adequate theory of mind (...).

Over the past one hundred years or so, however, research on consciousness has taken off in many important directions. In psychology, with the notable exception of the virtual banishment of consciousness by behaviorist psychologists (e. g., Skinner 1953), there were also those deeply interested in consciousness and various introspective (or "first-person") methods of investigating the mind. The writings of such figures as Wilhelm Wundt (1897), William James (1890) and Alfred Titchener (1901) are good examples of this approach. Franz Brentano (…) also had a profound effect on some contemporary theories of consciousness. Similar introspectionist approaches were used by those in the so-called "phenomenological" tradition in philosophy, such as in the writings of Edmund Husserl (…) and Martin Heidegger (…). The work of Sigmund Freud was very important, at minimum, in bringing about the near universal acceptance of the existence of unconscious mental states and processes.

It must, however, be kept in mind that none of the above had very much scientific knowledge about the detailed workings of the brain. The relatively recent development of neurophysiology is, in part, also responsible for the unprecedented interdisciplinary research interest in consciousness, particularly since the 1980s. There are now several important journals devoted entirely to the study of consciousness: *Consciousness and Cognition*, *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, and *Psyche*. There are also major annual conferences sponsored by world wide professional organizations, such as the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness, and an entire book series called "Advances in Consciousness Research" published by John Benjamins. (...)

3. The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Materialism vs. Dualism

Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the ultimate nature of reality. There are two broad traditional and competing metaphysical views concerning the nature of the mind and conscious mental states: dualism and materialism. While there are many versions of each, the former generally holds that the conscious mind or a conscious mental state is non-physical in some sense. On the other hand, materialists hold that the mind is the brain, or, more accurately, that conscious mental activity is identical with neural activity. It is important to recognize that by non-physical, dualists do not merely mean "not visible to the naked eye." Many physical things fit this description, such as the atoms which make up the air in a typical room. For something to be non-physical, it must literally be outside the realm of physics; that is, not in space at all and undetectable in principle by the instruments of physics. It is equally important to recognize that the category "physical" is broader than the category "material." Materialists are called such because there is the tendency to view the brain, a material thing, as the most likely physical candidate to identify with the mind. However, something might be physical but not material in this sense, such as an electromagnetic or energy field. One might therefore instead be a "physicalist" in some broader sense and still not a dualist. Thus, to say that the mind is non-physical is to say something much stronger than that it is non-material. Dualists, then, tend to believe that conscious mental states or minds are radically different from anything in the physical world at all.

a. Dualism: General Support and Related Issues

There are a number of reasons why some version of dualism has been held throughout the centuries. For one thing, especially from the introspective or first-person perspective, our conscious mental states just do

not seem like physical things or processes. That is, when we reflect on our conscious perceptions, pains, and desires, they do not seem to be physical in any sense. Consciousness seems to be a unique aspect of the world not to be understood in any physical way. Although materialists will urge that this completely ignores the more scientific third-person perspective on the nature of consciousness and mind, this idea continues to have force for many today. Indeed, it is arguably the crucial underlying intuition behind historically significant "conceivability arguments" against materialism and for dualism. Such arguments typically reason from the premise that one can conceive of one's conscious states existing without one's body or, conversely, that one can imagine one's own physical duplicate without consciousness at all (…). The metaphysical conclusion ultimately drawn is that consciousness cannot be identical with anything physical, partly because there is no essential conceptual connection between the mental and the physical. Arguments such as these go back to Descartes and continue to be used today in various ways (Kripke 1972, Chalmers 1996), but it is highly controversial as to whether they succeed in showing that materialism is false. Materialists have replied in various ways to such arguments and the relevant literature has grown dramatically in recent years.

Historically, there is also the clear link between dualism and a belief in immortality, and hence a more theistic perspective than one tends to find among materialists. Indeed, belief in dualism is often explicitly theologically motivated. If the conscious mind is not physical, it seems more plausible to believe in the possibility of life after bodily death. On the other hand, if conscious mental activity is identical with brain activity, then it would seem that when all brain activity ceases, so do all conscious experiences and thus no immortality. After all, what do many people believe continues after bodily death? Presumably, one's own conscious thoughts, memories, experiences, beliefs, and so on. There is perhaps a similar historical connection to a belief in free will, which is of course a major topic in its own right. For our purposes, it suffices to say that, on some definitions of what it is to act freely, such ability seems almost "supernatural" in the sense that one's conscious decisions can alter the otherwise deterministic sequence of events in nature. To put it another way: If we are entirely physical beings as the materialist holds, then mustn't all of the brain activity and behavior in question be determined by the laws of nature? Although materialism may not logically rule out immortality or free will, materialists will likely often reply that such traditional, perhaps even outdated or pre-scientific beliefs simply ought to be rejected to the extent that they conflict with materialism. After all, if the weight of

the evidence points toward materialism and away from dualism, then so much the worse for those related views.

One might wonder "even if the mind is physical, what about the soul?" Maybe it's the soul, not the mind, which is non-physical as one might be told in many religious traditions. While it is true that the term "soul" (or "spirit") is often used instead of "mind" in such religious contexts, the problem is that it is unclear just how the soul is supposed to differ from the mind. The terms are often even used interchangeably in many historical texts and by many philosophers because it is unclear what else the soul could be other than "the mental substance." It is difficult to describe the soul in any way that doesn't make it sound like what we mean by the mind. After all, that's what many believe goes on after bodily death; namely, conscious mental activity. Granted that the term "soul" carries a more theological connotation, but it doesn't follow that the words "soul" and "mind" refer to entirely different things. Somewhat related to the issue of immortality, the existence of near death experiences is also used as some evidence for dualism and immortality. Such patients experience a peaceful moving toward a light through a tunnel like structure, or are able to see doctors working on their bodies while hovering over them in an emergency room (sometimes akin to what is called an "out of body experience"). In response, materialists will point out that such experiences can be artificially induced in various experimental situations, and that starving the brain of oxygen is known to cause hallucinations. <…>

i. Substance Dualism [and Objections <…>]
Interactionist Dualism or simply "interactionism" is the most common form of "substance dualism" and its name derives from the widely accepted fact that mental states and bodily states causally interact with each other. For example, my desire to drink something cold causes my body to move to the refrigerator and get something to drink and, conversely, kicking me in the shin will cause me to feel a pain and get angry. Due to Descartes' influence, it is also sometimes referred to as "Cartesian dualism." Knowing nothing about just where such causal interaction could take place, Descartes speculated that it was through the pineal gland, a now almost humorous conjecture. But a modern day interactionist would certainly wish to treat various areas of the brain as the location of such interactions. <…>

ii. Other Forms of Dualism

While a detailed survey of all varieties of dualism is beyond the scope of this entry, it is at least important to note here that the main and most popular form of dualism today is called property dualism. Substance dualism has largely fallen out of favor at least in most philosophical circles, though there are important exceptions (e. g., Swinburne 1986, Foster 1996) and it often continues to be tied to various theological positions. Property dualism, on the other hand, is a more modest version of dualism and it holds that there are mental properties (that is, characteristics or aspects of things) that are neither identical with nor reducible to physical properties. There are actually several different kinds of property dualism, but what they have in common is the idea that conscious properties, such as the color qualia involved in a conscious experience of a visual perception, cannot be explained in purely physical terms and, thus, are not themselves to be identified with any brain state or process.

Two other views worth mentioning are epiphenomenalism and panpsychism. The latter is the somewhat eccentric view that all things in physical reality, even down to micro-particles, have some mental properties. All substances have a mental aspect, though it is not always clear exactly how to characterize or test such a claim. Epiphenomenalism holds that mental events are caused by brain events but those mental events are mere "epiphenomena" which do not, in turn, cause anything physical at all, despite appearances to the contrary (for a recent defense, see Robinson 2004).

Finally, although not a form of dualism, idealism holds that there are only immaterial mental substances, a view more common in the Eastern tradition. The most prominent Western proponent of idealism was 18th century empiricist George Berkeley. The idealist agrees with the substance dualist, however, that minds are non-physical, but then denies the existence of mind-independent physical substances altogether. Such a view faces a number of serious objections, and it also requires a belief in the existence of God.

b. Materialism: General Support

Some form of materialism is probably much more widely held today than in centuries past. No doubt part of the reason for this has to do with the explosion in scientific knowledge about the workings of the brain and its intimate connection with consciousness, including the close connection between brain damage and various states of consciousness. Brain death is now the main criterion for when someone dies. Stimulation to

specific areas of the brain results in modality specific conscious experiences. Indeed, materialism often seems to be a working assumption in neurophysiology. Imagine saying to a neuroscientist "you are not really studying the conscious mind itself" when she is examining the workings of the brain during an fMRI. The idea is that science is showing us that conscious mental states, such as visual perceptions, are simply identical with certain neuro-chemical brain processes; much like the science of chemistry taught us that water just is H2O.

There are also theoretical factors on the side of materialism, such as adherence to the so-called "principle of simplicity" which says that if two theories can equally explain a given phenomenon, then we should accept the one which posits fewer objects or forces. In this case, even if dualism could equally explain consciousness (which would of course be disputed by materialists), materialism is clearly the simpler theory in so far as it does not posit any objects or processes over and above physical ones. Materialists will wonder why there is a need to believe in the existence of such mysterious non-physical entities. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Darwinian revolution, it would seem that materialism is on even stronger ground provided that one accepts basic evolutionary theory and the notion that most animals are conscious. Given the similarities between the more primitive parts of the human brain and the brains of other animals, it seems most natural to conclude that, through evolution, increasing layers of brain areas correspond to increased mental abilities. For example, having a well developed prefrontal cortex allows humans to reason and plan in ways not available to dogs and cats. It also seems fairly uncontroversial to hold that we should be materialists about the minds of animals. If so, then it would be odd indeed to hold that non-physical conscious states suddenly appear on the scene with humans.

There are still, however, a number of much discussed and important objections to materialism, most of which question the notion that materialism can adequately explain conscious experience. <…>

v. Varieties of Materialism

Despite the apparent simplicity of materialism, say, in terms of the identity between mental states and neural states, the fact is that there are many different forms of materialism. While a detailed survey of all varieties is beyond the scope of this entry, it is at least important to acknowledge the commonly drawn distinction between two kinds of "identity theory": token-token and type-type materialism. Type-type identity theory is the stronger thesis and says that mental properties, such

as "having a desire to drink some water" or "being in pain," are literally identical with a brain property of some kind. Such identities were originally meant to be understood as on a par with, for example, the scientific identity between "being water" and "being composed of H2O" (Place 1956, Smart 1959). However, this view historically came under serious assault due to the fact that it seems to rule out the so-called "multiple realizability" of conscious mental states. The idea is simply that it seems perfectly possible for there to be other conscious beings (e.g., aliens, radically different animals) who can have those same mental states but who also are radically different from us physiologically (Fodor 1974). It seems that commitment to type-type identity theory led to the undesirable result that only organisms with brains like ours can have conscious states. Somewhat more technically, most materialists wish to leave room for the possibility that mental properties can be "instantiated" in different kinds of organisms. (...) As a consequence, a more modest "token-token" identity theory has become preferable to many materialists. This view simply holds that each particular conscious mental event in some organism is identical with some particular brain process or event in that organism. This seems to preserve much of what the materialist wants but yet allows for the multiple realizability of conscious states, because both the human and the alien can still have a conscious desire for something to drink while each mental event is identical with a (different) physical state in each organism.

Taking the notion of multiple realizability very seriously has also led many to embrace functionalism, which is the view that conscious mental states should really only be identified with the functional role they play within an organism. For example, conscious pains are defined more in terms of input and output, such as causing bodily damage and avoidance behavior, as well as in terms of their relationship to other mental states. It is normally viewed as a form of materialism since virtually all functionalists also believe, like the token-token theorist, that something physical ultimately realizes that functional state in the organism, but functionalism does not, by itself, entail that materialism is true. Critics of functionalism, however, have long argued that such purely functional accounts cannot adequately explain the essential "feel" of conscious states, or that it seems possible to have two functionally equivalent creatures, one of whom lacks qualia entirely (…).

Some materialists even deny the very existence of mind and mental states altogether, at least in the sense that the very concept of consciousness is muddled (Wilkes 1984, 1988) or that the mentalistic notions found

in folk psychology, such as desires and beliefs, will eventually be eliminated and replaced by physicalistic terms as neurophysiology matures into the future (Churchland 1983). This is meant as analogous to past similar eliminations based on deeper scientific understanding, for example, we no longer need to speak of "ether" or "phlogiston." Other eliminativists, more modestly, argue that there is no such thing as qualia when they are defined in certain problematic ways (Dennett 1988).

Finally, it should also be noted that not all materialists believe that conscious mentality can be explained in terms of the physical, at least in the sense that the former cannot be "reduced" to the latter. Materialism is true as an ontological or metaphysical doctrine, but facts about the mind cannot be deduced from facts about the physical world (Boyd 1980, Van Gulick 1992). In some ways, this might be viewed as a relatively harmless variation on materialist themes, but others object to the very coherence of this form of materialism (Kim 1987, 1998). Indeed, the line between such "non-reductive materialism" and property dualism is not always so easy to draw; partly because the entire notion of "reduction" is ambiguous and a very complex topic in its own right. On a related front, some materialists are happy enough to talk about a somewhat weaker "supervenience" relation between mind and matter. Although "supervenience" is a highly technical notion with many variations, the idea is basically one of dependence (instead of identity); for example, that the mental depends on the physical in the sense that any mental change must be accompanied by some physical change (see Kim 1993).

4. Specific Theories of Consciousness

Most specific theories of consciousness tend to be reductionist in some sense. The classic notion at work is that consciousness or individual conscious mental states can be explained in terms of something else or in some other terms. This section will focus on several prominent contemporary reductionist theories. We should, however, distinguish between those who attempt such a reduction directly in physicalistic, such as neurophysiological, terms and those who do so in mentalistic terms, such as by using unconscious mental states or other cognitive notions.

a. Neural Theories

The more direct reductionist approach can be seen in various, more specific, neural theories of consciousness. Perhaps best known is the theory offered by Francis Crick and Christof Koch 1990 (see also Crick 1994, Koch 2004). The basic idea is that mental states become conscious

when large numbers of neurons fire in synchrony and all have oscillations within the 35-75 hertz range (that is, 35–75 cycles per second). However, many philosophers and scientists have put forth other candidates for what, specifically, to identify in the brain with consciousness. This vast enterprise has come to be known as the search for the "neural correlates of consciousness" or NCCs (...). The overall idea is to show how one or more specific kinds of neuro-chemical activity can underlie and explain conscious mental activity (Metzinger 2000). Of course, mere "correlation" is not enough for a fully adequate neural theory and explaining just what counts as a NCC turns out to be more difficult than one might think (Chalmers 2000). Even Crick and Koch have acknowledged that they, at best, provide a necessary condition for consciousness, and that such firing patters are not automatically sufficient for having conscious experience.

b. Representational Theories of Consciousness

Many current theories attempt to reduce consciousness in mentalistic terms. One broadly popular approach along these lines is to reduce consciousness to "mental representations" of some kind. The notion of a "representation" is of course very general and can be applied to photographs, signs, and various natural objects, such as the rings inside a tree. Much of what goes on in the brain, however, might also be understood in a representational way; for example, as mental events representing outer objects partly because they are caused by such objects in, say, cases of veridical visual perception. More specifically, philosophers will often call such representational mental states "intentional states" which have representational content; that is, mental states which are "about something" or "directed at something" as when one has a thought about the house or a perception of the tree. Although intentional states are sometimes contrasted with phenomenal states, such as pains and color experiences, it is clear that many conscious states have both phenomenal and intentional properties, such as visual perceptions. It should be noted that the relation between intentionalilty and consciousness is itself a major ongoing area of dispute with some arguing that genuine intentionality actually presupposes consciousness in some way (Searle 1992, Siewart 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002) while most representationalists insist that intentionality is prior to consciousness (Gennaro 2012, chapter two).

The general view that we can explain conscious mental states in terms of representational or intentional states is called "representationalism." Although not automatically reductionist in spirit, most versions of

representationalism do indeed attempt such a reduction. Most representationalists, then, believe that there is room for a kind of "second-step" reduction to be filled in later by neuroscience. The other related motivation for representational theories of consciousness is that many believe that an account of representation or intentionality can more easily be given in naturalistic terms, such as causal theories whereby mental states are understood as representing outer objects in virtue of some reliable causal connection. The idea, then, is that if consciousness can be explained in representational terms and representation can be understood in purely physical terms, then there is the promise of a reductionist and naturalistic theory of consciousness. Most generally, however, we can say that a representationalist will typically hold that the phenomenal properties of experience (that is, the "qualia" or "what it is like of experience" or "phenomenal character") can be explained in terms of the experiences' representational properties. Alternatively, conscious mental states have no mental properties other than their representational properties. Two conscious states with all the same representational properties will not differ phenomenally. For example, when I look at the blue sky, what it is like for me to have a conscious experience of the sky is simply identical with my experience's representation of the blue sky. <...>

c. Other Cognitive Theories

Aside from the explicitly representational approaches discussed above, there are also related attempts to explain consciousness in other cognitive terms. The two most prominent such theories are worth describing here:

Daniel Dennett (1991, 2005) has put forth what he calls the Multiple Drafts Model (MDM) of consciousness. Although similar in some ways to representationalism, Dennett is most concerned that materialists avoid falling prey to what he calls the "myth of the Cartesian theater," the notion that there is some privileged place in the brain where everything comes together to produce conscious experience. Instead, the MDM holds that all kinds of mental activity occur in the brain by parallel processes of interpretation, all of which are under frequent revision. The MDM rejects the idea of some "self" as an inner observer; rather, the self is the product or construction of a narrative which emerges over time. Dennett is also well known for rejecting the very assumption that there is a clear line to be drawn between conscious and unconscious mental states in terms of the problematic notion of "qualia." He influentially rejects strong emphasis on any phenomenological or first-person approach to investigating

consciousness, advocating instead what he calls "heterophenomenology" according to which we should follow a more neutral path "leading from objective physical science and its insistence on the third person point of view, to a method of phenomenological description that can (in principle) do justice to the most private and ineffable subjective experiences." (1991: 72)

Bernard Baars' Global Workspace Theory (GWT) model of consciousness is probably the most influential theory proposed among psychologists (Baars 1988, 1997). The basic idea and metaphor is that we should think of the entire cognitive system as built on a "blackboard architecture" which is a kind of global workspace. According to GWT, unconscious processes and mental states compete for the spotlight of attention, from which information is "broadcast globally" throughout the system. Consciousness consists in such global broadcasting and is therefore also, according to Baars, an important functional and biological adaptation. We might say that consciousness is thus created by a kind of global access to select bits of information in the brain and nervous system. Despite Baars' frequent use of "theater" and "spotlight" metaphors, he argues that his view does not entail the presence of the material Cartesian theater that Dennett is so concerned to avoid. It is, in any case, an empirical matter just how the brain performs the functions he describes, such as detecting mechanisms of attention.

Objections to these cognitive theories include the charge that they do not really address the hard problem of consciousness (as described in section 3b.i), but only the "easy" problems. Dennett is also often accused of explaining away consciousness rather than really explaining it. It is also interesting to think about Baars' GWT in light of the Block's distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness (see section 1). Does Baars' theory only address access consciousness instead of the more difficult to explain phenomenal consciousness? (Two other psychological cognitive theories worth noting are the ones proposed by George Mandler 1975 and Tim Shallice 1988).

<...>

Theme 5. Epistemology

David A. Truncellito

Epistemology

(http://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/)

Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Epistemologists concern themselves with a number of tasks, which we might sort into two categories.

First, we must determine the *nature* of knowledge; that is, what does it mean to say that someone knows, or fails to know, something? This is a matter of understanding what knowledge is, and how to distinguish between cases in which someone knows something and cases in which someone does not know something. While there is some general agreement about some aspects of this issue, we shall see that this question is much more difficult than one might imagine.

Second, we must determine the extent of human knowledge; that is, how much do we, or can we, know? How can we use our reason, our senses, the testimony of others, and other resources to acquire knowledge? Are there limits to what we can know? For instance, are some things unknowable? Is it possible that we do not know nearly as much as we think we do? Should we have a legitimate worry about skepticism, the view that we do not or cannot know anything at all?

1. Kinds of Knowledge

The term "epistemology" comes from the Greek "episteme", meaning "knowledge", and "logos", meaning, roughly, "study, or science, of". "Logos" is the root of all terms ending in "-ology" – such as psychology, anthropology – and of "logic," and has many other related meanings.

The word "knowledge" and its cognates are used in a variety of ways. One common use of the word "know" is as an expression of psychological conviction. For instance, we might hear someone say, "I just knew it wouldn't rain, but then it did". While this may an appropriate usage, philosophers tend to use the word "know" in a *factive* sense, so that one cannot know something that is not the case. (...)

Even if we restrict ourselves to factive usages, there are still multiple senses of "knowledge", and so we need to distinguish between them. One kind of knowledge is procedural knowledge, sometimes called competence or "know-how"; for example, one can know how to ride a bicycle, or one can know how to drive from Washington, D.C. to New York. Another kind of knowledge is acquaintance knowledge or familiarity; for

instance, one can know the department chairperson, or one can know Philadelphia.

Epistemologists typically do not focus on procedural or acquaintance knowledge, however, instead preferring to focus on *propositional* knowledge. A proposition is something which can be expressed by a declarative sentence, and which purports to describe a fact or a state of affairs, such as "Dogs are mammals", "2+2=7", "It is wrong to murder innocent people for fun". (Note that a proposition may be true or false; that is, it need not *actually* express a fact.) Propositional knowledge, then, can be called knowledge-that; statements of propositional knowledge (or the lack thereof) are properly expressed using "that"-clauses, such as "He knows that Houston is in Texas", or "She does not know that the square root of 81 is 9". In what follows, we will be concerned only with propositional knowledge.

Propositional knowledge, obviously, encompasses knowledge about a wide range of matters: scientific knowledge, geographical knowledge, mathematical knowledge, self-knowledge, and knowledge about any field of study whatever. Any truth might, in principle, be knowable, although there might be unknowable truths. One goal of epistemology is to determine the criteria for knowledge so that we can know what can or cannot be known, in other words, the study of epistemology fundamentally includes the study of meta-epistemology (what we can know about knowledge itself).

We can also distinguish between different types of propositional knowledge, based on the source of that knowledge. Non-empirical or *a priori* knowledge is possible independently of, or prior to, any experience, and requires only the use of reason; examples include knowledge of logical truths such as the law of non-contradiction, as well as knowledge of abstract claims (such as ethical claims or claims about various conceptual matters). Empirical or *a posteriori* knowledge is possible only subsequent, or posterior, to certain sense experiences (in addition to the use of reason); examples include knowledge of the color or shape of a physical object or knowledge of geographical locations. (Some philosophers, called rationalists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately grounded upon reason; others, called empiricists, believe that all knowledge is ultimately grounded upon experience.) A thorough epistemology should, of course, address all kinds of knowledge, although there might be different standards for *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge.

We can also distinguish between individual knowledge and collective knowledge. Social epistemology is the subfield of epistemology that addresses the way that groups, institutions, or other collective bodies might come to acquire knowledge.

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2. The Nature of Propositional Knowledge

Having narrowed our focus to propositional knowledge, we must ask ourselves what, exactly, constitutes knowledge. What does it mean for someone to know something? What is the difference between someone who knows something and someone else who does not know it, or between something one knows and something one does not know? Since the scope of knowledge is so broad, we need a general characterization of knowledge, one which is applicable to any kind of proposition whatsoever. Epistemologists have usually undertaken this task by seeking a correct and complete analysis of the concept of knowledge, in other words a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions which determine whether someone knows something.

a. Belief

Let us begin with the observation that knowledge is a mental state; that is, knowledge exists in one's mind, and unthinking things cannot know anything. Further, knowledge is a specific kind of mental state. While "that"-clauses can also be used to describe desires and intentions, these cannot constitute knowledge. Rather, knowledge is a kind of *belief*. If one has no beliefs about a particular matter, one cannot have knowledge about it.

For instance, suppose that I desire that I be given a raise in salary, and that I intend to do whatever I can to earn one. Suppose further that I am doubtful as to whether I will indeed be given a raise, due to the intricacies of the university's budget and such. Given that I do not believe that I will be given a raise, I cannot be said to know that I will. Only if I am inclined to believe something can I come to know it. Similarly, thoughts that an individual has never entertained are not among his beliefs, and thus cannot be included in his body of knowledge.

Some beliefs, those which the individual is actively entertaining, are called occurrent beliefs. The majority of an individual's beliefs are non-occurrent; these are beliefs that the individual has in the background but is not entertaining at a particular time. Correspondingly, most of our knowledge is non-occurrent, or background, knowledge; only a small amount of one's knowledge is ever actively on one's mind.

b. Truth

Knowledge, then, requires belief. Of course, not all beliefs constitute knowledge. Belief is necessary but not sufficient for knowledge. We are all sometimes mistaken in what we believe; in other words, while

some of our beliefs are true, others are false. As we try to acquire knowledge, then, we are trying to increase our stock of *true* beliefs (while simultaneously minimizing our false beliefs).

We might say that the most typical purpose of beliefs is to describe or capture the way things actually are; that is, when one forms a belief, one is seeking a match between one's mind and the world. (We sometimes, of course, form beliefs for other reasons – to create a positive attitude, to deceive ourselves, and so forth – but when we seek knowledge, we are trying to get things right.) And, alas, we sometimes fail to achieve such a match; some of our beliefs do not describe the way things actually are.

Note that we are assuming here that there is such a thing as objective truth, so that it is possible for beliefs to match or to fail to match with reality. That is, in order for someone to know something, there must be something one knows *about*. Recall that we are discussing knowledge in the factive sense; if there are no facts of the matter, then there's nothing to know (or to fail to know). This assumption is not universally accepted – in particular, it is not shared by some proponents of *relativism* – but it will not be defended here. However, we can say that truth is a *condition* of knowledge; that is, if a belief is not true, it cannot constitute knowledge. Accordingly, if there is no such thing as truth, then there can be no knowledge. Even if there is such a thing as truth, if there is a domain in which there are no truths, then there can be no knowledge within that domain. (For example, if beauty is in the eye of the beholder, then a belief that something is beautiful cannot be true or false, and thus cannot constitute knowledge.).

c. Justification

Knowledge, then, requires factual belief. However, this does not suffice to capture the nature of knowledge. Just as knowledge requires successfully achieving the objective of true belief, it also requires success with regard to the formation of that belief. In other words, not all true beliefs constitute knowledge; only true beliefs arrived at in the right way constitute knowledge.

What, then, is the right way of arriving at beliefs? In addition to truth, what other properties must a belief have in order to constitute knowledge? We might begin by noting that sound reasoning and solid evidence seem to be the way to acquire knowledge. By contrast, a lucky guess cannot constitute knowledge. Similarly, misinformation and faulty reasoning do not seem like a recipe for knowledge, even if they happen to lead to a true belief. A belief is said to be *justified* if it is obtained in

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the right way. While justification seems, at first glance, to be a matter of a belief's being based on evidence and reasoning rather than on luck or misinformation, we shall see that there is much disagreement regarding how to spell out the details.

The requirement that knowledge involve justification does not necessarily mean that knowledge requires absolute certainty, however. Humans are fallible beings, and fallibilism is the view that it is possible to have knowledge even when one's true belief might have turned out to be false. Between beliefs which were necessarily true and those which are true solely by luck lies a spectrum of beliefs with regard to which we had some defeasible reason to believe that they would be true. For instance, if I heard the weatherman say that there is a 90 % chance of rain, and as a result I formed the belief that it would rain, then my true belief that it would rain was not true purely by luck. Even though there was some chance that my belief might have been false, there was a sufficient basis for that belief for it to constitute knowledge. This basis is referred to as the justification for that belief. We can then say that, to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified.

Note that because of luck, a belief can be unjustified yet true; and because of human fallibility, a belief can be justified yet false. In other words, truth and justification are two independent conditions of beliefs. The fact that a belief is true does not tell us whether or not it is justified; that depends on how the belief was arrived at. So, two people might hold the same true belief, but for different reasons, so that one of them is justified and the other is unjustified. Similarly, the fact that a belief is justified does not tell us whether it's true or false. Of course, a justified belief will presumably be more likely to be true than to be false, and justified beliefs will presumably be more likely or more probable to be true than unjustified beliefs. (As we will see in section 3 below, the exact nature of the relationship between truth and justification is contentious.)

d. The Gettier Problem

For some time, the justified true belief (JTB) account was widely agreed to capture the nature of knowledge. However, in 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short but widely influential article which has shaped much subsequent work in epistemology. Gettier provided two examples in which someone had a true and justified belief, but in which we seem to want to deny that the individual has knowledge, because luck still seems to play a role in his belief having turned out to be true.

Consider an example. Suppose that the clock on campus (which keeps accurate time and is well maintained) stopped working at 11:56pm last night, and has yet to be repaired. On my way to my noon class, exactly twelve hours later, I glance at the clock and form the belief that the time is 11:56. My belief is true, of course, since the time is indeed 11:56. And my belief is justified, as I have no reason to doubt that the clock is working, and I cannot be blamed for basing beliefs about the time on what the clock says. Nonetheless, it seems evident that I do not know that the time is 11:56. After all, if I had walked past the clock a bit earlier or a bit later, I would have ended up with a false belief rather than a true one.

This example and others like it, while perhaps somewhat far-fetched, seem to show that it is possible for justified true belief to fail to constitute knowledge. To put it another way, the justification condition was meant to ensure that knowledge was based on solid evidence rather than on luck or misinformation, but Gettier-type examples seem to show that justified true belief can still involve luck and thus fall short of knowledge. This problem is referred to as "the Gettier problem." To solve this problem, we must either show that all instances of justified true belief do indeed constitute knowledge, or alternatively refine our analysis of knowledge.

i. The No-False-Belief Condition

We might think that there is a simple and straightforward solution to the Gettier problem. Note that my reasoning was tacitly based on my belief that the clock is working properly, and that this belief is false. This seems to explain what has gone wrong in this example. Accordingly, we might revise our analysis of knowledge by insisting that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified *and* must be formed without relying on any false beliefs. In other words, we might say, justification, truth, and belief are all necessary for knowledge, but they are not jointly sufficient for knowledge; there is a fourth condition – namely, that no false beliefs be essentially involved in the reasoning that led to the belief – which is also necessary.

Unfortunately, this will not suffice; we can modify the example so that my belief is justified and true, and is not based on any false beliefs, but still falls short of knowledge. Suppose, for instance, that I do not have any beliefs about the clock's current state, but merely the more general belief that the clock usually is in working order. This belief, which is true, would suffice to justify my belief that the time is now 11:56; of course, it still seems evident that I do not know the time.

ii. The No-Defeaters Condition

However, the no-false-belief condition does not seem to be completely misguided; perhaps we can add some other condition to justification and truth to yield a correct characterization of knowledge. Note that, even if I didn't actively form the belief that the clock is currently working properly, it seems to be implicit in my reasoning, and the fact that it is false is surely relevant to the problem. After all, if I were asked, at the time that I looked at the clock, whether it is working properly, I would have said that it is. Conversely, if I believed that the clock wasn't working properly, I wouldn't be justified in forming a belief about the time based on what the clock says.

In other words, the proposition that the clock is working properly right now meets the following conditions: it is a false proposition, I do not realize that it is a false proposition, and if I had realized that it is a false proposition, my justification for my belief that it is 11:56 would have been undercut or defeated. If we call propositions such as this "defeaters," then we can say that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be true and justified, and there must not be any defeaters to the justification of that belief. Many epistemologists believe this analysis to be correct.

iii. Causal Accounts of Knowledge

Rather than modifying the JTB account of knowledge by adding a fourth condition, some epistemologists see the Gettier problem as reason to seek a substantially different alternative. We have noted that knowledge should not involve luck, and that Gettier-type examples are those in which luck plays some role in the formation of a justified true belief. In typical instances of knowledge, the factors responsible for the justification of a belief are also responsible for its truth. For example, when the clock is working properly, my belief is both true and justified because it's based on the clock, which accurately displays the time. But one feature that all Gettier-type examples have in common is the lack of a clear connection between the truth and the justification of the belief in question. For example, my belief that the time is 11:56 is justified because it's based on the clock, but it's true because I happened to walk by at just the right moment. So, we might insist that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both true and justified, and its truth and justification must be connected somehow.

This notion of a connection between the truth and the justification of a belief turns out to be difficult to formulate precisely, but causal accounts of knowledge seek to capture the spirit of this proposal by more significantly altering the analysis of knowledge. Such accounts maintain

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that in order for someone to know a proposition, there must be a causal connection between his belief in that proposition and the fact that the proposition encapsulates. This retains the truth condition, since a proposition must be true in order for it to encapsulate a fact. However, it appears to be incompatible with fallibilism, since it does not allow for the possibility that a belief be justified yet false. (Strictly speaking, causal accounts of knowledge make no reference to justification, although we might attempt to reformulate fallibilism in somewhat modified terms in order to state this observation.)

While causal accounts of knowledge are no longer thought to be correct, they have engendered reliabilist theories of knowledge, which shall be discussed in section 3b below.

3. The Nature of Justification

One reason that the Gettier problem is so problematic is that neither Gettier nor anyone who preceded him has offered a sufficiently clear and accurate analysis of justification. We have said that justification is a matter of a belief's having been formed in the right way, but we have yet to say what that amounts to. We must now consider this matter more closely.

We have noted that the goal of our belief-forming practices is to obtain truth while avoiding error, and that justification is the feature of beliefs which are formed in such a way as to best pursue this goal. If we think, then, of the goal of our belief-forming practices as an attempt to establish a match between one's mind and the world, and if we also think of the application or withholding of the justification condition as an evaluation of whether this match was arrived at in the right way, then there seem to be two obvious approaches to construing justification: namely, in terms of the believer's mind, or in terms of the world.

a. Internalism

Belief is a mental state, and belief-formation is a mental process. Accordingly, one might reason, whether or not a belief is justified – whether, that is, it is formed in the right way – can be determined by examining the thought-processes of the believer during its formation. Such a view, which maintains that justification depends solely on factors internal to the believer's mind, is called internalism. (The term "internalism" has different meanings in other contexts; here, it will be used strictly to refer to this type of view about epistemic justification.)

According to internalism, the only factors that are relevant to the determination of whether a belief is justified are the believer's other mental states. After all, an internalist will argue, only an individual's mental

states – her beliefs about the world, her sensory inputs (for example, her sense data) and her beliefs about the relations between her various beliefs – can determine what new beliefs she will form, so only an individual's mental states can determine whether any particular belief is justified. In particular, in order to be justified, a belief must be appropriately based upon or supported by other mental states.

This raises the question of what constitutes the basing or support relation between a belief and one's other mental states. We might want to say that, in order for belief A to be appropriately based on belief B (or beliefs B1 and B2, or B1, B2, and…Bn), the truth of B must suffice to establish the truth of A, in other words, B must entail A. (We shall consider the relationship between beliefs and sensory inputs below.) However, if we want to allow for our fallibility, we must instead say that the truth of B would give one good reason to believe that A is also true (by making it likely or probable that A is true). An elaboration of what counts as a good reason for belief, accordingly, is an essential part of any internalist account of justification.

However, there is an additional condition that we must add: belief B must itself be justified, since unjustified beliefs cannot confer justification on other beliefs. Because belief B be must also be justified, must there be some justified belief C upon which B is based? If so, C must itself be justified, and it may derive its justification from some further justified belief, D. This chain of beliefs deriving their justification from other beliefs may continue forever, leading us in an infinite regress. While the idea of an infinite regress might seem troubling, the primary ways of avoiding such a regress may have their own problems as well. This raises the 'regress problem', which begins from observing that there are only four possibilities as to the structure of one's justified beliefs:

1. The series of justified beliefs, each based upon the other, continues infinitely.

2. The series of justified beliefs circles back to its beginning (A is based on B, B on C, C on D, and D on A).

3. The series of justified beliefs begins with an unjustified belief.

4. The series of justified beliefs begins with a belief which is justified, but not by virtue of being based on another justified belief.

These alternatives seem to exhaust the possibilities. That is, if one has any justified beliefs, one of these four possibilities must describe the relationships between those beliefs. As such, a complete internalist account of justification must decide among the four.

i. Foundationalism

Let us, then, consider each of the four possibilities mentioned above. Alternative 1 seems unacceptable because the human mind can contain only finitely many beliefs, and any thought-process that leads to the formation of a new belief must have some starting point. Alternative 2 seems no better, since circular reasoning appears to be fallacious. And alternative 3 has already been ruled out, since it renders the second belief in the series (and, thus, all subsequent beliefs) unjustified. That leaves alternative 4, which must, by process of elimination, be correct.

This line of reasoning, which is typically known as the regress argument, leads to the conclusion that there are two different kinds of justified beliefs: those which begin a series of justified beliefs, and those which are based on other justified beliefs. The former, called basic beliefs, are able to confer justification on other, non-basic beliefs, without themselves having their justification conferred upon them by other beliefs. As such, there is an asymmetrical relationship between basic and non-basic beliefs. Such a view of the structure of justified belief is known as "foundationalism". In general, foundationalism entails that there is an asymmetrical relationship between any two beliefs: if A is based on B, then B cannot be based on A.

Accordingly, it follows that at least some beliefs (namely basic beliefs) are justified in some way other than by way of a relation to other beliefs. Basic beliefs must be self-justified, or must derive their justification from some non-doxastic source such as sensory inputs; the exact source of the justification of basic beliefs needs to be explained by any complete foundationalist account of justification.

ii. Coherentism

Internalists might be dissatisfied with foundationalism, since it allows for the possibility of beliefs that are justified without being based upon other beliefs. Since it was our solution to the regress problem that led us to foundationalism, and since none of the alternatives seem palatable, we might look for a flaw in the problem itself. Note that the problem is based on a pivotal but hitherto unstated assumption: namely, that justification is *linear* in fashion. That is, the statement of the regress problem assumes that the basing relation parallels a logical argument, with one belief being based on one or more other beliefs in an asymmetrical fashion.

So, an internalist who finds foundationalism to be problematic might deny this assumption, maintaining instead that justification is the result of a *holistic* relationship among beliefs. That is, one might maintain

that beliefs derive their justification by inclusion in a set of beliefs which cohere with one another as a whole; a proponent of such a view is called a coherentist.

A coherentist, then, sees justification as a relation of mutual support among many beliefs, rather than a series of asymmetrical beliefs. A belief derives its justification, according to <u>coherentism</u>, not by being based on one or more other beliefs, but by virtue of its membership in a set of beliefs that all fit together in the right way. (The coherentist needs to specify what constitutes coherence, of course. It must be something more than logical consistency, since two unrelated beliefs may be consistent. Rather, there must be some positive support relationship – for instance, some sort of explanatory relationship – between the members of a coherent set in order for the beliefs to be individually justified.)

Coherentism is vulnerable to the "isolation objection". It seems possible for a set of beliefs to be coherent, but for all of those beliefs to be isolated from reality. Consider, for instance, a work of fiction. All of the statements in the work of fiction might form a coherent set, but presumably believing all and only the statements in a work of fiction will not render one justified. Indeed, any form of internalism seems vulnerable to this objection, and thus a complete internalist account of justification must address it. Recall that justification requires a match between one's mind and the world, and an inordinate emphasis on the relations between the beliefs in one's mind seems to ignore the question of whether those beliefs match up with the way things actually are.

b. Externalism

Accordingly, one might think that focusing solely on factors internal to the believer's mind will inevitably lead to a mistaken account of justification. The alternative, then, is that at least some factors external to the believer's mind determine whether or not she is justified. A proponent of such a view is called an externalist.

According to externalism, the only way to avoid the isolation objection and ensure that knowledge does not include luck is to consider some factors other than the individual's other beliefs. Which factors, then, should be considered? The most prominent version of externalism, called reliabilism, suggests that we consider the *source* of a belief. Beliefs can be formed as a result of many different sources, such as sense experience, reason, testimony, memory. More precisely, we might specify which sense was used, who provided the testimony, what sort of reasoning is used, or how recent the relevant memory is. For every belief, we can indicate the cognitive process that led to its formation. In its simplest and

most straightforward form, reliabilism maintains that whether or not a belief is justified depends upon whether that process is a reliable source of true beliefs. Since we are seeking a match between our mind and the world, justified beliefs are those which result from processes which regularly achieve such a match. So, for example, using vision to determine the color of an object which is well-lit and relatively near is a reliable belief-forming process for a person with normal vision, but not for a color-blind person. Forming beliefs on the basis of the testimony of an expert is likely to yield true beliefs, but forming beliefs on the basis of the testimony of compulsive liars is not. In general, if a belief is the result of a cognitive process which reliably (most of the time – we still want to leave room for human fallibility) leads to true beliefs, then that belief is justified.

The foregoing suggests one immediate challenge for reliabilism. The formation of a belief is a one-time event, but the reliability of the process depends upon the long-term performance of that process. (This can include counterfactual as well as actual events. For instance, a coin which is flipped only once and lands on heads nonetheless has a 50% chance of landing on tails, even though its actual performance has yielded heads 100% of the time.) And this requires that we specify which process is being used, so that we can evaluate its performance in other instances. However, cognitive process can be described in more or less general terms: for example, the same belief-forming process might be variously described as sense experience, vision, vision by a normally-sighted person, vision by a normally-sighted person in daylight, vision by a normally-sighted person in daylight while looking at a tree, vision by a normally-sighted person in daylight while looking at an elm tree, *and so forth*. The "generality problem" notes that some of these descriptions might specify a reliable process but others might specify an unreliable process, so that we cannot know whether a belief is justified or unjustified unless we know the appropriate level of generality to use in describing the process.

Even if the generality problem can be solved, another problem remains for externalism. Keith Lehrer presents this problem by way of his example of Mr. Truetemp. Truetemp has, unbeknownst to him, had a tempucomp – a device which accurately reads the temperature and causes a spontaneous belief about that temperature – implanted in his brain. As a result, he has many true beliefs about the temperature, but he does not know why he has them or what their source is. Lehrer argues that, although Truetemp's belief-forming process is reliable, his ignorance of the

tempucomp renders his temperature-beliefs unjustified, and thus that a reliable cognitive process cannot yield justification unless the believer is aware of the fact that the process is reliable. In other words, the mere fact that the process is reliable does not suffice, Lehrer concludes, to justify any beliefs which are formed via that process.

4. The Extent of Human Knowledge
a. Sources of Knowledge

Given the above characterization of knowledge, there are many ways that one might come to know something. Knowledge of empirical facts about the physical world will necessarily involve perception, in other words, the use of the senses. Science, with its collection of data and conducting of experiments, is the paradigm of empirical knowledge. However, much of our more mundane knowledge comes from the senses, as we look, listen, smell, touch, and taste the various objects in our environments.

But all knowledge requires some amount of reasoning. Data collected by scientists must be analyzed before knowledge is yielded, and we draw inferences based on what our senses tell us. And knowledge of abstract or non-empirical facts will exclusively rely upon reasoning. In particular, intuition is often believed to be a sort of direct access to knowledge of the *a priori*.

Once knowledge is obtained, it can be sustained and passed on to others. Memory allows us to know something that we knew in the past, even, perhaps, if we no longer remember the original justification. Knowledge can also be transmitted from one individual to another via testimony; that is, my justification for a particular belief could amount to the fact that some trusted source has told me that it is true.

b. Skepticism

In addition to the nature of knowledge, epistemologists concern themselves with the question of the extent of human knowledge: how much do we, or can we, know? Whatever turns out to be the correct account of the nature of knowledge, there remains the matter of whether we actually have any knowledge. It has been suggested that we do not, or cannot, know anything, or at least that we do not know as much as we think we do. Such a view is called skepticism.

We can distinguish between a number of different varieties of skepticism. First, one might be a skeptic only with regard to certain domains, such as mathematics, morality, or the external world (this is the most

well-known variety of skepticism). Such a skeptic is a local skeptic, as contrasted with a global skeptic, who maintains that we cannot know anything at all. Also, since knowledge requires that our beliefs be both true and justified, a skeptic might maintain that none of our beliefs are true or that none of them are justified (the latter is much more common than the former).

While it is quite easy to challenge any claim to knowledge by glibly asking, "How do you know?", this does not suffice to show that skepticism is an important position. Like any philosophical stance, skepticism must be supported by an argument. Many arguments have been offered in defense of skepticism, and many responses to those arguments have been offered in return. Here, we shall consider two of the most prominent arguments in support of skepticism about the external world.

c. Cartesian Skepticism

In the first of his *Meditations*, René Descartes offers an argument in support of skepticism, which he then attempts to refute in the later Meditations. The argument notes that some of our perceptions are inaccurate. Our senses can trick us; we sometimes mistake a dream for a waking experience, and it is possible that an evil demon is systematically deceiving us. (The modern version of the evil demon scenario is that you are a brain-in-a-vat; because scientists have removed your brain from your skull, connected it to a sophisticated computer, and immersed it in a vat of preservative fluid.) The computer produces what seem to be genuine sense experiences, and also responds to your brain's output to make it seem that you are able to move about in your environment as you did when your brain was still in your body. While this scenario may seem farfetched, we must admit that it is at least possible.)

As a result, some of our beliefs will be false. In order to be justified in believing what we do, we must have some way to distinguish between those beliefs which are true (or, at least, are likely to be true) and those which are not. But just as there are no signs that will allow us to distinguish between waking and dreaming, there are no signs that will allow us to distinguish between beliefs that are accurate and beliefs which are the result of the machinations of an evil demon. This indistinguishability between trustworthy and untrustworthy belief, the argument goes, renders all of our beliefs unjustified, and thus we cannot know anything. A satisfactory response to this argument, then, must show either that we are indeed able to distinguish between true and false beliefs, or that we need not be able to make such a distinction.

d. Humean Skepticism

According to the indistinguishability skeptic, my senses can tell me how things *appear*, but not how they actually are. We need to use reason to construct an argument that leads us from beliefs about how things appear to (justified) beliefs about how they are. But even if we are able to trust our perceptions, so that we know that they are accurate, David Hume argues that the specter of skepticism remains. Note that we only perceive a very small part of the universe at any given moment, although we think that we have knowledge of the world beyond that which we are currently perceiving. It follows, then, that the senses alone cannot account for this knowledge, and that reason must supplement the senses in some way in order to account for any such knowledge. However, Hume argues, reason is incapable of providing justification for any belief about the external world beyond the scope of our current sense perceptions. Let us consider two such possible arguments and Hume's critique of them.

i. Numerical vs. Qualitative Identity

We typically believe that the external world is, for the most part, stable. For instance, I believe that my car is parked where I left it this morning, even though I am not currently looking at it. If I were to go peek out the window right now and see my car, I might form the belief that my car has been in the same space all day. What is the basis for this belief? If asked to make my reasoning explicit, I might proceed as follows:

I have had two sense-experiences of my car: one this morning and one just now.

The two sense-experiences were (more or less) identical.

Therefore, it is likely that the objects that caused them are identical.

Therefore, a single object – my car – has been in that parking space all day.

Similar reasoning would undergird all of our beliefs about the persistence of the external world and all of the objects we perceive. But are these beliefs justified? Hume thinks not, since the above argument (and all arguments like it) contains an equivocation. In particular, the first occurrence of "identical" refers to qualitative identity. The two sense-experiences are not one and the same, but are distinct; when we say that they are identical we mean that one is similar to the other in all of its qualities or properties. But the second occurrence of "identical" refers to numerical identity. When we say that the objects that caused the two sense-experiences are identical, we mean that there is one object, rather than two, that is responsible for both of them. This equivocation, Hume argues, renders

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the argument fallacious; accordingly, we need another argument to support our belief that objects persist even when we are not observing them.

ii. Hume's Skepticism about Induction

Suppose that a satisfactory argument could be found in support of our beliefs in the persistence of physical objects. This would provide us with knowledge that the objects that we have observed have persisted even when we were not observing them. But in addition to believing that these objects have persisted up until now, we believe that they will persist in the future; we also believe that objects we have never observed similarly have persisted and will persist. In other words, we expect the future to be roughly like the past, and the parts of the universe that we have not observed to be roughly like the parts that we have observed. For example, I believe that my car will persist into the future. What is the basis for this belief? If asked to make my reasoning explicit, I might proceed as follows:

My car has always persisted in the past.

Nature is roughly uniform across time and space (and thus the future will be roughly like the past).

Therefore, my car will persist in the future.

Similar reasoning would undergird all of our beliefs about the future and about the unobserved. Are such beliefs justified? Again, Hume thinks not, since the above argument, and all arguments like it, contain an unsupported premise, namely the second premise, which might be called the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature (PUN). Why should we believe this principle to be true? Hume insists that we provide some reason in support of this belief. Because the above argument is an inductive rather than a deductive argument, the problem of showing that it is a good argument is typically referred to as the "problem of induction." We might think that there is a simple and straightforward solution to the problem of induction, and that we can indeed provide support for our belief that PUN is true. Such an argument would proceed as follows:

PUN has always been true in the past.

Nature is roughly uniform across time and space (and thus the future will be roughly like the past).

Therefore, PUN will be true in the future.

This argument, however, is circular; its second premise is PUN itself! Accordingly, we need another argument to support our belief that PUN is true, and thus to justify our inductive arguments about the future and the unobserved.

5. Conclusion

The study of knowledge is one of the most fundamental aspects of philosophical inquiry. Any claim to knowledge must be evaluated to determine whether or not it indeed constitutes knowledge. Such an evaluation essentially requires an understanding of what knowledge is and how much knowledge is possible. While this entry provides on overview of the important issues, it of course leaves the most basic questions unanswered; epistemology will continue to be an area of philosophical discussion as long as these questions remain.

Matthias Steup

Epistemology
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#GET

<…> 4. Sources of Knowledge and Justification

Beliefs arise in people for a wide variety of causes. Among them, we must list psychological factors such as desires, emotional needs, prejudice, and biases of various kinds. Obviously, when beliefs originate in sources like these, they don't qualify as knowledge even if true. For true beliefs to count as knowledge, it is necessary that they originate in sources we have good reason to consider reliable. These are perception, introspection, memory, reason, and testimony. Let us briefly consider each of these.

4.1. Perception

Our perceptual faculties are our five senses: sight, touch, hearing, smelling, and tasting. We must distinguish between an experience that can be classified as *perceiving* that *p* (for example, seeing that there is coffee in the cup and tasting that it is sweet), which entails that *p* is true, and a perceptual experience in which it seems to us as though *p*, but where *p* might be false. Let us refer to this latter kind of experience as *perceptual seemings*. The reason for making this distinction lies in the fact that perceptual experience is fallible. The world is not always as it appears to us in our perceptual experiences. We need, therefore, a way of referring to perceptual experiences in which *p* seems to be the case that allows for the possibility of *p* being false. That's the role assigned to perceptual seemings. So some perceptual seemings that *p* are cases of perceiving that *p*, others are not. When it looks to you as though there is a cup of coffee on the table and in fact there is, the two states coincide. If, however, you hallucinate that there is a cup on the table, you have perceptual seeming that *p* without perceiving that *p*.

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One family of epistemological issues about perception arises when we concern ourselves with the psychological nature of the perceptual processes through which we acquire knowledge of external objects. According to *direct realism*, we can acquire such knowledge because we can directly perceive such objects. For example, when you see a tomato on the table, *what you perceive* is the tomato itself. According to *indirect realism*, we acquire knowledge of external objects by virtue of perceiving something else, namely appearances or sense-data. An indirect realist would say that, when you see and thus know that there is a tomato on the table, what you really see is not the tomato itself but a tomato-like sense-datum or some such entity.

Direct and indirect realists hold different views about the structure of perceptual knowledge. Indirect realists would say that we acquire perceptual knowledge of external objects by virtue of perceiving sense data that represent external objects. Sense data, a species of mental states, enjoy a special status: we know directly what they are like. So indirect realists think that, when perceptual knowledge is foundational, it is knowledge of sense data and other mental states. Knowledge of external objects is indirect: derived from our knowledge of sense data. The basic idea is that we have indirect knowledge of the external world because we can have foundational knowledge of our own mind. Direct realists can be more liberal about the foundation of our knowledge of external objects. Since they hold that perceptual experiences get you in direct contact with external objects, they can say that such experiences can give you foundational knowledge of external objects.

We take our perceptual faculties to be reliable. But how can we know that they are reliable? For externalists, this might not be much of a challenge. If the use of reliable faculties is sufficient for knowledge, and if by using reliable faculties we acquire the belief that our faculties are reliable, then we come to know that our faculties are reliable. But even externalists might wonder how they can, via argument, *show* that our perceptual faculties are reliable. The problem is this. It would seem the only way of acquiring knowledge about the reliability of our perceptual faculties is through memory, through remembering whether they served us well in the past. But should I trust my memory, and should I think that the episodes of perceptual success that I seem to recall were in fact episodes of perceptual success? If I am entitled to answer these questions with 'yes', then I need to have, to begin with, reason to view my memory and my perceptual experiences as reliable. It would seem, therefore, that there is no non-circular way of arguing for the reliability of one's perceptual faculties.

4.2. Introspection

Introspection is the capacity to inspect the, metaphorically speaking, "inside" of one's mind. Through introspection, one knows what mental states one is in: whether one is thirsty, tired, excited, or depressed. Compared with perception, introspection appears to have a special status. It is easy to see how a perceptual seeming can go wrong: what looks like a cup of coffee on the table might be just be a clever hologram that's visually indistinguishable from an actual cup of coffee. But could it be possible that it introspectively seems to me that I have a headache when in fact I do not? It is not easy to see how it could be. Thus we come to think that introspection has a special status. Compared with perception, introspection seems to be privileged by virtue of being less error prone. How can we account for the special status of introspection?

First, it could be argued that, when it comes to introspection, there is no difference between appearance and reality; therefore, introspective seemings are necessarily successful introspections. According to this approach, introspection is infallible. Alternatively, one could view introspection as a source of certainty. Here the idea is that an introspective experience of p eliminates all possible doubt as to whether p is true. Finally, one could attempt to explain the specialness of introspection by examining the way we respond to first-person reports: typically, we attribute a special authority to such reports. According to this approach, introspection is incorrigible. Others are not, or at least not typically, in a position to correct first-person reports of one's own mental states.

Introspection reveals how the world appears to us in our perceptual experiences. For that reason, introspection has been of special interest to foundationalists. Perception is not immune to error. If certainty consists in the absence of all possible doubt, perception fails to yield certainty. Hence beliefs based on perceptual experiences cannot be foundational. Introspection, however, might deliver what we need to find a firm foundation for our beliefs about external objects: at best outright immunity to error or all possible doubt, or perhaps more modestly, an epistemic kind of directness that cannot be found in perception.

Is it really true, however, that, compared with perception, introspection is in some way special? Critics of foundationalism have argued that introspection is certainly not infallible. Might one not confuse an unpleasant itch for a pain? Might I not think that the shape before me appears circular to me when in fact it appears slightly elliptical to me? If it is indeed possible for introspection to mislead, then it is hard to see why introspection should eliminate all possible doubt. Yet it isn't easy to see

either how, if one clearly and distinctly feels a throbbing headache, one could be mistaken about that. Introspection, then, turns out to be a mysterious faculty. On the one hand, it does not seem to be in general an infallible faculty; on the other hand, when looking at appropriately described specific cases, error does seem impossible.

4.3. Memory
Memory is the capacity to retain knowledge acquired in the past. What one remembers, though, need not be a past event. It may be a present fact, such as one's telephone number, or a future event, such as the date of the next elections. Memory is, of course, fallible. Not every instance of taking oneself to remember that *p* is an instance of actually remembering that *p*. We should distinguish, therefore, between remembering that *p* (which entails the truth of *p*) and *seeming* to remember that *p* (which does not entail the truth of *p*).

One issue about memory concerns the question of what distinguishes memorial seemings from perceptual seemings or mere imagination. Some philosophers have thought that having an image in one's mind is essential to memory, but that would appear to be mistaken. When one remembers one's telephone number, one is unlikely to have an image of one's number in one's mind. The distinctively epistemological questions about memory are these: First, what makes memorial seemings a source of justification? Is it a necessary truth that, if one has a memorial seeming that *p*, one has thereby prima facie justification for *p*? Or is memory a source of justification only if, as coherentists might say, one has reason to think that one's memory is reliable? Or is memory a source of justification only if, as externalists would say, it is in fact reliable? Second, how can we respond to skepticism about knowledge of the past? Memorial seemings of the past do not guarantee that the past is what we take it to be. We think that we are a bit older than just five minutes, but it is logically possible that the world sprang into existence just five minutes ago, complete with our dispositions to have memorial seemings of a more distant past and items such as apparent fossils that suggest a past going back millions of years. Our seeming to remember that the world is older than a mere five minutes does not entail, therefore, that it really is. Why, then, should we think that memory is a source of knowledge about the past?

4.4. Reason
Some beliefs would appear to be justified solely by the use of reason. Justification of that kind is said to be *a priori*: prior to any kind of

experience. A standard way of defining *a priori* justification goes as follows:

A Priori Justification
S is justified *a priori* in believing that *p* if and only if *S*'s justification for believing that *p* does not depend on any experience.

Beliefs that are true and justified in this way (…) would count as instances of *a priori* knowledge.

What exactly counts as experience? If by 'experience' we mean just *perceptual* experiences, justification deriving from introspective or memorial experiences would count as *a priori*. For example, I could then know *a priori* that I'm thirsty, or what I ate for breakfast this morning. While the term '*a priori*' is sometimes used in this way, the strict use of the term restricts *a priori*justification to justification derived *solely* from the use of reason. According to this usage, the word 'experiences' in the definition above includes perceptual, introspective, and memorial experiences alike. On this narrower understanding, paradigm examples of what I can know on the basis of *a priori* justification are conceptual truths (such as "All bachelors are unmarried"), and truths of mathematics, geometry and logic.

Justification and knowledge that is not *a priori* is called "a posteriori" or 'empirical'. For example, in the narrow sense of "*a priori*", whether I'm thirsty or not is something I know empirically (on the basis of introspective experiences), whereas I know *a priori* that 12 divided by 3 is 4.

Several important issues arise about *a priori* knowledge. First, does it exist at all? Skeptics about apriority deny its existence. They don't mean to say that we have no knowledge of mathematics, geometry, logic, and conceptual truths. Rather, what they claim is that all such knowledge is empirical.

Second, if *a priori* justification is possible, exactly how does it come about? What *makes* a belief such as "All bachelors are unmarried" justified solely on the basis of reason? Is it an unmediated grasp of the truth of this proposition? Or does it consist of grasping that the proposition is *necessarily* true? Or is it the purely intellectual experience of "seeing" (with they "eye of reason") or "intuiting" that this proposition is true (or necessarily true)? Or is it, as externalists would suggest, the reliability of the cognitive process by which we come to recognize the truth of such a proposition?

Third, if *a priori* knowledge exists, what is its extent? *Empiricists* have argued that *a priori* knowledge is limited to the realm of the *analytic*,

consisting of propositions of a somehow inferior status because they are not really "about the world". Propositions of a superior status, which convey genuine information about world, are labeled *synthetic*. *A priori* knowledge of synthetic propositions, empiricists would say, is not possible. *Rationalists* deny this. They would say that a proposition such as "If a ball is green all over, then it doesn't have black spots" is synthetic and knowable *a priori*.

A fourth question about the nature of *a priori* knowledge concerns the distinction between necessary and contingent truths. The received view is that whatever is known *a priori* is necessarily true, but there are epistemologists who disagree with that.

4.5. Testimony

Testimony differs from the sources we considered above because it isn't distinguished by having its own cognitive faculty. Rather, to acquire knowledge of *p* through testimony is to come to know that *p* on the basis of someone's saying that *p*. "Saying that *p* must be understood broadly, as including ordinary utterances in daily life, postings by bloggers on their web-logs, articles by journalists, delivery of information on television, radio, tapes, books, and other media. So, when you ask the person next to you what time it is, and she tells you, and you thereby come to know what time it is, that's an example of coming to know something on the basis of testimony. And when you learn by reading the *Washington Post* that the terrorist attack in Sharm el-Sheikh of July 22, 2005 killed at least 88 people, that, too, is an example of acquiring knowledge on the basis of testimony.

The epistemological puzzle testimony raises is this: Why is testimony a source of knowledge? An externalist might say that testimony is a source of knowledge if and only if it comes from a reliable source. But here, even more so than in the case of our faculties, internalists will not find that answer satisfactory. Suppose you hear someone saying '*p*'. Suppose further that person is in fact utterly reliable with regard to the question of whether *p* is the case or not. Finally, suppose you have no evidential clue whatever as to that person's reliability. Wouldn't it be plausible to conclude that, since that person's reliability is unknown to you, that person's saying '*p*' does not put you in a position to know that *p*? But if the reliability of a testimonial source is not sufficient for making it a source of knowledge, what else is needed? Thomas Reid suggested that, by our very nature, we accept testimonial sources as reliable and tend to attribute credibility to them unless we encounter special contrary reasons.

But that's merely a statement of the attitude we in fact take toward testimony. What is it that makes that attitude reasonable? It could be argued that, in one's own personal experiences with testimonial sources, one has accumulated a long track record that can be taken as a sign of reliability. However, when we think of the sheer breadth of the knowledge we derive from testimony, one wonders whether one's personal experiences constitute an evidence base rich enough to justify the attribution of reliability to the totality of the testimonial sources one tends to trust. An alternative to the track record approach would be to declare it a necessary truth that trust in testimonial sources is justified. This suggestion, alas, encounters the same difficulty as the externalist approach to testimony: it does not seem we can acquire knowledge from sources the reliability of which is utterly unknown to us.

<...>

6. Additional Issues

6.1. Virtue Epistemology

Epistemology, as commonly practiced, focuses on the subject's beliefs. Are they justified? Are they instances of knowledge? When it comes to assessing how the subject herself is doing with regard to the pursuit of truth and the seeking of knowledge, this assessment is carried out by looking at the epistemic quality of her beliefs. According to virtue epistemology, the order of analysis ought to be reversed. We need to begin with the subject herself and assess her epistemic virtues and vices: her "good" and her "bad" ways of forming beliefs. Careful and attentive reasoning would be an example of an epistemic virtue; jumping to conclusions would be an example of an epistemic vice. It is only *after* we have determined which ways of forming beliefs count as epistemic virtues that we can, as a second step, determine the epistemic quality of particular beliefs. Its proponents construe virtue epistemology more or less stringently. According to pure virtue epistemology, epistemic virtues and vices are *sui generis*. They cannot be analyzed in terms of more fundamental epistemic or nonepistemic concepts. Proponents of a less stringent approach disagree with this; they would say that epistemic virtues and vices can fruitfully be analyzed by employing other concepts. Indeed, according to an externalist strand of virtue epistemology, it is the very notion of reliability that we should employ to capture the difference between epistemic virtues and vices. Stable ways of forming beliefs are epistemic virtues if and only if they tend to result in true beliefs, epistemic vices if and only if they tend to result in false beliefs. Virtue epistemology, thus conceived, is a form of reliabilism.

6.2. Naturalistic Epistemology

According to an extreme version of naturalistic epistemology, the project of traditional epistemology, pursued in an *a priori* fashion from the philosopher's armchair, is completely misguided. The "fruits" of such activity are demonstrably false theories such as foundationalism, as well as endless and arcane debates in the attempt to tackle questions to which there are no answers. To bring epistemology on the right path, it must be made a part of the natural sciences and become cognitive psychology. The aim of naturalistic epistemology thus understood is to *replace* traditional epistemology with an altogether new and redefined project. According to a moderate version of naturalistic epistemology, one primary task of epistemology is to identify how knowledge and justification are anchored in the natural world, just as it is the purpose of physics to explain phenomena like heat and cold, or thunder and lightning in terms of properties of the natural world. The pursuit of this task does not require of its proponents to replace traditional epistemology. Rather, this moderate approach accepts the need for *cooperation* between traditional conceptual analysis and empirical methods. The former is needed for the purpose of establishing a conceptual link between knowledge and reliability, the latter for figuring out which cognitive processes are reliable and which are not.

6.3. Religious Epistemology

In the history of philosophy, there are several famous arguments for the existence of God: the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, and the argument from design. From an epistemological point of view, the question is whether such arguments can constitute a rational foundation of faith, or even give us knowledge of God. A further question is whether, if God exists, knowledge of God might not also be possible in other ways, for example, on the basis of perception or perhaps mystical experiences. There is also a famous problem casting doubt on the existence of God: Why, if God is an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent being, is there evil in the world? Here, the epistemological question is whether, based on this problem, we can know that God (thus conceived) does not exist. Another, central issue for religious epistemology is raised by evidentialism. According to evidentialism, knowledge requires adequate evidence. However, there does not seem to be any adequate evidence of God's existence. Is it possible, then, for theists to endorse evidentialism?

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6.4. Moral Epistemology

The basic moral categories are those of right and wrong action. When we do theoretical ethics, we wish to find out what it is that makes a right action right and a wrong action wrong. When we do practical or applied ethics, we attempt to find out which actions are right and which are wrong. The epistemological question these areas of philosophy raise is this: How can we *know* any of that? Traditionally, philosophers have attempted to answer the questions of ethics via intuition, *a priori* reasoning, and the consideration of hypothetical cases. Some philosophers who belong to the naturalistic camp consider this approach misguided because they think that it is unreliable and liable to produce results that merely reflect our own cultural and social biases. Among those who think that moral knowledge can be acquired via intuition and *a priori* reasoning, a primary question is whether the kind of justification such methods can generate is coherentist or foundationalist. Finally, a further important question is whether moral knowledge is at all possible. Knowledge requires truth and thus objective reality. According to anti-realists, there is no objective reality of, and thus no truth about, moral matters. Since what is known must be true, it is not easy to see how, if anti-realism were correct, there could be knowledge of moral matters.

6.5. Social Epistemology

When we conceive of epistemology as including knowledge and justified belief as they are positioned within a particular social and historical context, epistemology becomes social epistemology. How to pursue social epistemology is a matter of controversy. According to some, it is an extension and reorientation of traditional epistemology with the aim of correcting its overly individualistic orientation. According to others, social epistemology ought to amount to a radical departure from traditional epistemology, which they see, like the advocates of radical naturalization, as a futile endeavor. Those who favor the former approach retain the thought that knowledge and justified belief are essentially linked to truth as the goal of our cognitive practices. They hold that there are objective norms of rationality that social epistemologists should aspire to articulate. Those who prefer the more radical approach would reject the existence of objective norms of rationality. Moreover, since many view scientific facts as social constructions, they would deny that the goal of our intellectual and scientific activities is to find facts. Such constructivism, if weak, asserts the epistemological claim that scientific theories are laden with social, cultural, and historical presuppositions and biases; if strong, it asserts the metaphysical claim that truth and reality are themselves socially constructed.

<…>

Theme 6. Philosophy of Nature

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Western Philosophy
Philosophy of Nature
http://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-philosophy/Philosophy-of-nature

Philosophy in the Modern world is a self-conscious discipline. It has managed to define itself narrowly, distinguishing itself on the one hand from religion and on the other from exact science. But this narrowing of focus came about very late in its history – certainly not before the 18th century. The earliest philosophers of ancient Greece were theorists of the physical world; Pythagoras and Plato were at once philosophers and mathematicians, and in Aristotle there is no clear distinction between philosophy and natural science. The Renaissance and early modern period continued this breadth of conception characteristic of the Greeks. Galileo and Descartes were at once mathematicians, physicists, and philosophers; and physics retained the name *natural philosophy* at least until the death of Sir Isaac Newton (1642–1727).

Had the thinkers of the Renaissance been painstaking in the matter of definition (which they were not), they might have defined philosophy, on the basis of its actual practice, as "the rational, methodical, and systematic consideration of humankind, civil society, and the natural world." Philosophy's areas of interest would thus not have been in doubt, though the issue of what constitutes "rational, methodical, and systematic consideration" would have been extremely controversial. Because knowledge advances through the discovery and advocacy of new philosophical methods and because these diverse methods depend for their validity on prevailing philosophical criteria of truth, meaning, and importance, the crucial philosophical quarrels of the 16th and 17th centuries were at bottom quarrels about method. It is this issue, rather than any disagreement over subject matter or areas of interest, that divided the greatest Renaissance philosophers.

The great new fact that confronted the Renaissance was the immediacy, the immensity, and the uniformity of the natural world. But what was of primary importance was the new perspective through which this fact was interpreted. To the Schoolmen of the Middle Ages, the universe was hierarchical, organic, and God-ordained. To the philosophers of the

Renaissance, it was pluralistic, machinelike, and mathematically ordered. In the Middle Ages, scholars thought in terms of purposes, goals, and divine intentions; in the Renaissance, they thought in terms of forces, mechanical agencies, and physical causes. All of this had become clear by the end of the 15th century. Within the early pages of the *Notebooks* of Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519), the great Florentine artist and polymath, occur the following three propositions:

1. Since experience has been the mistress of whoever has written well, I take her as my mistress, and to her on all points make my appeal.

2. Instrumental or mechanical science is the noblest and above all others the most useful, seeing that by means of it all animated bodies which have movement perform all their actions.

3. There is no certainty where one can neither apply any of the mathematical sciences, nor any of those which are based upon the mathematical sciences.

Here are enunciated respectively (1) the principle of empiricism, (2) the primacy of mechanistic science, and (3) faith in mathematical explanation. It is upon these three doctrines, as upon a rock, that Renaissance and early modern science and philosophy were built. From each of Leonardo's theses descended one of the great streams of Renaissance and early modern philosophy: from the empirical principle the work of Bacon, from mechanism the work of Hobbes, and from mathematical explanation the work of Descartes.

Any adequate philosophical treatment of scientific method recognizes that the explanations offered by science are both empirical and mathematical. In Leonardo's thinking, as in scientific procedure generally, there need be no conflict between these two ideals; yet they do represent two opposite poles, each capable of excluding the other. The peculiar accidents of Renaissance scientific achievement did mistakenly suggest their incompatibility, for the revival of medical studies on the one hand and the blooming of mathematical physics on the other emphasized opposite virtues in scientific methodology. This polarity was represented by the figures of Andreas Vesalius (1514–64) and Galileo.

Vesalius, a Flemish physician, astounded all of Europe with the unbelievable precision of his anatomical dissections and drawings. Having invented new tools for this precise purpose, he successively laid bare the vascular, neural, and muscular systems of the human body. This procedure seemed to demonstrate the virtues of empirical method, of experimentation, and of inductive generalization on the basis of precise and disciplined observation.

Only slightly later, Galileo, following in the tradition already established by Copernicus and Kepler, attempted to do for terrestrial and sidereal movement what Vesalius had managed for the structure of the human body–creating his physical dynamics, however, on the basis of hypotheses derived from mathematics. In Galileo's work, all of the most original scientific impulses of the Renaissance were united: the interest in Hellenistic mathematics, the experimental use of new instruments such as the telescope, and the underlying faith that the search for certainty in science is reasonable because the motions of all physical bodies are comprehensible in mathematical terms. Galileo's work also deals with some of the recurrent themes of 16th and 17th century philosophy: atomism (which describes the changes of gross physical bodies in terms of the motions of their parts), the reduction of qualitative differences to quantitative differences, and the resultant important distinction between "primary" and "secondary" qualities. The former qualities – including shape, extension, and specific gravity – were considered to be part of nature and therefore real. The latter – such as colour, odour, taste, and relative position – were taken to be simply the effect of the motions of physical bodies on perceiving minds and therefore ephemeral, subjective, and essentially irrelevant to the nature of physical reality.

Paul Griffiths

Philosophy of Biology
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/biology-philosophy/

The growth of philosophical interest in biology over the past thirty years reflects the increasing prominence of the biological sciences in the same period. There is now an extensive literature on many different biological topics, and it would be impossible to summarise this body of work in this single entry. Instead, this entry sets out to explain what philosophy of biology *is*. Why does biology matter to philosophy and vice versa? A list of the entries in the encyclopedia which address specific topics in the philosophy of biology is provided at the end of the entry.

Three different kinds of philosophical enquiry fall under the general heading of philosophy of biology. First, general theses in the philosophy of science are addressed in the context of biology. Second, conceptual puzzles within biology itself are subjected to philosophical analysis. Third, appeals to biology are made in discussions of traditional philosophical questions. The first two kinds of philosophical work are typically conducted in the context of a detailed knowledge of actual biology, the third less so.

Philosophy of biology can also be subdivided by the particular areas of biological theory with which it is concerned. Biology is a diverse set of disciplines, ranging from historical sciences such as paleontology to engineering sciences such as biotechnology. Different philosophical issues occur in each field. The latter part of the entry discusses how philosophers have approached some of the main disciplines within biology.

1. Pre-history of Philosophy of Biology

As is the case for most apparent novelties, closer inspection reveals a prehistory for the philosophy of biology. In the 1950's the biologist J. H. Woodger and the philosopher Morton Beckner both published major works on the philosophical of biology (Woodger 1952; Beckner 1959), but these did not give rise to a subsequent philosophical literature. Some philosophers of science also made claims about biology based on general epistemological and metaphysical considerations. Perhaps the most famous example is J. J. C. Smart's claim that the biology is not an autonomous science, but a technological application of more basic sciences, like 'radio-engineering' (Smart 1959, 366). Like engineering, biology cannot make any addition to the laws of nature. It can only reveal how the laws of physics and chemistry play out in the context of particular sorts of initial and boundary conditions. Even in 1969 the zoologist Ernst Mayr could complain that books with 'philosophy of science' in the title were all misleading and should be re-titled 'philosophy of physics' (Mayr 1969). The encouragement of prominent biologists such as Mayr and F.J Ayala (Ayala 1976; Mayr 1982) was one factor in the emergence of the new field. The first sign of philosophy of biology becoming a mainstream part of philosophy of science was the publication of David Hull's *Philosophy of Biological Science* in the prominent Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy series (Hull 1974). From then on the field developed rapidly. Robert Brandon could say of the late 1970's that "I knew five philosophers of biology: Marjorie Grene, David Hull, Michael Ruse, Mary Williams and William Wimsatt." (Brandon 1996, xii–xiii) By 1986, however, there were more than enough to fill the pages of Michael Ruse's new journal *Biology and Philosophy*.

2. Three Types of Philosophy of Biology

Three different kinds of philosophical enquiry fall under the general heading of philosophy of biology. First, general theses in the philosophy of science are addressed in the context of biology. Second, conceptual puzzles within biology itself are subjected to philosophical analysis. Third, appeals to biology are made in discussions of traditional philosophical questions.

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3. Philosophy of Evolutionary Biology

Philosophy of biology can also be subdivided by the particular areas of biological theory with which it is concerned. Until recently, evolutionary theory has attracted the lion's share of philosophical attention. This work has sometimes been designed to support a general thesis in the philosophy of science, such as the "semantic view" of theories (Lloyd 1988). But most of this work is concerned with conceptual puzzles that arise inside the theory itself, and the work often resembles theoretical biology as much as pure philosophy of science. Elliott Sober's classic study *The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary theory in philosophical focus* (Sober 1984b) marks the point at which most philosophers became aware of the philosophy of biology. Sober analyzed the structure of explanations in population genetics via an analogy with the composition of forces in dynamics, treating the actual change in gene frequencies over time as the result of several different "forces", such as selection, drift, and mutation. This sort of careful, methodological analysis of population genetics, the mathematical core of conventional evolutionary theory, continues to give rise to interesting results (Pigliucci and Kaplan 2006; Okasha 2007).

The intense philosophical interest in evolutionary theory in the 1980's can partly be explained by the controversies over 'sociobiology' that were provoked by the publications of E.O. Wilson's eponymous textbook (Wilson 1975) and still more by Richard Dawkins's *The Selfish Gene* (Dawkins 1976). The claim that the real unit of evolution is the individual Mendelian allele created an explosion of philosophical work on the 'units of selection' question (Brandon and Burian 1984) and the issue of 'adaptationism' (Dupré 1987). Arguably, philosophers made a significant contribution to the rehabilitation of some forms of 'group selection' within evolutionary biology in the 1990's, following two decades of neglect (Sober and Wilson 1998).

The debates over "adaptationism" turned out to involve a diffuse set of worries about whether evolution produces optimal designs, the methodological role of optimality assumptions, and the explanatory goals of evolutionary theory. Philosophical work has helped to distinguish these strands in the debate and reduce the confusion seen in the heated and polemical biological literature for and against 'adaptationism' (Orzack and Sober 2001).

4. Philosophy of Systematic Biology

Philosophical discussion of systematics was a response to a 'scientific revolution' in that discipline in the 1960's and 1970's, a revolution

which saw the discipline transformed first by the application of quantitative methods, and then by the 'cladistic' approach, which argues that the sole aim of systematics should be to represent the evolutionary relationships between groups of organisms (phylogeny). Ideas from the philosophy of science were used to argue for both transformations, and the philosopher David L. Hull was an active participant in scientific debates throughout these two revolutions (Hull 1965; Hull 1970; Hull 1988; see also Sober 1988).

The biologist Michael Ghiselin piqued the interest of philosophers when he suggested that systematics was fundamentally mistaken about the ontological status of biological species (Ghiselin 1974). Species are not types of organisms in the way that chemical elements are types of matter. Instead, they are historical particulars like nations or galaxies. Individual organisms are not instances of species, as my wedding ring is an instance of gold. Instead, they are parts of species, as I am a part of my family. As Smart had earlier noticed, this has the implication that there can be no 'laws of nature' about biological species, at least in the traditional sense of laws true at every time and place in the universe (Smart 1959). This has led some philosophers of biology to argue for a new conception of laws of nature (Mitchell 2000).

However, the view that species are 'individuals' leaves other important questions about species unsolved and raises new problems of its own. Around twenty different so-called 'species concepts' are represented in the current biological literature, and the merits, interrelations, and mutual consistency or inconsistency of these has been a major topic of philosophical discussion.

Biological species are one of the classic examples of a 'natural kind'. The philosophy of systematics has had a major influence on recent work on classification and natural kinds in the general philosophy of science (Dupré 1993; Wilson 1999).

5. Philosophy of Molecular Biology
I mentioned above that the reduction of Mendelian genetics to molecular genetics one of the first topics to be discussed in the philosophy of biology. The initial debate between Schaffner and Hull was followed by the so-called 'anti-reductionist consensus' (Kitcher 1984). The reductionist position was revived in a series of important papers by Kenneth Waters (Waters 1990; Waters 1994) and debate over the cognitive relationship between the two disciplines continues today, although the question is not now framed as a simple choice between reduction and

irreducibility. Lindley Darden, Schaffner and others have argued that explanations in molecular biology are not neatly confined to one ontological level, and hence that ideas of 'reduction' derived from classical examples like the reduction of the phenomenological gas laws to molecular kinematics in nineteenth century physics are simply inapplicable (Darden and Maull 1977; Schaffner 1993). Moreover, molecular biology does not have the kind of grand theory based around a set of laws or a set of mathematical models that is familiar from the physical sciences. Instead, highly specific mechanisms that have been uncovered in detail in one model organism seem to act as 'exemplars' allowing the investigation of similar, although not necessarily identical, mechanisms in other organisms that employ the same, or related, molecular interactants. Darden and others have argued that these 'mechanisms' – specific collections of entities and their distinctive activities – are the fundamental unit of scientific discovery and scientific explanation, not only in molecular biology, but in a wide range of special sciences (Machamer, Darden *et al.* 2000; see also Bechtel and Richardson 1993).

Another important topic in the philosophy of molecular biology has been the definition of the gene (Beurton, Falk and Rheinberger 2000; Griffiths and Stotz 2007). Philosophers have also written extensively on the concept of genetic information, the general tenor of the literature being that it is difficult to reconstruct this idea precisely in a way that does justice to the apparent weight placed on it by molecular biologists (Sarkar 1996; Maynard Smith 2000; Griffiths 2001; Jablonka 2002).

6. Philosophy of Developmental Biology

The debates over 'adaptationism' in the 1980's made philosophers familiar with the complex interactions between explanations of traits in evolutionary biology and explanations of the same traits in developmental biology. Developmental biology throws light on the kinds of variation that are likely to be available for selection, posing the question of how far the results of evolution can be understood in terms of the options that were available ("developmental constraints") rather than the natural selection of those options (Maynard Smith, Burian *et al.* 1985). The debate over developmental constraints looked at developmental biology solely from the perspective of whether it could provide answers to evolutionary questions. However, as Ron Amundson pointed out, developmental biologists are addressing questions of their own, and, he argued, a different concept of "constraint" is needed to address those questions (Amundson 1994). The emergence in the 1990's of a new field promising to unite

both kinds of explanation, evolutionary developmental biology, has given rise to a substantial philosophical literature aimed at characterizing this field from a methodological viewpoint (Maienschein and Laublicher 2004; Robert 2004; Amundson 2005; Brandon and Sansom 2007).

7. Philosophy of Ecology and Conservation Biology

Until recently this was a severely underdeveloped field in the philosophy of biology. This is surprising, because there is obvious potential for all three of the approaches to philosophy of biology discussed above. There is also a substantial body of philosophical work in environmental ethics, and it seems reasonable to suppose that answering the questions that arise there would require a critical examination of ecology and conservation biology. In fact, an important book which sought to provide just those underpinnings – Kristin Shrader-Frechette and Earl McCoy's *Method in Ecology: Strategies for Conservation* (1993) – was an honorable exception to the philosophical neglect of ecology in earlier decades.

In the past decade philosophers have started to remedy the neglect of ecology and a number of major books have appeared (Cooper 2003, Ginzburg and Colyvan 2004, Sarkar 2005, MacLaurin and Sterelny 2008). Discussion has focused on the troubled relationship between mathematical models and empirical data in ecology, on the idea of ecological stability and the 'balance of nature', and on the definition of biodiversity.

8. Methodology in Philosophy of Biology

Most work in the philosophy of biology is self-consciously naturalistic, recognizing no profound discontinuity in either method or content between philosophy and science. Ideally, philosophy of biology differs from biology itself not in its knowledge base, but only in the questions it asks. The philosopher aims to engage with the content of biology at a professional level, although typically with greater knowledge of its history than biologists themselves, and less hands-on skills. It is common for philosophers of biology to have academic credentials in the fields that are the focus of their research, and to be closely involved with scientific collaborators. Philosophy of biology's naturalism and the continuity of its concerns with science itself is shared with much other recent work in the philosophy of science, perhaps most notably in the philosophy of neuroscience (Bechtel, Mandlik *et al.* 2001).

Even the distinction between the *questions* of biology and those of philosophy of biology is not absolutely clear. As noted above, philosophers of biology address three types of questions: general questions about

the nature of science, conceptual puzzles within biology, and traditional philosophical questions that seem open to illumination from the biosciences. When addressing the second sort of question, there is no clear distinction between philosophy of biology and theoretical biology. But while this can lead to the accusation that philosophers of biology have abandoned their calling for 'amateur hour biology' it can equally well be said that a book like *The Selfish Gene* (Dawkins 1976) is primarily a contribution to philosophical discussion of biology. Certainly, the professional skills of the philosopher are as relevant to these internal conceptual puzzles as they are to the other two types of question. All three types of questions can be related to the specific findings of the biological sciences only by complex chains of argument.

Additional Data on Philosophy of Nature
www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Philosophy_of_nature

The term **natural philosophy,** or the **philosophy of nature** (Latin, *philosophia naturalis*), has several applications, according to its historical context. Before the development of modern science, "natural philosophy" referred to the objective study of nature and the physical universe, and is considered the counterpart, or the precursor, of what is now called natural science, especially physics.

Naturphilosophie, a German philosophical movement prevalent from 1790 until about 1830, is chiefly associated with Friedrich Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel, and championed the concept of an organic and dynamic physical world, instead of the mechanism and atomism of the materialists.

Most recently, developments in physics and biology have initiated philosophical discussions on a whole new range of topics, mostly concerning the relationship of humans with nature and humanity's perception of natural reality. Modern natural philosophy explores the fundamental nature of natural reality and its implications for mankind, and includes fields such as environmental ethics, the philosophy of biology, and the philosophy of physics.

"Natural philosophy"
The usage of the term "natural philosophy" preceded the current term "science." The word "science" was a synonym for knowledge or study, and the term "natural philosophy" referred to knowledge or study of "the workings of nature". Natural philosophy became "science" (Latin,

scientia, "knowledge") when the acquisition of knowledge through experiments (special experiences) performed according to the scientific method became a specialized branch of study, beyond the type of observation, speculation, and logical analysis which takes place in philosophy.

Forms of modern science historically developed out of natural philosophy. At older universities, long-established Chairs of Natural Philosophy are today occupied mainly by physics professors. In Europe, natural philosophy reached its height during the high and late Middle Ages (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries), after the rise of the university system. Before the emergence of modern "science" and "scientists" in the nineteenth century, the word "science" simply meant "knowledge" and the label, "scientist" did not exist. Isaac Newton's 1687 scientific treatise is known as *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy).*

Natural philosophy of Plato

In what is thought to be one of Plato's earliest dialogues, *Charmides,* the distinction was drawn between sciences or bodies of knowledge which produced a physical result, and those which did not. Natural philosophy was categorized as a theoretical, rather than a practical, branch of philosophy, such as ethics. Sciences that guided arts and which drew upon the philosophical knowledge of nature did, of course, produce many practical results, such as architecture or medicine, but these subsidiary "sciences" were considered beyond the scope of natural philosophy.

Natural philosophy of Aristotle

In his lifelong study of nature, Aristotle identified the physical universe as being dependent on a first cause, an unmoved mover of the universe, which was without matter and therefore imperceptible. In his treatise, *Metaphysics,* he referred to the study of this first cause as the "first philosophy" (*Metaphysics* 6.1, 1026a27-31), and to physics, or the study of the material world, as the "second philosophy." Since the first entities were not perceptible, and were causal entities, they could only be studied through a metaphysical investigation of physical entities. In Physics, Aristotle conducted an investigation of different kinds of natural phenomena, providing a general framework for an understanding of nature.

Ancient Greek philosophers conducted their study of the natural world through observation, and drew their conclusions from reflection and logical deduction.

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Medieval Natural Philosophy

Medieval natural philosophy in Europe can be divided into two periods, distinguished by the rise of the university system. Before the the rise of the universities during the twelfth century, there existed mostly catalogues or encyclopedias of natural history, but very few works that dealt with natural philosophy. Most scholarly research took place under the auspices of church schools, monasteries or private patrons, and the strongest Greek influence was from medical works and Plato's *Timaeus,* part of which had been translated into Latin, with commentary, by Calcidius. During this period, several original texts emerged that dealt with natural philosophy, including William of Conches' *Philosophia mundi (Philosophy of the World)*, Bernard Sylvester's *Cosmographie,* and Hildegard of Bingen's *Scivia (Know the Ways)*.

During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, natural history was an official subject in the arts faculties of the medieval universities, distinct from the seven liberal arts, ethics, metaphysics, theology, medicine, and law. The works of Aristotle had become available in Latin, and the study of natural philosophy often took the form of disputations or commentaries arising from Aristotle's *Physics, De generatione et corruptione (On Generation and Perishing)*, the *De caelo (On the Heavens)*, *Meteorology, On the Soul,* and *Parva Naturalia,* a group of treatises on psychology. Very little scientific experimentation took place, and investigations were mostly based on the use of new methods of medieval logic. Investigations of the natural world that were based on mathematics, such as astronomy and optics, were generally considered to be outside the realm of natural philosophy.

Natural philosophy was considered useful to medicine and theology, and in Oxford and Paris, most original work in natural philosophy was carried out in pursuit of answers to theological problems, such as the nature of the soul and of angels, or in an effort to resolve contradictions between Christian doctrines and Aristotelian concepts of the cosmos.

Scientific inquiry

The Enlightenment brought about a great increase in scientific experimentation and discovery, much of which was carried out under private patronage, independently of the great universities. As scientific methods of research became established, natural philosophy was superseded by the development of various fields of scientific study.

Galileo (1564–1642), Francis Bacon (1561–1626), and Robert Boyle (1627–1691) shared a conviction that practical experimental observation provided a more satisfactory understanding of nature than reliance

on revealed truth or on a purely speculative approach. Galileo wrote about his experiments in a philosophical way, but his methodology resembled modern scientific research. Francis Bacon originated proposals for a much more inquisitive and practical approach to the study of nature. In 1686, Robert Boyle wrote what is considered to be a seminal work on the distinction between nature and metaphysics, *A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature*. This book represented a radical departure from the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, and introduced innovations such as an insistence upon the publication of detailed experimental results, including the results of unsuccessful experiments; and also a requirement for the replication of experiments as a means of validating observational claims.

Dualism of Descartes

René Descartes (1596–1650) distinguished between two kinds of substance, matter and mind. According to this system, everything which is "matter" is deterministic and natural–and so belongs to natural philosophy–and everything which is "mind" is volitional and non-natural, and falls outside the domain of philosophy of nature.

Naturphilosophie

Naturphilosophie, a movement prevalent in German philosophy, literature, and science from 1790 until about 1830, is chiefly associated with Friedrich Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel, and championed the concept of an organic and dynamic physical world, instead of the mechanism and atomism of the materialists. It originated from the philosophy of German idealism, and opposed the Cartesian dualism of mind and matter with a Spinozan concept of mind and matter as different modes of a single substance. Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* portrayed nature as individual instances of a spiritual notion, and gave nature a "life" and a "personality" which resembled the life and personality of human beings.

Revival of natural philosophy

Recent discoveries and developments in science have given rise to new discussions of the philosophy of nature, and have opened new areas of inquiry. Philosophy of nature now explores the fundamental features of natural reality and their implications for humankind. Human understanding of nature shapes beliefs and attitudes in many areas, including ethics, moral theory, metaphysics, and anthropology.

Powerful new technology allows the observation and measurement of physical phenomena far beyond the capacity of human senses, and has

inspired new thought about the nature of "matter" and the "imperceptible" world. In astronomy and physics, certain mathematical and geometric relationships which were assumed to be absolutely true have been found to alter when they are applied at infinitely greater magnitudes, raising questions about the definition of truth, and about how the human mind can grasp everyday practical reality and at the same time comprehend truth on a larger scale.

Humanity has developed ways of interfering with the natural biological order, such as genetic engineering, artificial insemination, organ transplants, cloning, gene therapy, and the use of chemical agents such as fertilizers and pesticides. This raises new questions about ethics; when and to what extent it is appropriate for humankind to intervene in natural processes of growth and multiplication, and whether such intervention will disrupt the natural balance of the universe. A new field, philosophy of biology, is rapidly developing in response to these issues and to ancient philosophical questions about the nature of happiness and the quality of life.

In just a short time, modern technology has allowed human beings to have a disproportionate impact on nature. Humanity is rapidly reshaping the natural environment, and scientists and scholars are questioning whether "nature" can survive this onslaught. Another field of natural philosophy concerns the ethical use and distribution of resources among an increasing world population, the effect of technology on the balance of political power, and the best way in which to administer global standards and resolve conflicting interests. Examples are the debate over global warming, efforts to stem the development of nuclear weapons, and the creation of laws to protect international resources such as fisheries. <...>

Theme 7. Social philosophy

Avrum Stroll, Albert William Levi,
Richard Wolin, Ed.

Western Philosophy
Social and Political Philosophy

Apart from epistemology, the most significant philosophical contributions of the Enlightenment were made in the fields of social and political philosophy. The *Two Treatises of Civil Government* (1690) by Locke and *The Social Contract* (1762) by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) proposed justifications of political association grounded in the newer political requirements of the age. The Renaissance political philosophies of Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes had presupposed or defended the absolute power of kings and rulers. But the Enlightenment theories of Locke and Rousseau championed the freedom and equality of citizens. It was a natural historical transformation. The 16th and 17th centuries were the age of absolutism; the chief problem of politics was that of maintaining internal order, and political theory was conducted in the language of national sovereignty. But the 18th century was the age of the democratic revolutions; the chief political problem was that of securing freedom and revolting against injustice, and political theory was expressed in the idiom of natural and inalienable rights.

Locke's political philosophy explicitly denied the divine right of kings and the absolute power of the sovereign. Instead, he insisted on a natural and universal right to freedom and equality. The state of nature in which human beings originally lived was not, as Hobbes imagined, intolerable, though it did have certain inconveniences. Therefore, people banded together to form society – as Aristotle taught, "not simply to live, but to live well". Political power, Locke argued, can never be exercised apart from its ultimate purpose, which is the common good, for the political contract is undertaken in order to preserve life, liberty, and property.

Locke thus stated one of the fundamental principles of political liberalism: that there can be no subjection to power without consent – though once political society has been founded, citizens are obligated to accept the decisions of a majority of their number. Such decisions are made on behalf of the majority by the legislature, though the ultimate power of

choosing the legislature rests with the people; and even the powers of the legislature are not absolute, because the law of nature remains as a permanent standard and as a principle of protection against arbitrary authority.

Rousseau's more radical political doctrines were built upon Lockean foundations. For him, too, the convention of the social contract formed the basis of all legitimate political authority, though his conception of citizenship was much more organic and much less individualistic than Locke's. The surrender of natural liberty for civil liberty means that all individual rights (among them property rights) become subordinate to the general will. For Rousseau the state is a moral person whose life is the union of its members, whose laws are acts of the general will, and whose end is the liberty and equality of its citizens. It follows that when any government usurps the power of the people, the social contract is broken; and not only are the citizens no longer compelled to obey, but they also have an obligation to rebel. Rousseau's defiantcollectivism was clearly a revolt against Locke's systematic individualism; for Rousseau the fundamental category was not "natural person" but "citizen". Nevertheless, however much they differed, in these two social theorists of the Enlightenment is to be found the germ of all modern liberalism: its faith in representative democracy, in civil liberties, and in the basic dignity of human beings.

Charles William Hendel

Social and political philosophy
(Hocking W. E., Blanshard B., Hendel Ch. W., Randall J. H. Preface to Philosophy: Textbook. N. Y. The Macmillan Company, 1960. P. 204–215, 222–225)

B. The Problem of Human life in Society

147. Need and Difficulty of a Philosophical Study of Society
When discussion gets down to bedrock, it is philosophy. In order to make right decisions, we must know our true situation, and we must also know ourselves. Socrates was always recalling that commandment of the Greek religion: Know thyself. It means knowing what we really think, what counts most, what makes life worth living and having, what we ought to work for – the first things, the basic things, the lasting goods to which everything else is subordinate. Whatever we believe on these questions, together with the things that happen in our lifetime, makes the history of our time. So philosophy is important because it deals with precisely these essentials.

But the way of philosophy is no easy one. The old saying, "Great things are difficult", is very much to the point here. We have to find our way to the truth by applying ourselves to the stubborn realities of our present life. We must begin here and eventually return here, bringing some wisdom we may have learned through that hard, straight course of thinking which is philosophy.

It generally takes so much to live a decent and worthwhile life that any man does well to be suspicious of easy solutions of something as large as the problem of human civilization, which is what we are dealing with in this study. First thoughts are likely to be only thoughtless opinions or prejudices. We may think that all we need today is to get the government out of our private and individual affairs so that we can be free once again. But that commits us to individualism. Have we thought what individualism really means, following it out into every detail so that we see the whole social order drawn up in such terms? Or suppose we simply condemn the selfishness of individuals as the source of all evil in our present world, as it was in all those times we know about through history. Well, if selfishness is such an absolute fact, how does it happen that we have any family life, fellowship with others, clubs, labor unions, societies, states, nations? There is more to it than these single-term solutions indicate.

148. The Spurious Conflict between the Individual and the State

In that easy kind of philosophy, the real problems are left out of sight while we imagine an exaggerated battle between two great opponents, the Individual and the State. They are represented as lasting enemies of each other; the gain of one is inevitably the loss of the other. Those of the party who idealize the social whole, the "socialists" look forward to a perfect regulation of the lives of men by the state for the sake of social justice. But the "individualists" seek to be free from the government of the state altogether.

Now there is, indeed, a genuine problem about the limits of the authority of government, but it is false and misleading to make "man" and "the state" into two great opposing parties. For the men and the women are the state; and conversely, the state is all the people. The problems that are really worth bothering about are those that fall inside the whole organization of men in the state and society. They are the problems of the relation of some parts to other parts, and individual men are standing on both sides of the fence. The whole state, too, is involved in every issue.

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That old sham battle of Individual versus Society is not worth discussing, and it is an unworthy distraction from the urgent practical issues, where a decision really makes a difference in the lives and happiness of people. What are these issues today? Here is where we must really begin our philosophy.

149. Some Problems of Life in Our Social Order

(a) *Inequality*. The questions that really bother us are those like inequality. We are living in a society which professes to assure all men in it of their equal rights; but we see them discriminated against, some having privileges and others suffering under disabilities.

Things are not right in our social order, nor are they right in our own personal motives and ideas of the way to act. We are not living up to our principles. The question then is whether we understand these principles. Or it may be more serious still – are they true? And if they are true, what makes people act as if they were not? Do they secretly believe something else? Is it, perhaps, the notion that men are not really equal, that some are bound to be superior, and that those who are ought to have the benefits of their superiority of mind, character, and ability to succeed? Here is something one must get to the bottom of, because it has to do with the whole foundation of human life in society. There seems to be a struggle between two principles, one which works toward inequality, the other toward equality, and this struggle is what makes social life the troublesome thing it is.

(b) *Discrimination against Nation and Race*. But the most superficial view of this situation shows that some other problems are involved. We notice at once that it is not the individuals alone who are unequal. It is not the sheer merit of this or that person which entitles him to his wealth, position, or power in the community; nor is it something that the individual himself could do or not do that puts him at the disadvantage with others which we consider unfair or unequal. Men are treated, not as the men they individually are, but as members of some social group, for instance a nation or a race. All of one group are lumped together for the benefits or the disabilities of the discrimination. How does that come about? What can possibly justify it? What is going to come of it? This struggle of whole groups for their rights is another one of the present realities of our situation.

(c) *Capital and Labor*. An urgent problem exists within our great and complex economic order. Men are engaged in wide spread business dealings with each other, in industry and commerce, and some groups of

men are managing other men. This gives them a power over the others. The power is not confined, however, to the actual business of the factory or the commercial enterprise. It has ramifications outside. The economic system itself touches almost the whole of life, and it determines the chances a man has, not only for work, but also for most of his opportunities in life, and even for his bare survival. The power of control that resides in this system is vast, and some individuals have to be at the controls, directing and using this power. They naturally have their own interests and look out for them. It has long been said, and accepted as a supposed truth of economics, that men are ruled by such self-interest. At any rate, the facts of the situation are clear enough.

In the face of this economic power, men, determined to be free, have organized themselves in labor or trade unions to protect themselves. As citizens of a free democracy they have demanded their elementary rights. They have presented their grievances and sought to have them rectified. They have used their bargaining power through unions to gain advantages for themselves. They have appealed to the public for social justice. And they have actively fought for all these things, too, by such means as they have had at their disposal, chiefly the power to strike. The story of "capital and labor" is one of continuing conflict and antagonism between powerful groups within our society. The question now is what we are to do about this internal warfare.

(d) *Democratic Government.* Naturally we turn to government when we face problems on so vast a scale as the whole economic and social organization of our life. But government itself is a problem no less troublesome. The overwhelming task of haxing to fight a war against totalitarian domination has momentarily made us forget that something was wrong with government before the war. It was some kind of weakness or failure to meet the needs of people which brought on the Nazi and Fascist dictatorships that have caused the trouble. Similar defects existed in our own practice of government. Now they arc being brought home to us again.

How can we conduct the vast business of our United States through a government by elected representatives in Congress and a President, with a Supreme Court in the background? Can they all pull together as a team? Will they serve the whole people?

How can there be both democratic and efficient government? It is possible to get efficiency if a leader is accepted whose decision is always the law, but such leaders have to look first to the satisfaction of their supporters and afterwards to satisfying the people at large. This tends to make

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justice play second fiddle to party politics. On the other hand, even when representatives, senators, or the president aim to carry out the will of the people for the common welfare, they have difficulty hearing the voice of the people. Through the press, through lobbies, through all kinds of representations, the groups and interests within the state that stand to profit by some act of legislation make themselves heard and get their will done. The people then have a sense that their own government is not only unjust but also inefficient because these interested groups are themselves pulling at crosspurposes.

If it is one thing men must have in a government, it is unity of action and plain, honest purpose. So the political struggles of parties for power are not simply like contests of sport. They have a profound importance and are the concern of every citizen. Through them, individuals, corporations, and groups of all sorts are struggling to obtain government that will work for the good of all.

(e) *Free Institutions*. At a time when the powers of government are at their highest because of the necessity of mobilizing all the forces of the nation, the problem is also urgent of preserving free institutions, besides political democracy. This is one of the things in mind when certain people call for "free enterprise". It holds for labor, however, as well as for business: labor unions must be independent of government dictation. But it applies also to very much more than the industrial and commercial order. The press and all organs of communication must be free; and education must be free, together with the institutions, private, municipal, and state, that carry on the work of education; and religious teaching must be free, and the churches and groups that meet for common worship. Besides these universal institutions, there exist a host of small clubs, fraternal organizations, and assemblies of all sorts for good fellowship as well as common work.

There is a live question today about the independence and freedom of all these cherished institutions in our society. One cannot mark out boundaries for each of these bodies and say: Here is your province, just stay within it, and then you can do what you like inside it. All these institutions reach the public and touch the whole of our lives, especially industry and commerce, communications, education, and religion. Somehow they must all be governed in the interest of the whole community and yet not governed by the government. How is this to be done? How are free institutions to be preserved so that they do not have to surrender to a government when they come under regulation, as they must in any social order? The struggle taking place over this question is less evident

to the casual observer, but it is no less real than those more obvious struggles for social justice and true equality before the law. These things are all part of one and the same picture.

(f) *The Many Loyalties of Men and Their Sense of Justice*. And finally, the whole situation is complicated by the fact that every citizen has so many loyalties. The people of the nation are not all nicely parcelled out in these different groups so that we can reckon with a lot of them as a group. They may at one and the same time be members of a political party, a lodge, a union, a business or financial corporation, a farm organization, a college, a church. They feel the claims of each one of these bodies or institutions. They are naturally concerned to have the rights of any controversy worked out fairly and harmoniously for all of them. The citizens are thus involved in all social disputes and all issues of government. All the decisive questions are of public concern. But in such great matters much feeling is naturally aroused. A judicial attitude is needed which will enable all men to see what justice is for the w^hole nation. For the right decisions of a government all depend ultimately upon the sense of justice and will of the people.

(g) *Nationalism and International Relations*. But we have talked about these urgent questions as if we were the only people on earth. All these questions lead beyond the state and beyond our own nation. Economic questions have an international character, and organizations of industry and commerce, as well as of labor, reach across the lines between the states of the world. Churches do likewise in their spiritual ministry to man. The protests of minorities against unfair and inhuman treatment are made in every quarter. And the rights of man are believed to be universal rights – the same in America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Whatever troubles any state has in respect to any of these matters has reverberations everywhere else: the failure to deal adequately with these economic, political, and social problems in any one nation involves the others. So the various states of the world are inevitably implicated in a whole set of international problems. But we have been suffering from a blind or willful nationalism in this regard. What is to be done about it? How are the nations to deal with the realities of today which are international? What must be the relations of states and nations to each other so that they will form a peaceful community?

150. Life in the Family as an Ideal and a Problem

In the end, all these questions come down to one large one which can be solved only within ourselves: What are our ideas of the right way

for men to live with each other – both individual men and whole nations – in every circumstance of their existence?

Sometimes we speak of "the family of nations" as if we wanted to see the idea of the family realized there, in the wide world, as well as in our homes. It is also common usage to speak of men at war as being comrades or brothers at arms, and we often say that they ought to be more like brothers, too, in peacetime. The image of the family relationship is thus something of an ideal, contrasting with the defects of the rest of civilization around us. In the midst of passions of hate, jealousies, ruthless competition, and the conflicts of people with each other, the home seems a great, free haven for man. It is the center of some kindly measure of love in a world where love hardly counts at all. Here inequality does not matter, though there is no literal equality between parents and children, nor in the authority of husband and wife. For affection and care are the important things in family life, not rank or power. Those who grow up together have close ties founded on the deepest human interests. They appreciate and share in the same values of life. They are also united "for mutual support", as Aristotle put it, which means not only for economic but above all for the psychological and moral support which men and women find in each other, and young and old likewise. In such an order of life, justice is done with a wise discrimination which is more truly just than the decisions handed down in law because the whole heart is in it, and the good of all persons is really in concern. Hence the family has often been taken as an example of the ideal community, with a unity, peace, and common enjoyment of good which we sorely need in all the other social relations.

But this is not to say that family is itself no problem. Our society is full of unhappiness over difficulties with this closest of all human relationships. Some of the trouble does come, of course, from a sort of invasion of the home by that very outside world which is so full of ills. The problems men have concerning property, money, business, and social position in the wider world are what set members of a family against one another. Brothers quarrel over the division of property. They claim and fight for their rights by recourse to law. Sometimes, too, a man brings home discontent with his work, or his wife resents it because he is not "getting on" in the world, and such discontented people make bad companions for each other, which reflects throughout their family and social life. Worse still is the evil of economic unemployment, which keeps people at home with nothing to do beyond the home to make its value appreciated after the day's work. People cannot stay home under such conditions; and without any steady responsibility their very lives disintegrate

and fall to a dead, spiritless level of uselessness where nobody feels worth while. Things like these in our civilization contribute greatly to spoil or ruin family life.

Yet this does not mean that we need only to get rid of civilization with its wrongs, and then all will be well with the family. After due allowance is made for the evils that come into the home from without, there are still deep-seated causes of trouble within to make life in the family a problem. There are, for one thing, the plain moral failings of men and women to live as they ought. Besides, if a simple family existence were all men had of social life, it would become a scene of discontent, unrest, and conflict because they would not be satisfied with so incomplete a life. For mankind has, throughout history, formed itself into the larger communities and states.

Aristotle gave the account of the way men and women, beginning with their union in the marital relation and the family, have naturally gone forward to achieve the most truly human and the fullest life, which is only found in a civilized society. Man is *meant* to live in the state: he is "a political animal". To reduce his life to any smaller compass and purpose would be to repress him and to spoil even his family life. The problem of the home is not to be solved, therefore, by isolating man from all his other problems of society. They all form one great universal question: how is man to dwell in community with his fellows, and by what ideas can he direct and govern his life so that it will go right and will be good?

151. The Vision of the Good Life in Society

The true community is not something already in existence somewhere but in *the vision* which men have of the existence that is most truly worth having. It is an ideal, that is, some view of what is right or of what ought to be. Whenever we criticize our social order and the various faults of our human relationships, we have some ideal in mind of the true order and the right way of life. Even when we compare the family favorably with the state or the international order, we do not regard the existing family itself as a perfect model which should be copied in every other social form. We are seeing in the family only some approximation to an idea of a human community which is still to be achieved there and everywhere else in our experience. This is the case with people who think and who have some ambition and enterprise. There are many, of course, who find themselves perfectly at ease and well off and consequently are inclined to be complacent with the *status quo* and to talk as if it were the perfect order of things. They oppose change. They deprecate thinking

about the foundations of human life in society and about ideals that will stimulate men to work for a better future. Thus they have no use for philosophy because philosophy means digging at the roots with a view to better growth and a finer flowering of life in mankind. And that view of the good life is not merely a notion of some crank; it is a well-grounded vision, based on the reason and experience of mankind.

Such a vision, for example, is that enshrined in the tradition of our religion. When men are imbued with a faith in God and regard themselves as having a profoundly important relationship to that Divine Being who is conceived as a God of righteousness and love, they see at the same time a profound importance in the way they themselves live with their fellow men. That insight speaks strongly in their hearts as a commandment, as from God himself: they shall love their neighbor as themselves. And to see that steadily and see it whole is to have a vision of a community and fellowship the like of which the world has never known. Yet it is what a Christian's faith tells him must be, even in this present world. Such a vision feeds no one's complacency but lays an injunction upon a man to go and do the things necessary to fulfill it.

But men can find their visions of the true order of society in other ways, too, besides religion. The great statesmen of history who have had a personal responsibility for the welfare and even the desperate saving of their nations, have had insights that became lessons for men ever after. Take the example of Pericles, the leader of Athenian democracy, as described by Thucydides, a general under him in the long Peloponnesian War which lasted twenty-seven years and exhausted the whole Greek world, so that it afterward fell before a conqueror. Pericles gave an address at the civic funeral held for the men who had fallen in the first year of the war in 431 b.c. He recounted to those assembled for the ceremony all that Athens had meant to them so that their pride and love of country would be aroused. But with that exalting of the state went a more moving and elemental appeal: "it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honor in action that men were enabled to win all this", and did not those fine men who had there fallen deserve of them, the living, that they should carry on?

And then nearly twenty-three hundred years later, Lincoln, in this country, expressed the same human wisdom and inspiration: "the brave men, living and dead, who struggled here…, it is for us the living rather to be dedicated here to the unfinished work that they have thus far so nobly advanced..."

Here is the vision of di fellowship, patterned on the experience of men who engage in battle or some great struggle together. Cannot something of this be had by those who survive, and who are to carry on the life of the country? Is the obligation of the citizens to the nation not all the greater because their kin, their fellows, their own people have already given so much for it, and more is still to be done? The state is no abstract entity to the men who have made it live, and it should mean vastly more to those who live on in it. The state consists of home, family, friends, associates of all sorts, all the personal relationships and ways of life together. But the relations must be personal, if men are ever to feel a personal duty or obligation to act and to sacrifice for the state. Here is the democratic vision of the true kind of community. It has its applications to the heme as well as to all the other forms of relationship which create the problems of our present social order.

It is the business of philosophy to discuss the fundamental and universal questions that lie behind the problems of our time. It aims to reduce the great variety of issues to some common problem in order to see their essence. It looks to the "realities first and then studies them in idea. It forms some conception of the inspiring visions that men have had of their life in the state and society and draws the conclusions from these ideals for the state of affairs as it now is. One of the values of philosophy is that it makes the important ideas precise and accurate – ideas that are otherwise used without clear understanding of their meaning.

Thus men will argue interminably and get nowhere about the rights of capital or labor or the rights of minorities or the rights of the individual, without knowing exactly what a "right" of any kind is. Nor do they have any common understanding of what law or justice is. Even the meaning of "republic", which is the name for our form of state, is not clear and definite. Government itself – why it exists, what it is, and what it is intended to do – this also is vague and uncertain when people are talking about what government today cannot or should not do. And what is meant by personal liberty and freedom? To reach any solution for the problems of the day, we have first to set our ideas in order and examine life in society with a clear understanding of what we mean to have in life. This is the task of philosophy.

157. The Necessities of a Civilized Life: the Economy
Men exist in society because no man is ever sufficient to himself. They have many different needs which others besides themselves are able to supply by a division of labor and exchanging goods and services. They

learn to produce things in quantity and develop the skill to improve the quality. This economy is simple enough as long as the wants remain equally simple. It ministers to a natural, healthy, and regular life. "Alas, too regular", is the comment of civilized man. This monotonous round of existence is like the routine of tire animals – one generation after another living the same old way. It seems like a "community of pigs". A civilized order is one where men *aim* to be *better* off. It is natural to crave luxuries and not be content with the simple necessities.

The logic of this restless dynamic of civilization is a whole stock of things that become urgently necessary to make possible the enjoyment of luxury. Such a civilized life costs more than is at first realized.

There is excess and unwholesome living, and so the practice of medicine is immediately necessary. Moreover, some men enjoy more than their share, others become discontented, and the love of gain in all of them involves them in difficulties with each other that call for skillful adjustment; so lawyers and courts of law are necessary. The resulting expansion, too, of industry, commerce, and the population, through the higher standard of living, leads to encroachment upon other peoples and consequently the necessity of a defense against war. Then the art of war must be cultivated and some men specially trained for it. But this has grave dangers. The soldiers ought always to act as the devoted guardians of the community, and their experience must not give them any habits of life which make them a menace to any of their own people. They will have to distinguish between their conduct toward external enemies and that to their fellow citizens. Hence, more important still than their very proficiency at war is their learning the principles of civilized life and loyalty to their community. For this, an education is necessary which is much more than military training. It has to give them an appreciation of the whole state of which they are a part so that they will understand the specific reason for their military function. Only when they truly understand this will they do all things as they ought and keep their own duties in mind, namely, the preserv-ation of *their community*.

158. The Great Importance of Education, and Its Functions

But an inevitablc logic leads further. If the soldiers are doing their part, what about the other people? What is their share? They seem to be only enjoying life and luxury, with their desires in full rein; and they may be enriching themselves with the various goods of this world. Now the soldiers are not going to do anything for these people unless they see them too, devoting themselves to some essential service for the community. It

follows that all men in the state must have that same education for citizenship. It should be a liberal education, a balanced education of spirit and body which will enable them to have good health and sound judgment for their part in society.

This universal education is the best means, too, of improving the general economy. For it serves two purposes. The first is that of training the men who are naturally fighters but who need to have their minds enlarged so as to grasp the point of their discipline. The second function is to select the men who are best qualified for that or any other service. The community should find out, through the system of education, who are the proper persons for each type of work: some to till the soil, others to work with their hands, others for the military profession, and a few for the most important duties of all, the supreme direction of this whole social order.

Moreover, this education can do something very salutary for each individual. Education is itself nothing less than the whole of a man's own personal development. If it is rightly directed, everyone can attain to higher levels of proficiency and experience. But it is very important that this be not left to mere chance or accident. Everything that touches the mind and character educates man. The acts of parents at home, the acts of the other citizens in their daily life, the imaginative and colorful portrayals of men and gods in mythology, art, drama, the rhythms and temperament of music and dancing – all these expressions of the human spirit call out some analogous disposition and behavior in those who participate in them. All these doings of man must measure up to an ethical standard, since they actually make men in their image, and that should always be an image of the good man and citizen.

Only the very best men are able to direct all these agencies of education in the community, "men full of zeal to do whatever they believe is for the good of the commonwealth and never willing to act against its interest". How these "guardians" of the state are to be found is a great problem not easily solved. For the purposes of the present argument they are supposed to be there, doing their work properly.

Now we see all the youth of the land going through a common education by which they are to be assigned to their different places and functions in the social system. Here is a point of difficulty – in getting them to accept these respective assignments. Perhaps it can only be done by the poetic invention of a fine allegory and to give them the right idea:

"All of you in this land are brothers; but the god who fashioned you mixed gold in the composition of those among you who are fit to rule..., he put silver in the auxiliaries [soldiers], and iron and brass in the farmers

and craftsmen". (Plato) This looks at first like indoctrinating youth with the ideas of a caste system, but the point follows: "Now, since you are all of one stock, although your children will generally be like their parents, sometimes a golden parent may have a silver child or a silver parent a golden one, and so on with ail the other combinations". Each child is to be placed in the class of work for which he proves himself competent during his education. If children of craftsmen or farmers have the qualification, they are to be entrusted to the highest offices. The scion of golden parents is likewise to be put where he belongs, regardless of the position or achievement of his family. Each man's place in life is thus according to merit, and besides, the good of the community requires that every individual shall measure up to the job. If this were believed, it "might have a good effect in making them care more for the commonwealth and for one another".

David Miller

Political philosophy
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/political-philosophy

Political philosophy can be defined as philosophical reflection on how best to arrange our collective life - our political institutions and our social practices, such as our economic system and our pattern of family life. (Sometimes a distinction is made between *political* and *social* philosophy, but I shall use 'political philosophy' in a broad sense to include both.) Political philosophers seek to establish basic principles that will, for instance, justify a particular form of state, show that individuals have certain inalienable rights, or tell us how a society's material resources should be shared among its members. This usually involves analysing and interpreting ideas like freedom, justice, authority and democracy and then applying them in a critical way to the social and political institutions that currently exist. Some political philosophers have tried primarily to justify the prevailing arrangements of their society; others have painted pictures of an ideal state or an ideal social world that is very different from anything we have so far experienced (utopianism).

Political philosophy has been practised for as long as human beings have regarded their collective arrangements not as immutable and part of the natural order but as potentially open to change, and therefore as standing in need of philosophical justification. It can be found in many different cultures, and has taken a wide variety of forms. There are two reasons for this diversity. First, the methods and approaches used by political phi-

losophers reflect the general philosophical tendencies of their epoch. Developments in epistemology and ethics, for instance, alter the assumptions on which political philosophy can proceed. But second, the political philosopher's agenda is largely set by the pressing political issues of the day. In medieval Europe, for instance, the proper relationship between Church and State became a central issue in political philosophy; in the early modern period the main argument was between defenders of absolutism and those who sought to justify a limited, constitutional state. In the nineteenth century, the social question – the question of how an industrial society should organize its economy and its welfare system – came to the fore. When we study the history of political philosophy, therefore, we find that alongside some perennial questions – how can one person ever justifiably claim the authority to govern another person, for instance? – there are some big changes: in the issues addressed, in the language used to address them, and in the underlying premises on which the political philosopher rests his or her argument. (…)

One question that immediately arises is whether the principles that political philosophers establish are to be regarded as having universal validity, or whether they should be seen as expressing the assumptions and the values of a particular political community. This question about the scope and status of political philosophy has been fiercely debated in recent years (…). It is closely connected to a question about human nature (…). In order to justify a set of collective arrangements, a political philosophy must say something about the nature of human beings, about their needs, their capacities, about whether they are mainly selfish or mainly altruistic, and so forth. But can we discover common traits in human beings everywhere, or are people's characters predominantly shaped by the particular culture they belong to?

If we examine the main works of political philosophy in past centuries, they can be divided roughly into two categories. On the one hand there are those produced by philosophers elaborating general philosophical systems, whose political philosophy flows out of and forms an integral part of those systems. Leading philosophers who have made substantial contributions to political thought include Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Hegel and J.S. Mill. On the other hand there are social and political thinkers whose contribution to philosophy as a whole has had little lasting significance, but who have made influential contributions to political philosophy specifically. In this category we may include Cicero, Marsilius of Padua, Machiavelli, Grotius, Rousseau, Bentham, Fichte and Marx. Two important figures whose work reflects non-Western influences are Ibn Khaldhun and Kauṭilya. Among the most

important twentieth-century political thinkers are Arendt, Berlin, Dewey, Foucault, Gandhi, Gramsci, Habermas, Hayek, Oakeshott, Rawls, Sartre and Taylor.

Political institutions and ideologies

What are the issues that, historically and today, have most exercised political philosophers? To begin with, there is a set of questions about how political institutions should be arranged. Today we would think of this as an enquiry into the best form of state, though we should note that the state itself is a particular kind of political arrangement of relatively recent origin – for most of their history human beings have not been governed by states (…). Since all states claim Authority over their subjects, two fundamental issues are the very meaning of authority, and the criteria by which we can judge forms of political rule legitimate (…). Connected to this is the issue of whether individual subjects have a moral obligation to obey the laws of their state (…), and of the circumstances under which politically-inspired disobedience is justifiable (…). Next there is a series of questions about the form that the state should take: whether authority should be absolute or constitutionally limited (…); whether its structure should be unitary or federal (…); whether it should be democratically controlled, and if so by what means (…). Finally here there is the question of whether any general limits can be set to the authority of the state – whether there are areas of individual freedom or privacy that the state must never invade on any pretext (…), and whether there are subjects such as religious doctrine on which the state must adopt a strictly neutral posture (…).

Beyond the question of how the state itself should be constituted lies the question of the general principles that should guide its decisions. What values should inform economic and social policy for instance? Part of the political philosopher's task is to examine ideas that are often appealed to in political argument but whose meaning remains obscure, so that they can be used by politicians from rival camps to justify radically contrasting policies. Political philosophers try to give a clear and coherent account of notions such as Equality, Freedom and liberty, Justice, Needs and interests, Public interest, Rights and Welfare. And they also try to determine whether these ideas are consistent with, or conflict with, one another – whether, for instance, equality and liberty are competing values, or whether a society might be both free and equal at once.

Further questions arise about the principles that should guide one state in its dealings with other states. May states legitimately pursue what

they regard as their national interests, or are they bound to recognize ethical obligations towards one another (…)? More widely, should we be seeking a cosmopolitan alternative under which principles of justice would be applied at global level? (…). When, if ever, are states justified in going to war with each other? (...)

Over about the last two centuries, political debate has most often been conducted within the general frameworks supplied by rival ideologies. We can think of an ideology as a set of beliefs about the social and political world which simultaneously makes sense of what is going on, and guides our practical responses to it (…). Ideologies are often rather loosely structured, so that two people who are both conservatives, say, may reach quite different conclusions about some concrete issue of policy. Nevertheless they seem to be indispensable as simplifying devices for thinking about a political world of ever-increasing complexity.

No political philosopher can break free entirely from the grip of ideology, but political philosophy must involve a more critical scrutiny of the intellectual links that hold ideologies together, and a bringing to light of the unstated assumptions that underpin them. The most influential of these ideologies have been Liberalism, Conservatism, Socialism, nationalism (…) and Marxism (…). Other ideologies are of lesser political significance, either because they have drawn fewer adherents or because they have been influential over a shorter period of time: these include Anarchism, Communism, Fascism, Libertarianism, Republicanism, Social democracy and Totalitarianism.

Contemporary political philosophy

The last quarter of the twentieth century has seen a powerful revival of political philosophy, which in Western societies at least has mostly been conducted within a broadly liberal framework. Other ideologies have been outflanked: Marxism has gone into a rapid decline, and conservatism and socialism have survived only by taking on board large portions of liberalism. Some have claimed that the main rival to liberalism is now communitarianism (…); however on closer inspection the so-called liberal-communitarian debate can be seen to be less a debate about liberalism itself than about the precise status and form that a liberal political philosophy should take – whether, for example, it should claim universal validity, or should present itself simply as an interpretation of the political culture of the Western liberal democracies. The vitality of political philosophy is not to be explained by the emergence of a new ideological revival to liberalism, but by the fact that a new set of political issues has

arisen whose resolution will stretch the intellectual resources of liberalism to the limit.

What are these issues? The first is the issue of social justice, which in one form or another has dominated political philosophy for much of the century. Most of the many liberal theories of justice on offer have had a broadly egalitarian flavour, demanding at least the partial offsetting of the economic and social inequalities thrown up by an unfettered market economy (…). These theories rested on the assumption that social and economic policy could be pursued largely within the borders of a self-contained political community, sheltered from the world market. This assumption has become increasingly questionable, and it presents liberals with the following dilemma: if the pursuit of social justice is integral to liberalism, how can this be now be reconciled with individual freedoms to move, communicate, work, and trade across state boundaries?

The second issue is posed by feminism, and especially the feminist challenge to the conventional liberal distinction between public and private spheres (…). In many respects feminism and liberalism are natural allies, but when feminists argue for fundamental changes in the way men and women conduct their personal relationships, or advocate affirmative action policies for employment that seems to contravene firmly-entrenched liberal principles of desert and merit, they pose major challenges to liberal political philosophy (…).

Third, there is a set of issues arising from what we might call the new politics of cultural identity. Many groups in contemporary societies now demand that political institutions should be altered to reflect and express their distinctive cultures; these include, on the one hand, nationalist groups asserting that political boundaries should be redrawn to give them a greater measure of self-determination, and on the other cultural minorities whose complaint is that public institutions fail to show equal respect for those attributes that distinguish them from the majority (for instance their language or religion) (…). These demands once again collide with long-established liberal beliefs that the state should be culturally neutral, that citizens should receive equal treatment under the law, and that rights belong to individuals, not groups (…). It remains to be seen whether liberalism is sufficiently flexible to incorporate such demands.

Finally, liberalism is challenged by the environmental movement, whose adherents claim that liberal political principles cannot successfully address urgent environmental concerns, and more fundamentally that the liberal image of the self-sufficient, self-directing individual is at odds with the ecological picture of humanity's subordinate place in the system

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of nature as a whole (…). Liberalism, it is said, is too firmly wedded to the market economy and to consumption as the means of achieving personal well-being, to be able to embrace the radical policies needed to avoid environmental disaster.

None of these problems is capable of easy solution, and we can say with some confidence that political philosophy will continue to flourish even in a world in which the sharp ideological divisions of the mid-twentieth century no longer exist. We may also expect a renewal of non-Western traditions of political philosophy as free intellectual enquiry revives in those countries where for half a century or more it has been suppressed by the state. Political questions that have concerned philosophers for two millennia or more will be tackled using new languages and new techniques, while the ever-accelerating pace of technological and social change will generate new problems whose solution we can barely begin to anticipate.

Theme 8. Philosophy of Culture

Andrea Borghini
Philosophy of Culture
http://philosophy.about.com/od/Philosophical-Theories-Ideas/a/Philoso-phy-Of-Culture.htm

Culture and Human Nature. The ability to transmit information across generations and peers by means other than genetic exchange is a key trait of the human species; even more specific to humans seems the capacity to use symbolic systems to communicate. In the anthropological use of the term, "culture" refers to all the practices of information exchange that are not genetic or epigenetic. This includes all behavioral and symbolic systems.

The Invention of Culture. Although the term "culture" has been around at least since the early Christian era (we know, for instance, that Cicero used it), its anthropological use was established between the end of eighteen-hundreds and the beginning of the past century. Before this time, "culture" typically referred to the educational process through which an individual had undergone; in other words, for centuries "culture" was associated with aphilosophy of education. We can hence say that culture, as we mostly employ the term nowadays, is a recent invention.

Culture and Relativism. Within contemporary theorizing, the anthropological conception of culture has been one of the most fertile terrains for cultural relativism. While some societies have clear-cut gender and racial divisions, for instance, others do not seem to exhibit a similar metaphysics. Cultural relativists hold that no culture has a truer worldview than any other; they are simply *different* views. Such an attitude has been at the center of some of the most memorable debates over the past decades, entrenched with socio-political consequences.

Multiculturalism. The idea of culture, most notably in connection with the phenomenon of globalization, has given rise to the concept of multiculturalism. In one way or other, a large part of the contemporary world population lives *in more than one culture*, be it because of the exchange of culinary techniques, or musical knowledge, or fashion ideas, and so on.

How to Study a Culture? One of the most intriguing philosophical aspects of culture is the methodology by means of which its specimens have been and are studied. It seems, in fact, that in order to study a culture

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one has to *remove* herself from it, which in some sense it means that the only way to study a culture is by not sharing it.

The study of culture poses thus one of the hardest questions with respect to human nature: to what extent can you really understand yourself? To what extent can a society assess its own practices? If the capacity of self-analysis of an individual or a group is limited, who is entitled to a better analysis and why? Is there a point of view, which is best suited for the study of an individual or a society?

It is no accident, one could argue, that cultural anthropology developed at a similar time at which psychology and sociology also flourished. All three disciplines, however, seem to potentially suffer of a similar defect: a weak theoretical foundation concerning their respective relationship with the object of study. If in psychology it seems always legitimate to ask on which grounds a professional has a better insight into a patient's life than the patient herself, in cultural anthropology one could ask on what grounds the anthropologists can better understand the dynamics of a society than the members of the society themselves.

How to study a culture? This is still an open question. To date, there certainly are several instances of research that try and address the questions raised above by means of sophisticated methodologies. And yet the foundation seems to be still in need of being addressed, or re-addressed, from a philosophical point of view.

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Culture and Cognitive Science
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/culture-cogsci/

<...>

1. What is Culture?
The meaning of the term "culture" has been highly contested, especially within anthropology (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952; Baldwin et al. 2006). The first highly influential definition came from Edward Tylor (1871, 1), who opens his seminal anthropology text with the stipulation that culture is, "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." Subsequent authors have worried that Tylor's definition packs in too much, lumping together psychological items (e. g., belief) with external items (e. g., art). From a philosophical perspective, this would be especially problematic for those who hope that culture could be characterized as a natural kind, and thus as a proper subject for scientific inquiry. Other definitions often try to choose between the external and internal options in Tylor's definition.

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On the external side, anthropologists have focused on both artifacts and behaviors. Herskovits (1948, 17) tells us that, "Culture is the man-made part of the environment," and Meade (1953, 22) says culture "is the total shared, learned behavior of a society or a subgroup." These dimensions are combined in Malinowski's (1931, 623) formulation: "Culture is a well organized unity divided into two fundamental aspects–a body of artifacts and a system of customs."

More recently, externally focused definitions of culture have taken a semiotic turn. According to Geertz (1973, 89), culture is "an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols." Culture, on such a view, is like a text – something that needs to be interpreted through the investigation of symbols. For Geertz, interpretation involves the production of "thick descriptions," in which behavioral practices are described in sufficient detail to trace inferential associations between observed events. It's not sufficient to refer to an observed ritual as a "marriage;" one must recognize that nuptial rites have very different sequelae across social groups, and these must be described. Ideally, the anthropologist can present a culture from the point of view of its members.

Geertz's thick descriptions may seem to move from the external focus of earlier approaches into a more psychological arena, but he does not take interpretation to centrally involve psychological testing. The term "thick description" is taken over from Ryle (1971), whose approach to the mind emphasizes behavioral dispositions. An even more radical break from psychology can be found in an approach called "cultural materialism" (Harris 2001). Cultural materialists believe that thick description thwarts explanation, because the factors that determine social practices are largely unknown to practitioners. For Harris, these factors principally involve material variables, such as the ecological conditions in which a group lives and the technologies available to it. Cultural variation and change can be best explained by these factors without describing richly elaborated practices, narratives, or psychological states. Harris calls the materialistic approach "etic" and contrasts it with the "emic" approaches, which try to capture a culture from within. This differs from Tylor's external/internal distinction because even external cultural items, such as artworks, may be part of emic analyses on Harris's model, since they belong to the symbolic environment of culture rather than, say, the ecological or technological environments – variables that can be repeated across cultural contexts. Harris aims for generalizations whereas Geertz aims for (highly particular) interpretations. The debate between semioticians and materialists can be described as a debate about whether anthropology is best pursued as one of the humanities or as a science.

Aside from Tylor, the approaches that we have been surveying focus on external variables, with Harris's cultural materialism occupying one extreme. But psychological approaches to culture are also prevalent, and they have gained popularity as cognitive science has taken a cultural turn. D'Andrade (…) tells us that, since the 1950s, "Culture is often said to consist in rules… These rules are said to be implicit because ordinary people can't tell you what they are" (…). Richerson and Boyd (…) define culture as "information capable of affecting individuals' behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission." Sperber (…) describes culture in terms of "widely distributed, lasting mental and public representations inhabiting a given social group."

Those who advance definitions of culture do not necessarily assume that a good analysis must be faithful to the colloquial understanding of that term. Rather, these definitions are normative, insofar as they can be used to guide research. A focus on artifacts might orient research towards manufactured objects and institutions, a focus on behavior might promote exploration of human activities, a focus on symbols might take language as a principal subject of study, a materialist orientation might shift attention toward ecology, and a focus on mental states might encourage psychological testing. Philosophically, definitions that focus on external variables tend to imply that culture is not reducible to the mental states of individuals, whereas psychological definitions may imply the opposite. This bears on debates about methodological individualism. At one extreme, there are definitions like Richerson and Boyd's (culture as information) that leave external variables out, and, at the other, there are authors such as Harris, who say psychology can be ignored.

In summary, most definitions characterize culture as something that is widely shared by members of a social group and shared in virtue of belonging to that group. As stated, this formulation is too general to be sufficient (a widespread influenza outbreak would qualify as cultural). Thus, this formulation must be refined by offering a specific account of what kind of shared items qualify as cultural, and what kind of transmission qualifies as social. The definitions reviewed here illustrate that such refinements are matters of controversy.

2. Cultural Transmission

One common thread in the definitions just surveyed is that culture is socially transmitted. That point was already emphasized in Tylor's seminal definition. Social transmission is a major area of research and various theories have been offered to explain how it works.

2.1. Memes and Cultural Epidemiology

It is a platitude that cultures change over time. Some research studies the nature of these changes. Such changes are often described under the rubric of cultural evolution. As the term suggests, cultural change may resemble biological change in various respects. As with biological traits, we can think of culture as having trait-like units that arise and then spread to varying degrees. The study of cultural evolution explores the factors that can determine which cultural traits get passed on.

Some authors push the analogy between cultural evolution and biological evolution very far. Within biology, the most celebrated evolutionary process is natural selection: traits that increase fitness are more likely than others to get passed on from one generation to the next. 20th century evolutionary theory ("the modern synthesis") supplements this Darwinian idea with the principle that traits are transmitted genetically. Genes produce traits (or phenotypes), which impact reproductive success, and thereby impact which genes will be copied into the next generation. Richard Dawkins (1976), who helped popularize this idea, suggests that cultural traits get reproduced in an analogous way. Dawkins characterizes cultural items as "memes" – a term that echoes "gene" while emphasizing the idea that culture is passed on mimetically – that is, by imitation. Like a gene, a meme will spread if it is successful (…).

Some authors have resisted the analogy, arguing that there are crucial differences between generic and cultural transmission (…). In natural selection, genes ordinarily spread vertically from parents to children. Cultural items, in contrast, often spread laterally across peer groups, and can even spread from children to parents, as with the rise of email and other technological innovations. Cultural traits are also spread in a way that is mediated by intentions, rather than blindly. A teacher may intend to spread a trait, and a student may recognize that the trait has some value, and innovators may come up with new traits by intending to solve problems. Intentional creation is unlike random mutation because it can happen at a more rapid rate with immediate correction if the trait doesn't succeed. Success, too, is measured differently in the cultural case. Some cultural traits are passed on because they increase biological fitness, but traits that reduce reproduction rates, such as tools or war or contraception, can also spread, and many traits, such as music trends, spread without any impact on procreation or survival. Unlike genes, cultural traits are also copied imperfectly, sometimes changing slightly with each transmission. And there is no clear distinction within culture between a genotype and a phenotype; the trait that gets reproduced is often responsible for the reproducing. For example, if someone learns to ride a bicycle, there is no

clear distinction between an inner mechanism and an outward manifestation; the skill is both the mechanism and its deployment.

All these contrasts suggest to some that the notion of a meme is misleading. Cultural traits are spread in ways that differ significantly from genes. In an effort to bypass the comparison to genes, Sperber (1996) offers an epidemiology analogy. Cultural items, which for him are representations, are spread like viruses. They can be spread laterally, and they can reduce fitness. Viral transmission depends on contagion, and, like viruses, some cultural traits are catchier than others. That is to say, some traits are easier to learn–they are more psychologically compelling.

Boyer (2001) has applied this idea to the spread of religious beliefs. Tales of the supernatural build on existing knowledge but add variations that make them exciting, such as the idea of a person who can survive death and walk through walls. Boyer shows experimentally that such exotic variations on ordinary categories are easy to remember and spread.

The epidemiology analogy may have limitations. For example, viruses do not usually spread with intentional mediation, and they are often harmful. But it has some advantages over the analogy to genetic transmission. Ultimately, such analogies give way to actual models of how transmission works.

2.2. Imitation and Animal Culture

In cultural transmission, an acquired trait possessed by one member of a social group ends up in another member of that group. In order for this to occur, there must be some learning mechanism that eventuates in doing what another individual does. Traditional learning mechanisms, such as associative learning, trial and error, and conditioning through reinforcement, are inadequate for explaining social learning. If one individual performs a behavior in front of another, the other may associate that behavior with the model, but association will not cause it to perform the behavior itself. Likewise, witnessing a behavior cannot lead to conditioning, because observation alone does not have reinforcement value. Conditioning can be used as a tool in social transmission, of course – a teacher can reward a student – but such deployment depends on a prior achievement: the student must attempt to do what the teacher has done or instructed. Thus, transmission requires learning mechanisms that go beyond those mentioned, mechanisms that cause a learner to reproduce what a model has done.

In a word, cultural transmission seems to depend on copying. When observing a model, there are two things one might copy: the end or the

means. If a model obtains fruit from a plant, an observer capable of copying ends may recognize that the plant bears fruit and try to obtain that fruit as a result of having seen what the model achieved. Tomasello (1996) calls such learning emulation. Emulation is not always successful, however, because one cannot always achieve an end without knowing the right means. Tomasello reserves the term "imitation" for cases where observers perform the actions that they observe. This is a powerful tool for social transmission, and it is something human beings are very good at. Indeed there is evidence that we spontaneously imitate facial expressions and gestures almost immediately after birth (Metzoff and Moore 1977). In fact, human children over-imitate: they copy complex stepwise procedures even when simpler ways of obtaining goals are conspicuously available (Horner and Whiten 2005).

The human tendency to imitate may help to explain why our capacity for social learning far exceeds other species. Apes may be more likely to emulate than to imitate (Tomasello 1996). That is not to say that apes never imitate; they just imitate less than human beings (Horner and Whiten 2005). Thus, apes do have some capacity to learn from conspecifics. If culture is defined in terms of practices or abilities that are shared within groups in virtue of the achievements of particular group members, then one can even say that apes have culture. Evidence for group-specific innovations, such as nut cracking techniques, have been found among chimpanzees (Whiten et al. 2005) and orangutans (Van Schaik and Knott 2001). Culture and cultural transmission has also been documented in dolphins (Krützen et al. 2005).

This raises a question. If other creatures are capable of cultural transmission, why don't they show the extreme forms of cultural variation and accumulated cultural knowledge characteristic of our species? There are various possible answers. Great apes may also be less innovative than humans, and this may stem from their limited capacity to understand causal relations (Povinelli 2000), or to plan for the distant future. Apes may also have limitations on memory that prevent them from building on prior innovations to create cultural products of ever-increasing complexity. In addition, apes have less highly developed skills for mental state attribution (Povinelli 2000), and that may further reduce their capacity for imitative learning. Human infants do not just copy what adult models do; they copy what those models are trying to do (Metzoff, 1995). Warneken and Tomasello (2006) have shown that young chimps understand intended actions to some degree, but less robustly than their human counterparts. Finally, the human capacity to build on prior innovations and

transmit cultural knowledge is often linguistically mediated, and apes and dolphins may have communication systems with far more limited expressive potential, making it impossible to move beyond simple copying and adopt the deferred form of imitation that we call instruction.

2.3. Biases in Cultural Transmission

It is widely agreed that human cultural transmission often involves imitation, but there is also evidence that we do not imitate every behavior we see. We imitate some observed behaviors more than others. Much research explores the biases that we and other creatures use when determining whom and when to imitate.

Biases divide into two categories. Sometimes imitation depends on content. We are more likely to pass on a story if it is exciting (recall Boyer), we may be more likely to repeat a recipe if it is tasty, and we are more likely to reproduce a tool if it is effective. In other cases, imitation depends more on context than content. The term "context bias" refers to our tendency to acquire socially transmitted traits as a function of who is transmitting them rather than what is getting transmitted (Henrich and McErleath 2003). There are two basic kinds of context biases: those based on frequency and those based on who is modeling the trait. Let's consider these in turn.

The most important frequency-dependent bias is conformity. Social psychologists have known for decades that people often copy the behavior of the majority in a social group (e.g., Asch 1956). Copying the majority may help in creating cultural cohesion and communication, and it may also allow for group selection, a process in which a group's prospects for survival increases relative to other groups based on its overall fitness. Group selection is hard to explain by appeal to biological evolution, because genetic mutations are localized to individuals, and are thus unlikely to result in whole groups having different traits, but conformity allows for spread within a group, and thus overcomes this limitation of genes. This story still depends on the possibility that an innovation that has not yet become widely practiced can get off the ground. If people only copied the majority, that would never happen. One solution is to suppose that conformity biases work in concert with an opposing trend: nonconformity. If we sometimes copy rare behaviors, then new innovations can initially spread because of their novelty and then spread because of their high frequency. One example of these complementary processes is fashion. New fashions (such as street clothing coming from a small subculture, or the seasonal innovations of fashion designers) may initially appeal because of their novelty, and then spread through conformity.

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The nonconformist bias is postulated to explain the observation that people sometimes prefer to copy cultural forms simply because they are rare. Model-dependent biases (the second class of context biases mentioned above) also promotes the imitation of rare forms. In these biases, people selectively copy specific members of a social group. We tend to copy those who are skilled, those who are successful, and those who hold high prestige. The prestige bias is the most surprising, because instrumental reasoning alone could lead us to copy people who are skillful or successful. Prestige is not synonymous with dominance. We do not necessarily hold those who dominate us in high regard, and we do not seek to look at them, be near them, or be like them. We do all of these things with high prestige individuals, and this tendency goes beyond our bias to copy people who are skilled in domains that we are trying to master. Henrich and Gil White (2001) review a large body of empirical evidence in support of this conclusion. For example, many people will shift attitudes towards experts, even when the experts have no expertise on the topic under consideration; people will copy the task-performance style of a professionally attired individual more often than they copy the style of a college student; and groups of high-status individuals exert more influence on dialect changes over time. Within the anthropological literature, it has often been noted that high prestige individuals in small-scale societies are listened to more than others, even on topics that have little to do with the domain in which their prestige was earned. Imitating prestigious individuals may confer advantages similar to imitating people who are skillful or successful, however. Doing so may increase the likelihood of acquiring prestige-enhancing traits.

Given the wide variety of biases, it may seem like a difficult task to figure out whom to imitate on any given occasion. This is especially daunting in cases where two biases conflict, as with conformity and prestige. To solve this problem, McElreath et al. (2008) have proposed that imitation biases are hierarchically organized and context-sensitive. For example, conformity may be the default choice when payoffs in a group of models are similar, but prestige bias kicks in when the payoff differential increases. McElreath et al. use computational models to show that such payoff sensitivity produces behavioral patterns that fit with empirical evidence.

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3. Examples of Cultural Influence

Philosophers have long speculated about cultural variation, raising questions about whether people in different cultures differ psychologically. Clearly people in different cultures know different things, believe different things, and have different tastes. But one might also wonder whether culture can influence the way we think and experience the world. And one might wonder whether differences in taste are a superficial veneer over underlying normative universals, or whether, instead, culture plays a role in shaping normative facts. Cognitive science offers empirical insights into cultural differences that have been taken to bear on these enduring questions. What follows is a survey of some areas in which empirical investigation has been very active.

3.1. Language

20th century linguistics was born out of anthropology, and anthropological studies of language built on the efforts of European missionaries to understand the languages of human societies that had been isolated from European contact. Within this context, the study of language principally involved radical translation – attempting to translate the vocabulary of another language when there is no bilingual interpreter to tell you what words mean. Anthropologists observing this practice, such as Franz Boas, were struck by how different the world's languages can be, and they began to wonder whether these differences pointed toward differences in how cultural groups understand the world.

Philosophers entered into such speculation too. Quine (1960) famously used the activity of radical translation as a springboard to present his theses about limits on a theory of meaning. When trying to construct a translation manual for a foreign language based on verbal behavior, there is a problem of underdetermination. If the language users say "gavagai" when and only when a rabbit is present, they may be referring to rabbits, but they may also be referring to rabbit time slices or undetached rabbit parts. Absent any resolution of this underdetermination, there would always be a degree of indeterminacy in our theories of what other language users mean. Quine's behaviorism led him to think that these indeterminacies are not merely epistemic; linguistic behavior is not just evidence for what people mean, but the source of meaning, so there is no further fact that can settle what people mean by their words. This led Quine to be skeptical about the role of reference in his semantic theory, but he didn't become a meaning nihilist. Without determinate reference, the meaning of words can be understood in terms of inferential

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roles. But Quine (1953) had earlier argued that there is no principled distinction between those inferences that are constitutive of meaning, and those that merely reflect beliefs about the world (the analytic/synthetic distinction). Thus, the meaning of a word depends, for Quine, on the total role of that word in its language; Quine is a meaning holist. In the context of radical translation, this raises a striking philosophical possibility. When we encounter a word in another language, we cannot determine what it refers to, so we must specify its meaning in terms of its total inferential role; but inferential roles vary widely across cultural groups, because beliefs diverge; thus, the meaning of a word in a language spoken by one cultural group is unlikely to have an exact analogue in other languages. Meanings vary across cultures. In this sense, radical translation is actually impossible. One cannot translate a sentence in another language, because one cannot find synonymous sentence in one's own. At best, one can write paragraph-, chapter-, or book-length gloss on inferential links that help convey what foreign speakers mean by their words.

This conjecture leads quickly to another that relates even more directly to psychology. Many philosophers have assumed a close relationship between language and concepts. Words are sometimes said to constitute concepts and, more often, to express them. Corresponding to the linguistic inferential roles that constitute meanings for Quine, one might posit isomorphic conceptual roles, and, if meanings are not shared, then it might follow that concepts are not either: people in different groups might conceptualize the world differently. The idea that languages may not be intertranslatable suggests that there may also be incommensurable conceptual schemes.

This idea is challenged by Davidson (1974), who offers a kind of dilemma. Suppose we encounter a group whose beliefs and linguistic behaviors differ from ours but can nevertheless be accurately characterized with patience and time. If we can understand these other people, then their concepts must be shared with ours. Suppose, however, that we cannot ever understand what they mean by their words because they say things that can be offered no coherent translation. Then it's best to assume they are not really saying anything at all; their words are meaningless noises. Either way, there is no proliferation of conceptual schemes. Davidson's argument, which is only roughly presented here, controversially presupposes a principle of charity, according to which we should not attribute irrational (e.g., inconsistent) beliefs. Davidson may also be overly demanding in requiring accurate translation between languages as opposed to some weaker criterion of comprehension (…).

Well before Quine and Davidson were debating the incommensurability of meanings, linguists had been exploring similar ideas. Edward Sapir (1929), a student of Boaz, had proposed two interrelated theses: linguistic determinism according to which language influences the way people think, and linguistic variation, according to which languages have profound differences in syntax and semantics (these terms are not Sapir's, but exist in the literature). Together, these two theses entail linguistic relativity: the thesis that speakers of different languages differ in how they perceive and think in virtue of speaking different languages. Sapir's student, Benjamin Whorf (1956), speculated that languages encode fundamentally different "logics", which become so habitual to language users that they seem natural, resulting in fundamentally different ways of understanding the world. For example, Whorf speculates that speakers of Hopi are anti-realists about time, since tense in that language is expressed using epistemic modals, which describe events as recalled, reported, or anticipated, in lieu of past, present, or future. Sapir and Whorf's relativism about language has come to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. These two have been criticized for offering insufficient support. They had limited knowledge of the languages they discuss, and throughout their discussions, they infer cognitive differences directly from linguistic differences rather than testing whether language causes (or even correlates) with difference in thought.

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis went out of fashion with the advent of Chomskyan linguistics. Chomsky argued that linguistic differences are superficial and scientifically uninteresting. Languages are united by a universal grammar, and differences simply reflect different settings in universally shared rules. A further setback for the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis came with early testing. Heider (1972) set out to see whether color vocabulary influenced color perception. She investigated the Dani of New Guinea, who have only two color terms ("mili", for dark cool colors, and "mola," for light and warm colors). Heider found that the Dani divide color space in much the same way as English speakers, and performed like English speakers on color memory tests. There was also a failed effort to show that Chinese speakers, who lack a counterfactual construction, have difficulty with subjunctive thought (Bloom 1981; Au 1983). Evidence for psychological differences across speakers of distinct languages were hard to come by. <...>

3.2. Perceiving and Thinking

Research on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis looks for ways in which language influences perception and thought. But language is not the only

way that a culture can influence cognition. Other research looks for cultural differences in language and perception that are not necessarily mediated by language. For example, there is research suggesting that cognition can be affected by methods of subsistence or social values.

In the decades after World War II, psychologists began to do research on "cognitive styles". Witkin (1950) introduced a distinction between field-dependent psychological processing and field-independent psychological processing. Field-dependent thinkers tend to notice context and the relationship between things, whereas field-independent thinkers tend to abstract away from context and experience objects in a way that is less affected by their relationships to other things. <...>

Witkin's test was designed to study individual differences within his own culture, but Berry (1966) realized that it could also be used to investigate cultural variation. He was interested in how different forms of subsistence might influence cognition. One hypothesis is that hunters and gatherers must be good at differentiating objects (plants or prey) from complex scenery. Horticulturalists, on the other hand, must pay close attention to the relationship between the many environmental factors that can influence growth of a crop. To test this, Berry studied Inuit hunters and Temne horticulturalists in Africa, and found that the latter are more field-dependent than the former. (…)

Berry was interested in isolated, small-scale societies, but the same research methods and principles have also been applied to much larger cultural groups. Cultures of every size differ on a number of dimensions. One distinction that has been extremely valuable in cross-cultural research is the contrast between individualist cultures and collectivist cultures (see Triandis, 1995). Individualists place emphasis on individual achievements and goals; they value autonomy and disvalue dependency on others. Collectivists place emphasis on group membership and often value group cohesion and success above personal achievement. Following Triandis, we can define more precisely as follows:

Collectivism: a social pattern in which individuals construe themselves as parts of collectives and are primarily motivated by duties to those collectives

Individualism: a social pattern in which individuals see themselves as independent of collectives and are primarily motivated by their own preferences and needs

The difference can be brought out experimentally by giving people in different cultures tasks that assess how much they value autonomy and how much they value inter-dependence. For example, when asked to pick

a colored pen from an array of pens, individualists tend to pick the most unusual color, and collectivists tend to pick the most common.

Individualist and collectivist cultures are distributed widely across the globe. Countries in Western Europe, North America, and Anglophone Australasia score high in individualism. Collectivism is more common in East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and South America. It should be obvious that these are vast and remote regions of the globe and highly diverse, culturally speaking. Any large nation, such as India or America, will have scores of subcultures each of which might vary along these dimensions. The point is not that all collectivist cultures are alike. Differences between collectivist cultures and within collectivist cultures are often greater than between collectivist and individualist cultures. The point is simply that collectivist cultures share this one dimension of similarity, and that dimension, as we will see, has an impact on cognitive style. Like wise for individualists. Future research will offer more finely grained distinctions, but at present, research on the cognitive effects of individualism and collectivism offers some of the strongest evidence for cultural differences in thought.

Some researchers trace individualism and collectivism to material conditions. For example, many Western cultures are individualistic and trace their seminal cultural influence to ancient Greece, which had an economy based on fishing and herding. Far Eastern countries trace their seminal cultural influence to China, which had intensive agriculture. In the West, free mercantilism and capitalism emerged long ago, emphasizing individual achievement. In the East, capitalism and free trade is comparatively new. So the East/West contrast in collectivism and individualism may have its origins in how people made their livelihood in past centuries. Once these differences are in place, they tend to be reflected in many other aspects of culture. Far Eastern languages use characters that require a fine sensitivity to relationships between parts; Eastern religion often focuses on relationships between human beings and nature; Eastern ethical systems often emphasize responsibilities to the family (Nisbett, 2003). These cultural differences can be used to transmit and preserve psychological differences from generation to generation.

Nisbett et al. (2001) present a large body of research, which suggests that members of individualist and collectivist cultures tend to have measurably different cognitive styles. Nisbett and his collaborators (mostly East Asian psychologists) talk about field-dependence and field-independence, but also introduce the closely related terms: holistic and analytic cognitive styles. They postulate that, as collectivists, East Asians

will process information more holistically, seeing the relation between things, and collectivists will process information more analytically, focusing on individual agents and objects. They show that these differences come out in a wide variety of psychological tasks. Here are some examples reviewed by Nisbett.

Westerns are more likely than Easterners to attribute a person's behavior to an internal trait rather than an environmental circumstance. In many cases, such attributions are mistaken (social psychologists call this the Fundamental Attribution Error).

Easterners are more likely to see both sides of a conflict when faced with counter-arguments in a debate; Westerners dig in their heels. The Eastern responses are more dialectical, whereas Westerners are guided by the principle of Non-Contradiction. This is a principle central to modern logic in the West, which asserts that a claim and its negation can't both be right.

Westerners tend to categorize objects based on shared features (cows go with chickens because they are both animals), whereas Easterners focus more on relationships between objects (cows go with grass, because cows eat grass).

When looking at a fish tank, Westerners first notice the biggest, fastest fish and ignore the background. Easterners are more likely to notice background features and relational events (a fish swimming past some seaweed), and they are less likely to recall individual fish on a memory test. In studies of expectations, Westerns tend to expect things to remain the same, whereas Easterners are more likely to expect change.

In assessing the import of these differences, it is important to realize that they are often subtle. In some cases, it is possible to get a Westerner to respond like an Easterner and conversely, if subjects are properly instructed or primed (Oyseman & Lee, 2008). But the results show that there are predictable and replicable differences in default cognitive styles as a function of culture.

Several philosophical ramifications deserve note. First, variation in cognitive styles can be used to challenge the idea that the rules used in thought are fixed by a hard-wired mental logic. This idea was promulgated by Boole (1854) in his work on formal logic, and it helped pave the way for the advent of computing and, ultimately, for the computational theory of mind. If there is no fixed mental logic, then the study of reasoning may owe more to nurture than has often been assumed, and the traditional computational theory of mind might even need a re-examination. Cultural differences do not refute computational approaches, but they

raise a question: if some cultures tend to rely on formal principles and others rely on stochastic approaches to reasoning, then we should not by default assume that the mind naturally functions like a classical computer as opposed to, say, a connectionist computer.

Second, variation in reasoning can also be used to raise questions about whether certain cognitive norms (such as a preference for the principle of non-contradiction) are culturally inculcated and contestable. This issue is related to contemporary debates about whether classical logic is privileged. It was also the subject of a provocative paper by Winch (1964), who, following ethnographic work by Evans-Pritchard on the logic of witchcraft among the Azanda, argued that the Western allegiance to bivalence is culturally contingent, rather than normatively compulsory.

Third, variation in perception raises questions about modularity; if values can influence how we see, then seeing may be more amendable to top-down influences than defenders of modularity have supposed. Citing work on the Mueller-Lyer illusion, Fodor (1983) argues that modularity is consistent with the possibility that cultural settings can, over protracted time periods, alter how information is processed. But this concession may be inadequate: perceptual processing styles can be altered very quickly by priming cultural values such as individualism and collectivism. Moreover, unlike the Mueller-Lyer illusion, which may involve bottom-up perceptual learning, research on individualism and collectivism suggests that *values* can influence how we see. That's close in spirit to the idea that perception is theory-laden, which was the central thesis of New Look psychology–the theory that the modularity hypothesis is supposed to challenge (Bruner, 1957; Hanson, 1958).

3.3. Emotions

Emotions are a fundamental feature of human psychology. They are found in all cultures, and arguably, in all mammals. Indeed, we seem to share many emotions with other animals. Dogs, for example, show signs of fear (they cower), sadness (they cry), and delight (they wag their tails giddily). This suggests that emotions are evolved responses. There is a good explanation for why emotions would be selected for: they help us cope with challenges that have a tremendous impact on life and well-being. Fear protects us from dangers, sadness motivates us to withdraw when resources or kin are lost, and joy registers accomplishments and motivates us to take on new challenges. Thus, it seems highly likely that emotions are part of human nature. But emotions can also be influenced by nurture. Some researchers even suggest that emotions can be socially constructed–they say some emotions come into existence through social

learning. The thesis is controversial, of course, but the claim that culture has an impact on emotional states is hard to deny (for a review, see Mesquita and Frijda, 1992).

To see how culture might impact emotions, consider various things that normally occur when people have emotional responses. There is some *elicitor* of the emotion; there is characteristically some *appraisal* of that elicitor; this occurs along with *feelings*; and these are associated with *motivational states* as the body prepares to react; the emotion is also *expressed*; and can lead to a decision about what *actions* to carry out, including complex strategic actions extended over time. Each of these things can come under cultural influence.

Begin with elicitors. Culture can clearly influence what arouses our emotions. In Bali, crawling babies are said to arouse disgust (Geertz, 1973: 420), and in Japan, disgust can be caused by failing an exam (Haidt et al., 1997). In Sumatra, an encounter with a high status individual can cause shame (Fessler, 2004). In Iran, a woman without a headscarf might cause anger, and in France, a woman with a headscarf might cause the same reaction.

Feelings can differ cross-culturally, as well. For example, it has been reported that, while *anger* is typically associated with high arousal in the West, in Malay, anger (or *murah*) is more strongly associated with sullen brooding (Goddard, 1996). There are corresponding differences in motivational states. Anger might instill a disposition to aggress in the West, whereas sulking behavior may be more typical in Malaysia. In Malay, aggression is associated with *amok*, which refers (as the imported homophone does in English) to a frenzied state. Thus, there seems to be no exact synonym for anger: a state that is prototypically aggressive but not frenzied.

Culture can also impact expressions of emotions. This is sometimes done through active suppression. Ekman and Friesen (1971) present evidence that public expression of negative emotions is discouraged in Japan. New expressions may also be cultivated culturally. There is evidence that tongue biting is used by women to express shame in parts of India (Menon and Shweder, 1994). There are also cultural difference in gestures used to express anger, such as the middle finger in North America or the double finger salute in Britain. What North Americans interpreted as an "okay" sign would be interpreted as a sexual insult in Russia or Brazil. As these gestures become habitual, they may become incorporated into automatic ways of expressing emotions in some contexts.

In addition to emotional expressions, cultures can promote highly complex behavioral responses. Love is sometimes taken to be grounds for

marriage, but less so in cultures where marriage is arranged. Grief in Biblical contexts might have been expressed by tearing ones clothes or covering oneself with dirt. Shame can require culturally specific behaviors of self-abasement, such as bowing low. Hope may promote the use of lucky charms or prayers, depending on one's cultural beliefs.

These examples suggest that culture can impact emotional response in a wide variety of ways. As a consequence, emotions that are widely recognized in one culture may go unnoticed or uninstantiated in another. One example is *amae*, a Japanese emotion construct, which is characterized as a positive feeling of dependency on another person, group, or institution (Doi, 1973). Another example is the Samoan emotion of *musu*, which expresses a person's reluctance to do what is required of him or her. In more isolated societies, it has even been argued that none of the named emotions correspond exactly to emotions that we would recognize here. This may be the case among the Ifaluk, a small group in Micronesia (Lutz, 1988).

In arguing for cultural variation in emotions, researchers often cite differences in emotional vocabulary. Such differences would not be especially powerful evidence were it not for independent evidence (just discussed) that culture can exert a causal impact. Vocabulary differences may also be evidential in another way. The very fact that a label exists in a language may have a causal impact on the frequency or manifestation of a psychological state. This is what Hacking (1999) calls a "looping effect". This can sometimes be seen in the case of pathological emotions. For example, incidence and symptoms of depression may increase as a consequence of public discourse about depression (Ryder et al., 2008; see also Murphy, 2006). Depression as we know it may be culturally specific in the way it presents, even if there are related disorders in other cultures, such as*melancholia* and *acidia* in medieval Europe (Jackson, 1981). Some emotional disorders may be common in one society and virtually unheard of elsewhere. One example is *latah*, a disorder found among women in parts of South East Asia, in which victims enter a trance-like state, shout obscenities, repeat what others say to them, and exhibit an extremely strong and sensitive startle response (Simons, 1996).

In light of such cultural variation, some argue that emotions are socially constructed (...) Others resist this idea, arguing that emotions are innate biological programs, shared across the species despite differences in emotion vocabulary. The latter position has been associated with evolutionary approaches to emotion (Plutchik, 2001), and research on universal recognition of emotional facial expressions (Ekman et al. 1969).

Ekman and his collaborators studied an isolated culture, the Fore, in Papua New Guinea. These people had little contact with the West, and Ekman wondered whether they assign the same significance to emotional expressions as we do. He identified six emotions that are very reliably identified in Western nations (joy, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust), and found corresponding words in Fore. He asked his respondents to look at photos of expressions and identify which faces go with which words. He also described various scenarios (such as seeing an old friend or smelling something bad) and asked them to choose the face that best expressed how someone in those situations would feel. Using these methods, he was able to show that the Fore give responses that are very similar to the responses we give in the West. Ekman concluded that emotional expressions are not cultural inventions, but rather, are biologically determined.

A close look at Ekman's data suggests that he may exaggerate the degree of universality. The Fore do indeed respond similarly to their Western counterparts, but not identically. For example, they are more likely to label as fear the faces that we identify as surprise, and they also associate sadness with the faces we label angry. So the dominant response among the Fore differs from ours in two of six cases. And even where they agree with our labeling, the level of agreement is often surprisingly low, with less than 50% giving the expected response. Moreover, the Fore who had more exposure to outsiders also gave answers that were more like outsiders', suggesting some cultural influence (…).

It doesn't follow that emotions are mere social constructions. Rather, it seems that we have biologically basic emotions that can be altered by culture. Whether these alternations qualify as different emotions or simply different manifestations of the same emotion depends on what one takes emotions to be. The nature of emotions is a matter of considerable debate (Prinz, 2004). For those who take emotions to essentially involve judgments, constructivist theories of emotion are attractive, because culture can influence how people construe situations (…). Constructivism is also appealing to those who think of emotions as analogous to scripts, which include everything from canonical eliciting to conditions to complex behavioral sequalae (…). Those who see emotions as automatic behavioral programs or patterned bodily changes have been less inclined towards constructivism (…). Griffiths (1997) has argued that emotions are not a natural kind: some are culturally constructed scripts, others are automatic behavioral programs, and others are evolved strategic responses that unfold over longer timescales.

It might seem that we can't settle on the question of whether culture shapes emotions without deciding between these theories of what emotions are. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that culture can influence every aspect of our emotional responses, and this suggests that, whatever emotions really are, culture can have an impact. It is open to debate whether the impact is sufficiently significant to warrant the conclusion that some emotions are social constructs.

3.4. Morality

Few deny that biology makes some contribution to morality. There is a vast literature on prosocial behavior in primates, moral behavior in early childhood, and universal dispositions to empathy and altruism (e.g., Warneken and Tomasello, 2009). But no account of moral psychology can stop with biology. Morality is also influenced by culture. This raises traditional philosophical question about moral relativism.

Evidence for cultural variation in values is easy to come by (see Prinz, 2007). Consider, for example, attitudes towards various forms of violence. Cannibalism, slavery, honor killing, headhunting, public executions, and torture have been widely practiced by a range of societies, but are reviled in the contemporary West. There is also considerable diversity in the sexual domain: polygamy, cousin marriage, masturbation, bestiality, pre-marital sex, prostitution, concubinage, homosexuality, and other practices are accepted in some places and morally condemned elsewhere. The anthropological record suggests that just about every behavior that we consider immoral has been an accepted cultural practice somewhere. Of course, a society wouldn't survive very long if it encouraged random killing of next-door neighbors, but societies that encourage murder of people in the next village can endure indefinitely (…).

One can find further support of moral diversity by conducting psychological experiments on members of different cultures and subcultures. Nisbett and Cohen (1996) compared Americans from Southern States with Americans from the North, and found that Southerners were much more likely to endorse violence of various forms in response to moral transgression (killing to defend property, corporal punishment, gun possession, and so on). They explain this by noticing that many Southerners are descendents of Scots-Irish immigrants who had to develop a "culture of honor" to survive under harsh, comparatively lawless conditions in Northern Ireland before coming to the United States.

Cultural differences in morality have also been tested using economic games (Henrich et al., 2005). One example is the ultimatum game,

in which one person is told that they must divide a sum of money (say $100) with a stranger. If the stranger rejects the division, no one gets any of the money. In the U.S., most people offer relatively equal splits. If they offer too little, the other person typically rejects the split out of spite, and both players go home empty handed. This is a measure of moral attitude towards fairness, and there are subtle differences across cultures. The Machiguenga of Peru, who have an economic system that does not depend much on cooperation, make lower offers on average than Americans, and they accept lower offers. Among the Au of New Guinea, people sometimes reject "hyper-fair" offers–that is offers over 50 %. In the U.S., a hyper-fair offer would be happily accepted, but the Au routinely reject such generosity; a similar pattern has been found in Russian and other former Soviet states (Herrmann et al., 2008). Hyper-fair offers may be regarded as ostentatious or as trying to achieve some kind of dominance by making the recipient feel indebted.

Some philosophers have resisted the claim that there is cultural variation in morality. Rachels (2003: chap. 2), for example, argues that some differences are merely apparent. Inuits tolerate infanticide, but so would we if we lived in the Arctic tundra where resources are rare. Against this kind of reply, one might argue that, in fact, values don't tend to change right away when we change environments (the U.S. Southern culture of honor may be a hold-over from hard times in Northern Ireland prior to U.S. immigration; Nisbett and Cohen, 1996). Moreover, the fact that our attitudes toward infanticide might shift in the tundra might be taken as evidence for relativism rather than evidence against it; morality is highly sensitive to environmental variables.

Other critics have argued that we cannot adequately assess whether cultures differ in values. Moody-Adams (1997) argues that, absent a complete understanding of another culture's beliefs, we might mistake differences in factual beliefs for moral differences. For example, did the Aztecs really think cannibalism was okay, or were they driven to this practice because of a cosmology that made them think this was the only way to appease the Gods? We may never know. On the other hand, anyone who is willing to concede that culture can alter people's non-moral beliefs might also concede that values can be altered.

The most enduring philosophical debate about moral variation concerns metaethical relativism. Does moral diversity imply that there is no single true morality? On its own, the answer is no. But some relativists argue that that there is no source of morality other than our attitudes

(e.g., they argue for subjectivism), so cultural variation implies that morality is relative (Prinz, 2007). Others argue that appeals to cultural history adequately explain why we have moral values, so there is no pressure to posit a further domain of values that transcend culture (Harman, 1977). These views do not entail that any morality is possible. There may be a plurality of acceptable value systems, given human nature and the situations we find ourselves in (Wong, 2006). Opponents of relativism think such pluralism is still too generous. Demands of reason (Kant), intrinsic goods (consequentialism), natural conditions for flourishing (Aristotle), ideal observers (Smith), and divine commands have all been explored as sources of absolute values.

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